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Abstract 
This thesis aims to explore how technology start-ups build dynamic capabilities in 
networking to enable their new venture internationalisation (NVI). Positioned within 
the theoretical context of international entrepreneurship research, this thesis draws on 
the strategic management, entrepreneurship, and international business literature. 
Specifically, this thesis draws on three theoretical perspectives: (1) dynamic 
capabilities, (2) networking and social capital, and (3) NVI theory. Together this study 
combines Helfat et al. (2007) asset orchestration framework along with Nahapiet and 
Ghoshal’s (1998) three dimensions of social capital as a theoretical lens to explore 
how various networking activities enable or inhibit NVI. Specifically, this thesis 
explores three overarching network processes, with respect to how international new 
ventures (INVs) (1) create, (2) extend, and (3) modify their social capital in high-
technology markets.  
The empirical context is Scottish and Australian medical technology start-ups that 
compete in the global medical technology sector, a distinct sector of the wider life 
sciences industry. Methodologically, this an interpretivist study, which takes an 
abductive approach to building theory from longitudinal multiple case study research. 
The focal actor (i.e. level of analysis) is the INV, while the unit of analysis is the focal 
actor’s network relationships. Data collection and analysis took place over three 
iterative phases drawing on multiple primary and secondary data sources and 
processual analytical techniques. To collect these data, this thesis used semi-structured 
interviews drawing on the critical incident and narrative sequence techniques along 
with documents, and observation. This study began with a purposeful sample of eight 
medical technology start-ups, and as findings emerged, a theoretical sample of four 
cases, along with visual maps, conceptually ordered displays and case-ordered effects 
matrices helped focus and refine the cross-case analysis. From the emergent cross-
case data analysis, three overarching aggregate categories were found to aggregate 
eleven second-order themes, which aggregate several first-order concepts. 
The overarching finding of this thesis is that networking capability development is an 
affect-based emergent process that enables NVI. Specifically, this thesis makes three 
contributions to knowledge. The primary contribution of this thesis takes a step 
towards a process theory of networking capability development. Therefore, this study 
identifies networking capability as one particular type of dynamic capability that 
enables NVI. Secondly, this thesis begins to unlock the black box of networking by 
identifying several networking activities that underpin the network-enhancing, 
network-delaying, and network-modifying process, which triggers, enables, and 
accelerates a virtuous cycle of networking capability development. Finally, this thesis 
argues that learning from delays and nurturing core ties helps shift technology start-
ups’ reliance from impersonal relations towards future aspirations to internalise 
operations. A discussion of these findings then outlines the implications for theory, 
policy, and practice. This study closes with a discussion on research limitations and 
recommends new avenues for future research. 
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1 - Introduction  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Aim 
To introduce and provide an overview on the purpose of this thesis.  
 
 
Chapter Objectives 
 To introduce the research focus and contextualisation.   
 To present the aim and objectives of the research. 
 To illustrate the content structure of this PhD thesis. 
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1.1 Introduction 
This thesis explores how technology start-ups build dynamic capabilities in networking to 
enable their new venture internationalisation (NVI). This introductory chapter therefore 
provides an overview of the thesis. It is important to emphasise this is an exploratory study 
that emerged from identifying a research problem within the global medical technology 
sector. Therefore, the researcher followed an “abductive” (Dubois and Gadde, 2002) 
approach whereby he iterated between fieldwork and literature. The following sections then 
provide a research background and context on some of the growth challenges that medical 
technology start-ups face. Following an initial discussion of the research context, this chapter 
will explain the aim, objectives, and methodology of this research. Finally, this chapter will 
present the content structure of this thesis. 
1.2 Research Background and Contextualisation 
The core purpose of this research is to understand how technology start-ups are able to pursue 
early growth and development in international markets. This study therefore positions itself 
within the field of international entrepreneurship (IE) research (Oviatt and McDougall, 1994; 
Autio et al. 2000; Zahra et al. 2000; Jones and Coviello, 2005). A central reason why the 
researcher decided to pursue doctoral research was due to his interest in how entrepreneurs 
can grow their technology start-ups into highly profitable international businesses (Shrader 
et al. 2000; Zahra et al. 2000; Autio et al. 2000). The second motivator to pursue doctoral 
research was that the researcher wanted to explore a high-technology setting that was 
theoretically relevant to the field of IE (Crick and Jones, 2000; Coeurderoy and Murray, 
2008; Filatotchev et al. 2009). Therefore, the researcher developed an interest in the life 
sciences due to the knowledge-intensive and global nature of this industry (Powell et al. 
2005; Gassman and Keupp, 2007; Ernst and Young, 2008; Jones et al. 2011).  
Following initial research, it was apparent that there is often gulf in life science 
entrepreneurs’ scientific and commercial capabilities (George et al. 2001; Colombo and 
Grilli, 2005; Hine and Kapeleris, 2006; Rothaermel and Deeds, 2006). These findings were 
then a central reason for pursuing IE research within the life sciences industry. Secondly, 
given the complex industry architecture of most technology-based sectors, 
internationalisation is often a prerequisite for survival and growth (Preece et al. 1999; Autio, 
2005; Brännback et al 2007). This research then drove the initial decision to embark on a 
PhD due to the disparity and interplay between doing “good science” and learning to be 
 16 
 
commercially capable within high-technology international markets (Fontes and Coombs, 
1997; Crick and Jones, 2000; George, 2005; Onetti et al. 2012). 
Based on these motivations, the researcher decided to examine these issues within the 
“global medical technology sector” (Frost and Sullivan, 2008). Academics (Chatterji, 2009), 
policy makers (Scottish Enterprise, 2011; AusBiotech, 2013), regulators (MHRA, 2013) and 
industry analysts (Frost and Sullivan, 2008) all emphasise that research and development 
(R&D), production, sales, and marketing of a medical technology (i.e. medtech) is a highly 
globalised activity. Therefore, new, existing or a combination of medical technologies 
underpin the commercialisation of medical devices (Mehta, 2008). The United States (US) 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) define a medical device as:  
An instrument, apparatus, implement, machine, contrivance, implant, in vitro reagent, or other 
similar or related article, including a component part, or accessory, which is […]  used in the 
diagnosis of disease or other conditions, or in the cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of a 
disease, in man or other animals (US FDA, 2014).  
Whereas, the European commission in their “EU Medical Device Directive 2007/47/ec” are 
narrower in their definition as they define a medical device as:  
Any instrument, apparatus, appliance, software, material or other article, whether used alone or 
in combination, including the software intended by its manufacturer to be used specifically for 
diagnostic and/or therapeutic purposes and necessary for its proper application, which – is 
intended by the manufacturer to be used for human beings (EU Medical Device Directive 47/E, 
2007: 23). 
Additionally, the European Commission argue the “legal manufacturer” of a medical device 
should intend to manufacture the device for the purpose of human beings and not animals. 
The European Commission therefore define the legal manufacturer as “the person who is 
responsible for the design, manufacture, packaging and labelling of a device before it is 
placed on the market under his own name, regardless of whether these operations are carried 
out by the person himself or on his behalf by a third party” (MHRA, 2014). Thus, the pivotal 
provision regulating a medical device manufacturer – i.e. the innovator (Teece, 1986) – is 
placing the medical device on the market “under his own name” (Emergo Group, 2007). 
Relatedly, the US FDA’s 510(k) regulatory approval for medical devices also follow similar 
protocols (FDA, 2013). Consequently, this clause has important implications for the medical 
device manufacturer as they can subcontract various business activities such as design, 
 17 
 
manufacture, packaging, and labelling operations of their medical device (Schnoll, 2007; 
Emergo Group, 2007; Higson, 2010). Therefore, in line with Coviello and Munro (1997), 
network relationships have a crucial role in the internationalisation process of new and small 
technology based firms. 
Mehta (2008) also classifies medical device companies on two distinct types of markets – 
commodity products and innovative medical device products. That is, the former are 
commodity products (e.g. wound dressings, blood bags) which are mainly sold by healthcare 
multinational enterprises (MNEs) (e.g. Johnson and Johnson), whereas the latter are more 
high-value, R&D intensive products (e.g. pacemakers, spinal stents) that are invented by 
small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) and MNEs (2008: 8). Consequently, these 
regulations have meant that budding entrepreneurs who are often inventors of unique 
medical technologies have capitalised on the global opportunity to commercialise a medical 
device (Oviatt et al. 1993; Chatterji, 2009). Frost and Sullivan (2008) also report that the 
“innovative” medical device sector comprises of “cardiovascular, orthopaedic, general 
surgical, neurological, urological, gynaecological, endoscopic, and ophthalmic market 
segments.” Mehta (2008: 8) also categorises these innovative medical devices as either (1) 
implants (e.g. artificial heart valves), (2) non-invasive (ECG monitors), or (3) minimally 
invasive (e.g. catheters) devices. Therefore, in line with Oviatt et al. (1993) original research 
on “global start-ups” in the medical technology sector, the researcher developed a primary 
interest in the “innovative” segment of the medical device sector. 
The researcher also developed an interest in the medical technology sector due to its unique 
positioning with the wider life sciences industry. Life Sciences Scotland (2009) – a division 
of Scottish Enterprise – define the life sciences as reflecting “a wide range of activity 
including the discovery, research, development and manufacture of therapeutics; 
diagnostics; medical devices and platform technologies as well as the specialist suppliers of 
products and services necessary for these organisations to function.” Scottish Enterprise 
(2011) also report that medical technology is a “global industry sector within the wider life 
sciences industry.” Interestingly, Mehta (2008) argues innovative medical device companies 
often have shorter product life cycles and are more dynamic in their new product 
development (NPD) in comparison to new biotechnology firms.  
Murray (2004) also reports these shorter product life cycles in medical technology are due 
to the technological distinction between engineering and scientific disciplines. That is, the 
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Biomedical Engineering Society (BMES) define biomedical engineering as a discipline that 
“uses traditional engineering expertise to analyse and solve problems in biology and 
medicine with the objective of providing an overall enhancement of healthcare” (Lee, 
2010:2). Thus, biomedical engineers discover inventions through a multidisciplinary 
approach towards mechanical, materials, and electrical engineering (Murray, 2004). 
Whereas, biotechnology and pharmaceutical discoveries emerge from pharmacology, 
biotechnology, chemistry, and genetic engineering disciplines (Hine and Kapeleris, 2006). 
Therefore, Industry Canada (2013) describe an important distinction between these 
disciplines is medical devices temporarily or permanently replace a function in the body, 
while pharmaceuticals are absorbed into the human body to perform their intended 
functions.   
Academic (Chatterji, 2009), policy (Scottish Enterprise, 2011) and consultancy (Frost and 
Sullivan, 2008) based research also reports that the global medical technology sector is 
highly profitable and core growth sector for most advanced economies. For example, 
Scottish Enterprise (2011) reports on findings made by Health Research International (2011) 
who estimate the global medical technology sector was valued at US$327 billion, with a 
predicted annual growth rate of 5.4%, reaching a value of US$424.5 billion by 2015. Related 
research commissioned by Industry Canada (2013) also reports that the “global medical 
device sector” includes 27,000 firms worldwide, and employs about one million people. 
Moreover, these policy makers emphasise this is a “global industry” which traditionally has 
a low level of industry concentration, with no dominant firm. However, Mehta (2008) reports 
in recent years, a few global players (e.g. Medtronic) continue to dominate this sector, 
leaving early stage innovation firms to occupy a global niche in this device industry.  
Therefore, Crick and Jones (2000) emphasise a core challenge that new and small technology 
firms’ face is the imperative of exploiting their innovation in underdeveloped international 
technology markets. The medical technology sector was therefore of interest to the 
researcher given that technology start-ups can capitalise on industry change that incumbents 
have yet to identify within international niche markets (Jolly et al. 1992; Oviatt et al. 1995; 
Preece et al. 1999; Kuemmerle, 2002). Nonetheless, Carpenter et al. (2003: 806) emphasise 
Mitchell et al. (1992: 419) original findings that “attempting to become an international 
medical player is risky” and found internationalisation was likely to have a negative effect 
on domestic (US) operations and firm survival. Relatedly, Karim and Mitchell (2000) in a 
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follow up historic study of the US medical sector found MNEs continue to dominate this 
industry sector through   acquisition based corporate strategies. 
Interestingly, the majority of the above research is set in the US medical technology sector. 
This is not surprising given that the US in 2012 accounted for a 36.3% market share of the 
entire global medical device sector (Industry Canada, 2013). In revenue terms, Industry 
Canada reports US dominance equates to US$118.9 billion of the global US$327.7 billion 
market valuation. Thereafter, Japan (9.9%), Germany (7.0%), China (4.3%), and France 
(4.1%) are the top five international markets for the sale of medical technology. 
Consequently, this implies for non-US based medical technology start-ups, the outlook must 
be international – usually US-oriented and in some cases global from inception (Oviatt et al. 
1993; Chatterji, 2009). Moreover, Frost and Sullivan (2008) report an increasing trend is that 
entrepreneurial firms are looking towards the emerging BRIC markets (Brazil, Russia, India, 
and China) to exploit international opportunities. However, Industry Canada report in 2012 
that the BRIC markets had a combined market value of US$26.2 billion, which is still less 
than 10% of the entire value of the global medical technology sector.  
Nevertheless, recent research indicates that the high-technology landscape is changing as 
emerging markets move towards more knowledge-based economies (Saxenian, 2002; 
Fischer and Zedtwitz, 2004; Filatotchev et al. 2009; Tang and Hull, 2011). This research 
then reports that increasing amounts of entrepreneurs recognise R&D and knowledge 
transfer opportunities within the emerging markets. For example, Ernst and Young (2008) 
report on the increasing trend that Western biotechnology firms continue to subcontract 
R&D and production activities to emerging markets in order to reduce cost and accelerate 
commercialisation. In addition to this, recent research also reports on the growth of foreign 
clinical trials in countries such as Brazil, Cuba, and Turkey given technological 
advancements in their local healthcare systems (Thorsteinsdóttir, 2007; Karabag, 2011; 
Pregelj et al. 2011). Thus, in accordance with Jones et al. (2011b), it is apparent the 
internationalisation of life science new ventures is a highly globalised activity that takes 
place at all stages of the value chain. 
Thus, it is evident that the global medical technology sector provides a theoretically relevant 
and rich industry context to conduct research within the field of IE. Since the industry 
architecture of this sector is complex, it is apparent that technology start-ups need to engage 
in various R&D, production, sales and marketing cross-border activities to ensure survival 
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and growth (Jones, 1999; Autio, 2005; Gassman and Keupp, 2007; Brännback et al 2007). 
Therefore, George’s (2005) initial findings on the disparity and interplay between doing 
“good science” and learning to become commercially capable in a globally competitive 
environment is a problem that motivates this research. 
1.3 Dynamic Capabilities, Networking, and New Venture Internationalisation 
Given this contextual setting, dynamic capabilities (Teece et al. 1997; Eisenhardt and Martin, 
2000; Zollo and Winter, 2002) has recently emerged within strategic management research 
as a useful perspective to explore how innovation-based firms sustain competitive advantage 
in environments marked by rapid technological and market change. Chapter 2 explains there 
are numerous conflicting definitions of dynamic capabilities, but Helfat and Peteraf (2009) 
note most contributions share the view that organisations use their dynamic capabilities to 
change their resource base. However, Zahra et al (2006) emphasises the seminal strategic 
management contributions are more relevant for established firms who possess existing 
dynamic capabilities. Whereas in entrepreneurship research, there is an important need to 
explore how “how dynamic capabilities develop, emerge, or evolve” in new ventures 
(2006:920). Consequently, section 2.3.3 emphasises that this study adopts Helfat et al. (2007: 
4) definition of dynamic capability as “the capacity of an organization to purposefully create, 
extend, or modify its resource base.” 
Interestingly, the IE literature reports both conceptually (Young et al. 2003; Sapienza et al. 
2006; Weerawardena et al. 2007) and empirically (Westhead et al. 2001; Knight and 
Cavusgil, 2004) on the resource and capability gaps which constrain NVI. For technology 
start-ups, a lack of resources and capabilities is a significant challenge due to intensive levels 
of human, intellectual, and financial capital needed to commercialise knowledge intensive 
products within the international marketplace (Burgel and Murray, 2000; Bell et al. 2003; 
Prashantham and Young, 2009). Chapter 3 describes that recent conceptual research argues 
dynamic capabilities are an essential part of a firm’s resource base to enable NVI (e.g. 
Sapienza et al. 2006; Zettinig and Benson-Rea, 2008; Prashantham and Floyd, 2012). 
However, Vogel and Güttel (2013) in a recent bibliometric review confirm the majority of 
studies are still conceptual. In addition to these findings, Helfat et al. (2007) argue more 
research needs to explore the particular types of dynamic capabilities. 
Consequently, to compensate for resource and capability gaps, it is now widely understood 
that network relationships can support NVI (Coviello and Munro, 1995, 1997; Casson, 1997; 
 21 
 
Zhou et al. 2007; Fernhaber and Li, 2013). Coviello and Munro (1997: 365) define network 
relationships as “social and industrial relationships among for example, customers, 
suppliers, competitors, family, and friends.” Additionally, researchers argue that networking 
(e.g. Dubini and Aldrich, 1991) and social capital (e.g. Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998; Adler 
and Kwon, 2002) are useful perspectives to examine how technology start-ups access 
resources to support various cross-border R&D (Zahra et al. 2003), production (Sherer, 
2003), sales and marketing (Yli-Renko et al. 2002) activities. In Chapter 4, Table 4-1 and 
section 4.5 indicates there are multiple definitions of networking, which leads to the 
researcher’s definition that networking is the process of forming and strengthening ties 
through the exchange of information and resources to advance each actor’s long-term 
development. Consequently, Chapter 4 reviews the social capital literature and describes that 
there is growing consensus that social capital is an intangible asset that refers to resources 
that derive from a network of relationships (Payne et al. 2011). 
However, section 4.2 reviews this literature and adopts Nahapiet and Ghoshal’s (1998: 243) 
definition that social capital is “the sum of resources embedded within, available through, 
and derived from the network of relationships by an individual or social unit.” Moreover, 
Chapter 4 emphasises that networking and social capital are distinct concepts, by adopting 
the view put forth by Watson (2007: 855) that “networking is the process of enhancing an 
[actor’s] social capital.” Thus, recent research suggests that technology start-ups need to 
invest in a stock of business and social relationships if they are to build social capital that 
supports NVI (Coviello, 2006; Chetty and Agndal, 2007 Presutti et al. 2007; Prashantham 
and Dhanaraj, 2010). Relatedly, Tang (2011: 389) notes that stimulating and facilitating 
networking remains a key approach in industrial policies and business support programmes 
at international, regional, national, and sub-national level to the enhance the competitiveness 
of SMEs (e.g. European Commission, 2008; OECD, 2007; UNCTAD, 2001). 
Nevertheless, Mosey and Wright (2007) emphasise that since most “technology 
entrepreneurs” focus on building research led relationships; they will often struggle to create 
a valuable business network of relationships. Research on biotechnology start-ups has also 
found that even when such firms have access to industrial networks, some scientists are 
unable to exploit commercial opportunities or are unable to overcome inertia in their 
scientific networks (Maurer and Ebers, 2006). Consequently, Reuber and Fischer (1997: 
810) argue when top management teams (TMTs) have greater international experience they 
are more likely to have access to a valuable network of relationships. However, research has 
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found that most technology entrepreneurs lack industrial experience and need to build a 
network of relationships from the ground up to support their growth and development (Vissa 
and Bhagavatula, 2012).  
In the life sciences, networking is also a knowledge intensive, complex, and globally 
dispersed activity (Gassmann and Keupp, 2007). For example, Santoro and McGill (2005) 
found in some cases there are often only a handful of individuals or organisations across the 
world who are competent in the specific R&D, manufacture or sale of highly advanced life 
science technologies. In the start-up phase, this raises numerous collaboration risks, but the 
greatest concern is often the misappropriation of a new venture’s intellectual property rights 
(IPR) (Pisano, 1991; Hayton, 2005). For example, Coriat and Orsi (2002) emphasise survival 
rates of technology start-ups operating in the US is lower than other foreign markets due to 
the constant threat of litigation battles. Therefore, research has found technology start-ups 
with insufficient experience in identifying, evaluating, and selecting appropriate 
partnerships, are more likely to make misguided decisions, which can end in the new 
venture’s failure (Mudambi and Zahra, 2007).    
Ernst and Young (2008) also argue the greatest risk for small life science firms is the 
challenge of selling a product to a network of customers in multiple countries. That is, prior 
to selling a product, life science new ventures need to apply for regulatory approval in each 
foreign market (MHRA, 2014). However, despite the global nature of the life sciences 
industry, the “triad regions” – North America, Europe and Asia-Pacific – have yet to agree 
on a global regulated standard. Thus, Rothaermel and Deeds (2006) identifies for life science 
start-ups, multiple regulatory approvals equates to high transaction costs that results in long 
NPD times that are often unaffordable, time consuming, and reduce commercial windows of 
opportunity. Additionally, Maurer and Ebers (2006) argues if life science firms overcome 
these initial growth challenges, there is often the challenge that existing customers can 
quickly become potential rivals by imitating their products and technologies.  
Consequently, Mosey and Wright (2007) argue that the founder(s) existing experience, will 
often determine how well technology start-ups can build a network of customer 
relationships. For example, Ireland and Hine (2007) argue despite the growing amount of 
life science new ventures, the large incumbent pharmaceutical companies – the big pharma 
– and medical technology MNEs dominate the life sciences industry. This means a typical 
strategy for small technology firms is to target MNEs as a core customer due to the 
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dominance they have in global supply chains (Dunne et al. 2009). However, Burgel and 
Murray, (2000) report since technology start-ups are often commercially inexperienced and 
unable to demonstrate a proven record of international sales they often struggle to negotiate 
with large incumbent firms. Moreover, research also reports on challenges small technology 
firms face in attempting to build a network of customer relationships through various forms 
of international trade and/or foreign direct investment (FDI) (Bell, 1995; Coviello and 
Munro 1997, Jones, 1999; McNaughton, 2002). 
Traditionally, technology start-ups would leverage their core asset – a globally protected 
patent – to access complementary assets in order to build and sustain a competitive 
advantage (Teece, 1986, Pisano, 1991). However, Larson (1992) reports that technology 
start-ups must use networks to build an advantage as relying on IPR as a formal mechanism 
is no longer sufficient to protect their strategic position. Therefore, the network perspective 
argues technology start-ups can informally use trust and social embeddedness within an 
existing network of relationships to maintain their network position on the global value chain 
(e.g. Thorelli, 1986; Johanson and Mattson, 1988). For example, if technology firms attempt 
to enter China, they often encounter the social and cultural hurdles of adapting to guanxi 
networks (Zhao and Aram, 1995; Zhou et al. 2007). Since generations of trust, obligation 
and reputation deeply engrain these networks (Park and Luo, 2001) such firms are likely to 
encounter what Johanson and Vahlne (2009) recently term as the “liabilities of outsidership.” 
Johanson and Vahlne (2009) argue that firms will encounter this disadvantage if they are 
outside certain international networks. Consequently, despite the historic importance of 
networks, there is still limited conceptual (e.g. Larson and Starr, 1993; Hite and Hesterly, 
2001) and empirical research (e.g. Hite, 2005; Coviello, 2006) on how new ventures build 
an emerging network of relationships.  
Chapter 4 therefore reviews the organisational capabilities literature that examines the 
networking behaviour of international new ventures (INVs). Chapter 3 explains that the INV 
is unique organisational form that draws upon multiple strands of international business (IB), 
entrepreneurship and strategic management research (Zahra and George, 2002). Oviatt and 
McDougall (1994: 49) therefore define an INV as “a business organization that from 
inception, seeks to derive significant competitive advantage from the use of resources and 
the sale of output in multiple countries.” Consequently, section 4.3 finds that this 
organisational capability research is fragmented and takes place at multiple of levels of 
analysis. For example, entrepreneurship researchers use various theoretical perspectives 
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such as relational capabilities (e.g. Brinckmann and Hoegl, 2011), alliance portfolio 
capabilities (Baum et al. 2000), and network management capabilities (Walter et al. 2006) 
to understand the strategic management of networks.  
More interestingly, recent IE research has begun to use dynamic capabilities as lens to 
examine various aspects of networking behaviour through the “networking capability” 
concept (e.g. Fernhaber and McDougall, 2005; Weerawardena et al. 2007; Tolstoy and 
Agndal, 2010). However, section 4.4 reports that this research is still descriptive and is less 
clear on how INVs build networking capabilities. Consequently, Sapienza et al. indicate that 
dynamic capability research on what INVs “do and the resources they control, including the 
social capital they and their managers have amassed” would be “enlightening” to advance 
future research (2006: 930). Therefore, Chapter 5 addresses this research problem and 
section 5.3 defines networking capability as the capacity of a focal actor to purposefully 
create, extend, or modify its social capital. This, conceptualisation therefore seeks to address 
the above challenges that medical technology start-ups encounter, as it seems fruitful to take 
a dynamic capabilities perspective to explore networking capability development in NVI. 
1.4 Research Aim and Objectives 
Again, it is important to emphasise that the following research objectives are the eventual 
outcome of several years of “abductive” research (Dubois and Gadde, 2002). Chapter 6 
therefore describes how the researcher retrospectively arrived at these eventual research 
objectives. Nevertheless, Chapter 6 emphasises that researcher’s aim has never dramatically 
changed given the research background set out in the previous section of this introductory 
chapter. Therefore, based on this research background, the overarching aim of this thesis is:  
To explore how technology start-ups build dynamic capabilities in networking to enable 
their new venture internationalisation. 
Therefore, this study aims to achieve three overarching research objectives. 
 Objective 1: To explore how INVs create, extend, and modify their social capital in 
high-technology markets.  
 
 Objective 2: To examine why specific networking activities enable or inhibit new 
venture internationalisation in high-technology markets. 
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 Objective 3: To determine which network processes underpin networking capability 
development in new venture internationalisation? 
Objective 1: To explore how INVs create, extend, and modify their social capital in high-
technology markets.  
This research objective stems from the fact that scant research explores the development of 
networking capabilities in NVI. Chapter 2 therefore indicates one reason for this lack of 
research is due to the debate within strategic management research as to what dynamic 
capabilities represent and entail. Consequently, following a discussion on the dynamic 
capabilities debate, the researcher lays out his justification for using Helfat et al. (2007) asset 
orchestration framework to explore dynamic capability development. Chapter 3 confirms the 
asset orchestration framework is a useful approach to study how INVs build dynamic 
capabilities in high-technology markets. More specifically, Chapter 4 provides a theoretical 
overview of networking and social capital research, in order to explore how INVs create, 
extend, and modify their social capital in high-technology markets.  
Consequently, the researcher intends to contribute to theory by achieving this research 
objective. Given the emergent nature of Helfat et al. (2007) framework, only a limited 
number of strategic management studies have yet to use this lens to pursue empirical 
research (e.g. Nambisan and Sawhney, 2011; Chadwick et al.. 2014). Therefore, to the 
researcher’s knowledge, this is first entrepreneurship study to use this framework to explore 
dynamic capability development. Moreover, given the emergent use of this framework, to 
the researcher’s knowledge, this is the first study to combine Helfat et al. (2007) with 
Nahapiet and Ghoshal’s (1998) perspective on social capital to explore networking 
capability development. Thus, in Chapter 5 the researcher combines these theoretical lenses 
with the aim to contribute to IE and wider strategic management research.  
Coviello and Jones (2004), describe the dearth of longitudinal and cross-national based 
research in the field of IE. Jones et al. (2011a) in a systematic review of IE research also 
discuss progress but call for additional longitudinal and cross-national research. Since the 
overarching theme of this thesis is one of process, it was necessary to design a longitudinal 
study that captured the true essence of capability development in NVI. Chapter 6 therefore 
describes the researcher’s longitudinal multiple case study design (e.g. Eisenhardt, 1989; 
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Leonard-Barton, 1990; Gioia et al. 2013), which aims to provide a more fine-grained 
understanding of the activities that underpin networking capability development in NVI. 
Specifically, Chapter 6 outlines that the researcher took the opportunity to conduct 
longitudinal cross-national research in the UK and Australia. Since, the medical technology 
sector is global, it was interesting to conduct research with comparable medical technology 
start-ups who were unable to sell products to the domestic marketplace. Thus, given limited 
research on how INVs create, extend, or modify social capital (e.g. Arenius, 2002; Coviello, 
2006; Prashantham and Dhanaraj, 2010), the researcher anticipates that the emergence of 
new networking activities will contribute to IE research. 
Objective 2: To examine why specific networking activities enable or inhibit new venture 
internationalisation in high-technology markets. 
This research objective stems from the need to ask why certain networking activities enable 
or inhibit NVI in high-technology markets. Miles and Huberman (1994) suggest that 
longitudinal research helps with exploring and describing how certain events and activities 
unfold, but it is important to ask why certain events or activities influence a phenomenon in 
the way they do. Chapter 7 therefore intends to summarise the various events that unfolded 
in each case firm. Following this, Chapter 8 will then aim to explore and describe various 
networking activities within the context of NVI, and then move onto ordering and explaining 
why certain networking influence NVI. To achieve this, Chapter 6 explains that this study 
uses various longitudinal data collection and analysis techniques to build theory from case 
study research.  
Objective 3: To determine which network processes underpin networking capability 
development in new venture internationalisation? 
This research objective aims to build theory through a longitudinal multiple-case study 
design. Given the abductive nature of this research (e.g. Dubois and Gadde, 2002) the final 
research objective intends to interpret the emergent findings at a higher level of abstraction. 
Chapter 6 therefore provides a detailed discussion on how the researcher intends to analyse 
and interpret raw data on which network processes underpin networking capability 
development in NVI. Indeed, by theorising on the network processes that underpin 
networking capability development, the researcher intends to contribute to theory, policy-
making, and practice. Firstly, this study aims to contribute to the continued need for new 
process research in IB and IE research (Welch and Paavilainen-Mantymaki, 2014). 
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Secondly, this study aims to contribute to policy and practice by highlighting the challenges 
and opportunities that technology start-ups encounter with networking as they engage in 
NVI.  
For example, by demonstrating the process of how technology start-ups build networking 
capability, it is anticipated this research will assist policy makers develop unique 
programmes to support NVI in high-technology markets. Specifically, the researcher 
anticipates this research will assist policy makers create a range of support mechanisms to 
help technology entrepreneurs build a high-value network of relationships that facilitates 
NVI. Additionally for practitioners, this study aims to provide entrepreneurs with a resource 
on how to identify various behaviours that are associated with the black box that is 
networking. Given the intangible nature of networking activities, the researcher anticipates 
that practitioners would expect a useful protocol on how to identify, measure, and assess the 
strength of one’s networking capability. This thesis then aspires to achieve these 
requirements, by making an important step towards a process theory that supports a wider 
policy and commercial based readership.  
1.5 Structure of Thesis 
In summary, Chapter 1 introduces the background and contextual setting of this study. This 
chapter also highlights the core literature this study draws upon, along with the aim and 
objectives of this research. This chapter then provides an insight into how the researcher 
intends to achieve these emergent research objectives. Therefore, Figure 1-1 depicts the 
overall structure of this thesis. Chapter 2 will now discuss the selection of a theoretical lens 
from the dynamic capabilities literature to help navigate and focus this research study. 
Chapter 3 will then aim to review the IE literature that sheds light on the capability building 
process within INVs. Chapter 4 will then review the networking and social capital literature 
to shed light on the capability building process within INVs. Chapter 5 will then discuss the 
research problem by presenting the eventual aim, objectives, and research questions that 
drive this research. Chapter 6 will then describe the research methodology of this study, 
while Chapters 7 and 8 will report the within-case and cross-case findings on how 
technology start-ups build dynamic capabilities in networking to enable NVI. Finally, 
Chapter 9 will discuss these research findings in relation to existing literature and conclude 
on the major contributions of this research. 
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Figure 1-1: Thesis Structure 
 
Source: The Author
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2 – Dynamic Capabilities: An 
Emerging Theoretical Lens 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Aim 
To select a theoretical lens from the dynamic capabilities literature that helps 
navigate and focus this research study.  
Chapter Objectives 
 To review the theoretical foundations that underpin the dynamic capabilities 
perspective. 
 To examine the dynamic capabilities perspectives that offer a robust 
theoretical lens. 
 To select a process lens that enables an exploration of the development of 
deployment of dynamic capabilities in technology-based firms. 
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2.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to select a theoretical lens from the dynamic capabilities literature that 
helps navigate and focus this research study. The dynamic capabilities perspective is an area 
of strategic management research that has received significant attention, but also widespread 
debate and criticism due to multiple theoretical perspectives. Therefore, to select a robust 
theoretical lens, this chapter intends to achieve three objectives. Firstly, this chapter will 
review the theoretical foundations that underpin and unify the multiple dynamic capability 
perspectives. Secondly, this chapter will examine the dynamic capability perspectives that 
offer a robust theoretical lens. Finally, this chapter will select the most suitable process lens 
that enables an exploration of the development and deployment of dynamic capabilities. This 
chapter will therefore provide the researcher with a theoretical lens that will inform the 
arguments made in this thesis.  
2.2 Dynamic Capabilities – Theoretical Foundations 
Although there is significant debate in the dynamic capabilities literature, there is widespread 
agreement that Teece, Pisano and Shuen publication entitled Dynamic Capabilities and 
Strategic Management (1997), is the seminal and  definitive founding paper (Barreto, 2010; 
Ambrosini and Bowman, 2009; Helfat and Peteraf, 2009). Moreover, Leiblein (2011) 
emphasises that having received 13,700 citations, Teece et al. (1997) is now one of strategic 
management’s most recognised contributions. Teece et al. (1997: 516) define dynamic 
capabilities as “the firm’s ability to integrate, build and reconfigure internal and external 
competencies to address rapidly changing environments.” Thus, this framework of dynamic 
capabilities provides an analytical tool to understand how “private enterprise firms” sustain 
competitive advantage whilst operating in environments of rapid technological change 
(1997: 509).  
Teece et al. (1997: 509) ground their framework in the argument that competitive advantage 
lies within dynamic capabilities that rest in the firms: path dependence (history), specific 
asset position (resource base) and distinctive organisational processes (routines). Thus, 
Teece et al. (1997) central thesis is that competitive advantage stems from dynamic 
capabilities rooted in high performance routines that operate inside the firm, which influence 
its future direction (i.e. new paths) and asset position within the wider environment. Since 
Teece et al. (1997), Barreto (2010) and other recent reviews (e.g. Ambrosini and Bowman, 
2009; Helfat and Peteraf, 2009; Easterby-Smith and Prieto, 2008) report there is significant 
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debate and varied opinion on dynamic capabilities overall nature, purpose, context, 
development mechanisms and outcomes. For example, some scholars such as Teece (2000; 
2007, 2012) maintain that dynamic capabilities seek to explain how innovation based firms 
sustain competitive advantage through revolutionary responses to environmental change. 
Whereas, other scholars argue dynamic capabilities aim to explain how firms continuously 
improve and adapt to more evolutionary forms of change (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; 
Zollo and Winter, 2002; Winter, 2003).  
Within and amongst the seminal contributions, it also evident that scholars use various 
terminology (e.g. core competencies, distinctive capabilities, higher-order capabilities, 
organisational routines) to describe and investigate a firms involvement in strategic change. 
Rajagopalan and Spreitzer (1997: 49) define strategic change as “a difference in the form, 
quality, or state over time (Van de Ven and Poole, 1995) in an organization’s alignment with 
its external environment.” Consequently, Dosi et al. (2000: 4) were early to emphasise that 
the “terminological flotilla” is likely to burden organisational capability scholars with 
confusion and misdirection. Moreover, Easterby-Smith et al. (2009) also emphasise that the 
first ten years of dynamic capabilities scholarship is predominately conceptual and the 
limited empirical research is yet to adopt on a uniform theoretical lens. Zahra et al. (2006: 
917) therefore emphasise that the emergent literature on dynamic capabilities and their role 
in value creation has become “riddled with inconsistencies, overlapping definitions, and 
outright contradictions.” Arend and Bromiley (2009: 87) thus note these inconsistencies are 
so problematic, that they go as far to argue that scholars “should abandon the dynamic 
capabilities approach all together if it does not quickly develop a theoretical foundation.”  
However, Helfat and Peteraf (2009: 92) respond to Arend and Bromiley’s critique, and 
argue: “Although dynamic capabilities began as an “approach” to understanding strategic 
change (Teece et al.. 1997), rather than a “theory,” there are clearly identifiable theoretical 
foundations.” The prime objective of this section will therefore review the theoretical 
foundations that underpin and unify the emerging dynamic capabilities “paradigm” (i.e. 
Augier and Teece, 2009). Table 2-1 therefore interprets this discussion on dynamic 
capabilities theoretical foundations.  
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Table 2-1: Dynamic Capabilities Theoretical Foundations 
 Transaction Costs 
Theory 
Resource Based Theory Evolutionary Theory 
Theoretical 
question 
 Why do firms exist?  Why are firms 
different? 
 How do firms adapt to 
external change? 
Ontology  Coase (1937) 
 March and Simon 
(1958) 
 Cyert and March 
(1963) 
 Penrose (1959) 
 Lippman and Rumlet 
(1982) 
 Schumpeter (1934) 
 March and Simon 
(1958) 
 Cyert and March 
(1963) 
Linkage to 
Teece et al. 
 Positions  Positions  Processes 
 Paths 
Seminal 
contributions 
 Williamson (1975, 
1985) 
 Wernerfelt (1984) 
 Dierickx and Cool 
(1989) 
 Barney (1991) 
 Nelson and Winter 
(1982) 
 Dosi et al. (2000) 
Assumptions  Bounded rationality 
 Opportunism 
 Resource 
heterogeneity 
 Resource immobility 
 Satisficing behaviour 
 Disequilibrium 
Conditions  Asset specificity 
 Uncertainty 
 Frequency 
 Valuable 
 Rare 
 Non-imitable 
 Non-substitutable 
 Strategy 
 Structure 
 Core Capabilities 
Unit of 
analysis 
 Transaction  Resource  Routine 
Mechanism  Static  Predominately static  Dynamic 
Intended 
outcome 
 Cost reduction  Sustained competitive 
advantage 
 Innovation based 
capabilities 
Source: Based on Augier and Teece (2009) 
Augier and Teece (2009) argue that evolutionary theory (Nelson and Winter, 1982) and 
transaction cost theory (Williamson, 1975, 1985) heavily influence dynamic capabilities as 
they share a behavioural (Cyert and March, 1963) heritage. Moreover, they argue March and 
Simon (1958) and  Cyert and March’s (1963) ideas on “bounded rationality”, “opportunistic 
behaviour”, “organisational slack” and “organisational routines” ontologically inform 
Williamson (1975, 1985) and Nelson and Winter’s (1982) theories. Furthermore, Penrose’s 
(1959) theory on the growth of the firm informs resource-based theory (RBT) (Wernerfelt, 
1984; Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Barney, 1991) which is an important theoretical foundation 
of dynamic capabilities. The following sections will therefore introduce each of these 
theories and review the theoretical components that are most pertinent to the dynamic 
capabilities view of the firm. 
2.2.1 Evolutionary Theory 
Augier and Teece (2009: 412) argue Nelson and Winter’s An Evolutionary Theory of 
Economic Change (1982) is the “most germane intellectual foundation in the dynamic 
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capabilities paradigm.” Helfat and Peteraf (2009) also note that Nelson and Winter’s (1982) 
evolutionary theory is the basis on which Teece et al. (1997) derives attention to distinctive 
processes and path dependencies. Behavioural theory (March and Simon, 1958; Cyert and 
March, 1963) along with Joseph Schumpeter’s (1934; 1942) contributions on innovation, 
entrepreneurship, and economic change therefore underpin Nelson and Winter’s (1982) 
evolutionary theory. Nelson and Winter (1982) build on these contributions and borrow basic 
ideas from biology as a metaphor to develop an evolutionary theory of capabilities that 
explains how innovation based firms (rather than population of firms in industries) adapt to 
external change (1982: 3). Cyert and March’s (1963) assumptions that firms are motivated 
by profit and engaged in search to improve their profits, thus assumes “satisficing” rather 
than “optimising behaviour” as markets are in a constant state of disequilibrium (1982: 4). 
Consequently, Teece (1984) was early to acknowledge that such evolutionary ideas would 
help stimulate a theory of distinctive innovation based competencies.  
Teece et al. (1997) view on distinctive processes is thus derived from Nelson and Winter’s 
(1982) assumption that routines are the genes (building blocks) of organisations, which are 
nested in-between individual skills and organisational capabilities. Augier and Teece (2009: 
415) note, “firms in this view also come with ‘routines’ or ‘competencies,’ which are 
recurrent patterns of action that may change through search and learning.” Routines thus 
result from the iterative learning cycle of improvisation, experimentation and 
institutionalisation (Winter, 2003). Becker (2004) highlights although it is not explicit within 
Nelson and Winter (1982), this hierarchy is more apparent in Dosi et al. (2000: 5) who state: 
“In our view, clarity would be served by reserving the term ‘skills’ to the individual level 
and ‘routines’ to the organisational level.” Dosi et al. (2000) argue a hierarchy exists where 
the skills of individuals offer the building blocks on which groups of individuals come to 
form collective routines, which in turn offer the building blocks of how capabilities emerge 
and solidify within organisations.  
Nelson (1991: 67) notes evolutionary theory assumes that organisational adaptation differs 
depending on each firms: (1) strategy and (2) structure as well as (3) core capabilities. Thus, 
Nelson (1991: 67) argues strategic decision makers will interpret an industry environment 
differently when strategies and structures are “out of tune”, (e.g. a technological leader 
strategy with an inefficient R&D department) which means changes in strategy often require 
ex-ante changes in structure (Nelson, 1991: 68). Core capabilities are then “what an 
organization can do well” and “has something of a life of [their] own.” Thus, “higher-order” 
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routines involve Schumpeterian resource combinations, which coordinate “lower-order” 
routines that form a firm’s operational capabilities (Nelson, 1991: 68). Evolutionary theory 
on routines has thus spawned research on organisational learning (Levitt and March, 1988; 
March, 1991), absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990), combinative capabilities 
(Kogut and Zander, 1992) and the knowledge-based view (Grant, 1996) which all treat 
knowledge accumulation as a vital source of sustained performance.  
Helfat and Peteraf (2009) explain Teece et al. (1997) dynamic capabilities framework also 
hinges on evolutionary theory’s treatment of path dependence. The notion of path 
dependence recognises that “history matters” (Teece et al.. 1997). Augier and Teece (2009) 
note that firm capabilities define at least to some degree where a firm has been and what is 
has done. Where a firm can go is a function of its current asset position and the specific paths 
it needs to travel (Teece et al. 1997: 522). Therefore, this process often has an “imprinting” 
(Stinchcombe, 1965) effect in which events occurring at key development stages amount to 
replicated patterns of behaviour and long-term consequences. Szulanski (2003) explains 
“sticky” path-dependent knowledge endowments provide a point of differentiation between 
firms that enables the deployment of unique profit-seeking strategies. In other words, since 
tacit knowledge is deeply rooted in the history of the firm, the process of strategically 
leveraging this knowledge is a core source of sustained competitive advantage (Foss, 2002).   
Vergne and Durand (2011: 370) explain path dependence translates into features (e.g. 
capabilities) which persist over time and appear hard to change due to technological (David, 
1985), institutional (North, 1990), or cognitive (Maurer and Ebers, 2006) lock-ins. First 
mover advantages or superior products may not always succeed as “chance events” (Arthur, 
1989) or “network externalities” (Katz and Shapiro, 1985) may lock-in inferior technologies 
(i.e. the QWERTY keyboard) due to switching costs imposed on consumers. Whilst these 
“externalities” may benefit market leaders in the short-run, rapid technological change often 
means, “consumer switching costs become quickly swamped by switching benefits” (Teece 
et al. 1997: 523). Overall, Augier and Teece (2009) argue that evolutionary theory’s 
explanation of routines and path dependence shape the addressable opportunities faced by 
firms and are theoretical foundations in the dynamic capabilities perspective. Evolutionary 
theory is therefore paramount to this thesis as it underpins section 2.4 discussion on “asset 
orchestration” (Helfat et al. 2007), which is an emerging dynamic capabilities lens that 
examines strategic change in organisations.    
 35 
 
2.2.2 Transaction Costs Theory 
The transaction costs approach is widely accepted as a framework for helping to understand 
economic organisation (Augier and Teece, 2009). In Madhok’s (2002) review, he argues the 
primary motivation of transactions costs theory is to explain why firms exist. In Ronald 
Coase’s (1937) seminal contribution The Nature of the Firm, he identifies a paradox in neo-
classical economics that “frictionless markets” do not explain the existence of firms. Instead, 
there are costs for “organising” production and the entrepreneur must consider the costs 
involved in each market transaction. Specifically, Coase’s (1937) initial proposition was that 
firms and markets are alternative governance structures that differ in their transaction costs. 
Therefore, Coase argues firms exist under conditions when it is more economically efficient 
to replace markets and organise activities within the institution of the firm. These ideas 
influenced Oliver Williamson’s Markets and Hierarchies (1975) and The Economic 
Institutions of Capitalism (1985), which consequently form the basis of transaction costs 
economics (TCE).  
Like Coase, Williamson (1975) disputes frictionless markets and argues transaction costs 
exist due to sources of possible friction that may arise when using a market to link processes 
in the chain of production. Williamson (1975, 1985) therefore adds considerable precision 
to Coase’s general argument by identifying the types of exchange, which conduct efficiently 
within firm boundaries rather than within the market. Thus, Williamson’s basic view is that 
economic activity will be more efficient – transaction costs will be lower – when this activity 
occurs within a single organisation, or hierarchy, rather than through a market of several 
organisations. TCE is therefore a notable theory as it ontologically underpins explanations 
of international expansion (Buckley and Casson, 1976; Rugman, 1981; Hennart, 1982) 
cooperative strategy (Dyer and Singh, 1998) and vertical integration (Monteverde and Teece, 
1982). Chapter 3 and 4 will thus review TCE in the context of internationalisation and 
cooperative strategy, as these are central research topics throughout this thesis.  
Nevertheless, Augier and Teece emphasise that although dynamic capabilities “borrows 
from transaction costs” it borrows "less extensively than it does from the behavioral theory 
of the firm” (2009: 414). Instead, Augier and Teece (2009) argue that transaction costs limit 
the explanation of the “modern business firm” as innovation-based firms require superior 
organisational capabilities that are continuously reconfigured and improved. Transaction 
costs thus contribute but cannot solely explain the dynamic capabilities of the firm, since 
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rational decisions such as internalisation must involve co-specialisation, learning and the 
appropriately of profits from innovation (Augier and Teece, 2009: 414). However, 
Williamson’s (1975) behavioural assumptions on (1) bounded rationality and (2) 
opportunism do inform dynamic capabilities in that (1) asset specificity, (2) uncertainty, and 
(3) frequency provide insight on cost reduction in high-technology markets. Specifically, 
Teece et al. (1997) argues that Williamson’s (1975) assumption on asset specificity indicates 
that innovating firms must invest in specialised and co-specialised assets such as a dedicated 
manufacturing plant or a distribution system to avoid misappropriation when attempting to 
profit from an innovation. Therefore, TCE is an important theory as it helps explain how 
firms manage their internal (section 2.3, section 3.3) and external (section 4.3) asset position, 
which are both central to this thesis.    
2.2.3 Resource Based Theory 
RBT is one of strategic management’s most influential theories that aims to explain why 
firms are different (Barney et al. 2011). RBT is ontologically rooted in Edith Penrose’s The 
Theory of the Growth of the Firm (1959) that positions firms as administrative entities based 
on their potentially valuable resources (McKelvie and Wiklund, 2010). Central to Penrose’s 
(1959: 5) theory is the assumption that growth is an evolutionary process “where the 
experience of management will affect the productive services that all of its other resources 
are capable of rendering.” In other words, “productive resources” are the “material” (plant, 
equipment, land, materials etc.) and “human” (labour, managerial, staff, engineers etc.) 
resources that provide the “subjective productive opportunities” to produce products and 
services, which can subsequently be consumed (Penrose, 1959). Therefore, the 
heterogeneous, path-dependent, and continuous combination of market and human resources 
to exploit productive opportunities is what theoretically drives the Penrosean growth of the 
firm (Kor and Mahoney, 2000). 
Penrose’s (1959) theory along with Lippman and Rumelt’s (1982) assumptions on uncertain 
imitability led to what initially was termed as the resource based view (RBV) (Wernerfelt, 
1984; Barney, 1986a, Dierickx and Cool, 1989, Barney, 1991). The RBV gained swift 
scholarly momentum due to the premise that researchers should examine a firm’s internal 
resource base opposed to only the industry (e.g. Mason, 1957; Bain, 1968; Porter, 1980) or 
the firm’s wider environment (e.g. Hannan and Freeman, 1977). However, within this 
literature, Barney’s (1991) seminal study is what launched the RBV as a major strategic 
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management theory. Central to Barney’s (1991) argument is that (1) resource heterogeneity 
– unique resources; and (2) resource immobility – low transferability – underpin sustained 
competitive advantage. Barney (1991) thus argues for a firm’s resource base to sustain 
competitive advantage its capabilities must be (1) “valuable” in that it exploits an 
opportunity or neutralises a threat, is (2) “rare” in comparison to the competition, (3) costly 
to “imitate”, and (4) and non “substitutable” where there are few alternatives to sustain 
competitive advantage.  
However, Peteraf (1993) elaborates although resource heterogeneity is necessary for 
competitive advantage, this only provides temporary advantage, and resource immobility is 
the sufficient condition for non-imitation of valuable resources. Teece et al. (1997: 527) 
therefore distinguish dynamic capabilities from the RBV on the premise that Barney’s 
(1986) original strategic factor market (SFM) logic explains the exchange of tradable 
resources, but is less clear on the examination of non-tradable resources such as 
technological, reputational, or institutional assets. Dierickx and Cool’s (1989) assumptions 
on the “replicability” and “inimitability” of asset stock accumulation therefore ontologically 
underpins Teece et al. (1997) notion of asset positions. Central to Dierickx and Cool’s (1989) 
argument is that idiosyncratic, firm-specific assets are “accumulated internally” over time 
and do not trade on open markets. Thus, these assets are built rather than bought and their 
sustainability depends on whether these “strategic asset stocks” are non-tradable, non-
imitable and non-substitutable (1989: 1507). Lipmann and Rumelt’s (1982) assumptions on 
non-imitability thus underpin Dierickx and Cool’s (1989) argument that (1) time 
compression diseconomies; (2) asset mass efficiencies; (3) interconnectedness of asset 
stocks; (4) asset erosion; and (5) casual ambiguity isolate and impede rival imitation. Figure 
2:1 illustrates these “barriers to imitation”: 
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Figure 2-1: Stocks and Flows of Asset Accumulation 
 
Source: The Author’s interpretation of Dierickx and Cool (1989) 
Dierickx and Cool (1989: 1506) use the “bath-tub” metaphor to emphasise the stock and 
flow of R&D asset accumulation. The authors argue that R&D stocks (i.e. know-how) 
accumulate through flows of new investment (i.e. amount of R&D spending) but depreciate 
as an asset erodes over time, meaning that isolating mechanisms protect its value. For 
example, time compression diseconomies implies it is not possible to rush asset accumulation 
and the more a new entrant “tries to reduce the time horizon associated with asset 
accumulation, ceteris paribus, the more costly the process will be.” (Lockett et al. 2009: 15). 
Whereas, Foss (1999) notes time compression diseconomies provide early-mover advantage 
and enable firms compete with would-be imitators. Moreover, asset mass efficiencies are the 
“economies of scale” of intangible assets (i.e. knowledge) in which a favourable initial asset 
position enhances further asset accumulation (Knott et al. 2003). Leiblien (2011) notes time 
compression diseconomies and asset mass efficiencies have clear conceptual overlaps with 
absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Zahra and George, 2002) which represents 
the firm’s ability to accumulate and exploit knowledge for commercial purposes. 
Consequently, Section 2.3.1 emphasises that Zahra and George (2002) reconceptualise 
absorptive capacity as a dynamic capability, which indicates Dierickx and Cool’s (1989) 
isolating mechanisms are integral within the wider dynamic capabilities literature. 
Causal ambiguity is an effective barrier to imitation when rivals do not understand an 
innovator’s core competencies, which helps sustain competitive advantage (Reed and 
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DeFillippi, 1990). Since this knowledge is often tacit (Polanyi, 1967) and technologically 
intensive (Von Hippel, 1978) this means firms will often use secrecy to protect their valuable 
assets. Moreover, Reed and DeFillippi (1990: 90) argue that causal ambiguity “may be so 
great that not even managers within the firm understand the relationship between actions and 
outcomes.” Thomke and Kuemmerle (2002) thus argue the interconnectedness of asset 
stocks is an additional mechanism on which innovating firms can combine various stocks of 
casually ambiguous knowledge to impede rival imitation. Teece’s (1986) initial discussion 
on the development of asset complementarities therefore links to the interconnectedness of 
asset stocks and especially those assets are casually ambiguous, as they provide pioneering 
firms with greater opportunity to profit from their own innovations. Inimitability therefore 
underpins the asset accumulation process and are paramount resource based assumptions 
within the dynamic capabilities framework (Teece et al. 1997). Section 2.4 emphasises that 
asset accumulation is a central in the “asset orchestration” process, and is an important 
assumption in the examination of how firms engage in strategic change. 
2.3 The Dynamic Capabilities Debate 
Section 2.2 highlights there is widespread debate within the dynamic capabilities literature 
(e.g. Teece et al. 1997; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Zollo and Winter, 2002), but focusses 
on the theoretical foundations that unify these contributions. In this section, the prime 
objective is to examine the seminal dynamic capabilities articles that contribute to the debate 
on this emerging theoretical lens. Table 2-2 thus presents what Barreto (2010) identifies as 
the seminal contributions within this literature. Moreover, Table 2-3 examines these various 
perspectives, which supports the aim to establish a dynamic capabilities lens that will direct 
this study.    
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Table 2-2: Main Definitions of Dynamic Capabilities 
Study Definition 
 
Teece & 
Pisano 
(1994) 
“The subset of the competences and capabilities that allow the firm to create new 
products and processes and respond to changing market circumstances.” (1994: 541) 
Teece et al. 
(1997) 
“The firm’s ability to integrate, build, and reconfigure internal and external 
competencies to address rapidly changing environments.” (1997: 509) 
Eisenhardt 
and Martin 
(2000) 
“The firm’s processes that use resources – specifically the processes to integrate, 
reconfigure, gain and release resources – to match and even create market change. 
Dynamic capabilities thus are the organizational and strategic routines by which 
firm’s achieve new resource configurations as markets emerge, collide, split, evolve 
and die.” (2000: 1107) 
Teece 
(2000) 
“The ability to sense and then seize opportunities quickly and proficiently.” (2000: 
47) 
Zollo and 
Winter 
(2002) 
“A learned and stable pattern of collective activity through which the organization 
systematically generates and modifies its operating routines in pursuit of improved 
effectiveness.” (2002: 340) 
Winter 
(2003) 
“Those (capabilities) that operate to extend, modify, or create ordinary capabilities.” 
(2003: 991)  
Zahra et al. 
(2006) 
“The abilities to reconfigure a firm’s resources and routines in the manner envisioned 
and deemed appropriate by its principal decision makers(s).” (2006: 918) 
Teece 
(2007) 
“Dynamic capabilities can be disaggregated into the capacity (a) to sense and shape 
opportunities and threats, (b) to maintain competitiveness through enhancing, 
combining, protecting, and, when necessary, reconfiguring the business enterprise’s 
intangible and tangible assets.” (2007: 1319) 
Helfat et al. 
(2007) 
“A dynamic capability is the capacity of an organisation to purposefully create, 
extend, or modify its resource base.” (2007: 4)  
Source: Barreto (2010: 260) 
2.3.1 Dynamic Capabilities and Competitive Advantage 
Ambrosini and Bowman (2009) review the dynamic capabilities literature and argue that 
Teece and Pisano (1994) were the first scholars to introduce the dynamic capabilities 
perspective. In this study, Teece and Pisano (1994) argue firms that are able to adapt their 
internal and external competencies to the challenges of rapid technological change, are those 
that exhibit dynamic capabilities. Consequently, the authors argue that the core purpose of 
dynamic capabilities are to sustain competitive advantage1 (1994: 537). Teece et al. (1997) 
therefore extend Teece and Pisano’s (1994) initial contribution through the argument that 
sustained competitive advantage of firms stems from dynamic capabilities, which are rooted 
                                         
1 There is wide debate in strategic management on defining competitive advantage. For parsimony, this study 
follows Peteraf and Barney’s extensive review in which they define ‘competitive advantage’ as the firm’s 
ability to “create more economic value than marginal (breakeven) competitors in its product market.” 
Economic value is the “difference between the perceived benefits gained by the purchasers of a good and the 
economic cost to the enterprise.” Value creation is therefore the difference between perceived benefits (i.e. 
willingness to pay) and the economic costs of producing a good/ service (2003: 316).  
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in high performance routines that operate inside the firm, which influence new paths and 
positions. Sustained competitive advantage therefore has little to do with Porter’s (1985) 
discussion on calendar time (i.e. industry cycles), but on Lippman and Rumelt’s (1982) 
discussion on the firm’s ability to isolate competitive duplication. Teece and colleagues 
(Teece and Pisano, 1994; Teece et al. 1997, Teece, 2000; Teece, 2007) therefore maintain 
that dynamic capabilities are idiosyncratic to each firm, and strategy formation is a long-
term capability development process.  
In contrast, Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) examine Teece et al. (1997) initial arguments and 
contend that although some aspects of dynamic capabilities are idiosyncratic in detail, other 
aspects of dynamic capabilities exhibit commonalities, which are comparable across firms. 
Specifically, the authors argue that dynamic capabilities consist of several strategic and 
organisational processes such as NPD, and alliances, which are repeatable across firms 
(2000: 1106). Strategy formation therefore relies on learning mechanisms such as exploring 
best practices, learning from mistakes, crises, knowledge codification, and paced experience 
(i.e. absorptive capacity), which shape an organisations unique path. Subsequently, the 
authors argue dynamic capabilities result in the creation of new “fungible” resources, which 
they define as the “extent to which capabilities are applied for an alternative use at a lower 
cost” (2000: 1100). However, Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) argue that dynamic capabilities 
are “equifinal” (i.e. multiple paths lead to similar destinations) and “substitutable” that 
suggests dynamic capabilities are more replicable than Teece et al. (1997) would argue. 
However, Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) also argue that dynamic capabilities evolve through 
strategic thinking that is intuitive and reliant on informal rules (i.e. heuristics) rather than 
rational decision making based on deductive reasoning (2000: 1112).    
Furthermore, Eisenhardt and Martin argue dynamic capabilities are more pertinent in high-
velocity markets (e.g. Eisenhardt, 1989) in which market boundaries are blurred, successful 
business models are unclear and market players are ambiguous and shifting (2000: 1111). In 
D’Aveni’s (1994) terms, these markets encounter hypercompetition in which the rules or 
norms of an industry are continuously shifting due to revolutionary forms of change, which 
make it almost impossible for a firm to sustain a dominant position. Eisenhardt and Martin 
(2000) therefore argue that Teece et al. (1997) perspective explains how temporary 
advantage is maintained in moderately dynamic markets, but is ineffective in capturing how 
firms achieve long-term advantage in high-velocity markets. Given this volatility, the 
authors argue that “simple routines” underpin “effective dynamic capabilities” which help 
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firms focus on strategic issues without being locked into specific behaviours or past 
experiences that are no longer relevant for the emerging industry context (2000: 111). 
Instead, the authors argue the core purpose of dynamic capabilities is to maintain temporary 
competitive advantage and it is how the firm uses them “sooner, more astutely, or more 
fortuitously than the competition to create resource configurations that have that advantage” 
(Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000: 1117) 
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Table 2-3: The Dynamic Capabilities Debate 
  Teece et al. (1997) Eisenhardt and Martin 
(2000) 
Zollo and Winter 
(2002) 
Winter (2003) Zahra et al. (2006) Teece  (2007) Helfat et al. (2007) 
 
PURPOSE 
 
 
 Sustained competitive 
advantage 
 Temporary competitive 
advantage 
 Improved 
effectiveness 
 Reconfigure 
operational 
capabilities 
 Reconfigure substantive 
capabilities 
 Sustained competitive 
advantage 
 Strategic change 
STRATEGY PROCESS 
Strategic 
thinking 
 
 Rational 
 Idiosyncratic 
 Intuitive 
 Emergent 
 Rational 
 Deliberate 
 Rational 
 Deliberate 
 Rational 
 Emergent 
 Intuitive 
 Asset orchestration 
 Intuitive/rational 
 Asset orchestration 
Strategy 
formation 
 Previous paths 
 Asset position 
 Processes 
 Equifinal paths 
 Fungible assets 
 Best practices 
 Codification 
 Articulation 
 Experience 
 Dynamic routines 
 Operating routines 
 Dynamic capabilities 
 Substantive capabilities 
 Sensing 
 Seizing 
 Transforming 
 Create 
 Extend 
 Modify 
Strategic 
change 
 Radical 
 Fast pace 
 Revolution 
 Radical 
 Fast pace 
 Revolution 
 Moderate 
 Gradual pace 
 Evolutionary 
 Moderate 
 Gradual pace 
 Evolutionary 
 Radical/Moderate 
 Fast/Gradual 
 Evolutionary 
 Radical 
 Fast pace 
 Revolutionary 
 Radical/Moderate 
 Fast/Gradual 
 Revolutionary/ Evolutionary 
STRATEGY CONTENT 
Result of 
strategic 
activities 
 New asset position 
 New paths 
 New fungible resources 
 Equifinal paths 
 Modify operating 
routines 
 Modify operating 
routines 
 Modify substantive 
capabilities 
 Indirect superior 
performance 
 Coordination 
 Integration 
 Learning 
 Reconfiguration 
 Technical fitness 
 Evolutionary fitness 
STRATEGY CONTEXT 
Industry 
context 
 Hyper-competition  Hyper-competition  Continuous 
improvement 
 Continuous 
improvement 
 Hyper-competition  Hyper-competition  Multiple industry contexts 
 
Source: The Author
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2.3.2 Dynamic Capabilities and Resource Reconfiguration 
Zollo and Winter (2002) contribute to this debate by using evolutionary (Nelson and Winter, 
1982) and organisational learning (Levitt and March, 1988) theory to investigate the 
mechanisms on which firms develop dynamic capabilities. Zollo and Winter’s (2002: 340) 
perspective also differs from the abovementioned, as they argue the core purpose of dynamic 
capabilities is to pursue “improved effectiveness” rather than sustain competitive advantage. 
Consequently, the authors argue that the process of dynamic capability development is 
gradual and emerges through routine based forms of learning. Levitt and March (1988: 320) 
thus define organisational learning as “organizations [that] are seen as learning by encoding 
inferences from history into routines that guide behaviour.” Therefore, the authors argue (1) 
experience accumulation, (2) knowledge articulation, and (3) knowledge codification, 
represent the learning mechanisms that help firms continuously improve its resource base. 
Zollo and Winter (2002) also argue the major output of building dynamic capabilities is that 
firms are able to configure their “existing” operating routines. This perspective therefore 
takes a more evolutionary approach to strategic change in comparison to the above 
perspectives that assume dynamic capabilities play a “revolutionary” role in a firm’s 
development (Barreto, 2010).  
Zollo and Winter’s (2002) perspective is also distinct from the above as their discussion on 
learning mechanisms indicates that strategy process is rational and deliberate, as opposed to 
what Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) would argue as being intuitive and emergent. For 
example, the authors emphasise that experience accumulation is a learning mechanism on 
which firms accumulate tacit knowledge from their previous experience (Kogut and Zander, 
1992). This experiential knowledge then provides the know-how to continuously improve 
and gradual reconfigure a firm’s existing operating routines. Zollo and Winter (2002) 
therefore argue dynamic capabilities are manifest in deliberate learning (i.e. knowledge 
articulation and codification) mechanisms that transform tacit knowledge into codified 
knowledge. Articulation routines thus include the sharing of ideas and discussion on change, 
while codification routines involve deliberate efforts to produce artefacts such as strategic 
partnering manuals and environmental scanning procedures to disseminate this articulated 
knowledge. Central to this view, is that firms build dynamic capabilities from previous 
experience of operational change, and use this knowledge to implement further resource 
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improvements (Zollo and Winter, 2002). Zollo and Winter (2002) is therefore a broader 
perspective as it assumes that firms can build dynamic capabilities in industry contexts where 
the pace of change is more gradual and magnitude of change is more moderate.   
Winter (2003) extends this debate and argues that these learning mechanisms lead to the 
creation of higher-order routines (dynamic capability) which support the regular 
modification of lower-order operating routines (operational capability). In this study, the 
author refers to Collis’s (1994) “capability hierarchy” principal in which operational (zero-
level), dynamic (first-order), and meta (second-order) capabilities link to one another. 
Easterby-Smith and Prieto (2008: 237) also build on Winter (2003) and state: “Operational 
capabilities or routines are geared towards the functioning of the organization; dynamic 
capabilities are dedicated to the modification of operational routines; finally, learning 
capabilities facilitate the creation and modification of dynamic capabilities.” Second-order 
learning processes (Adler and Clark, 1991) therefore underpin meta-capabilities, which 
scholars describe as the “learning-to-learn type” of capability (Danneels, 2002; 2008). 
Recently, Ambrosini et al. (2009) advance Winter’s (2003) conceptual ideas by using 
Senge’s (1990) theory of generative (second-order) learning to propose a “regenerative 
dynamic capability” that modifies a firms dynamic capabilities (first-order), which in turn 
modifies  a firms operational (zero-level) resource base.  
Zahra et al. (2006) however note that these perspectives are less clear on how dynamic 
capabilities “develop, emerge, or evolve” in new and established organisations. The authors 
therefore argue for the creation and subsequent use of dynamic capabilities correspond to an 
actor’s (e.g. individual, team, or senior management) perception of opportunities to change 
existing routines or resource configurations, their willingness to undertake such change, and 
their ability to implement these changes. The authors therefore criticise early views that 
dynamic capabilities represent sustained advantage (Teece et al. 1997) or strategic processes 
such as NPD that enable long-term advantage (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). Instead, Zahra 
et al. (2006) build on Winter’s (2003) discussion and distinguish “substantive capabilities” 
(i.e. ordinary capabilities) from dynamic capabilities, which they define as the ability to 
change substantive capabilities. Central to their argument is substantive capabilities solve 
problems such as NPD, whereas dynamic capabilities “reform” the way it performs tasks 
such as the development of new products. This perspective thus differs from Eisenhardt and 
Martin (2000), as the authors argue that routines such as NPD represent a substantive 
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capability, but the ability to change existing NPD routines is what constitutes a dynamic 
capability (2006: 951).  
Zahra et al. (2006) therefore argue the core purpose of a dynamic capability is to reconfigure 
substantive capabilities and they distinguish this higher-order capability from its effects on 
potential outcomes such as increased costs, survival, and growth. The authors thus propose 
that dynamic capabilities mediate the relationship between a firm’s substantive capabilities 
and its organisational knowledge, which mean dynamic capabilities have an indirect impact 
on performance (2006: 943). In other words, the authors emphasise a dynamic capability is 
one way to implement change, but firms require bundles of capabilities (substantive and 
dynamic) and knowledge to achieve the outcome of superior performance. Moreover, Nelson 
and Winter’s (1982) original arguments on “maladaptation” (i.e. the harmful side of change), 
reminds scholars that dynamic capabilities are only one aspect of strategic management, and 
do not necessarily underpin sustained competitive advantage. Thus, Zahra et al. (2006) 
distinction between dynamic capabilities in new and established firms, seeks to strike a 
balance that suggests capability development is one that is both intuitive as it is rational, and 
emergent as it is deliberate. Nevertheless, what unifies all of these perspectives is that 
resource reconfiguration is central to the overall purpose and nature of dynamic capability 
development. 
2.3.3 Dynamic Capabilities and Asset Orchestration 
Teece (2012: 1395) notes the role of individual executives and entrepreneurs is now 
beginning to form an important part of the dynamic capabilities debate. That is some 
researchers argue that the previous dynamic capability perspectives focus too heavily on 
Nelson and Winter’s (1982) notion of organisational routines, but allocate less attention to 
the individual skills, knowledge and actions of executives and entrepreneurs (Adner and 
Helfat, 2003; Teece, 2007; Helfat et al. 2007, Augier and Teece, 2009). Moreover, Teece 
(2007) argues that the previous perspectives do not explicate on the nature and 
“microfoundations” of dynamic capability development. Over the past decade, an increasing 
number of scholars have been calling for research on the microfoundations of strategic 
management, which Foss (2011: 1414) defines as “the foundations that are rooted in 
individual action and interaction.” Teece and colleagues (Teece, 2000, 2007; Helfat et al. 
2007; Augier and Teece, 2009) therefore argue that the “asset orchestration” process is an 
emerging but central function within the dynamic capabilities paradigm.  
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However in the dynamic capabilities literature, it seems researchers have yet to clearly define 
“asset orchestration” but some studies do elaborate on the processes that underpin this 
managerial function (Teece, 2007; Helfat et al. 2007; Augier and Teece, 2009; Sirmon et al. 
2011). Teece’s (2007: 1319) definition in Table 2-2 indicates that a firm’s dynamic 
capabilities fall into three clusters of activities: (1) the identification and assessment of an 
opportunity (i.e. sensing); (2) the mobilisation of resources to create value from an 
opportunity (i.e. seizing); (3) and the continuous realignment of resources to address new 
opportunities (i.e. transforming). Consequently, Teece argues that initial research on – 
coordination, integration, learning, and reconfiguration (i.e. Teece and Pisano, 1994; Teece 
et al. 1997) – are actually sub-processes that support sensing, seizing, and transforming. 
Therefore, Teece argues that the combination of these processes and sub-processes 
encapsulate the asset orchestration process (2007: 1341). 
In response to this research, Helfat, Finkelstein, Mitchell, Peteraf, Singh, Teece, and Winter 
collaborate on Dynamic Capabilities: Understanding Strategic Change in Organisations 
(2007) to examine the asset orchestration process. Specifically, Helfat et al. (2007: 25) argue 
that asset orchestration is a “managerial activity [that] involves, inter alia, orchestrating 
complementary and co-specialized assets, inventing and implementing new business 
models, and making astute investment choices (including with regard to R&D and M&A) in 
situations of uncertainty and ambiguity.” The authors therefore emphasise that asset 
orchestration differs from previous dynamic capability perspectives, as it not only protects 
asset value (i.e. Lippman and Rumlet, 1982) but also creates asset value through 
Schumpeterian resource combinations (2007: 28). Therefore, asset orchestration not only 
involves the choice of governance modes, it involves a strategic manger’s resource allocation 
skills to design and implement governance structures that protect and create long-term 
investment priorities (Maritan and Peteraf, 2007). Therefore, Teece argues that asset 
orchestration is inherently entrepreneurial, as it exhibits few routines, as most 
“transformations require actions that one may never replicate” (2012: 1397). 
Helfat et al (2007) therefore redefine dynamic capability by synthesising the previous 
perspectives listed in Table 2-3 in relation to the asset orchestration process. Helfat et al. 
(2007: 4) argue:  
A dynamic capability is the capacity of an organization to purposefully create, extend, 
or modify its resource base. 
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Helfat et al. (2007: 4) argue that the words in italics have specific meanings but recognise a 
single phrase cannot include everything of theoretical importance. Firstly, the “resource 
base” includes “tangible, intangible, and human assets (or resources) as well as capabilities 
which the organization owns, controls, or has access to on a preferential basis” (2007: 4). 
The term “preferential basis” thus implies organisations’ need not own a resource or 
capability for it to comprise part of the resource base such as preferential access to co-
specialised assets (2007: 4). Secondly, the authors define “capacity” as “the ability to 
perform a task in at least a minimally acceptable manner.” (2007: 5). Consistent with the 
Oxford English Dictionary, the word ability is “the possession of the means or skill to do 
something.” Figure 2-2 thus illustrates “resources” and “experience” underpin the “capacity’ 
concept.” Thus, resources provide the “means” to perform a change activity, while 
experience concerns the degree of “skills” an organisation has to implement a change activity 
(Helfat and Peteraf, 2003). 
Figure 2-2: The Capacity Dimensions to Perform a Task 
 
Source: Adapted from Helfat and Peteraf (2003) 
Thirdly, the authors note that “purposeful” suggests dynamic capabilities reflect some degree 
of deliberate intent (2007: 5). Helfat and Peteraf (2009: 95) therefore argue a “minimal 
degree of intentionality distinguishes a capability (dynamic or otherwise) from an accident 
or pure luck.” Moreover, the authors adopt Winter and colleagues (Dosi et al. 2000; Zollo 
and Winter, 2002; Winter, 2003) view that the term “purposeful” distinguishes dynamic 
from operational capabilities in that the latter organisational processes lack strategic intent. 
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However, the authors also argue that dynamic capabilities are also likely to exhibit emergent 
streams of activity (i.e. Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000) where there is clear intent (e.g. 
alliances or acquisitions), but uncertainty on how to achieve an aim due to issues such causal 
ambiguity (Barney, 1991) and environmental turbulence (D’Avenni, 1994). Helfat et al 
(2007) therefore adopt a similar standpoint to that of Zahra et al. (2006) in which they argue 
that dynamic capability development is both intentional and emergent.  
Finally, the words “create, extend or modify” encapsulate “asset orchestration” that signifies 
the process with which firms alter their resource base (2007: 5-6). Helfat et al. (2007) 
therefore argue asset orchestration consists of organisational and managerial processes that 
primarily involve (1) search and selection activities and (2) configuration and deployment 
activities. In line with Pettigrew (1992), the authors argue search and selection activities 
involve strategic decisions such as the creation of co-specialised assets or investment in 
R&D. Whereas, configuration and deployment activities focus on implementation such as 
the management of co-specialised assets or cultivation of innovation processes (2007: 28). 
Helfat et al. (2007) thus note asset orchestration is the overarching strategic process that 
underpins dynamic capability development. Helfat et al. (2007) perspective is similar to 
Winter (2003) and Zahra et al. (2006) as they argue the core purpose of a dynamic capability 
is to implement strategic change, which they define as change that influences the long-term 
direction of the organisation.  
Based on Table 2-3 examination, the author argues that Helfat et al. (2007) perspective on 
asset orchestration provides a theoretical lens with the most magnification (i.e. focal length) 
and clarity (i.e. aperture) to examine the development and deployment of dynamic 
capabilities. That is the author adopts the view that the core purpose of a dynamic capability 
is to reconfigure the resource base (e.g. Zahra et al. 2006) rather than sustain competitive 
advantage (e.g. Teece, 2007),  which increases the conceptual appeal of Helfat et al.(2007) 
lens. The following section will therefore adopt a process perspective to facilitate this wider 
aim of exploring how international new ventures build dynamic capabilities in networking 
to achieve outputs congruent with survival and growth.   
2.4 A Process Lens on Dynamic Capability Development and Deployment 
The prime objective of this section is to establish a process lens that enables the exploration 
of dynamic capability development and deployment. This section will therefore build on 
section 2.3 discussion that asset orchestration is a valuable theoretical lens to explore 
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dynamic capability development. Interestingly, Maritan and Peteraf (2007) note that few 
contributions conduct granular research on the organisational and managerial processes that 
underpin dynamic capability development. This section therefore applies a process lens to 
examine the creation, extension, and modification of a firm’s resource base (Helfat et al. 
2007). Moreover, the (1) search and selection, and (2) configuration and deployment 
activities provide a useful platform to conduct granular research. Sirmon e al (2011) also 
propose that their “resource management framework” (Sirmon et al. 2007) also takes a 
process perspective on how organisations manage their resource base and overlaps with 
Helfat et al. (2007) asset orchestration framework. The following sections will therefore 
examine the resource creation, extension, and modification processes to clarify the 
mechanisms on which this theoretical lens operates.  
2.4.1 Resource Creation Process 
Helfat et al. (2007: 6) note the word “create” include “all forms of resource creation in an 
organization including obtaining new resources through acquisitions and alliances, as well 
as through innovation and entrepreneurial activity.” The authors note the creation of new 
resources therefore involves the search and selection of existing resources that are available 
within the wider external environment. For example, the authors state the creation of 
resources through acquisitions fundamentally involves the search and selection of 
acquisition candidates, while resource creation for NPD involves the search and selection of 
new products (2007: 6). Nevertheless, despite this brief description, Helfat et al. (2007) do 
not elaborate on the search and selection activities that underpin the resource creation 
process. Teece (2007) in contrast identifies “sensing” and “seizing” opportunities as central 
processes that result in the emergence of dynamic capabilities. Therefore, Teece’s (2007) 
discussion on sensing aligns closely with Helfat et al. (2007) notion of resource creation as 
both processes consider how firms search for opportunities.    
Search is an “exploration” process that underpins an important aspect of organisational 
learning theory (March, 1991). Rooted in March and Simon (1958), problemistic search 
seeks to explain how organisations search for new information in order to solve existing 
problems. Teece (2007: 1326) notes search includes processes that direct R&D, taps supplier 
and “complementor” innovation, and identifies changing customer needs. In this literature, 
search processes are normally “local” as organisational members search for alternatives 
within their “neighbourhood” as information does not span technological or organisational 
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boundaries (Levinthal, 1997). Rosenkopf and Nerkar (2001) label these search processes as 
“local exploration” while Henderson and Clark (1990) argue these processes result in the 
exploitation of incremental innovation. By contrast, “global” search involves the 
exploitation of “path-breaking” opportunities (Levinthal, 1997) and radical innovation 
(Henderson and Clark, 1990; Henderson and Clark, 1994). Rosenkopf and Nerkar (2001) 
thus note this learning process involves “radical exploration” where organisational members 
search for new opportunities that span technological and organisational boundaries. 
Dynamic capabilities therefore encapsulate both of these search activities (local and global), 
which allows firms to create new resources in response to technological and market 
opportunities (Teece, 2007: 1322). 
Although Helfat et al. (2007) argue resource creation is an entrepreneurial activity the 
authors give scant attention to the nature of opportunity. Whereas in the entrepreneurship 
literature, there is wide debate on whether opportunities are waiting to be “discovered” or 
“created” by entrepreneurs (Stevenson and Jarillo, 1990; Venkataraman, 1997; Alvarez and 
Barney, 2007). Short et al. (2010) review the opportunity concept and find that 
entrepreneurship research leans more towards the process of discovery, opposed to the 
creation of opportunities. Nevertheless, recent research views opportunity discovery and 
creation as important processes in the advancement of RBT (Barney et al. 2011). That is 
Alvarez and Barney (2007: 13) argue discovery theory suggests opportunities are 
“exogenous” as they exist independently of entrepreneurial perceptions and actions and are 
“waiting to be discovered and exploited.” Whereas, in creation theory, opportunities are not 
objective phenomena formed by exogenous market imperfections, but “created 
endogenously, by the actions, reactions, and enactment of entrepreneurs exploring ways to 
produce new products or services” (2007: 15). 
Alvarez and Barney (2007: 13) thus argue the exogenous nature of opportunity discovery 
means this theory is predominately about search, and the term “search” has little meaning in 
creation theory, as entrepreneurs do not “search” as they are unaware of what they are 
looking for. However, Sarasvathy (2001) notes that creation theory places greater emphasis 
on the Schumpeterian qualities of the entrepreneur. Relatedly, Bingham et al. (2007) argues 
entrepreneurs create opportunities through intuition (i.e. heuristics) and adaptation, which 
indicates that creation theory and search share a distinctive behavioural heritage. Zahra 
(2008) therefore challenges Alvarez and Barney’s (2007) assumption and argues that search 
creates a virtuous and dynamic cycle in which entrepreneurs discover and subsequently 
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create opportunities. Thus, Zahra (2008: 253) argues opportunity creation involves search in 
Schumpeterian environments where industry knowledge is young, technology is emergent, 
and the firm has a specialised strategic focus, which are all important settings within dynamic 
capabilities research. 
Helfat et al. (2007: 53) identify “selection” as a central aspect of the decision-making 
process, and argue that selection involves “investment” in opportunities. In strategic 
management, a stream of studies have begun to examine a firm’s “investment” in “strategic 
opportunities” (Makadok and Barney, 2001; Denrell et al. 2003; Coen and Maritan, 2011). 
Denrell et al. (2003) for example discuss the investment in strategic opportunities in which 
firms buy commodity resources (i.e. information) in factor markets and intentionally 
transform these tradable resources into non-tradable “complex” resources. Under this view, 
commodity resources are “discovered” and bought in factor markets, while complex 
resources are “created” internally and built over time. Sirmon et al. (2007: 278) also discuss 
the resource creation process, but under the label of “structuring” resource portfolios which 
involves sub-processes of (1) acquiring (2) accumulating and (3) divesting resources. Sirmon 
et al. (2011) identifies their notion of “acquiring” and “accumulating” overlaps with 
“buying” and “building” while divesting is a processes that links with section 2.3.3 
discussion on resource modification. These investment processes thus signify a virtuous 
cycle of “buying [discovery] and building [creation]” since firms “buy resources in SFMs, 
builds them further through internal development, and then uses those resources to shape 
further SFM transactions” (Maritan and Peteraf, 2011: 1383). 
Finally, “configuration” and “deployment” are important steps in the asset orchestration 
process (Sirmon and Hitt, 2009). Although Helfat et al. (2007: 8) argue “configuration” and 
“deployment” result in strategic change they do not discuss the implementation processes 
that lead to resource creation, extension, or modification. Sirmon and colleagues (Sirmon et 
al. 2007; Sirmon and Hitt, 2009; Sirmon et al. 2011) on the other hand provide a rich 
discussion on configuration and deployment within their resource management framework. 
Sirmon et al. (2007) emphasise firms must initially “design” capability configurations before 
they are able to use such configurations to implement strategy. Sirmon et al. (2011: 1392) 
label this strategic behaviour as “leveraging” that involves “a sequence of processes to 
exploit the firm’s capabilities and take advantage of specific market opportunities.” 
Specifically, these leveraging processes consist of (1) mobilizing, which provides a plan or 
vision for identifying requisite capabilities to design new capability configurations; (2) 
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coordinating, which involves integrating capabilities into efficient and effective 
configurations, and (3) deploying, which exploits a capability configuration for the 
implementation of strategy (Sirmon et al. 2007: 277).  
Teece’s (2007) discussion on “seizing” opportunities is one example that sheds light on new 
capability configurations. The author argues that seizing opportunities involves the creation 
of an innovative business model that defines a firms commercialisation strategy and 
investment priorities. Therefore, the author argues firms must make “design choices” (i.e. 
Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 2002) on the architecture of their business model, opposed to 
the mere selection of a physical technology. Thus, having an entrepreneurial vision that 
“shapes” an industry architecture (i.e. the business ecosystem) and having skills to 
coordinate co-specialised assets are vital for successful deployment of new capability 
configurations (Teece, 2007: 1330). Overall, the variation in a firm’s ability to make 
capability configurations influence the extent to which firms can successfully create 
heterogeneous resource positions (Maritan and Peteraf, 2011). Given this limited literature 
on resource creation, it is evident this is an area ripe for further research. 
2.4.2 Resource Extension Process 
Helfat et al. (2007: 6) note the word “extend” means when “organisations ‘extend’ their 
resource base in the direction of more of the same, as for example when they seek to promote 
growth in an ongoing business.” Therefore, the authors note that “extension of the current 
resource base also requires an important selection decision regarding whether or not to 
enhance current assets and capabilities, and which ones to enhance” (2007: 6). Coen and 
Maritan (2011) therefore argue that “investment” in existing assets reinforces the resource 
extension process. Thus, the choice to increase investment in an “existing asset” is largely 
dependent on the acquisition of new knowledge, as this new knowledge helps firms make 
decisions on whether increased investment in existing assets will continue to yield 
competitive advantage and sustained profitable growth (Makadok and Barney, 2001). 
Denrell et al. (2003) discussion on the “search” for new knowledge therefore infers that 
search is also an important activity in the resource extension process.  
On first glance, Helfat et al. (2007) notion of “resource extension” is similar to the 
entrepreneurial process of “opportunity creation” as it involves “building” new opportunities 
(Zahra, 2008). However, the core distinction in “resource extension” is this process focusses 
on increased investment in “existing” opportunities, opposed to the investment in ‘new’ 
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opportunities (Denrell et al. 2003). Despite this discussion, few dynamic capabilities studies 
discuss the “resource extension” process and ones that do (e.g. Winter, 2003; Helfat et al. 
2007) provide scant detail on what resource extension actually entails. However, Karim and 
Mitchell (2000) is one exception within the dynamic capabilities literature that examines 
resource extension. In this study, the authors focus on acquisitive growth and find that 
“resource deepening” processes lead to path-dependent change, while “resource extension” 
processes leads to path-breaking change. Specifically, the authors find that acquirers will 
sustain growth when they extend investment in a “target firms” core competencies, which 
are distinct from their previous resource base (2000: 1068). Karim and Mitchell (2000) 
therefore reinforce the argument that innovation based firms must reallocate and extend 
investment in core competencies if they are to sustain long-term competitive advantage.  
Resource extension is also similar to the evolutionary concept of “retention” which is the 
mechanism on which firms preserve, duplicate, or propagate positively “selected” forms 
(Zott, 2003). Interestingly, Levinthal (1995) identifies a paradox, as the notion of “retention” 
in the evolutionary theory is at cross-roads with RBT, as the latter does not focus on the 
“retention” of firm-specific capabilities, but on the “uniqueness” of capabilities. Thus, in 
evolutionary theory, “uniqueness” poses the risk of extinction if there are no repeatable 
processes, while in RBT, too much repetition risks imitation. Ironically, Penrose (1959) is 
one of the few resource-based scholars to include the evolutionary concept of “retention” 
but warns that rapid investment may endanger a firm’s distinctive competencies. For 
example, if as Barney (1986b) suggests, that organisational culture is a valuable resource, 
then rapid investment in new human resource could threaten the integrity of the culture and 
thereby diminish a firm’s overall advantage (Dierickx and Cool, 1989). Garnsey (1998) thus 
argues since early growth can be as much as a threat as an opportunity, firms must invest 
wisely in distinctive resources they wish to retain and extend.  
Sirmon and colleagues (Sirmon et al. 2007; Sirmon et al. 2011) discuss investment, but 
assign different labels to resource extension process. Sirmon et al. (2007: 277) like other 
scholars (e.g. Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Thomke and Kuemmerle, 2002) discuss 
“accumulating” as “a process of developing resources internally” which overlaps with 
resource extension. Thus, the authors note internal development of resources enhances 
isolating mechanisms, decreases imitation threats, and increases maintainability of 
advantage (2007: 279). Similarly, Sirmon et al. (2007) discussion on the “enriching” process, 
which belongs to the “bundling” component of their resource management framework, 
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provides insight into how firms invest in existing capabilities. That is, the authors define 
enriching as “learning new skills that extend the repertoire of current skills or by adding a 
complementary resource from the resource portfolio to the current bundle.” (2007: 277). 
Therefore, the “key goal of an enriching bundling process is to ‘extend’ and elaborate a 
current capability” to maintain the worth of valuable assets (2007: 281). Resource extension 
is therefore a long-term investment process, and important within the asset orchestration 
function (Helfat et al. 2007; Maritan and Peteraf, 2011).    
2.4.3 Resource Modification Process 
Helfat et al. (2007: 6) note the word “modify” means “organisations can ‘modify’ their 
resource base in order to change their businesses, including in response to change in the 
external environment.” The authors argue:   
‘In addition, modification of a resource base requires search for and selection of any such modifications. As 
part of resource modification, a firm may choose to destroy part of its existing resource base by selling, closing, 
or discarding it. Dynamic capabilities apply to exit, not just expansion’ (Helfat et al. 2007: 6).  
Although the previous section explains that firms should extend investment in distinctive 
resources, the resource modification process suggests core capabilities also have a “dark 
side” (Schreyögg and Kliesch-Eberl, 2007: 916). In Leonard-Barton’s (1992: 118) words 
core capabilities run the risk of becoming “core rigidities” which are “deeply embedded 
knowledge sets [that] actively create problems” and hamper a firm’s competitive advantage. 
Whereas, in Hannan and Freeman’s (1984) terms, this rigidity issue involves “structural 
inertia” where organisations fail to adapt at the rate business environments change. Levinthal 
and March (1993) note this is common when an organisation’s learning falls into a 
“competency trap” as it struggles to balance excessive exploration (the failure trap) or 
excessive exploitation (the success trap). Thus, in high-velocity markets, organisational 
capabilities may “easily invert from a strategic asset into a strategic burden” (Schreyögg and 
Kliesch-Eberl, 2007: 916).  
Helfat and Peteraf (2003) thus identify several processes that trigger the resource 
modification process. In this study, the authors argue that “selection events” may “branch” 
the evolution of capabilities in several directions (2003: 1004). Consequently, the authors 
argue that: (1) retirement, (2), retrenchment, (3) renewal, (4) replication, (5) redeployment, 
and (6) recombination are the underlying processes of capability transformation. These 
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branches therefore provide researchers with a framework to investigate what Helfat et al. 
(2007) refer to as the resource modification process. Figure 2-6 illustrates these modification 
processes.  
Helfat and Peteraf (2003) describe “retirement” as a modification process when firms 
abandon an existing capability, such as when trade embargos eradicate the demand or supply 
of a particular product or service. Similarly, the authors describe “retrenchment” as a process 
where firms gradually phase out a capability due to decreasing demand (2003: 1005-1006). 
Consequently, Teece (2007: 1333) argues firms need dynamic capabilities to “destroy part 
of its existing resource base by selling, closing, [or] discarding it.” Whereas, Sirmon et al. 
(2007) discussion on the “divesting” process, which forms part of the “structuring” process, 
provides insight into how firms shed resources. The authors argue that since firms have finite 
resources, it is imperative they evaluate their current resource base and divest less-valued 
resources to generate the capacity to accumulate resources of a higher-value (2007: 280). 
Therefore, divestment is a strategic task to help managers free up the capacity to create and 
extend resources (Hitt et al. 2011). 
Figure 2-3: Branches of the Capability Lifecycle 
 
Source: Helfat and Peteraf (2003: 1005) 
Agarwal and Helfat (2009: 282) note “strategic renewal” is one type of “strategic change”, 
which they define as the “refreshment or replacement of attributes of an organization that 
have the potential to substantially affect its long-term prospects.” Strategic renewal therefore 
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concerns the refinement of existing capabilities (Floyd and Lane, 2003). Helfat and Peteraf 
(2003) argue that renewal primarily involves improving an existent capability through the 
search for new alternatives, which might lead to minor or major resource based 
modifications. Sirmon et al. (2007) discussion on the “stabilizing” process, which forms part 
of the “bundling” process, also provides insight on how firms make incremental 
improvements to existing capabilities. Specifically, the authors argue that when firms hold 
a current competitive advantage they will often engage in stabilizing to maintain this 
advantage (2007: 281). This modification process therefore involves the continuous and 
gradual “refreshment” of a firm’s resource base, to avoid inertia that slowly rots a firm’s 
competitive advantage (Capron and Mitchell, 2009). 
Replication is a modification process that involves reproducing the same capability in a new 
geographic market (Winter and Szulanski, 2001). Szulanski and Jensen (2008) note 
franchising is the most common replication strategy as it enables firms to standardise their 
capabilities across multiple geographic markets. In innovation-based firms, replication 
might occur when firms attempt to replicate their business model in multiple foreign markets 
(Doganova and Eyquem-Renault, 2009). Whereas, the “global strategy” literature provides 
ample examples of when organisations standardise their capabilities across multiple foreign 
markets (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1991; Ghemawat, 2003; Peng and Miles, 2009). However, 
Sapienza et al. (2006: 924-925) propose that in the case of young firms which 
internationalise early, they are more likely to survive and grow when they redeploy their 
limited resources across multiple capabilities. Thus, the authors argue young firms need 
fungible resources (e.g. a platform technology) to pursue several heterogeneous foreign 
market opportunities at a comparatively lower cost (2006: 924-925). 
Redeployment therefore involves modifying an existing capability to serve a new, but 
closely related product or service market (Helfat and Peteraf, 2003). Helfat and Raubitschek 
(2000) note this sort of transfer often requires some alteration of the capability in order to 
serve the new market. Helfat and Peteraf (2003: 1006) also emphasise that redeployment 
may take one of two forms. The first form is when a firm redeploys an existing capability to 
a new market. Madhok (1997) notes in the case of internationalisation, the firm can redeploy 
their capabilities such as their core technology through a combination of foreign market entry 
modes. That is the firm might directly export their core product to one foreign market, learn 
from it, and simultaneously license their intellectual property to another foreign market. 
Whereas the second form of redeployment involves the inter-temporal transfer of capabilities 
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from one market (i.e. a declining one) to a new market (i.e. such as an emerging foreign 
market) that exhibits greater growth potential (Luo, 2000, 2003).    
Recombination is a central resource modification process (Helfat and Winter, 2011). Helfat 
and Peteraf (2003) note that recombination is an alternative to renewal it creates new 
capabilities opposed to improving existing ones. Based on Schumpeterian logic, numerous 
scholars consider combination as a core capability building mechanism (Nelson and Winter, 
1982; Kogut and Zander, 1992; Teece et al. 1997; Dosi et al. 2000). Teece (2007: 1338) 
emphasises that combination is inherently entrepreneurial in which firms match and integrate 
co-specialised assets. For example, combining a biotechnology start-ups R&D capability 
with a manufacturer’s unique production capability can lead to the creation of new 
capabilities in biomedical research (Pisano, 1990). Sirmon et al. (2077) discussion on 
“pioneering” also forms part of the “bundling” process, which provides insight into how 
firms recombine resources. Interestingly, the authors emphasise “recombination” and 
“combination” are distinct processes, in that the former uses existing resources to create 
capabilities, while the latter uses new resources to create new capabilities. Sirmon et al. 
(2007: 282) thus note combination and recombination are creative modification process that 
address highly competitive contexts. Therefore, on close examination of resource 
modification, it is evident that multiple processes underpin this asset orchestration function. 
2.5 Conclusion 
In conclusion, this chapter selects Helfat et al. (2007) asset orchestration framework as a 
theoretical lens to help navigate this research study. After an initial review of dynamic 
capabilities theoretical foundations, it became clear that evolutionary (Nelson and Winter, 
1982), transaction costs (Williamson, 1975, 1985) and resource based (Dierickx and Cool, 
1989) theory underpin the dynamic capabilities perspective. These established theories are 
influential in their own right and reinforce Helfat and Peteraf’s (2009) argument that 
dynamic capabilities have a strong theoretical foundation. Nevertheless, this chapter 
identifies that numerous perspectives and conflicting interpretations burden the dynamic 
capabilities literature. Barreto (2010) argues that given dynamic capabilities is an emerging 
perspective, it is most likely that multiple perspectives will continue to surface before the 
paradigm reaches theoretical maturity. Since this ambiguity creates challenges for doctoral 
research, the researcher examined the seminal dynamic capability perspectives in order to 
select a robust theoretical lens. 
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The author argues there are three major benefits that justify the selection of Helfat et al. 
(2007) theoretical lens. Firstly, unlike early perspectives (e.g. Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000), 
asset orchestration provides the opportunity to select a process lens that enables a thorough 
exploration of dynamic capability development and deployment. That is, asset orchestration 
focusses on search and selection as well as configuration and deployment processes, which 
provide a platform for granular research on the nature, processes, and outcomes of dynamic 
capabilities. Secondly, asset orchestration aims to reveal the microfoundations (Teece, 2007; 
Helfat et al. 2007) of dynamic capabilities through the examination of how individual 
entrepreneurs engage in strategic management processes such as resource allocation, 
investment, and reconfiguration. Moreover, unlike previous perspectives (e.g. Zollo and 
Winter, 2002) that focus on large firms, Helfat et al. (2007) argue asset orchestration is 
relevant to new ventures that compete in high-velocity markets. Given the aim is to explore 
how technology start-ups build dynamic capabilities in networking to enable NVI, asset 
orchestration is a useful lens through which to conduct this research.   
Finally, the author selects Helfat et al. (2007) perspective of asset orchestration over Teece 
(2007) for the reason this study aligns with section 2.3.2 view that dynamic capabilities core 
purpose is to alter the resource base rather than sustain competitive advantage. This 
perspective then enables the researcher to focus on how individual entrepreneurs and their 
new ventures create, extend, and modify their resource base to enable NVI. Having 
introduced this theoretical lens, Chapter 3 will discuss NVI in context of capability 
development, while Chapter 4 will use dynamic capabilities as a lens to examine the process 
of networking and social capital accumulation. The asset orchestration framework thus 
navigates the remainder of this thesis. 
  
 60 
 
3 – New Venture 
Internationalisation: A Capability 
Building Process 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Aim 
To review literature that sheds light on the capability building process within new 
venture internationalisation. 
Chapter Objectives 
 To review the theoretical elements that underpin new venture 
internationalisation theory. 
 To examine early internationalisation research that helps explain the building 
of capabilities in new venture internationalisation. 
 To review literature that explores the building of dynamic capabilities in new 
venture internationalisation. 
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3.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to review literature that sheds light on the capability building process 
within NVI. This chapter therefore intends to achieve three objectives. Firstly, this chapter 
will review the theoretical elements that underpin NVI theory. This section will indicate that 
this theory draws on international business, entrepreneurship, and strategic management 
theory. Secondly, this chapter will examine early internationalisation research that helps 
explain the building of capabilities in NVI. This chapter will also adopt the argument that 
early internationalisation is a process of capability development. Thirdly, this chapter will 
review literature that explores the building of dynamic capabilities in NVI. This chapter will 
therefore provide a theoretical context for this doctoral research and conclude with the view 
that the INV is a fertile empirical setting to conduct dynamic capabilities research. 
3.2 New Venture Internationalisation – Theoretical Foundations 
NVI theory has received significant attention due to the premise that INVs are incongruent 
with traditional views on multinational enterprises (MNEs) (Oviatt and McDougall, 1994, 
Autio, 2005; Zahra, 2005). Thus, McDougall et al. (1994) original contention is that 
traditional IB theory such as product lifecycle (Vernon, 1979), stage (e.g. Bilkey and Tesar, 
1977; Johanson and Vahlne, 1977, 1990), oligopolistic reaction (Knickerbocker, 1973) and 
internalisation (e.g. Buckley and Casson, 1976) theories do not explain these variances. 
Autio (2005) also argues NVI theory aims to explain why new ventures engage in accelerated 
internationalisation. Oviatt and McDougal (1994) therefore was positioned as a direct 
challenge to Johanson and Vahlne’s (1977, 1990) process theory of internationalisation that 
seeks to explain a firm’s gradual involvement in international markets. Consequently, 
section 3.3 reviews the debate between process and NVI theories, but the general view is 
that INVs are unique organisational forms that draw upon multiple strands of IB, 
entrepreneurship and strategic management theory (Zahra and George, 2002).  
Indeed, Sapienza et al. (2005) argue for many new ventures, internationalisation is not just 
an afterthought, but also now an “essential gambit” that inevitably alters the focus and 
direction of a company. Therefore, early discussion on early and rapid internationalisation 
of new ventures included research on “born globals” (Rennie, 1993; Knight and Cavusgil, 
1996; Madsen and Servais, 1997), “international new ventures” (Oviatt and McDougall, 
1994), “instant internationals” (Preece et al. 1999), “entrepreneurial instant exporters” 
(McAuley, 1999), “international ventures” (Kuemmerle, 2002) and “micro-multinationals” 
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(Dimitratos et al. 2003; Ibeh et al. 2004). However, despite these various labels, there is 
widespread agreement that Benjamin Oviatt and Patricia McDougall’s publication Toward 
a Theory of International New Ventures (1994) is the seminal study that underpins NVI 
theory2.  
Oviatt and McDougall (1994: 49) define an INV as “a business organization that from 
inception, seeks to derive significant competitive advantage from the use of resources and 
the sale of output in multiple countries.” Oviatt and McDougall therefore combine theory on 
internalisation (e.g. Buckley and Casson, 1976), alternative governance structures (Vesper, 
1990; Williamson, 1991), foreign location advantage (Dunning, 1988), and control over 
unique resources (Barney, 1991) as the four major elements of sustainable INVs. Within this 
framework, Oviatt and McDougall (1994: 52-54) argue that (1) coordination of value chain 
activities (few versus many) and the (2) number of countries involved (few versus many) 
reveals four types of INV. Thus, INVs include: (1) export/import start-ups, (2) multinational 
traders, (3) geographically focussed start-ups, and (4) global start-ups. Export/import start-
ups therefore coordinate few value chain activities in only few countries, while multinational 
traders coordinate a few activities but within an array of foreign markets. Geographically 
focussed start-ups therefore coordinate many cross-border activities but within a specific 
region, and global start-ups derive significant competitive advantage from extensive 
coordination of activities in multiple geographical locations (1994: 58-60).  
NVI theory is therefore a fundamental branch of what has become international 
entrepreneurship (IE) research (Oviatt and McDougall, 2005; Keupp and Gassmann, 2009; 
Jones et al. 2011). Table 3-1 indicates that various scholars seek to define IE, which 
McDougall and Oviatt (2000) argue is frequently at the intersection of entrepreneurship 
(Giamartino et al. 1993) and IB (Wright and Ricks, 1994) research paths. Whereas, Zahra 
and George (2002b) argue strategic management theory continues to influence IE research 
due to discussion on issues such as unique resources and industry competitiveness. Table 3-
1 therefore chronologically lists the various contributions that seek to define IE research. 
  
                                         
2 Oviatt and McDougall (2005b) retrospectively discuss the origins and importance of their 1994 paper 
having won the 2004 Journal of International Business Studies Decade Award. 
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Table 3-1: Definitions of International Entrepreneurship Research 
Study Definition 
 
McDougall (1989) “the development of international new ventures or start-ups that, from their inception, 
engage in international business, thus viewing their operating domain as international 
from the initial stages of the firm’s operation.” (1989: 387) 
Zahra (1993) “the study of the nature and consequences of a firm’s risk-taking behaviours as it 
ventures into international markets.” (1993: 9) 
McDougall and Oviatt (2000) “a combination of innovative, proactive, and risk-seeking behaviour that crosses 
national borders and is intended to create value in organizations.” (2000: 903) 
Zahra and George (2002) “the process of creatively discovering and exploiting opportunities that lie outside a 
firm’s domestic markets in pursuit of competitive advantage” (2002b: 261). 
Kuemmerle (2002)  “The development of international new ventures or start-ups that, from their 
inception, engage in either home-base-augmenting (HBA) or home-base-exploiting 
(HBE) activities or both, thus viewing their operating domain as international from 
the initial stages of the firm’s operation.” (2002: 105) 
Oviatt and McDougall (2005a) “the discovery, enactment, evaluation, and exploitation of opportunities – across 
national borders – to create future goods and services.” (2005: 540) 
Source: The Author 
Oviatt and McDougall (2005a) argue that the interpretations in Table 3-1 have meant IE has 
emerged on two branches where one branch focusses on the cross-national-border behaviour 
of entrepreneurial actors (i.e. NVI) and the second focusses on the cross-national-border 
comparison of entrepreneurs, their behaviour, and the circumstances in which they are 
embedded (i.e. international comparisons of entrepreneurship). Due to these two research 
streams, the authors redefine IE as “the discovery, enactment, evaluation, and exploitation 
of opportunities – across national borders – to create future goods and services” (2005: 540). 
This redefinition then synthesises research on opportunity (i.e. Zahra and George, 2002b) 
and cross-border activities (i.e. Kuemmerle, 2002) in order to unify this previous research. 
Therefore, the researcher aims to examine NVI research with the view to investigate the 
cross-national-border behaviour of entrepreneurial actors that consists of individual 
entrepreneurs, groups, and organisations. The prime objective of this section will review the 
theoretical elements that underpin NVI theory to gain a deeper understanding of new 
ventures that operate in multiple foreign markets. 
3.2.1 Internalisation and Alternative Governance Advantages 
The internalisation of some transactions (i.e. Williamson, 1985) is the first element of NVI 
theory and is one of the most fundamental elements that underpins theories of the MNE 
(Buckley and Casson, 1976; Teece, 1977; Hood and Young, 1979; Rugman, 1981; Dunning, 
1980; Hennart, 1982). Buckley (1988: 181) argues the internalisation approach to MNE 
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theory rests “on two general axioms: (1) Firms choose the least cost location for each activity 
they perform, and (2) firms grow by internalizing markets up to the point where benefits of 
further internalization are outweighed by the costs.” MNE theory therefore assumes firms 
will initially develop a “firm-specific advantage” within its domestic market, and if it is not 
possible to exploit and safeguard this advantage through foreign market or contractual 
transactions, the firm will “internalise” these cross-border operations (Rugman, 1981). 
Oviatt and McDougall (1994: 54) therefore argue the latter point is central to INVs, as all 
organisations large or small must own “some” assets, otherwise they will have nothing 
valuable to trade within an economic transaction. However, unlike MNEs that vertically 
integrate across national borders, INVs are more likely to internalise a limited number of 
transactions, such as upstream activities that specialise in R&D and/or production (Jones, 
1999; Kuemmerle, 2002). 
Therefore, a core difference between MNEs and INVs is the latter lack the sufficient 
resources to control many assets through ownership, and must rely on alternative governance 
structures (i.e. strategic alliances) to access vital assets (Oviatt and McDougall, 1994). In IB 
research, Hennart (1988) notes that firms use foreign market entry modes as governance 
structures to organise their interdependence between countries. Root (1994: 5) defines an 
international market entry mode as “an institutional arrangement that makes possible the 
entry of a company’s products, technology, human skills, management, or other resources 
into a foreign country.” Various IB researchers categorise foreign entry modes such as 
exporting (e.g. indirect and direct exporting), contracts (e.g. licensing, franchising), joint 
ventures (JVs) and wholly owned subsidiaries (WOS) on a continuum of risk, control, and 
resource commitment (Young et al. 1989; Erramilli and Rao, 1990; Hill et al. 1990, Root, 
1994). Brouthers and Hennart (2007) note exporting generally has the lowest risk, control 
and level of commitment, while WOSs are at the opposite end of the spectrum, with the 
highest level of risk, control and commitment. Figure 3-2 therefore illustrates that alternative 
governance structures are either non-equity based contracts such as licensing and 
franchising, or equity based contracts such as minority or 50/50 JV agreements (Pan and 
Tse, 2000; Peng, 2009). 
Researchers use various perspectives to investigate the use of “alternative governance” 
structures on NVI (e.g. Bell, 1995; Coviello and Munro, 1995, 1997; Zacharakis, 1997; 
Casson, 1997; Jones, 1999; McNaughton, 2002). Bell (1995) for example was early to 
identify that small software firms use various foreign entry modes such as direct exporting 
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and licensing to support early internationalisation. Similarly, Zacharakis (1997) takes a TCE 
perspective to propose that a small firm’s “strategic alliance strategy” encapsulates the use 
entry modes such as licensing and JVs to support international expansion. Relatedly, Jones 
(1999) empirically finds that “international entrepreneurs” use multiple inward, outward, 
and cooperative R&D, production and sales and marketing cross-border activities to 
facilitate early internationalisation. However, Oviatt and McDougall (1994: 55) note a more 
“powerful resource-conserving alternative to internalization” involves the use of informal 
and formal network relationships (e.g. Aldrich and Zimmer, 1986; Larson, 1992) opposed 
to formal contracts. Subsequently, Oviatt and McDougall (2005a) elaborate on this initial 
discussion and propose that network relationships moderate the speed of NVI.  
Figure 3-1: Foreign Market Entry Modes 
 
Source: Peng (2009: 165) who adapted from Pan and Tse (2000: 538) 
Networks (e.g. Coviello, 2006) and social capital (e.g. Yli-Renko et al. 2002) are therefore 
fundamental to NVI as they have help overcomes resource shortages (Bell, 1995; Coviello 
and Munro, 1995, 1997), build legitimacy (Fernhaber and McDougall, 2009) and identify 
foreign market opportunities (Loane and Bell, 2006; Al-Laham and Souitaris, 2008). 
However, the limited studies that investigate an INV’s networking behaviour use various 
perspectives such as “network dynamics” (Coviello, 2006), “network development” (e.g. 
Wakkee, 2006), social capital dynamics (e.g. Prashantham and Dhanaraj, 2009), and 
“networking capability” (e.g. Mort and Weerawardena, 2006). Chapter 4 therefore aims to 
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review these networking perspectives, as they are central to this thesis. Furthermore, this 
study supports Coviello and Munro’s (1997) view that an INV’s network comprises of 
informal (i.e. inter-personal) and formal (i.e. inter-firm strategic alliances) network 
relationships, which allows a broader examination of NVI. 
3.2.2 Foreign Location Advantages 
Oviatt and McDougall (1994: 55) argue foreign location advantage is the third element that 
distinguishes INVs from domestic new ventures. Foreign location advantages are rooted in 
Dunning’s (1980, 1988) eclectic theory of international production – i.e. the “eclectic 
paradigm” – that seeks to explain the incentives of why firms choose FDI. Dunning argues 
that the ownership (O), location (L) and internalisation (I) advantages determine the extent, 
form, and pattern of an MNE’s international production. In terms of INVs, Oviatt and 
McDougall (1994) argue that Dunning’s discussion on locational advantages is particularly 
important as it helps explain where cross-border activity should be located. Kuemmerle 
(2002) argues that location advantages indicate the profitability potential of exploiting an 
international ventures ownership advantage (e.g., proprietary knowledge) in combination 
with a foreign country’s indigenous resources. Locational advantages can arise when a 
foreign market has a (1) high demand for a firm’s products or services; is (2) rich in natural, 
physical, and human resources; or is (3) agglomerated into specialised clusters of economic 
activity (Dunning, 2000).   
However, Meyer and Peng (2005) emphasise that attractive foreign markets such as the 
emerging economies also have “locational disadvantages” such as political instability, high 
trade barriers, weak appropriability regimes, and high psychic distance. Oviatt and 
McDougall (1994: 55) therefore argue MNEs can overcome these obstacles with 
“advantages of scale” whereas INVs are more likely to rely on proprietary knowledge and 
build alliances with local firms to compete in such markets. For example, research has found 
foreign regulatory regimes has a higher influence on the speed of NVI than industry and firm 
characteristics (Coeurderoy and Murray, 2008). Kuemmerle (2002) also examines the 
international entrepreneur’s choice of central location – their “home base” – in which the 
INV can manage knowledge flows that stem from home base-augmenting (HBA) and home 
base-exploiting (HBE) cross-border activities. Kuemmerle (2002) argues INVs are more 
likely to engage in initial HBA activities (i.e. R&D and NPD) prior to HBE activities (i.e. 
manufacturing, sales, and marketing). Thus, this is a dramatic departure from traditional 
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views that exporting represents a firm’s initial involvement in international markets 
(McDougall et al. 2003; Fernhaber et al. 2008). 
Gabrielsson and Kirpalani (2004) argue born global firms who originate from small domestic 
markets such as Australia, Finland, Israel and Taiwan are similar to INVs as they leverage 
proprietary technology to penetrate global markets. Rennie (1993) was the first to use the 
term “born global” to identify firms whose exports account for 76% of total sales after two 
years from foundation by coordinating cross-border activities in multiple countries. Knight 
and Cavusgil (1996: 11) define born globals as “small, technology orientated companies that 
operate in international markets from the earliest days of their establishment.” Relatedly, 
Madsen and Servais (1997) argue born globals produce highly specialised products for 
international niche markets and are not limited to a single market. Central to this view, is a 
born-globals knowledge base is highly mobile and are combined with less mobile resources 
(e.g. manufacture/distribution) in multiple countries to exploit competitive advantage (Moen 
and Servais, 2002; Chetty and Campbell-Hunt, 2004). Similarly, research on global start-
ups (Oviatt and McDougall, 1994; Oviatt et al. 1995), which is the most radical form of INV, 
aligns with born-globals as they derive competitive advantage from extensive coordination 
of activities in multiple geographic regions. 
However, research on “foreign locational advantages” has begun to question whether small 
firms actually implement a global strategy (Bell et al. 2001; Rugman and Verbeke, 2007; 
Lopez et al. 2009). For example, Bell et al. (2001) introduce the notion of the “born-again 
global” and argue most small technology firms are unlikely to implement a global strategy 
as firms undergo stochastic periods of rapid internationalisation, de-internationalisation and 
re-internationalisation. In addition to these findings, Rugman and Almodóvar (2011) go as 
far to argue there is a “born-global illusion” as most manufacturing firms cross-border 
activities only take place in one of the triad regions (i.e. North America, Europe, Asia-
Pacific). Lopez et al. (2009) also highlights Rugman and Verbeke’s (2007) regionalisation 
discussion as they argue “born-globals” are actually “born-regionals” as they found Costa 
Rican technology firms initially export to Central and South America, despite the strategic 
importance of the US market. However, Jones et al. (2011) argue research on born-globals 
and INVs often uses terminology loosely and interchangeably. Which leads Coviello et al. 
(2011: 628) to remind scholars that Oviatt and McDougall choose to use the term INV in 
recognition that many ventures compete primarily in regional markets (i.e. in a few 
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countries) while only a select few have a true global focus. Therefore, this debate illustrates 
foreign locational advantages strongly underpin NVI theory (Fernhaber et al. 2007). 
3.2.3 Control over Unique Resources 
The control over unique resources (i.e. Barney, 1991) is the fourth and final element that 
underpins NVI theory (Oviatt and McDougall, 1994). Oviatt and McDougall (1994: 56) 
argue that the previous elements – (1) internalisation, (2) alternative governance structures, 
and (3) foreign location advantages – are the necessary conditions for sustainable INVs, 
while (4) unique resources are the sufficient condition for INVs sustainable competitive 
advantage. Peng (2001: 815) reviews the RBV in IB research and predicts the RBV literature 
in IE is in its “infancy” and “will grow more substantially in the new millennium.” 
Consequently, D’Angelo and Warner (2010) review Peng’s predictions and find the RBV 
continues to advance IE research but predominately within the IB journals (e.g. Boojhawon 
et al. 2007; Zucchella et al. 2007; Filatotchev et al. 2009). Consequently, D’Angelo and 
Warner (2010) report that Westhead et al. (2001) is the most cited RBV-IE study within 
entrepreneurship research. Westhead et al. (2001) uses the RBV to examine the influence of 
human and financial resources on the internationalisation of new and small firms. 
Specifically, the authors empirically find that the managerial experience of principal 
founders in selling goods or services abroad is the most “valuable” resource that encourages 
new and small firms to export (2001: 334).  
These findings align with Oviatt and McDougall’s (1994) original contention that an INV’s 
most unique resource is its knowledge base. Since then, various researchers have 
conceptually (e.g. Prashantham, 2005; Sapienza et al. 2006) and empirically (e.g. Autio et 
al. 2000; Zahra et al. 2000; Gassmann and Keupp, 2007) demonstrated that knowledge is an 
INV’s most unique and valuable resource. Therefore, Oviatt and McDougall (1994) 
underscore the importance of profiting from strong appropriability regimes (e.g. patents, 
copyrights, and secrecy), isolating mechanisms (e.g. casual ambiguity), and network 
governance structures (e.g. co-specialisation) as strategies to protect an INV’s knowledge 
based competitive advantage. Interestingly, the emergence of the KBV (i.e. Grant, 1996; 
Miller and Shamsie, 1996) has helped advance NVI research. For example, Prashantham 
(2005) conceptually builds on the KBV to propose that the INV’s acquisition and creation 
of market and technological knowledge through its social capital, is what directly enhances 
NVI. Loane and Bell (2006) empirically use the KBV as lens to examine the role of networks 
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on the rapid internationalisation of entrepreneurial firms. Central to their cross-national 
findings is the majority of the entrepreneurial firms use existing and new networks to acquire 
international knowledge, which improves their international competitiveness (479-480). 
Similarly, Gassmann and Keupp (2007) use the KBV to examine the competitive advantage 
of biotechnology ventures that undergo early and rapid internationalisation. In this inductive 
study, the authors argue that born-global firms have greater rent generating potential when 
they build “specialised knowledge” from unique NPD that is scalable and specialised within 
international value chains. Moreover, the authors argue such specialised knowledge enables 
firms to use scientific networks to bypass ownership of physical assets (e.g. production 
capacity) and access “on demand” resources to capitalise on early rent potential (2006: 362). 
Interestingly, Autio (2005) notes the emergence of knowledge-based research has helped 
advance NVI theory in ways Oviatt and McDougall never intended. That is, Autio (2005) 
argues “knowledge” is the primary driver of international expansion that unites rather than 
divides the process (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977, 1990) and new venture (Oviatt and 
McDougall, 1994) theories of internationalisation. Moreover, Sapienza and colleagues 
(Autio et al. 2000; Sapienza et al. 2005; Sapienza et al. 2006) infer early internationalisation 
is a process of capability development in which both theories help explain this phenomenon. 
That is, Johanson and Vahlne (1977, 1990) seeks to question how firms internationalise, 
while Oviatt and McDougall (1994) specifically question why new ventures internationalise 
(Autio, 2005). Given this chapter, aims to review literature on INV capability development 
it seems evident internationalisation process theory can help shed additional light on 
achieving this overall aim. The following section will therefore examine early 
internationalisation research that helps explain the development of capabilities within INVs. 
3.3 Early Internationalisation: A Capability Building Process 
Section 3.2 reviews the theoretical elements that underpin NVI theory and highlights the 
observation that Johanson and Vahlne’s process theory could shed additional light on 
capability building within INVs. Thus, the prime objective of this section is to examine early 
internationalisation research that helps explain the building of capabilities in INVs. Johanson 
and Vahlne (2006, 2009) note although researchers perceive their original theory (i.e. 
1977/1990) as a process of “late internationalisation” the authors emphasise they do not 
discredit the process of early internationalisation. Instead, Johanson and Vahlne (2009) 
acknowledge some firms do engage in early internationalisation, but maintain most firms 
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gradually increase their international commitment as they build foreign market experience. 
Indeed, several behavioural models of internationalisation seek to explain how firms enter 
and expand within foreign markets which Andersen (1993) terms the (1) innovation models 
(Bilkey and Tesar, 1977; Cavusgil, 1980; Czinkoata, 1982; Reid, 1981) and (2) Uppsala 
model (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977, 1990). These models depart from the above economic 
theories that explain MNE [and INV] transaction cost reduction, to explain 
internationalisation as a dynamic process characterised by organisational learning, 
knowledge, and change (Johanson and Vahlne, 1990: 18). 
Welch and Paavilainen-Mantymaki (2014) argue that all of the behavioural models share the 
assumption that internationalisation does not begin with FDI, as firms gradually make small, 
cautious, and progressive steps as they enter and expand within foreign markets. Relatedly, 
Andersen (1993) notes the major point of difference between the innovation and Uppsala 
model is the former focusses on firms exporting behaviour, while the latter moves beyond 
international trade, and examines the use of FDI for subsequent expansion. Therefore, the 
underlying theoretical mechanism of Johanson and Vahlne’s process theory is that 
internationalisation “evolves in an interplay between the development of knowledge about 
foreign markets and operations on one hand and an increasing commitment of resources to 
foreign markets on the other” (1990: 11). Thus, the authors propose state variables (market 
knowledge and market commitment) interact with change variables (commitment decisions 
and current activities) to produce an incremental, self-reinforcing, and path dependent 
pattern of international expansion (Autio, 2005: 10). 
Recently, Johanson and Vahlne (2009) adapted their 1977 U-Model in response to 
widespread research on business networks. In what they term “A Business Network Model 
of the Internationalization Process” they incorporate business network (e.g. Johanson and 
Mattsson, 1988) and opportunity (see section 2.3.1) theory into the U-Model. Johanson and 
Mattsson (1988) originally argue the network model of internationalisation assumes the 
knowledge of other firms in a network influence a firm’s decision-making. The network 
model (see section 4.2.2) thus argues individual firms have a network position that 
determines the resources they are able to access from other partners within the industrial 
network (1988: 295). Consequently, Johanson and Vahlne’s (2009) revision explicates firms 
encounter “liabilities of outsidership” if they attempt to enter foreign markets with no 
relevant network position. Thus, involvement in foreign networks of relationships creates 
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“insidership”, where firms learn, build trust and commitment, and are the essential elements 
of the internationalisation process (2009: 1415). 
Johanson and Vahlne (2009) note although the basic structure is the same as the 1977 model, 
they incorporate some important changes. Firstly, building on Johanson and Vahlne (2006), 
they include recognition of “opportunities” as part of the “market knowledge” concept to 
stress that opportunities are “discovered” from knowledge that resides within networks that 
consequently trigger the internationalisation process. Secondly, the authors replace “market 
commitment” with “network position” to explicate that internationalisation occurs in 
networks, while subsequent network positions determine the future exploitation of 
opportunities. Relationship development is then central to internationalisation process. 
Johanson and Vahlne (2009) also replace “commitment decisions” with “relationship 
commitment decisions” and “current activities” with “Learning [and] creating trust-
building” to explicate that relational development in foreign markets is a complex, uncertain 
and time consuming process which involves considerable commitment on part of the 
entering firm. Figure 3-2 therefore outlines the evolution of internationalisation process 
theory. 
Figure 3-2: The Evolution of Internationalisation Process Theory 
 
Source: Based on Johanson and Vahlne (2009) 
Chapter 4 and 5 extensively discuss these networking issues at length, as they underpin this 
overall thesis, which argues networking is a process of dynamic capability development. 
Consequently, given that Johanson and Vahlne (2009) and Oviatt and McDougall (2005) 
have both revised process and NVI theory, it is evident Autio and colleagues (Autio et al. 
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2000; Autio, 2005; Sapienza et al. 2006) initial argument that earlier theories complement 
one another is significant to this research. The following section will therefore identify and 
articulate the major capability assumptions that underpin Johanson and Vahlne (2009) as 
well as Oviatt and McDougall (2005) to help explain the process of early 
internationalisation. Therefore, this section aims to examine such theory to help explain the 
development of capabilities within INVs. 
3.3.1 Early Internationalisation Capabilities 
Table 3-2 identifies and articulates the major capability assumptions that underpin process 
(Johanson and Vahlne, 2009) and new venture (Oviatt and McDougall, 2005) theories of 
internationalisation. Firstly, it is evident the assumptions of these theories differ due to their 
ontological positioning. For example, behavioural (Cyert and March, 1963) and growth 
(Penrose, 1959) theory ontologically underpin the process theory of internationalisation, 
whereas MNE (Buckley and Casson, 1976; Dunning, 1980), strategic management (Barney, 
1991) and entrepreneurship (Katz et al. 1988; Vesper, 1982) theories underpin NVI theory. 
Johanson and Vahlne (2009: 1418) therefore argue their epistemology on bounded 
rationality leads to uncertainty, but emphasise firms “reduce” rather than “avoid” uncertainty 
by accumulating experiential knowledge3. Whereas, Oviatt and McDougall’s (2005) 
assumptions are more implicit as they adopt the view entrepreneurs take calculated risks 
rather than avoid uncertainty. However, since economic based theories underpin their 1994 
model of sustainable INVs, while their 2005 model is a precise interpretation of the speed 
of internationalisation, it is evident new venture theory is more static in comparison to the 
dynamics of internationalisation process theory. 
Section 3.2.3 emphasises Autio’s (2005) comments that “knowledge” unites the original 
process (i.e. 1977/1991) and new venture (i.e. 1994) theories of internationalisation. Since 
then, there appears to be greater commonalities within these reconceptualisations. Firstly, 
Johanson and Vahlne (2009: 1416) acknowledge Oviatt and McDougall (1994) research and 
argue “general internationalisation knowledge” encompasses several strands of experience 
including Sapienza et al. (2006) discussion on “foreign market entry” experience. Oviatt and 
McDougall (2005) however are more specific and argue that “foreign market knowledge” 
and “knowledge intensity” (i.e. technological knowledge) moderates the speed of 
                                         
3 Johanson and Vahlne (2009: 1418) dismiss previous criticism that their theory is about uncertainty 
avoidance, and argue internationalisation will always involve uncertainty, but their theory is more about 
uncertainty reduction – i.e. risk management. 
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internationalisation. Secondly, both theories now emphasise that the discovery and 
enactment of opportunities is a primary driver of early internationalisation. Therefore, 
echoing Zahra (2008: 243), it is apparent these reconceptualisations implicitly adopt 
Penrose’s (1959: 73) assumption that [opportunity discovery and creation] form a virtuous 
and dynamic cycle of experiential learning. Finally, both theories acknowledge networks as 
a driver of early internationalisation, but the forthcoming discussion on Table 3-2 highlights 
these theories take different perspectives on the nature of networks.   
Table 3-2: Capability Assumptions about Early Internationalisation 
 IPT – Johanson and Vahlne (2009) INV – Oviatt and McDougall (2005) 
Primary theoretical 
question 
 How do firms internationalise?  Why do entrepreneurial firms 
internationalise? 
Ontology  Behavioural theory 
 Theory of the growth of the firm 
 Network model of internationalisation 
 Entrepreneurship 
 RBV 
 Alternative governance structures  
Epistemology  Uncertainty reduction  Calculated risk 
Level of analysis  Firm  Entrepreneur / new venture 
Primary driver of early 
internationalisation 
 Knowledge opportunities (i.e. 
experiential knowledge) 
 Network position 
 Foreign / technological knowledge 
 Technology / Competition 
 Network relationships 
Nature of path 
dependence 
 Country-specific lock-in  Regional or global lock-in 
Strategic posture  Reactive to internal environment  Proactive to external environment 
Nature of competition  Compete with local players in foreign 
markets 
 Compete with global players in niche 
foreign markets 
International expansion 
patterns 
 Gradual pace 
 Establishment chain indicator of 
internationalisation pattern 
 Rapid pace 
 Multiple modes indicator of 
internationalisation pattern 
Nature of resources  Slack resources  Fungible resources 
Nature of networks  Industrial networks 
 Buyers and suppliers 
 Trust and commitment 
 Entrepreneurial networks 
 Social and business networks 
 Brokerage 
Major cost  Learning and unlearning  Cross-border coordination 
Major risk  Slow response to market change  Unsuccessful coordination 
Objectives of early 
internationalisation 
 Sustained survival 
 Long-term profitability 
 Rapid growth 
 Value creation 
Source: The Author 
Autio (2005) emphasises assumptions on path dependence differ between the process and 
new ventures theories of internationalisation. Johanson and Vahlne (2009) maintain that 
“history matters” and the actions of the firm in specific foreign markets supersedes the 
relevance of individuals’ prior experience. Thus, using path dependence terminology (e.g. 
Arthur, 1989) Johanson and Vahlne indicate that firms encounter “country-specific” lock-in 
where previous foreign experiences bound the firm to specific local markets. For instance, 
in INV theory, “export/import start-ups” would likely encounter “country-specific lock-in” 
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as they coordinate few cross-border activities in limited countries. Whereas, Autio (2005) 
highlights early forays into international markets can lock firms into an international or 
global growth trajectories. In other words, INVs can encounter “regional” (i.e. 
geographically focussed start-up) or “global” (i.e. global-start-up) lock-in. This indicates 
international entrepreneurs’ and their new ventures require an eclectic bundle of capabilities 
to undergo various forms of early internationalisation. 
The patterns and pace of international expansion also seem to differ between theories. That 
is, Oviatt and McDougall are explicit the pace of early internationalisation is rapid, while 
Johanson and Vahlne accept foreign market entry can be early but maintain the pace of 
internationalisation is typically gradual. Interestingly, Johanson and Vahlne argue Johanson 
and Wiedersheim-Paul’s (1975) initial observations on (1) psychic distance and the (2) 
establishment chain triggered the development of the Uppsala model, but the authors argue 
their theory “is not an establishment chain” in which firms pursue a pattern of international 
trade and FDI in a stepwise manner (2006: 2). Instead, Johanson and Vahlne (2009) argue 
psychic distance and the establishment chain are indicators rather than determinants of 
gradual internationalisation. In contrast, Oviatt and McDougall (2005) argue the combined 
use of various entry modes in multiple foreign markets are an indicator of the patterns of 
early internationalisation. Thus, this indicates INVs must accumulate various resources and 
capabilities to implement such strategy. 
The nature of resources that facilitate early internationalisation seem to differ between 
theories. For example, Johanson and Vahlne (2009) assume firms must have a sufficient 
resource endowment to increase their commitment in international markets. Whereas, Oviatt 
and McDougall (2005) assume the alertness of the entrepreneur is what leads to INVs to 
pursue foreign growth opportunities. Thus, the process and new venture theories differ as 
the former assumes early internationalisation depends on the amount of “slack” resources, 
while the latter focusses on the “fungibility” (i.e. degree of alternative use) of resources. 
Therefore, this analysis leads to the observation that Oviatt and McDougall’s theory explains 
why entrepreneurial firms encounter “regional” or “global lock-in” through fungible 
resource endowments, while Johanson and Vahlne’s theory explains how “country-specific” 
lock-in occurs through market-specific resource endowments.  
To compensate for resource shortages, the process and new venture theories of 
internationalisation both consider the importance of networks, but with different 
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perspectives. That is, Johanson and Vahlne (2009) draw on industrial network theory 
(Johanson and Mattsson, 1988) and argue a central position in a business network enables 
gradual internationalisation. In contrast, Oviatt and McDougall initially (i.e. 1994) assume 
new ventures adopt alternative governance structures to accelerate internationalisation and 
subsequently (i.e. 2005) include research on entrepreneurial networks (i.e. Dubini and 
Aldrich, 1991) as a moderating force of internationalisation speed. Thus, this moves 
discussion from the firm’s business network to the entrepreneur’s personal and extended 
network that consists of formal and informal ties. Chapter 4 therefore provides a theoretical 
overview of networking and social capital, as both are central within the NVI process. 
Chapter 5 therefore draws upon the problem of networking capability development in NVI. 
However, both theories are less explicit on the major cost of building capabilities for early 
internationalisation. For example, implicit in Johanson and Vahlne (2009) is that experiential 
learning is expensive, gradual, time consuming and less responsive to radical change. Given 
Johanson and Vahlne (2009) assumption that learning occurs in established industrial 
networks, this view indicates learning is efficient for understanding the modification of 
existing capabilities, but inefficient (i.e. costly) for understanding the creation of new 
capabilities. Whereas, in Oviatt and McDougall (2005), it is apparent cross-border 
coordination is an INV’s greatest cost. Indeed, Autio et al. (2000) emphasise that although 
INVs benefit from “learning advantages of newness” this does not remove the liabilities of 
newness that stem from low reputation, social capital, and resources. Consequently, these 
implicit assumptions on the major cost have implications for the major risk of building 
capabilities for early internationalisation. That is, Johanson and Vahlne indicate the major 
risk of learning is a slow response to market change. Whereas, for Oviatt and McDougall 
the major risk of unsuccessful cross-border coordination is that mortality rates are higher in 
younger firms as “proactivity is not a panacea; increased risk taking may threaten survival 
or profitability” (Sapienza et al. 2005: 452).  
Finally, both theories are explicit on the way firms deploy their capabilities to achieve early 
internationalisation objectives. In Johanson and Vahlne, the authors assume early 
internationalisation fuels gradual growth, which consequently implies that a firm’s foreign 
market entry experience is a source of sustained survival and long-term profitability 
(Sapienza et al. 2006). Whereas in Oviatt and McDougall, the authors assume that early 
internationalisation aims to fuel rapid growth and create value across national borders. 
Indeed, Oviatt and McDougall (2005: 542) argue the rate of competition motivates early 
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internationalisation, while the advent of technology enables the need for “faster” 
internationalisation. These forces therefore imply Johanson and Vahlne assume the firm’s 
strategic posture is reactive due to the limits of its internal capabilities, while Oviatt and 
McDougall explicate new ventures are proactive – and often aggressive – about the 
exploitation of external opportunities despite the limits of its internal resource base (Shrader 
et al. 2000). Thus, the above theories indicate the development and deployment of 
technological and managerial capabilities are paramount for NVI, which is the focus of the 
following sections. 
3.3.2 Technological Capabilities 
Shrader et al. (2000) regard INVs involved in high-technology markets as the personification 
of risk. These firms are high risk since they have a limited history of operation and 
profitability, have short product cycles, and must quickly defend a strategic position in 
international markets that are ill-defined (Carpenter et al. 2003). Zahra (2005) notes despite 
advances in ICT, reductions in the cost of travel and increased market access to the emerging 
economies, most INVs will still end in failure. Thus, to sustain competitive advantage, 
researchers have found INVs must build sophisticated technological capabilities and 
leverage this proprietary knowledge in multiple international markets (Autio et al. 2000; 
Shrader et al. 2000; Bell et al. 2003; Gassmann and Keupp, 2007). However, as Jolly et al. 
(1992: 71) points out such new ventures need to overcome two drawbacks – the challenges 
of being a start-up and competing against global players.  
Crick and Jones (2000) emphasise among the challenges these new ventures face is the 
imperative to exploit their technologies in markets that are underdeveloped but exhibit 
international opportunities. Thus, a central source of a INVs initial expansion is to capitalise 
on emerging industry change that incumbents have yet to identify within specific high-
technology markets (Jolly et al. 1992; Preece et al. 1999). This unique situation allows the 
innovator (i.e. INVs) to establish a strategic position in niche markets sooner than their 
competitors (i.e. followers) when these industry changes take place (Mudambi and Zahra, 
2007). However, Jolly et al. (1992: 72) emphasises technology start-ups born with resource 
constraints will need to overcome growth challenges such as building distribution channels, 
confronting the liabilities of “outsidership,” and accepting that local adaptation is required 
in most foreign markets. Therefore, the decision to implement a “global strategy” (i.e. 
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standardisation) or invest in a “multidomestic strategy” (i.e. local adaptation) is a significant 
challenge for start-ups in high-technology industries (Davies and Brush, 1997).  
One view echoed by Jolly et al. (1992) is to succeed in international high-technology 
markets, technology new ventures should implement a global strategy through a standardised 
product that has the global potential to revolutionise an industry. However, Autio (1997) 
emphasises that such firms are sometimes wrongly associated with being representative of 
all new technology based firms. Instead, empirical research has found INVs will often adopt 
an internationalisation strategy that utilises multiple entry modes to penetrate high-
technology niche markets (Bell, 1995; Jones, 1999; McNaughton, 2002). Thus, Madsen and 
Servais (1997) notes most INVs are actually “multidomestic” as strategic decisions on 
outward internationalisation (e.g. indirect exporting, direct exporting, or licensing) may vary 
due to regional and local issues that are apparent in specific technology markets. 
Prashantham and Young (2011) note it is imperative that INVs efficiently use their 
technology to develop the correct product at a time when their innovation is most likely to 
sell within a new market. In most cases, INVs are “pioneers” as they are the first company 
to introduce a product or technology to a market, but normally depend on a single product 
for survival and growth (Zahra, 1996; Bloodgood et al. 1996). However, Preece et al. (1999: 
261) notes these technology start-ups operate in high-velocity environments (Bourgeois and 
Eisenhardt, 1988) in which hypercompetition creates product obsolescence in months or 
weeks rather than in years. Central to INV growth is firms transfer technology to markets 
quickly whilst augmenting their technological capabilities through interactions with others 
in the trade sector (Crick and Jones, 2000). Bloodgood et al. (1996) note given INVs high 
development costs and limited resources, they must develop a strategy that quickly increases 
product differentiation to sustain subsequent international expansion. 
Therefore, INVs that do penetrate high-technology markets have been found to benefit from 
“learning advantages of newness” (Autio et al. 2000) and “technological learning” (Zahra et 
al. 2000) which are found in industries endowed with high rates of innovation. For example, 
Zahra et al. (2000) empirically find INVs that utilise high-control modes to enter multiple 
foreign markets will increase the depth, breadth, and speed of their technological learning. 
Several subsequent empirical studies identify that knowledge intensity is a core source of 
INVs competitive advantage (e.g. McNaughton, 2001; Yli-Renko et al. 2002; Fletcher and 
Harris, 2012; D’Angelo, 2012). Prashantham and Young (2011) also argue an INV’s 
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“knowledge-intensity” represents the new venture’s “technological knowledge” which helps 
distinguish from the firm’s “foreign market knowledge.” The authors thus argue that 
“country-specific technological knowledge” allows INVs to tailor sales and marketing 
through more nuanced understanding of foreign client local needs and customs.  
Finally, Knight and Cavusgil (2004) empirically confirm that technological learning enables 
INVs to build technological capabilities from the identification of new technical solutions to 
customer problems that occur in multiple foreign markets. Moreover, research on 
technological learning shows that INVs can improve future profitability by mitigating 
product obsolescence by leveraging their existing technological capabilities in multiple 
foreign markets (Crick and Jones, 2000). Zahra et al. (2000) therefore found that 
technological learning indirectly provides impetus to identify new market opportunities and 
has a direct positive impact on INV performance. Moreover, Zahra and George (2002) 
propose technological learning is a “non-financial outcome” that continues to drive 
entrepreneurship across national borders. In addition to these findings, Mudambi and Zahra 
(2007) argue the capabilities of the firm’s TMT is vital antecedent of NVI within high-
technology markets, which is the focus of the following section.  
3.3.3 Managerial Capabilities 
Oviatt and McDougall (2005a) note a major contrast between MNEs and INVs, is knowledge 
in the latter is “individualised” to the founder(s) and their TMT. In most cases, if new 
ventures internationalise they must recruit a TMT with the legitimacy and experience to 
marshal new resource (e.g. venture capital) to navigate emergent growth challenges 
(Fernhaber and McDougall-Covin, 2009). Bloodgood et al. (1996) indicate a TMT with a 
wide body of experience are more likely to overcome growth challenges and quickly launch 
a portfolio of products in international markets. Brinckmann and Hoegl (2011: 38) also 
distinguish between founding teams and TMTs as they argue founding teams are the initial 
“entrepreneurial team” which is more reflective of the initial start-up, while the TMT is a 
general team once the new venture has begun to build legitimacy.  
Various empirical studies report that the international experience of TMTs and board of 
directors’ positively influences NVI (Bloodgood et al. 1996; Reuber and Fischer, 1997; 
Burgel and Murray, 1998). For example, McDougall et al. (1996) case analysis shows new 
ventures led by managers with foreign work experience in both MNEs and INVs can 
internationalise faster than ventures without such experience. Carpenter et al. (2003) 
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research on “upper echelons” also indicates TMTs with higher levels of industry experience 
have more strategic choice and reduce the ventures subjective perceptions on the risk of 
resource intensive cross-border activities. Additionally, research on foreign education 
(Burgel and Murray, 1998), family history of entrepreneurship (Westhead et al. 2001), and 
global mindset (Nummela et al. 2004) are all found to positively influence NVI. Greater 
international managerial experience then provides more awareness of international 
opportunities and enables TMTs to navigate INVs through the complexities of multimarket 
competition (Carpenter et al. 2003).  
Zahra (2005) notes even when an INV has a TMT and a technologically superior product in 
place, it must build managerial capabilities in specific areas that are necessary for superior 
performance. Empirical research reports that successful INVs require a wide range of 
managerial capabilities such as firm-specific sales capabilities to implement an exporting 
strategy, as well as broader strategic management skills to launch foreign sales subsidiaries 
(Freeman et al. 2006; Freeman and Cavusgil, 2007). In addition to these findings, De Clercq 
et al. (2012) identify several conceptual (e.g., Prashantham, 2005; Sapienza et al. 2006) and 
empirical (e.g., Zhou et al. 2010; Zou and Ghauri, 2010) studies that identify managers 
foreign market knowledge as a key source of INV competitiveness. For example, 
Prashantham and Young (2011: 283-284) distinguish between “country-neutral” and 
“country-specific” market knowledge where the former relates to Eriksson et al. (1997) 
notion of “general internationalisation knowledge” and the latter is country-specific and tacit 
which accumulates through direct foreign market experience. 
Interestingly, Autio et al. (2000) empirically find that earlier initiation of internationalisation 
and greater knowledge intensity is associated with faster international growth. Central to 
their argument is most INVs benefit from “learning advantages of newness” over established 
firms when assimilating foreign knowledge. Therefore, new ventures are more dynamic in 
their learning and are able to adapt to changes in the marketplace and develop capabilities 
necessary to pursue growth in foreign markets (Autio et al. 2000: 913). Sapienza et al. (2006: 
923) also argue that since INVs have few routines, they must “import” routines from the 
TMTs previous international experience, which serves as “embryonic routines” that reduce 
the initial costs of learning in foreign markets. Thus, experiential knowledge about how to 
perform tasks quickly at critical points in in time is a crucial factor in INV success and is 
often more critical than access to financial capital alone (Kuemmerle, 2002). However, Autio 
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(2005: 16) emphasises that neither process nor new venture theories fully develop normative 
implications regarding the “timing” of internationalisation.  
Thus, Autio (2005) notes the major theories seek to explain how (i.e. Johanson and Vahlne) 
and why (i.e. Oviatt and McDougall) firms engage in early internationalisation, but neither 
explain when new ventures should rapidly expand their foreign operations. However, Jones 
and Coviello (2005) assume time is a critical element in a firm’s entrepreneurial 
internationalisation that involves time-sensitive and self-reinforcing cycles of relationships. 
At a general level, Jones and Coviello indicate INV chronologies are imprinted (e.g. 
Kutschker et al. 1997) with early cross-border activities, while at a specific level they argue 
INVs differ from SMEs in terms of the time taken to commence cross-border activity and 
the speed or rate at which internationalisation unfolds. Jones and Coviello thus define a 
fingerprint pattern as “a composite of the [1] number and range of cross-border business 
modes established by the firm, and the [2] number and distance of countries with which 
those modes were established, at [3] a specific point in time” (2005: 293). These three 
“ridges” then form a fingerprint that provides a static impression of each firm’s 
internationalisation behaviour at a certain point in time. Thus, Jones and Coviello argue that 
researchers must examine the “dynamic profiles” of the firm’s internationalisation behaviour 
by monitoring changes in the composition of business modes and countries over a certain 
period of time.  
Despite this conceptual research, few studies investigate an INV’s capabilities for 
subsequent international expansion. Liesch et al. (2007: 234) for example raises the question: 
“What happens to early and rapidly internationalizing firms after they make their initial 
forays into international markets?” Although researchers (e.g. Acedo and Jones, 2007; 
Morgan-Thomas and Jones, 2009) assess speed in relation to foreign market entry, an INV’s 
post-market entry is still a matter for conceptual debate (Prashantham and Young, 2011). 
Consequently, the emergence of dynamic capabilities have prompt researchers to suggest 
this may be a useful lens to examine the timing of NVI (Autio et al. 2000; Autio, 2005; 
Zahra, 2005; Sapienza et al. 2006). For example, Autio et al. (2000) acknowledges that early 
internationalisation may root a more innovative and dynamic strategic posture allowing new 
ventures to capitalise on market opportunities that emerge from rapid technological change. 
Therefore, the dynamic capabilities perspective appears to be a useful lens to examine NVI, 
which means the following section will explore literature that reveals how INVs build 
dynamic capabilities to overcome survival and growth challenges.  
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3.4 Dynamic Capability Building in International New Ventures 
The prime objective of this section is to review the literature that explores dynamic capability 
building in INVs. Although dynamic capabilities are inherently entrepreneurial (Helfat et al. 
2007; Teece, 2007), the majority of existing research focusses on large established firms 
(Zahra et al. 2006). Indeed, Zahra et al. argue a predominate reason for this scant research is 
the process of how these capabilities are created and solidified are likely to differ between 
new and established firms (see section 2.3.2). Table 3-3 highlights these differences: 
Table 3-3: Dynamic Capabilities in New Ventures versus Established Companies 
Dimension New Ventures Established Companies 
Configuration and attributes of DC 
(number, scope, complexity, 
stability) 
 Few 
 Focussed 
 Simple then complex 
 Rapidly Changing 
 Many 
 Broad 
 Complex then simple 
 Resistant to change 
Triggers/speed for the development 
and use of DC 
 Increasing integration skills, recent 
execution failures, opportunities in 
previously underexplored areas, and 
major changes in demands from 
customers 
 
 Development, use likely follows vary 
rapidly upon event; changes 
sometimes dramatic 
 Presence of integration skills, recent 
repeated execution failures, and 
major changes in the competitive 
landscape whereby competitors have 
leapfrogged the firm’s technology or 
features 
 Development, use occurs after a 
significant gap following changed 
circumstances; changes rarely 
dramatic 
Primary method(s) for discovering 
and developing DC 
 Trial-and-error 
 Improvisation 
 Imitation 
 Learning from experience 
 Planned change, experimentation  
 Imitation 
Capability upgrading  Learning is based on action more 
than planning 
 A key goal is filling major gaps in the 
firm’s existing capability portfolio to 
explore opportunities for organic 
growth 
 Deliberate, with an emergent quality 
 The focus is on building dynamic 
capabilities that both leverage what 
the firm is already doing while 
stretching it competence basis 
Source: Zahra et al. (2006: 941) 
Since Autio and colleagues (Autio et al. 2000; Autio, 2005) initial discussion on the 
theoretical potential of dynamic capabilities, a number of conceptual interpretations have 
emerged within the context of INVs (Sapienza et al. 2006; Weerawardena et al. 2007; 
Zettinig and Benson-Rea, 2008; Prange and Verdier, 2011; Prashantham and Floyd, 2012). 
Nevertheless, despite this conceptual research, to the author’s knowledge, only a handful of 
empirical studies actually examine dynamic capabilities in INVs (e.g. Knight and Cavusgil, 
2004; Mort and Weerawardena, 2006; Zhou et al. 2010; Lu et al. 2010; Autio et al. 2011; 
Eriksson et al. 2014). By contrast, conceptual (Luo, 2000; Birkinshaw and Pedersen, 2001; 
Dunning and Lundan, 2010; Pitelis and Teece, 2010) and early empirical (Griffith and 
Harvey, 2001; Luo, 2002; Uhlenbruck, 2004; Lee and Slater, 2007; Malik, 2008) research 
on dynamic capabilities in MNEs is more widespread. Dunning and Lundan (2010) for 
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example argue the institutional underpinnings of the MNE is not only consistent with the 
dynamic capabilities perspective, but serves to highlight the unique role of organisational 
routines that are locally embedded but mobile across borders. In addition to this research, 
Pitelis and Teece (2010) argue that the dynamic capabilities paradigm offers the most 
promise for an entrepreneurial theory of the MNE.  
However, Zahra et al. (2006) initial arguments continue to make traction within INV 
research (Sapienza et al. 2006; Autio et al. 2010; Prashantham and Floyd, 2012). Conversely, 
Mudambi and Zahra (2007) emphasise INVs are actually the perfect conceptual and 
empirical setting to conduct dynamic capabilities research since they are knowledge 
intensive organisations that must continuously adapt and learn from rapid technological 
change. Relatedly, Sapienza et al. (2006) infer INVs are an interesting context to examine 
dynamic capabilities as established theories take an overly positive view on the effects on 
firm performance, but do not consider their potential threats to survival. Given this thesis 
uses Helfat et al. (2007) asset orchestration perspective (see section 2.4) as a theoretical lens, 
the following sections will explore whether INVs develop and deploy dynamic capabilities 
to create, extend and modify their resource base.  
3.4.1 Creation of INV Resource Base 
Research indicates that INVs can use dynamic capabilities to create new resources and 
capabilities, which contributes to increasing the probability of survival and growth (Sapienza 
et al. 2006; Weerawardena et al. 2007; Prashantham and Floyd, 2012). Therefore, Zahra et 
al. (2006) argues that dynamic capabilities is a useful perspective for entrepreneurship 
research, but the configuration of such capabilities differ in established firms and new 
ventures. That is, Table 3-3 indicates established firms have many “complex” routines that 
operate across organisational functions, while new ventures exhibit a few “simple” routines, 
which focus on specific organisational functions. Thus, the authors propose established firms 
are more likely to utilise dynamic capabilities to reconfigure existing capabilities, while new 
ventures are more likely to use dynamic capabilities to create new capabilities.  
Zahra et al. (2006) thus argues organisational learning is likely to differ in established firms 
and new ventures in which the former mainly engages in experimentation (e.g. deliberate 
and codified procedures), while the latter are more improvisational and engage in trial-and-
error learning. Sapienza et al. (2006: 916) thus argue that INVs “import” established routines 
from the TMTs previous experience, which reduces the costs of improvisation, decreases the 
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time to exploit opportunities, and improves their overall strategic and network position. In 
advancing this research, Prashantham and Floyd (2012) utilise Feldman and Pentland’s 
(2003) micro-level routine assumptions to examine capability development in INVs. Central 
to their argument is variability in the performative aspect of routines (i.e. improvisational 
learning) is associated with new capability development, while variability in the ostensive 
aspect of routines (i.e. trail-and-error learning) is associated with existing capability 
improvement. The authors also contend the degree of psychic distance between the new 
venture’s domestic market and new international markets moderate the relationship between 
the variability of routines and capability learning outcomes.  
Despite this conceptual research, few empirical studies investigate how new ventures use 
their dynamic capabilities to create new capabilities in international markets (Zhou e al, 
2010; Autio et al. 2011). In Zhou et al. (2010) the authors empirically investigate how INVs 
utilise “capability upgrading” to mediate the relationship between their “entrepreneurial 
proclivity” (i.e. proactiveness, risk-taking, and innovative behaviour) and their learning 
advantages of newness, which helps stimulate superior performance. The authors argue that 
Luo’s (2000) initial research on capability upgrading suggests this learning mechanism is 
crucial in the creation of new capabilities, which facilitates international expansion (2010: 
886). Central to their findings, is “network capability upgrading” and “knowledge capability 
upgrading” are essential dynamic capabilities for an INV’s rapid growth. The authors also 
report knowledge capability upgrading provides INVs with situation-specific, precise, and 
up-to-date foreign market knowledge, while network capability upgrading provides firms 
with access to superior knowledge that improves learning advantages of newness and 
maximises international sales growth (2010: 887-889).Autio et al. (2011) emphasises the 
empirical challenges of operationalizing capability development in INVs. In this study, the 
authors argue that routine based definitions (e.g. Winter, 2003) are more relevant to 
established firms as they assume “deliberate intent” and “planned outcomes.” Instead, the 
authors propose a broader lens that observes “new, ancillary, modified, and non-repetitive 
processes that might be built into a capability.” (2011: 18). The authors argue that the term 
process provides more conceptual impetus than routine, as every routine is a process, but not 
every process is a routine. Central to their qualitative findings, is successful INVs develop a 
“language of organizing” in which the TMT uses unique cognitive processes (e.g. a shared 
vocabulary) to create new capabilities that effectively respond to highly uncertain situations 
associated with environmental change (2011: 28). The authors also build on George’s (2005) 
initial findings and argue INVs can “learn to be capable” by leveraging their heterogeneous 
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experiences. The authors argue that INVs can learn to expand the “diversity” and improve 
the “dexterity” by which they create and execute their processes (2011: 30). Thus, including 
non-formalised and non-repetitive processes into a routine – empowers researchers to 
examine the timing and uncertainty of how INVs begin create new capabilities for 
subsequent growth. 
3.4.2 Extension of INV Resource Base 
Deeds et al. (2000) argue the asset accumulation process (i.e. resource extension) is critical 
for the development of dynamic capabilities in high technology new ventures. In IE research, 
few studies (if any) specifically examine how INVs build and/or utilise their dynamic 
capabilities to extend investment in specific asset stocks, yet some studies do discuss the 
importance of “capability building” for NVI (e.g. Weerawardena et al. 2007; Lu et al. 2010). 
Chang (1995) emphasises that “capability building” is core to IB research, as it underpins 
the process by which firms become MNEs through FDI. Interestingly, Chang (1995: 388) 
was early to propose the integration of Johanson and Vahlne (1977) and Teece et al. (1990) 
frameworks to examine how MNEs build capabilities by extending investment in overseas 
operations. However, in INVs, resource extension is likely to differ due to Oviatt and 
McDougall’s (1994) original contention that most young firms will initially invest in non-
equity modes such as trade and contractual alliances opposed to FDI. Consequently, 
Weerawardena et al. (2007) propose the international orientation of the founder(s) [rather 
than FDI] triggers resource extension, since born-globals utilise their dynamic capabilities 
to invest in cutting-edge knowledge intensive products, which subsequently accelerates 
internationalisation. 
Interestingly, Karra et al. (2008) examines the international entrepreneur’s dynamic 
capabilities and argue these “entrepreneurial capabilities” support the creation of successful 
INVs4. In this case-based research, the authors argue IE is not only about outward (and 
inward) early internationalisation, but involves building long-term competitive advantage 
through investment in complex international resource configurations (2008: 441). Thus, the 
authors argue founders that focus on building entrepreneurial capabilities in (1) international 
opportunity identification; (2) institutional bridging; and (3) cross-cultural collaboration are 
more likely to enable their INVs achieve unique resource configurations. Moreover, the 
                                         
4 In entrepreneurship research, there is also emerging consensus that new venture creation is a process of 
dynamic capability development (e.g. Newbert, 2005; Corner and Wu, 2011). 
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authors find focal entrepreneurs that use institutional bridging and cross-cultural 
collaboration capabilities are more likely to identify and exploit international opportunities. 
That is, the authors propose the accumulation of social (e.g. local buying behaviour) and 
cultural (e.g. local norms and practices) knowledge leads to the development of an 
institutional bridging capability, while the capacity to develop complex foreign exchange 
relationships with value-chain partners develops a cross-cultural collaboration capability 
(2008: 448). Thus, the authors report the capacity to interpret and assimilate knowledge from 
across the international network, much of which is tacit and culturally specific, is a key skill 
for international entrepreneurs. 
Consequently, Zahra and colleagues (Zahra and Hayton, 2008; Newey and Zahra, 2009) 
empirically report on the link between absorptive capacity and dynamic capabilities within 
IE and entrepreneurship research. For example, Zahra and Hayton (2008) empirically find 
that absorptive capacity moderates the relationship between international venturing and the 
firm’s profitability and revenue growth. Thus, the authors find an increase in absorptive 
capacity encourages INVs to invest in their R&D and innovative capabilities that 
subsequently provides wider access to foreign entry modes, which facilitates international 
expansion (2008: 198). Newey and Zahra (2009) also introduce “value network absorptive 
capacity” (VN-ACAP) from their inductive research, in which they argue absorptive 
capacity increases within value networks (e.g. Christensen and Raynor, 2003) that focus on 
inter-organisational NPD. Thus, the authors find that biotechnology new ventures that 
increase their VN-ACAP with pharmaceutical MNEs are more likely to build a “product 
portfolio planning” dynamic capability in high-velocity markets, which supports the 
reconfiguration of operationally focussed NPD capabilities (2009: 91). 
Thus, this review indicates the majority of IE and entrepreneurship research that consider 
the role of resource extension focus on NPD as a particular type of dynamic capability (e.g. 
Deeds et al. 2000; Weerawardena et al. 2007; Newey and Zahra, 2009; Corner and Wu, 
2011). However, Prange and Verdier (2011) propose that multiple dynamic capabilities 
underpin INV survival and growth. Moreover, most IE research uses the early dynamic 
capability perspectives (e.g. Teece et al. 1997; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000) as a lens, which 
means these studies primarily investigate how INVs modify their resource base. The 
following section will therefore examine studies that provide insight into how INVs modify 
their resource base. 
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3.4.3 Modification of INV Resource Base 
Research indicates that INVs can build and deploy dynamic capabilities to modify their 
resource base particularly in response to rapid technological change (Autio, 2005; Zahra, 
2005; Sapienza et al. 2006; Weerawardena et al. 2007; Prashantham and Floyd, 2012). Zahra 
et al. (2006) emphasise that established firms utilise dynamic capabilities to modify their 
resource base, but the nature of strategic change is often incremental with the goal to achieve 
realignment opposed to transformation. Whereas, the authors argues that technology new 
ventures are more likely to use dynamic capabilities to seize opportunities through the 
implementation of revolutionary change that often results in transformational outcomes. 
Indeed, within the IE research, various conceptual articles adopt different perspectives on 
the nature of INVs dynamic capabilities in terms of the resource modification process. 
Similar to section 2.3, it appears that most INV studies differ with respect to nature of 
dynamic capabilities and type of strategic change they expect to achieve.   
Weerawardena et al. (2007) for example propose INVs build dynamic capabilities in 
internationalisation, technological learning, and networking to implement radical change. 
Thus, INVs build dynamic capabilities in high-velocity markets that require the development 
of cutting-edge knowledge intensive products to accelerate internationalisation (2007: 299). 
Whereas, other conceptual studies (e.g. Sapienza et al. 2006; Zettinig and Benson-Rea, 2008) 
view dynamic capabilities as means for INVs to achieve adaptation within foreign markets. 
Sapienza et al. (2006) for example propose that INVs with an early exposure to multiple 
foreign markets will encounter a stronger “imprinting” effect where they develop specialised 
capabilities for rapid adaptation to the external environment. Central to their argument is age 
at initiation, managerial experience, and resource fungibility moderate internationalisation 
outcomes as it decreases the negative effects on the probability of survival, but 
simultaneously increases the positive effects on the probability of firm growth (2006:195). 
Zettinig and Benson-Rea (2008) also support Sapienza et al. (2006) view on adaptation and 
argue INVs develop “superior adaptability” from the exploitation of existing knowledge to 
help achieve long-run survival. Thus, the authors argue that dynamic capabilities support the 
continuous renewal of INVs resource base (2008: 358).   
Empirically, it is evident most INV research on dynamic capabilities views them as a source 
of adaptation opposed to revolutionary change (Knight and Cavusgil, 2004; Jantunen et al. 
2005; Lu et al. 2010; Autio et al. 2011). For example, Knight and Cavusgil (2004) use 
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evolutionary theory (i.e. Nelson and Winter, 1982) to propose how born-globals use 
innovation to achieve superior performance. Central to their argument, is dynamic 
capabilities are rooted in the firm’s organisational culture which supports the adaptation of 
business strategy that delivers unique products that have a superior technical and quality 
focus, which can be distributed through multiple foreign channels. Moreover, Jantunen et al. 
(2005: 236) empirically find the international orientation of the entrepreneur and the INVs 
dynamic capability to reconfigure its resource base, constitute a core source of international 
performance. In addition to this research, Lu et al. (2010) investigates INVs “adaptive 
capability” as a mediating link between resources and international performance, who find 
that adaptive capability allows firms to coordinate, recombine, and allocate resources to meet 
multiple foreign market requirements. Thus, the authors find dynamic capabilities that focus 
on adaptation are a vital source of INV competitive advantage, which leads to superior 
performance (2010: 432).     
Prange and Verdier (2011) address these differing opinions and propose INVs seek to build 
four types of dynamic capabilities during early internationalisation. That is, the authors 
propose the “international exploitation” process results in building “threshold” and 
“consolidation” dynamic capabilities, while the “international exploration” process results 
in the creation of “value-adding” and “disruption” dynamic capabilities (2011: 127). Central 
to their argument is international exploitation process is akin with views on adaptation in 
which INVs use threshold capabilities to incorporate the use of existing resources in new 
foreign markets (e.g. replication) while consolidation capabilities support the continuous 
renewal of resources in response to foreign market opportunities (2011: 128). By contrast, 
the authors argue international exploration is akin with transformational change, in which 
international entrepreneurs exhibit value-adding capabilities that support the redeployment 
of existing capabilities to exploit new opportunities, while INVs disruption capabilities 
prevent lock-in as the recombination of resources supports the discovery of radical 
innovation (2011: 128). Thus, on close examination it is evident that INVs exhibit multiple 
resource modification processes, which are important elements for dynamic capability 
development. 
3.5 Conclusion 
In conclusion, this chapter reviews literature that sheds light on the capability development 
process within INVs. After an initial review, it is evident INVs are a unique organisational 
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form, which differ from MNEs. That is, INVs rely on alternative governance structures, 
capitalise on foreign location advantages, and leverage unique resources such as their 
“learning advantages of newness” to sustain long-term competitive advantage. However, this 
chapter supports Autio and colleagues (Autio et al. 2000; Autio, 2005; Sapienza et al. 2006) 
view that Johanson and Vahlne’s process theory compliments Oviatt and McDougall’s new 
venture theory of internationalisation, particularly with respect to understanding how new 
ventures build capabilities for early internationalisation. This chapter then examines Oviatt 
and McDougall (2005) and Johanson and Vahlne’s (2009) recent reconceptualisations to 
investigate capability development in NVI. This literature review indicates the development 
of internationalisation capabilities is multifaceted, in which the process and new venture 
theories indicate that NVI is a process of capability development. Subsequently, this review 
indicates that technological and managerial capabilities are vital for the NVI process.  
This chapter then reviews literature that explores the development and deployment of 
dynamic capabilities in NVI. This review indicates that dynamic capabilities are imperative 
for NVI as they facilitate the creation, extension, and modification of INVs resource base. 
Moreover, research indicates dynamic capabilities research is likely to differ in INVs in 
comparison to MNEs, as INVs have few routines and predominately focus on the creation 
of new capabilities, opposed to the modification of existing capabilities. Moreover, this 
review also indicates that resource extension is likely to differ between MNEs and INVs, as 
the former is likely to focus on FDI, whereas the latter view focusses on the international 
entrepreneur’s capabilities that supports the creation of an INVs resource base. 
Consequently, this review also argues the “sustainable INVs” encounter a process of 
dynamic capability development. Therefore, in accordance with Zahra (2005), it appears IE 
and the INV more specifically, is an interesting context to conduct dynamic capabilities 
research, which should help advance this strategic management agenda.   
Finally, this chapter reviews research on resource modification, which leads to the finding 
that opinion varies on whether INVs dynamic capabilities are a source of adaptation (e.g. Lu 
et al. 2006) or revolutionary change (e.g. Weerawardena et al. 2007). Consequently, Prange 
and Verdier (2011) propose that both dynamic capability views are important in the 
modification of INVs resource base. Nevertheless, it is important to emphasise that most 
INVs lack critical resources and must create and build these capabilities from their limited 
resource base. Sapienza et al. (2006: 919) thus notes due to low survival rates, INVs need to 
develop internal processes such as the routines required for coordination of activities within 
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the organisation, and external processes, such as the routines to develop market-related 
capabilities or relationships with other organisations. Thus, these authors indicate dynamic 
capability research on what INVs “do and the resources they control, including the social 
capital they and their managers have amassed” would be “enlightening” to advance future 
research (2006: 930). Chapter 4 and 5 will therefore review networking and social capital, 
as they are fundamental within the overall theoretical framework of this thesis 
.  
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4 – Networking and Social Capital: 
A Theoretical Overview 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Aim 
To review the networking and social capital literature to shed light on the capability 
building process within new venture internationalisation. 
Chapter Objectives 
 To review networking and social capital research that contributes to the 
entrepreneurial network literature. 
 To review studies that use a capabilities lens to examine the networking 
behaviour of international new ventures. 
 To review dynamic capabilities research that explores the building of 
networking capabilities in new venture internationalisation. 
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4.1 Introduction  
This chapter aims to review the networking and social capital literature to shed light on the 
capability building process within NVI. This chapter therefore intends to achieve three 
objectives. Firstly, this chapter will review the networking and social capital literature that 
underpins entrepreneurial network research. Hite and Hesterly (2001: 276) note that since 
network vocabulary is “unfamiliar” for most strategy and entrepreneurship scholars, this 
section will review the major networking and social capital concepts that are most prominent 
in entrepreneurship research. Secondly, this chapter will review studies that use a capabilities 
lens to examine the networking behaviour of INVs. Since this thesis assumes that early 
internationalisation is a process of dynamic capability development, this objective will aim 
to shed light on the emerging view that networking is also a process of capability 
development. Finally, this chapter reviews dynamic capabilities research that specifically 
explores the building of “networking capabilities” in NVI. This chapter will therefore 
provide a theoretical overview of networking and social capital that will inform the 
subsequent arguments made in this thesis. 
4.2 Networking and Social Capital – Theoretical Foundations 
Networking and social capital are critical factors in both entrepreneurship (Slotte-Kock and 
Coviello, 2010; Jack et al. 2010) and IE (Coviello, 2006; Prashantham and Dhanaraj, 2010) 
research. In Curran et al. (1993: 13) the authors recognise much of the initial theorising and 
research using the concepts of a “network” and “networking” are “conceptually and 
methodologically poorly realised.” This has meant various entrepreneurship scholars 
emphasise that networks and networking are distinct constructs (Curran et al. 1993; Chell 
and Baines, 2000; O’Donnell, 2004; Neergaard, 2005; Shaw, 2006). O’Donnell (2004: 375) 
for example underscore, “it is not the existence of the network per se, but rather the use of 
that network through a process of networking, from which benefits accrue.” This distinction 
is also apparent in Freytag and Ritter (2005: 644) who argue it is not a question of managing 
a network, but managing in networks, thus it is “more appropriate to talk about networking, 
influencing, and interacting, i.e. processes instead of outcomes.”  
Johannisson and Mønsted (1997: 128) argue the “unique features of networks are associated 
more with process than structure, so the verb form networking seems more appropriate and 
substantiates the use of the network metaphor as a generic conceptual tool for studying 
entrepreneurship.” Thus it is evident the process of networking and the network should be 
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analysed as “two separate but interdependent constructs, where the latter is the outcome of 
the former” (Tang, 2011: 375). Despite its importance, few scholars define the networking 
concept. In studies that define “networking” it is apparent opinion varies on the concept’s 
overall nature and purpose. Table 4-1 lists the most notable networking definitions within 
the entrepreneurship literature. In inspecting these definitions it is evident there is 
considerable debate on whether networking is an individual or firm-level concept and 
whether its core purpose is to access external resources (Watson, 2007), build long-term 
relationships (Chen and Chen, 1998), share ideas (Soh, 2003) or encapsulates a combination 
of these objectives (Gilmore and Carson, 1999). 
Consequently, Brüderl and Preisendörfer (1998) emphasise networking in entrepreneurship 
research has emerged through two separate perspectives. The first approach pertains to the 
individual entrepreneur’s personal network and the second approach concentrates on the 
entrepreneurial firm’s inter-organisational network. O’Donnell et al. (2001) emphasise the 
overall approach of each entrepreneurial network study is mainly dependent on the level of 
analysis (i.e. type of actor) investigated. Whether the actor is an individual entrepreneur or 
entrepreneurial firm influences the research on the network. For example, O’Donnell et al. 
(2001: 750) note studies that investigate the entrepreneur’s personal network are typically 
rooted in “social network” theory, while studies on the firm’s inter-organisational network 
inform “business network” theory. Anderson and Jack (2002: 193) therefore argue that social 
capital (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998; Adler and Kwon, 2002) is a useful “umbrella concept” 
that encapsulates the most important aspects of entrepreneurial network research. 
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Table 4-1: Networking Definitions 
Authors Networking Definitions LoA Purpose 
  E F A S L
T 
Jarillo (1989) “‘Networking’ is a system by which entrepreneurs can tap resources that are “external” to them, i.e., that they don’t control. In its simplest form, networking 
consists of the use of all personal relationships to obtain advice, financing, “insider” sales, etc. In its most sophisticated form, entrepreneurs set up an elaborate 
web of relationships between companies, most of them similar entrepreneurial characteristics, that are extremely efficient and flexible at delivering a product or 
service.” (pg.133)  
 ● ●  ● 
Dubini and Aldrich 
(1991) 
‘“Networking,” by contrast refers to the expectation that many times both parties are investing in a long-term relation. [Thus] “Networking” involves expanding 
one’s circle of trust.” (pg. 307-308) 
● ●   ● 
Cromie and Birley 
(1992) 
“Networking is primarily a social activity. It involves the developing of a relationship between two people which is built, in part, upon mutual trust and upon a 
base of common experience or knowledge.” (pg. 242) 
●   ● ● 
Ramachandran and 
Ramnarayan (1993) 
“Efficient and effective networking therefore helps to accelerate the rate of creation of new enterprises. Networking is primarily a means of raising required 
resources” (pg. 515) 
 ● ●   
Zhao and Aram (1995) “[Networking] lies with the function of resource acquisition from external sources for the new or young firm and the entrepreneur’s actions in developing and 
managing these relationships successfully’. ‘strategic entrepreneurial networking as a purposeful activity by entrepreneurs to “obtain a competitive advantage for 
their firms”’ (pg. 351- 352) 
 ● ●  ● 
Chen and Chen (1998) “Networking among Taiwanese firms encompasses non-contractual transactions based on inter-personal links and trust which goes beyond pure business 
relationships” (pg. 450) 
●    ● 
Gilmore and Carson 
(1999) 
“Networking refers to the actual process of liaison with contacts within the network; it is about individuals and companies working alongside each other and 
cooperating through the exchange of ideas, knowledge and technology” (pg. 31) 
● ● ● ● ● 
Chell & Baines (2000) “Networking denotes the action by which an owner-manager develops and maintains contacts for trading and business development purposes” (pg. 196)  ●  ●  ● 
Soh (2003) “networking describes the entrepreneurial behaviour in building relationships with an expectation to develop mutual trust and reciprocity in the network of firms” 
(pg. 729) 
●  ● ● ● 
Neergaard (2005) “Networking activities undertaken by founding team members include building the new venture team, raising capital, recruitment, finding customers/outlets, 
obtaining access to relevant advice/knowledge and establishing international contacts” (pg. 262) 
 ● ●  ● 
Miller et al (2007) “networking theory focusses on the development of trusting and reciprocal relationships among independent business owners as a tactical stance in competitive 
markets” (pg. 634) 
●    ● 
Watson (2007) “networking can provide the means by which small and medium enterprise (SME) owners can tap needed resources that are ‘external’ to the firm” (pg. 853) ●  ●   
Tang (2011) “Networking behaviours are interpreted to represent the directions and actions of firms in formulating, developing and maintaining network relationships” (pg. 
375) 
 ●   ● 
Key: LoA: Level of Analysis; E:  Entrepreneur; F: Firm; A: Access to external resources; S: Sharing of information; LT: Long-term relationship  
Source: The Author 
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Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998: 243) define social capital as “the sum of resources embedded 
within, available through, and derived from the network of relationships by an individual or 
social unit.” Social capital is rooted in Pierre Bourdieu’s (1986) original research that has 
spawned wide debate from Coleman (1988), Burt (1992) and Putnam (1995: 8), but there is 
general agreement within social science that social capital represents “the ability of actors to 
secure benefits by virtue of membership in social networks or other social structures” 
(Portes, 1998: 6). Adler and Kwon (2002) also note there are numerous social capital 
perspectives within management research, but generally researchers adopt an “internal” (i.e. 
Coleman, 1988) or “external” (i.e. Burt, 1992) approach, while some scholars attempt to 
combine these perspectives (i.e. Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998). Payne et al. (2011: 492) thus 
argue researchers “have failed to fully recognise that social capital can have alternative 
meanings, antecedents, and consequences at different levels [of analysis].”   
However, Adler and Kwon (2002) build on Nahapiet and Ghoshal’s (1998) integrative 
attempts and distinguish between the “sources” and “effects” of social capital. Thus, the 
authors define “social capital is the goodwill available to individuals or groups. Its sources 
lies in the structure and content of actor’s social relations. Its effects flow from the 
information, influence, and solidarity it makes available to the actor” (2002: 23). In 
entrepreneurship research, these social capital conceptualisations for the founding, survival 
and growth of entrepreneurial firms is now widely acknowledged (Davidsson and Honig, 
2003; Florin et al. 2003; Kim and Aldrich, 2005; Myint et al. 2005; Anderson et al. 2007). 
These studies therefore adopt Nahapiet and Ghoshal’s (1998) seminal conceptualisation in 
which they discuss the (1) structural, (2) relational, and (3) cognitive dimensions of social 
capital as a useful organising framework. Maurer and Ebers (2006: 263) also state that 
Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) is a “reasonably comprehensive conceptualisation” that 
“accommodates the major concerns of the extant literature.” 
Anderson and Jack (2002: 193) borrow from Powell and Smith-Doerr’s (1994) analogy of 
“glue and lubricant” to articulate the value of social capital in entrepreneurial networks. The 
authors specify social capital is both the “glue” that binds network structure and the 
“lubricant” which facilitates social interaction within the entrepreneurial network. 
Moreover, Watson (2007: 855) emphasises that networking is a process that enhances an 
entrepreneurial actor’s social capital. Since social capital is an intangible asset (Pennings et 
al. 1998), scholars therefore attempt to understand the “amount of social capital” which is 
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embedded in an entrepreneurial firm’s network of relationships (Yli-Renko et al. 2001; Liao 
and Welsch, 2005; Maurer and Ebers, 2006). 
Table 4-2: The Value of Social Capital in Entrepreneurial Networks 
The construction of social 
capital 
Emphasis Analytic category Key questions 
The nature of social 
capital 
Process Entrepreneurial networks What is it? 
How can we conceptualise it? 
As a glue Bonding (Structure) Creation of relationships How is it formed? 
Ends or means? 
As a lubricant Facilitating (Relational) Interaction with 
relationships 
How is it maintained? 
Is it purely exploitative? 
Are there rules? 
Source: Anderson and Jack (2002:199) 
This analogy is useful as increasing the quantity of glue and lubricant conceptually enhances 
the amount of social capital that embeds a network relationship. Thus, echoing Gilmore and 
Carson (1999), networking involves the process of increasing the quantity of glue and 
lubricant to form and forge long-term productive relationships. Networking therefore 
involves the process of enhancing the value of a firm’s social capital (Watson, 2007). To 
measure the value of social capital researchers can then examine the sources and effects of 
its structural, relational, and cognitive dimensions (Adler and Kwon, 2002; Nahapiet and 
Ghoshal, 1998). Thus, the prime objective of this section is to review the networking and 
social capital research that contributes to the entrepreneurial network literature. Since social 
capital is a highly fluid but valuable concept, each of these dimensions will now be discussed 
to gain further insight into the overall process and outcomes of networking by 
entrepreneurial firms. 
4.2.1 Structural Social Capital 
The structural dimension of social capital focusses on the advantages conferred by the 
configuration of an actor’s network of contacts (Moran, 2005: 1132). Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 
(1998: 244) note structural social capital is based on Granovetter’s (1992) discussion on 
“structural embeddedness” which refers to the overall pattern of connections between actors 
– that is, who you reach, and how you reach them (Burt, 1992). Structural social capital thus 
encapsulates “the impersonal configuration of linkages between people or units” (Nahapiet 
and Ghoshal, 1998: 244). The authors specify the sources of structural social capital are in 
the (1) presence or absence of “network ties” between actors, (2) the “network 
configuration” and (3) “appropriable organisation” which is the multiplexity of the network 
in that its creation for one purpose may be used for other purposes.  
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Jack et al. (2010) notes to understand the complexity of networking, scholars must initially 
understand the structure of the “entrepreneurial network.” Davern (1997: 288) note the 
fundamental components of any network are “nodes” and “connections” while in the social 
sciences, researchers normally replace nodes with “actors” and connections with “ties” or 
“bonds.” Social network theory thus defines network structure as “the pattern of direct and 
indirect ties between actors” (Hoang and Antoncic, 2003: 170). Shane and Cable (2002: 367) 
thus define a “direct tie” as “a personal relationship between a decision maker and the party 
about whom the decision is being made.” Relatedly, they define an “indirect tie” as “a 
relationship between two individuals who are not directly connected but through whom a 
connection can be made through a social network of each party’s direct ties” (2000: 367). 
Lin et al. (2001) also argues that direct and indirect ties comprise of a firms structural social 
capital, which provide access to a diverse range of information and resources.  
At the individual-level, direct ties are the individual entrepreneur’s personal network of 
family, friends, and acquaintances who provide access to early stage resources at the start-
up phase (Larson, 1992; Ostgaard and Birley, 1994). Whereas, indirect ties are advantageous 
for entrepreneurs who seek to obtain unique resources from their distant network (Shane and 
Cable, 2002). At the firm level, Gulati (1995) argues indirect ties are important for focal 
firms who need to access unique resources that are only available through direct ties. In these 
situations, focal firms can leverage trust they have built with direct ties and reinforce their 
position when a forming new alliances with indirect ties. As a result, access to unique 
resources is available through a social interaction process with various network contacts who 
embed a focal actor’s overall social structure (Tsai and Ghoshal, 1998). 
Jack (2010) emphasises studies which investigate the network configuration of new ventures 
have largely been based on Coleman (1988) and Burt’s (1992) influential contributions on 
social capital. These studies have fuelled major debate on whether advantages stem from 
cohesive or sparsely structured entrepreneurial networks. On one side of the debate, 
Coleman (1988) argues that “network cohesion” is characterised by a dense and closed 
network structure that offer the most advantages to firms. Whereas, Burt (1992) argues 
“structural holes” are more advantageous to firms that involved in sparse and loosely 
connected network structures. Figure 4-1 presents these opposing views have resulted in 
what social capital theorists describe as “bonding” [closed] and “bridging” [open] social 
capital (Gittell and Vidal, 1998; Leonard, 2004). 
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Bonding social capital is primarily associated with Coleman’s (1988) theory on network 
cohesion. Coleman (1988) argues there are numerous benefits from a dense group of actors 
who have known each other for a long time and interact frequently. Bhagavatula et al. (2010) 
for example argues cohesive networks are beneficial for new ventures as it allows 
information to be transmit quickly to all group members involved, which helps save valuable 
time and energy. Cohesive networks also facilitate exchange of fine-grained information, 
which tends to be tacit, complex or proprietary (Uzzi, 1997; Hansen, 1999; Reagans and 
McEvily, 2003). Another benefit of a cohesive network is the values of the group are clearly, 
although implicitly, defined, which in turn ensures a higher level of trust and reciprocity 
between the members of the network (Bhagavatula et al. 2010).  
Figure 4-1: Open and Closed Networks 
 
Source: Andersson et al. (2005: 34) 
According to Echols and Tsai (2005), cohesive networks discourage opportunistic behaviour 
and ensure inappropriate behaviour is dealt with through sanctions imposed by actors within 
the network. Cohesive networks then offer a mechanism to lubricate economic transactions, 
which warrants smooth and fair interactions within a minimal regulatory framework 
(Bhagavatula et al. 2010). A cohesive network is therefore an informal governance 
mechanism that protects entrepreneurs against various forms of opportunistic behaviour such 
as withholding information (Uzzi, 1997), belittlement (Fleming et al. 2007) and malfeasance 
(Yu et al. 2011). Steier and Greenwood (2000) also argue once entrepreneurs become 
established within a cohesive network, it is possible to minimise interaction with all actors 
and still access new information from closer members within the group.   
Bridging social capital in contrast focusses on Burt’s (1992) structural holes theory that 
emphasises the importance of gaps within a focal actor’s social structure. Burt (1992) argues 
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the benefit of social capital stems from non-redundant ties, or more specifically, from the 
absence of ties among those to whom one is connected (i.e. structural holes). Structural holes 
are then the gaps within a focal actor’s social structure that consequently provides brokerage 
opportunities to access non-redundant (i.e. diverse) sources of information and resources 
(Moran, 2005: 1331). Oh et al. (2006) note these brokerage opportunities normally occur in 
sparse networks of weak ties where many actors remain unconnected. Bridging ties intend 
to span structural holes by linking a focal firm to distant contacts in economic, professional, 
and social circles that are not otherwise accessible by the firm (McEvily and Zaheer, 1999).  
Burt (1992) argues (1) access, (2) timing, and the (3) referral of potentially valuable 
information are the main benefits to emerge from a non-redundant network rich in structural 
holes. Since actors have limits on the amount of information they can absorb (Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1990), Burt (1992) argues structural holes provide access to new and diverse 
information that would otherwise be unobtainable through a closed network. The size and 
diversity of a network also influences the timing of which a focal actor receives superior 
information. For example, if entrepreneurs enjoy a central position within a strategically 
valuable network, they are more likely to receive superior information earlier and faster than 
rivals (Hallen, 2008). Brokerage opportunities also help increase innovation and firm 
performance. For example, Maula et al. (2003) found that technology start-ups who build 
bridges over diverse social cleavages are more likely to accrue increased knowledge and 
learning benefits. Koka and Prescott (2002) also identify firms that are restricted by the 
competitiveness of their home markets can exploit brokerage opportunities across national 
borders to accrue greater resource control.  
Despite this research, brokerage has been criticised as being a predominately “individualist” 
theory (Batjargal, 2003; Xiao and Tsui, 2007). For example, Batjargal (2003) empirically 
finds that Russian entrepreneurs found brokerage less effective due to the reputational risks 
of leaving a cohesive network. Xiao and Tsui (2007: 23) also argue that the assumptions of 
brokerage are less compatible for collectivist cultures. In their empirical study, the authors 
investigate Chinese high-technology firms and find brokerage does not fit with collectivist 
values of China. Instead, the authors argue cohesiveness and high-commitment are more 
favourable with respect to personal career development. Flemming et al. (2007) therefore 
argues there are costs and benefits from both brokerage and closure and finding an “optimal 
network configuration” is actually contingent on many relational and cognitive attributes. 
An awareness of these “structural” costs and benefits are then more likely to help 
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entrepreneurial ventures with “efficient” tie creation (Hallen, 2008; Hallen and Eisenhardt, 
2012).  
4.2.2 Relational Social Capital 
The relational dimension of social capital focusses on the role of direct ties between actors 
and the relational, as opposed to structural, outcomes of interactions (Inkpen and Tsang, 
2005). Rooted in Granovetter’s (1992) notion of “relational embeddedness” this dimension 
refers to the “quality” of dyadic relationships opposed to the network structure in which 
these ties are configured. Relational social capital thus encapsulates the “personal 
relationships people have developed with each other through a history of interactions” 
(Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998: 244). The authors specify the most important facets of this 
dimension include (1) trust (Putnam, 1995); (2) norms (Coleman, 1990); (3) obligations and 
expectations (Bourdieu, 1986); and (4) “identification” (Simon and Davies, 1996). Put 
simply, although the structure of an actor’s network may provide access to several ties who 
offer potentially valuable resources, personal experience and the quality of past interactions 
will influence whom the actor is likely to approach and engage with (Moran, 2005). Thus, 
Uzzi and Gillespie (2002) note two actors may occupy equivalent network positions but if 
their personal and emotional attachments to other network members differ, their behaviours 
and performance are likely to differ. 
The relational dimension of social capital is a bonding mechanism that supports 
entrepreneurial firms lubricate and strengthen the relationships they hold with other actors 
(Jack and Anderson, 2002). In Granovetter’s (1973) seminal study, he explains the strength 
of ties within a network defines the strength and quality of relations. Theoretically, tie 
strength is a continuous measure, ranging from having no relationship (two actors are 
strangers) through passing acquaintance (weak tie) to building a strong relational tie (Kim 
and Aldrich, 2005). Granovetter (1973) emphasises tie strength can be broken down into 
four dimensions: (1) the time spent in a relationship; (2) the emotional intensity; (3) the 
intimacy of mutual confiding; and (4) the degree of reciprocity between two actors. Newbert 
et al. (2013) explains weak ties tend to be short-term superficial relations that are 
characterised by infrequent interaction and exchange, while strong ties tend to be long-
standing relationships based on frequent contact and high levels of obligation. Strong ties 
therefore form between entrepreneurial firms and long-standing business partners’ who has 
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shared norms and a successful history of cooperative exchange guide interactions (Elfring 
and Hulsink, 2003).  
It is widely acknowledged that trust is a fundamental source of relational social capital 
(Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998; Adler and Kwon, 2002; Inkpen and Tsang, 2005; Lee, 2009). 
In its simplest form, Barney and Hansen (1994: 176) refer to Sabel (1993) and define trust 
as “the mutual confidence that no party to an exchange will exploit another’s 
vulnerabilities.” Johanson and Vahlne (2009: 7) refer to the work of Morgan and Hunt (1994) 
and define trust as “the ability to predict another’s behaviour.” Barney and Hansen (1994: 
176) also emphasise that “trust” and “trustworthiness” are distinct concepts. That is, the 
authors explain that trust resides within a relationship between exchange partners, while 
trustworthiness is an attribute of an individual exchange partner. Put differently, trust is a 
shared asset built during the development of a relationship, while trustworthiness is an 
attribute, each actor will or should earn after a successful relational exchange (Doney and 
Cannon, 1997; Dyer and Chu, 2003). Despite these distinctions, Ring (1996: 150) argues the 
literature tends to treat trust as a “unitary concept” and provides scant understanding on the 
processes that create trust or on how actors rely on trust to govern economic exchange. 
In the cooperative strategy (Dyer and Singh, 1998) and entrepreneurship (Hoang and 
Antoncic, 2003) literature, trust is a distinctive governance mechanism in the development 
of relationships. This literature argues that firms manage inter-organisational relations 
through either contractual (Williamson, 1979; Hennart, 1988) or relational (Zaheer and 
Venkatraman, 1995; Dyer and Singh, 1998; Rousseau et al. 1998) forms of governance. The 
former perspective is firmly rooted in TCE (Williamson, 1985) and argues formal contracts 
minimise the assumed threat of a partner’s opportunistic behaviour. By contrast, the latter 
perspective is rooted in social exchange theory (Blau, 1964) which assumes partners tend to 
behave in a trustworthy manner, meaning relationships are self-governed by trust, especially 
when there is a history of successful collaboration. Alder (2001) however argues there is still 
confusion as to how trust can be broken down into various dimensions and components.  
One exemplar is Ring (1996) who reviews the above literature and identifies there are 
varying levels of trust which fulfil different management functions. In this study, Ring 
(1996: 152) distinguishes between “fragile trust” and “resilient trust” on the basis that 
“predictability” and “vulnerability” are very different attitudes towards building trust. In the 
first approach, the author argues the ability to predict another actor’s behaviour equates with 
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risk and is akin with Williamson’s (1993) notion of calculative trust. This calculated 
approach is “fragile” as trust bases upon the way actors characterise a contractual deal, rather 
than how actors characterise each other. In contrast, resilient trust does not rest in the 
predictability of outcomes, but in the belief in the goodwill of others (Ring and Van de Ven, 
1992). Ring (1996) argues resilient trust is non-calculative, but reliant on the integrity, 
loyalty, openness and discretion of each actor to express their vulnerabilities when building 
a relationship. In line with McAllister (1995) this trust is affection based meaning it will 
survive even when actors make occasional mishaps since it is rooted with interpersonal care 
and concern. Trust is then weaker when based on predictability and stronger when based on 
the benevolence of actors (Ring, 1996).   
Adler and Kwon (2002: 23) emphasise “the goodwill available to individuals or groups” 
indicates that the vulnerability aspect of trust is a fundamental and prolonged source of 
relational social capital. Adler (2001) emphasises norms (Putnam, 1995) are an important 
source of trust and determine what bonding actions are appropriate in certain relationships. 
Peng et al. (2008) indicates norms encapsulate the values, rules, beliefs, and actions of other 
actors’ which together influence how a focal actor behaves in various institutional settings. 
For example, research has found the creation and development of long-term relations is more 
likely to occur when actors either enjoy kinship ties, or are both geographically and culturally 
localised (Alvesson and Lindkvist, 1993). Uzzi (1997) also found relationships embedded 
with trust, norms and reciprocity create a willingness to share fine-grained information 
within locally dense inter-family networks. Adler and Kwon (2002) argue “solidarity” is 
then a major benefit to derive from strong social norms and beliefs as they encourage 
compliance with local rules and customs that reduce the need for formal contracts. Norms 
therefore facilitate the exchange and early access of complex information, which are major 
benefits that emerge from this source of relational social capital (Inkpen and Tsang, 2005). 
A strong reputation is also a central source for building trust, and a major benefit of relational 
social capital (Adler, 2001; Adler and Kwon, 2002). Jones et al. (1997: 932) define an actor’s 
reputation as an “estimation of one’s character, skills, reliability, and other attributes 
important to exchange.” Whereas, Shane and Cable (2002: 370) simply define an 
entrepreneur’s reputation as “information about an individual’s past performance.” 
Entrepreneurship scholars therefore emphasise a good reputation is an effective means of 
overcoming the liability of newness, building trust and increasing firm performance (Larson, 
1992; Stuart et al. 1999; Lechner et al. 2006). Stuart et al. (1999) for example found 
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biotechnology new ventures that receive endorsement from high profile ties such as alliance 
partners, investors, and board members achieved greater initial public offering (IPO) 
valuations than those without such acknowledgement. In IE research, Zahra and George 
(2002) emphasise that a good reputation within an entrepreneurial network provides greater 
access to foreign market opportunities. A strong reputation thus accelerates trust and helps 
entrepreneurial firms achieve high status and legitimacy that are major benefits for high-
potential new ventures (Packalen, 2007).  
It is evident that trust is the overarching source of relational social capital (Inkpen and Tsang, 
2005). In Adler (2001: 218) he identifies the underlying “bases” of trust are: (1) consistency 
in behaviour; (2) competence to perform tasks; (3) benevolence, loyalty, concern, and 
goodwill; (4) honesty and integrity; and (5) openness. Adler et al. (1999) also emphasise the 
role of goal congruence to identify trust. When actors meet these principles, a major effect 
of trust is the development of commitment that is the willingness and endured desire to 
maintain a valued relationship (Moorman et al. 1992). Morgan and Hunt (1994) emphasise 
commitment is the actor’s belief and choice to invest in a relationship with the view to 
maintaining its long-term development. In entrepreneurship research, scholars including 
Larson (1992), De Clercq and Sapienza (2006) and Mosey and Wright (2007) all 
acknowledge that trust and partner commitment are critical elements which enhance the 
quality of resource flows. Trust is therefore a prerequisite of commitment (Morgan and Hunt, 
1994), which means long-term commitment is a considerable effect to emerge from trust 
which together indicate the relational value of social capital (Adler and Kwon, 2002; 
Johanson and Vahlne, 2009). 
4.2.3 Cognitive Social Capital 
The cognitive dimension of social capital represents those resources providing shared 
meaning and understanding between the network members (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998: 
244). In extending this conceptualisation, Inkpen and Tsang (2005) identify that (1) shared 
goals and (2) shared culture are the two fundamental sources that underpin cognitive social 
capital. Although cognition is increasingly researched in strategic management (Tripsas and 
Gavetti, 2000), international business (Sullivan, 1998) and entrepreneurship (Mitchell et al. 
2002), network-based research has had a tendency to neglect and overshadow this topic 
(Inkpen and Tsang, 2005). Indeed, De Carolis and Saparito (2006: 4) argue there is a 
significant gap in the literature related to links between cognitive social capital and 
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entrepreneurial behaviour. Lee and Jones (2008) also stress entrepreneurship scholars should 
become more acquainted with the cognitive aspect of social capital.    
Tsai and Ghoshal (1998: 467) argue cognitive social capital is rooted in a “shared vision 
[which] embodies the collective goals and aspirations of the members of the organization.” 
These “shared goals” represent the degree to which network members share a common 
understanding and approach to the achievement of network tasks and outcomes (Inkpen and 
Tsang, 2005: 153). When a shared vision is present within the network, actors have a similar 
perception as to how they should interact with one another that promotes mutual 
understanding and exchange of ideas and resources (Tsai and Ghoshal, 1998). Thus, Inkpen 
and Tsang (2005) argue a shared vision is a “bonding mechanism” that stimulates relational 
exchange. Nevertheless, when actors have inconsistent goals, inter-partner conflict is likely 
to arise (Schnake and Cochran, 1985). For example, Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven (1996) 
found when entrepreneurial firms form strategic alliances with incumbents, both actor’s 
often have varying goals but are rarely communicated which often means these relations 
break down. Whereas, when objectives of strategic alliances are clearly stated, a common 
understanding and likelihood of alliance success is likely to emerge (Das and Teng, 1998).  
Inkpen and Tsang (2005: 153) argue the second major source of cognitive social capital is a 
shared culture that “refers to the degree to which norms of behaviour govern relationships.” 
In network-based research, Gulati et al. (2000: 205) note this facet is similar to the concept 
of “tie modality” (Galaskiewicz and Zaheer, 1999), which is “the set of institutionalised rules 
and norms that govern appropriate behaviour in the network. These are sometimes spelled 
out in formal contracts, most often they are simply understandings that evolve within the 
dyad of the network.” In IB research, the role of national (Hofstede, 1994) and organisational 
culture (Kogut and Singh, 1988; Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1990) on inter-firm relations has been 
researched extensively through institutional based frameworks. For example, Parkhe (1991) 
have found cultural diversity between partners can lead to learning benefits, while Lei et al. 
(1997) have found alliances that transfer tacit knowledge are often ineffective in 
circumstances when partners belong to diverse cultural contexts.  
For new ventures, Liao and Welsch (2005) emphasise when actors participate in networks 
that share norms and beliefs, they are more likely to develop trustful relationships through 
the successful exchange of information and resources. These authors also emphasise Ouchi 
(1980: 138) who state that: “Common values and beliefs provide the harmony of interests 
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that erase the possibility of opportunistic behaviour.” The network concept of “homophily” 
(McPherson et al. 2001; Ruef et al. 2003) which is the tendency to work or interact with 
people of similar interests is therefore an important aspect of cognitive social capital. Ruef 
et al (2003: 197) for example investigates the composition of entrepreneurial start-up teams 
and found gender and ethnicity were core homophily mechanisms as individuals often share 
a common identity, values, beliefs and norms. Whereas at inter-firm level, Milanov and 
Fernhaber (2009: 49) draw on the homophily principal to argue the position of an initial 
alliance partner may imprint the new venture’s future network position, and determine the 
path-dependent network context within which the new venture grows and forms its own 
future partnerships. Shared norms and beliefs are therefore important sources of cognitive 
social capital (Inkpen and Tsang, 2005). 
Shared language is a fundamental attribute that underpins a “shared culture” and is an 
important source of cognitive social capital (Inkpen and Tsang, 2005). Bolino et al. (2002) 
note when shared language and narratives exist, actors can more easily discuss problems, 
transfer ideas, share knowledge, and offer more effective assistance to one another. In IE 
research, a shared language provides actors with the ability to communicate more effectively 
across national borders (Oviatt and McDougall, 2005). Vissa (2011: 142) for example 
discusses the importance of shared language in supporting Indian entrepreneurs with forming 
new ties. Due to India’s cultural diversity, entrepreneurs who are able to communicate in the 
language of new contacts found it easier to establish new contacts as they were able to 
determine whether they shared norms, values, and taken-for-granted cultural assumptions 
which are difficult to gauge without conversation. Additionally, research on ethnic 
entrepreneurship has shown poor English proficiency in the US constrains tie formation and 
information exchange for first generation immigrant entrepreneurs (Aldrich and Waldinger, 
1990).  
Chen and Chen (1998: 450) note cultural and ethnic bonds are particularly useful for making 
networking linkages and penetrating institutional markets where cross-border operations are 
yet to be established. The cultural and socially embedded nature of Chinese guanxi networks 
are one example which exhibit intensive levels of cognitive social capital (Park and Luo, 
2001; Batjargal and Liu, 2004). Guanxi deeply embeds Chinese culture and means 
“relationships that bind people through the exchange of favours” (Todeva, 2006: 166). Park 
and Luo (2001) argue Chinese firms develop guanxi as a strategic mechanism to overcome 
competitive and resource disadvantages by cooperating and reciprocating favours with 
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competitive forces and government institutions. Tsang (1998) notes a major distinction of 
guanxi networks is their ability to grow beyond the family enterprise and expand into 
economic activities within the wider community. For new ventures that enter China, having 
rich cognitive social capital with Chinese relations is then a fundamental asset for navigating 
the complexity of guanxi networks (Batjargal and Liu, 2004; Fu et al. 2006). Cognitive social 
capital is therefore a highly important asset for new ventures who need to traverse through 
institutionally distant markets (Bhagavatula et al. 2010; Prashantham and Dhanaraj, 2010).  
An entrepreneur’s cognitive biases may also provide additional insight into the networking 
processes that enhance cognitive social capital (De Carolis and Saparito, 2006). Lee and 
Jones (2008: 559) for example found nascent entrepreneurs create cognitive social capital 
with new actors via face-to-face and electronic forms of communication. However, 
entrepreneurs who are less skilled in building rapport electronically (e.g. through email and 
teleconferencing) were unable to create cognitive social capital which limited their 
opportunity to obtain business backing including emotional support, information, advice, 
equipment and referrals. The nature of cognitive social capital then indicates why the 
development of network relations are complex and certainly not linear (Staber, 2006). Bolino 
et al. (2002) therefore argue higher levels of cognitive social capital provide actors with a 
common perspective that enables them to perceive and interpret events in similar ways. 
Echoing Johannisson (1986: 20), the enhancement of [cognitive social capital] is a skilful 
form of networking which provides entrepreneurial firms with the ability to navigate the 
“institutional jungle.” Entrepreneurs who utilise similar language, codes, and narratives then 
“lubricate” their cognitive social capital that provides shared understanding during 
interaction (Lee and Jones, 2008). 
Prashantham and Floyd (2012) also argue that [cognitive] social capital arising from network 
relationships supports INVs overcome the negative effects of psychic distance that inhibit 
capability development. Moreover, the authors argue relational capabilities enable INV 
learning in high psychic distance contexts (2012: 13). Indeed, Blyler and Coff (2003: 679) 
were early to propose that a firms “social capital is an essential component of a dynamic 
capability in that it enables resource management.” Since then a significant stream of 
literature has emerged that uses a dynamic capabilities as a theoretical lens to examine 
various aspects of relational and network management. Given this thesis argues that 
networking is a process of capability development, the following section will review the 
literature that sheds light on this process.  
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4.3 A Capabilities Perspective on Networking Behaviour 
The prime objective of this section is to review studies that use a capabilities lens to examine 
the networking behaviour of INVs. Interestingly, numerous studies adopt a (dynamic) 
capabilities lens to observe and explain various aspects of a firms networking behaviour. For 
example, in strategic management numerous labels seek to explain networking behaviour 
such as, “network capabilities” (Kogut, 2000, Zaheer and Bell, 2005); “network resources” 
(Gulati et al. 2000; Lavie, 2006); “alliance capabilities” (Kale and Singh, 2007; Heimeriks 
and Duysters, 2007), “alliance management capability” (Ireland et al. 2002) and “relational 
capabilities” (Capaldo, 2007).  
In the industrial marketing and purchasing (IMP) and IB literature, labels include, “network 
competence” (Ritter and Gemünden, 2003), “interaction capability” (Johnsen and Ford, 
2006), “collaboration capabilities” (Blomqvist and Levy, 2006; Allred et al. 2011) and 
“global dynamic capability” (Griffith and Harvey, 2001). In entrepreneurship research 
studies on network capabilities (Walter et al. 2006), alliance management capability 
(Rothaermel and Deeds, 2006), relational capability (Brinckmann and Hoegl, 2011) and 
“innovative capability” in inter-firm networks (Zheng et al. 2010) all examine the 
networking behaviour of technology new ventures. Figure 4-2 thus divides this literature on 
six quadrants to help researchers navigate this “terminological haze” (Winter, 2000). On the 
horizontal axis, this study adopts Möller and Halinen’s (1999) categorisation of “relational 
management”, “portfolio management” or “network management,”5 while on the vertical 
axis, this study pinpoints the research conducted in “established firms” or “new ventures.” 
                                         
5 Contributions with asterisks use dynamic capabilities as a theoretical lens to examine networking 
behaviour. 
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Figure 4-2: A Capabilities Perspective on Networking Behaviour 
 
Source: The Author 
4.3.1 Relational and Alliance Capabilities 
Möller and Halinen (1999) argue most researchers investigate relational management from 
an IMP perspective (Möller and Wilson, 1995) or strategic management (Dyer and Singh, 
1998) perspective. In this research, scholars primarily concentrate on the management of 
dyadic exchange relationships, opposed to the management of inter-personal relationships, 
which is more common in entrepreneurship research (e.g. Larson and Starr, 1993). In IE 
research, limited studies specifically investigate the INV’s management of individual 
network relationships as most studies concentrate on the management of social capital (Yli-
Renko et al. 2002; Prashantham and Dhanaraj, 2010), or their overall network (Coviello, 
2006). Bruneel et al (2010) is one exception that adopts an organisational learning 
framework to examine interorganisational learning during NVI. In this study, the authors 
empirically find INVs can substitute their limited internationalisation knowledge for 
interorganisational knowledge by capitalising on learning advantages of newness when 
collaborating with exchange partners. However, capability based research that specifically 
examines the relational behaviour of INVs is a major gap within the IE literature. 
In the wider strategic management literature, Schreiner et al. (2009) review of the alliance 
capability literature (e.g. Gulati, 1998; Anand and Khanna, 2000; Kale et al. 2002) indicates 
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two research streams have emerged with respect to the management of alliances. The first 
stream focusses on how alliance capability develops in firms (e.g. Anand and Khanna, 2000), 
while the second stream investigates the individual skills and organisational routines which 
underpin this capability (e.g. Gulati, 1998). In the latter stream, Schreiner et al. (2009) notes 
that researchers examine the skills needed for alliances at two different levels. The first camp 
(quadrants 1 and 4) consider the skills needed to manage an individual alliance (e.g. Doz, 
1996; Ireland et al. 2002) while the second camp (quadrants 2 and 5) considers the skills a 
firm needs to manage an entire portfolio of alliances (e.g. Hoffmann, 2007; Rothaermel and 
Deeds, 2006; Ozcan and Eisenhardt, 2009). 
To differentiate between these levels of analysis, some researchers also use the term 
“relational capability” (e.g. Collins and Hitt, 2006) instead of alliance capability to examine 
the management of exchange relationships within an alliance network. For example, 
Lorenzoni and Lipparini (1999) utilise Teece et al. (1997) assumptions on dynamic 
capabilities to conceptualise “relational capability” as a process that leverages inter-firm 
relationships. Lorenzoni and Lipparini (1999: 320) position relational capability as “the 
measurement of a firm’s capability to develop integrate, and transfer knowledge across 
different actors in a network.” Careful examination of this definition indicates the 
management of multiple relations in a network, rather than the exchange relationship per se. 
Similarly, Capaldo (2007: 585) argues a firm requires a distinctive set of relational 
capabilities to sustain “innovativeness by creating and managing the overall architecture of 
its network over time.” Capaldo (2007) then explicates that the management of strong and 
weak ties leads to the development of a distinctive relational capability, which in turn allows 
firms to build a “dynamic innovative capability” through their knowledge-intensive alliance 
network. 
Dyer and Kale (2007: 79) contribute to the dynamic capabilities debate by defining a 
relational capability as “a type of dynamic capability that refers to the capacity of the firm 
to purposefully create, modify or extend the firm’s resource base, augmented to include the 
resources of partners.” Similar to Capaldo (2007) the authors argue: “relational capabilities 
are a precondition for firms to access the benefits from their network ties” in which they 
define network ties as “sets of relationships between firms that reflects their transactions 
with other organizations within an industry or scientific field” (2007: 66-67). Dyer and Kale 
(2007) thus argue firms can source advantage from their relational capabilities when their 
alliances have (1) complementary capabilities, (2) relationship-specific assets; (3) inter-firm 
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knowledge sharing routines and (4) effective governance. In other words, firms can 
effectively manage their alliances when there is a high degree of asset complementarity and 
strategic fit (Teece, 2006), the inter-firm learning that takes place is adaptable to changing 
needs (Zollo et al. 2002) and the alliance is governed on fair contractual terms (Hennart and 
Zeng, 2005). 
Schreiner et al. (2009) argues this research is helpful for understanding how established 
firms formulate new alliances (e.g. Doz, 1996), but provides less detail on how firms 
effectively manage alliances after formation. However, in the entrepreneurship literature, the 
inverse is more common, as this research investigates how new ventures manage existing 
relationships (e.g. Larson and Starr, 1992) but few studies consider how entrepreneurs 
formulate or create new relationships. One example is Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven (1996), 
who were early to use the RBV as a lens to examine how new ventures form alliances when 
they are in a vulnerable strategic position but have a strong social position, which provides 
access to knowledge and new exchange relationships. In a similar vein, Baron and Markman 
(2003) investigate the “social competence” of individual entrepreneurs who build and extract 
value from their network relationships. In this study, the authors identify six networking 
skills (1) social perception, (2) impression management, (3) persuasiveness, (4) social 
adaptability, (5) expressiveness, and (6) emotional intelligence that lead to the creation of 
network relationships. 
However, Collins and Hitt (2006) emphasise Larson’s (1992) argument that social forces 
can blunt the entrepreneur’s economic rationality when forming new exchange relationships, 
which means firms must build relational capabilities in order to develop relational capital. 
De Clercq and Sapienza (2006) is one of the few entrepreneurship studies that investigates 
the effects of relational capital and commitment on VCs perception of portfolio company 
performance. In this study, the authors empirically find that the amount of relational capital 
embedded in the VC-portfolio company dyad and the extent to which the VC is committed 
to the portfolio company strongly relates to perceived performance, and stimulates 
organisational learning. Arikan and McGahan (2010) empirically find that VCs are more 
likely to invest in young firms when they exhibit strong corporate capabilities in the 
implementation of pre-emptive alliance and acquisition deals. Hallen (2008) also examines 
the entrepreneur’s ability to build exchange relations and identifies two paths on which new 
ventures establish ties with initial investors. One path indicates new ventures rely on the 
founders’ existing ties and human capital to secure early investment, while the second path 
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illustrates some entrepreneurs will wait and leverage their organisations accomplishments 
before they secure initial investment. 
Finally, Brinckmann and Hoegl (2011) specifically investigate the effects of relational 
capability on the development of technology based new ventures. Building on Capaldo 
(2007) the authors argue, “Relational capabilities pertain to the collaboration of the founding 
team members with external partners” (2011: 38). The authors focus on founding teams’ 
relations with resource providers in the technological, marketing, and financial domain and 
empirically verify the strength of the founding teams’ relational capabilities provide access 
to critical knowledge, new internal capabilities, and improves overall growth. This research 
then supports Hallen’s (2008) empirical finding that initial tie formation is heavily path 
dependent and new ventures require relational capabilities to overcome the inertia that 
dominates overly embedded relationships. Thus, relational management is an area ripe for 
research within the domain of IE. 
4.3.2 Alliance Portfolio Capabilities 
Möller and Halinen (1999: 418) define a portfolio management capability as the “firm’s 
competence in managing supplier and customer portfolios. It includes analytical aspects, 
such as competencies in creating and using databases and conducting supplier and customer 
evaluation, and organizational aspects, such as capabilities to develop organizational 
solutions for handing exchange relationships.” In strategic management, scholars label this 
area of inquiry as alliance portfolio research (Gulati, 1998; Reuer and Ragozzino, 2006; 
Hoffmann, 2007; Lavie, 2007; Wassmer, 2010). Wassmer (2010) emphasises that 
researchers examine alliance portfolios in two ways. Firstly, some studies examine an 
alliance portfolio as an aggregate of all the focal firm’s strategic alliances past and present 
(Marino et al. 2002; George et al. 2001; Lavie, 2007). Whereas, some studies grounded in 
the social network theory define an alliance portfolio as the a focal firm’s egocentric network 
and specifically examine the focal firm’s existing direct ties with exchange partners rather 
than the indirect ties of these partners (Rowley et al. 2000; Baum et al. 2000; Ozcan and 
Eisenhardt, 2009). 
However, only a few studies use a dynamic capabilities lens to examine the management of 
alliance portfolios (Kale and Singh, 2007; Heimeriks and Duysters, 2007). In Kale and Singh 
(2007: 983), the authors build on Kale et al. (2002) and argue an established firm’s alliance 
capability is identifiable and measurable through a dedicated alliance function that is 
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responsible for overseeing and coordinating the firm’s alliance portfolio. The authors utilise 
Zollo and Winter’s (2002) conceptualisation of dynamic capabilities to examine how 
“alliance learning” processes underpin the development of a focal firm’s alliance capability. 
Specifically, the authors argue that “alliance learning process” is a second-order learning 
process that “involves articulation, codification, sharing, and internalization of alliance 
management know-how.” (2007: 982). The authors then position “alliance learning” as a 
higher-order dynamic capability which is rooted in deliberate investments of second-order 
learning. By implication, Schreiner et al. (2009) elaborates Kale and Singh’s (2007: 982) 
discussion infers that second-order learning (i.e. articulation and codification) should 
improve and modify the firm’s first-order dynamic alliance capability that manages a 
portfolio of alliances. 
Heimeriks and Duysters (2007) similarly utilise Zollo and Winter’s (2002) perspective on 
dynamic capabilities to conduct empirical research on process of alliance capability 
development. Interestingly, these authors identify numerous deliberate learning mechanisms 
such as (1) functions; (2) tools; (3) control and management processes; and (4) external 
parties that underpin a focal firm’s dedicated alliance function. These learning mechanisms 
therefore provide a more granular insight into the organisational routines that underpin a 
firm’s alliance capability (2007: 44). However, as with the previous dynamic capability 
interpretations, this research is more relevant to large established firms, as Rothaermel and 
Deeds (2006:432) notes new ventures do not have the routines nor the resources in place to 
implement a dedicated alliance function.  
Most entrepreneurship research that examines new venture alliance portfolios are 
empirically set within high-technology industries (Deeds and Hill, 1996; Baum et al. 2000; 
Stuart, 2000; George et al. 2001; Ozcan and Eisenhardt, 2009). Although none of these 
studies adopt a dynamic capabilities lens, Wassmer (2010: 147) emphasises that 
organisational learning is the predominate theory that underpins these contributions (e.g. 
Deeds and Hill, 1996; Stuart, 2000; George et al. 2001). Stuart (2000) for example finds that 
technology start-ups can learn from their portfolio of interorganisational alliances and use 
these alliances as a source of endorsement to build public confidence in the value of their 
products and services. In addition to this research, George et al. (2001) examines the 
characteristics of biotechnology start-ups alliance portfolios (i.e. the diversity of horizontal 
and vertical ties) and their absorptive capacity (ACAP) to find they both jointly influence 
performance. Specifically, the authors find the content of knowledge-flows that lubricates 
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ties and their ACAP are better indicators of performance than simply portfolio size. This 
study also empirically verifies that vertical ties positively relate to performance, while 
horizontal ties positively relate to patents (i.e. innovation capability) but they are not 
significant predictors of company performance (2001: 221). 
Ozcan and Eisenhardt (2009) is also a notable contribution that challenges the traditional 
assumptions of alliance portfolio research. The authors argue that resource dependence 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) and social embeddedness (Gulati, 1995) theories typically 
underpin alliance-based research, which assume firms: (1) begin with superior resources and 
(2) commence negotiation with an established network position. Consequently, the authors 
argue these assumptions apply to a “rich-get-richer” view and are unclear on how less “well-
endowed” firms build high-performing alliance portfolios (2009: 247). Ozcan and 
Eisenhardt (2009) thus build a process theory, which proposes the conditions on which 
technology start-ups originate high-performing alliance portfolios. In this framework, the 
authors propose when technology start-ups (1) advocate a vision of the embryonic industry 
architecture, (2) synchronise multiple exchange partnerships and (3) exploit industry 
uncertainties, they are more likely to form high-performing alliance portfolios and achieve 
superior performance (2009: 269-270). 
Baum et al. (2000) also generate similar findings as they find biotechnology start-ups must 
understand and envision the composition of their alliance portfolio to avoid inter-partner 
conflict and rivalry between partners. Stuart (2000) also finds industry analysts look 
unfavourably on new ventures that have extensive, inefficient webs of alliances comprised 
of multiple and duplicate partners. These findings indicate that “efficient” alliance 
configurations – minimum costs for maximum relational benefit (e.g. Burt, 1992) – is 
beneficial for technology start-ups (Baum et al. 2000). However, these authors emphasise it 
is not clear “whether these benefits arise directly from the alliance participation or rather as 
second-order effects of the innovation-enhancing characteristics of alliances.” (Baum et al. 
2000: 287). In other words, is alliance success dependent on the actual alliance per se, or the 
firm’s dynamic capability to manage a portfolio of alliances? Given that alliance portfolios 
of technology start-ups are highly sensitive to the effects of initial imprinting, conceptually 
it would seem these firms need a dynamic capability to mitigate such path dependencies, 
which indicates this is an important INV function. 
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4.3.3 Network Management Capabilities 
Möller and Halinen (1999: 417-418) define a net management capability as the “firm’s 
capability to mobilize and coordinate the resources and activities of other actors in the 
network. It is a necessary capability to establish and manage such value-creating nets as 
supplier nets, customer nets, and R&D nets. Net management capability also is manifested 
in a firm’s actions when entering new networks, as in a foreign market entry, and it its 
capability of managing net positions.” Network management has therefore been an important 
topic in IB research given the mechanisms of this capability are implicit within the network 
model of internationalisation (Johanson and Mattsson, 1988). Although strategic 
management scholars investigate firm network capabilities (e.g. Kogut, 2000; Zaheer and 
Bell, 2005), this area of research has gained most traction within IMP and IB research. 
Ritter (1999) built the “network competence” concept and along with his colleagues (Ritter 
et al. 2002; Ritter and Gemünden, 2003) examine the processes of network management for 
innovation within knowledge-intensive industries. Ritter (1999: 471) defines network 
competence as “the degree of network management task execution and the degree of network 
management qualification possessed by people handing a company’s relationships.” Ritter 
et al. (2002: 120-121) emphasise the network competence construct consists of “task 
implementation” and “qualifications” as the two dimensions. The first dimension – task 
execution – thus consists of two elements, which are “relationship specific tasks” and “cross 
relational tasks.” Relational tasks thus involve the management of a single relationship 
through initiation, exchange, and coordination processes. Cross-relational tasks thus aim to 
manage tasks across the focal firm’s network through processes such as planning, 
organising, staffing, and controlling.  
The second dimension – qualifications – consist of two elements, which are “specialist” and 
“social qualifications.” Ritter and Gemünden (2003) note specialist qualifications include 
tasks that are necessary to handle the “technical side” of relationships. These skills include 
(1) technical skills to understand partners’ technical needs and requirements, (2) economic 
skills such as negotiation and (3) experiential knowledge of managing previous 
relationships. Additionally, social qualifications are the “extent to which a person is able to 
exhibit independent, prudent, and useful behaviour in social settings” (2003: 748). 
Therefore, this element includes social skills such as communication ability, extraversion, 
conflict management skills, empathy, emotional stability, self-reflectiveness, sense of justice 
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and cooperativeness (2003: 748). Overall, the authors argue the degree of a focal firms 
network competence is a two dimensional construct which consists of the (1) the degree of 
network management task execution and (2) the extent of network management 
qualifications possessed by the people handling the firms network of relationships (Ritter 
and Gemünden, 2003).  
Möller (2006) notes network management research mainly investigates large established 
firms such as MNEs parental and foreign subsidiary networks (e.g. Elango and Pattnaik, 
2007). Whereas, in the entrepreneurship literature, the majority of studies that investigate 
network management examine the “skills” of the individual entrepreneur to manage their 
personal contact network (Johannisson, 1995; Gilmore and Carson, 1999; Vissa, 2012). 
However, in some entrepreneurship studies such as Walter et al. (2006) and Zheng et al. 
(2010) they examine the network capabilities of technology based new ventures and 
emphasise the importance of coordination, market knowledge, communication, and status 
when managing an evolving network of relationships. In IE research, Zhou et al. (2010) is 
one notable contribution that examines the INV’s network capability upgrading function and 
finds that this capability mediates the relationship between its entrepreneurial proclivity (i.e. 
proactiveness, risk-taking and innovativeness) and its learning-advantages of newness. In 
other words, this study finds INVs that are proactive in seeking network capabilities often 
have a better chance of selecting reliable foreign partners, nurturing their relationships 
effectively, and acquiring up-to-date knowledge for improving performance (2010: 889). 
Therefore, it is evident that all of these capabilities are important within NVI research. 
4.4 Networking Capabilities – A Distinctive Dynamic Capability 
The prime objective of this section is to review research that uses dynamic capabilities as a 
lens to explore the building of networking capabilities in NVI. Given this thesis adopts Helfat 
et al. (2007) asset orchestration lens, this section will review networking capabilities on the 
premise that INVs will use such a capability to create, extend, and modify their social capital. 
Consequently, in Oviatt and McDougall’s (1994: 61) concluding remarks, they question 
whether Larson’s (1992) seminal research on networks is applicable for understanding what 
“social and economic processes and conditions promote network building across national 
borders?” Although section 4.3 sheds light on the capabilities of networking, few studies 
examine networking capabilities in NVI. Table 4-3 therefore present the existing networking 
capability definitions: 
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Table 4-3: Networking Capability Definitions 
Study Definition Theoretical Positioning 
Håkansson (1987) “networking ability is defined as the ability of a 
company on one hand to strengthen its role in the 
network in terms of resources and activities, and on the 
other to manage effectively each relationship with 
external partners” (1987: 124) 
1. Conceptual 
2. N/A 
3. N/A 
4. IMP school 
5. Business network 
6. N/A 
Fernhaber and 
McDougall (2005) 
“a networking capability refers to the ability of a firm to 
tap external resources through the building and 
maintenance of relationships” (2005: 118/126) 
1. Conceptual 
2. N/A 
3. Teece et al (1997) 
4. Johannisson (2000) 
5. Entrepreneurial network 
6. Adaptation 
Mort and 
Weerawardena 
(2006) 
“we define dynamic networking capability as the 
capacity of the firm to develop a purposeful set of 
routines within its networks, resulting in the generation 
of new resource configurations and the firm’s capacity to 
integrate, reconfigure, gain and release resource 
combinations.” (2006: 558) 
1. Empirical 
2. Inductive 
3. Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) 
4. Ritter et al (2002) 
5. Business network 
6. Adaptation 
Chen et al (2009) “Networking capability refers to the capacity of new 
ventures to identify, establish, coordinate and develop 
relationships with different players in the market.” 
(2009: 295) 
1. Empirical 
2. Deductive 
3. Barney (1991) 
4. Baron and Markman (2000) Ostgaard 
and Birley (1994) Lee et al (2001) 
5. Social capital, external links, 
entrepreneurial network 
6. Adaptation 
Tolstoy and 
Agndal (2010) 
“network resource combination capability incorporate 
(1) the ability to effectively interact with network 
partners, (2) the ability to identify complementarities 
between network resources in the overall network, and 
(3) the ability to proactively coordinate network 
resources to a specific end.” 
1. Empirical 
2. Inductive 
3. Lavie (2006) 
4. Bloomstermo et al (2004) 
5. Business relationships 
6. Adaptation and Revolution 
Key: (1) Nature of study; (2) Method; (3) Capability perspective; (4) Network perspective; (5) Level of analysis; (6) Strategic 
change perspective 
  Source: The Author 
4.4.1 Creation of Social Capital 
IE research indicates that INVs can utilise their networking capabilities to create social 
capital (e.g. Fernhaber and McDougall, 2005; Mort and Weerawardena, 2006). For example, 
Milanov and Fernhaber (2009: 47) argue this emerging literature highlights that “networking 
skills are among the most important entrepreneurial skills that can be developed.” Relatedly, 
they argue the “development of collaborative skills and recognition of good alliance partners 
are crucial already in the early stages of new venture development as the choice of the first 
partner may set the new venture on its networking trajectory, which is likely to be important 
for its future success” (2009: 47). Thus, Dubini and Aldrich (1991: 306-307) argue that: 
“networking can be treated like any other social skill that can be learned, involving making 
contacts, building relationships, and activating linkages.” These authors argue “ordinary 
business behaviour” is distinct from “networking behaviour” in that the former is 
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characterised by ad-hoc market mediated transactions, while the latter has the “expectation” 
that two parties will invest in a long-term relationship.  
In Håkansson’s (1987: 124) initial discussion, he defines networking ability as “as the ability 
of a company on one hand to strengthen its role in the network in terms of resources and 
activities, and on the other to manage effectively each relationship with external partners.” 
Therefore, unlike capability studies in Figure 4-2, Håkansson (1987: 124) was early to 
propose that networking behaviour combines an actor’s ability to improve its overall 
network position (i.e. portfolio and network management) and manage individual 
relationships (i.e. relational management). Since then, conceptual (Fernhaber and 
McDougall, 2005; Weerawardena et al. 2007) and empirical (Mort and Weerawardena, 
2006) research indicates that networking capabilities are vital in the creation of new 
relationships. Table 4-3 shows that Fernhaber and McDougall (2005: 128) argue INVs 
networking capabilities enhance the relationship between the new ventures adaptability and 
its international growth. Specifically, they argue an INV’s networking capability enables 
firms to amass new information from their established network and to identify new exchange 
partners and minimise the liabilities of foreignness that impinge growth (2005: 129). 
Mort and Weerawardena (2006) explore the networking capability of international 
entrepreneurs and argue that founders deploy these capabilities to penetrate global markets. 
Table 4-3 indicates that Mort and Weerawardena (2006) use Eisenhardt and Martin’s (2000) 
dynamic capabilities perspective as a lens to conceptualise networking capability as an 
entrepreneurial capability that supports the creation, building, and reconfiguration of 
network relationships. Central to their qualitative findings is that networking capability 
supports INVs identify and establish new relationships that support the exploitation of 
foreign market opportunities. Moreover, the authors empirically find the international 
entrepreneurs networking capability is an entrepreneurial capability that enables INVs to 
acquire technological knowledge within innovation networks that subsequently facilitates 
the development of knowledge intensive products (2006: 564). Thus, the authors find 
international entrepreneurs who have “superior” networking capabilities will enable NVI, 
which combined with attractive products, supports superior performance (2006: 567). 
Despite this research, few studies specifically examine how INVs create social capital. One 
exemplar is Arenius (2002) who in her doctoral dissertation investigates the creation of firm-
level social capital and its exploitation during NVI. In this multiple-case study, the author 
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explore how INVs create social capital and find that individual entrepreneurs rely on their 
previous foreign market experience and existing network to build and exploit firm-level 
social capital for the purposes of NVI. Prashantham and Dhanaraj (2010) also use 
longitudinal case studies to explore the origins of INVs social capital. In this study, the 
authors find Indian “returnee entrepreneurs” who have built MNE experience, will often 
have higher stocks of initial social capital than their counterparts, which mean they can 
leverage this initial social capital to achieve early international growth. Consequently, the 
authors find “network learning” plays a crucial role in the new ventures ability to realise the 
potential contribution of its social capital in the international growth process (2010: 977). 
This limited research thus indicates networking capabilities are integral in the overall 
creation of social capital, which stimulates INV performance.   
4.4.2 Extension of Social Capital 
Presutti et al. (2007) emphasises the extension of specific stocks of social capital – for 
example the INV’s largest single foreign customer – is a critical asset for NVI. Thus, the 
development of specific cross-border relationships (e.g. co-R&D and distribution 
agreements) are “landmarks” in a new ventures chronology of internationalisation, which 
indicates networking is path dependent since existing relationships have a strong influence 
on a firm’s behaviour including the further extension of the network (Jones and Coviello, 
2005: 290). Indeed, Jarillo (1989: 133) specifies that networking in its most simplistic form 
is about utilising existing personal relationships to access advice and information, while, in 
its most sophisticated form involves building an “elaborate web of relationships” between 
companies who can support a firm deliver a product or service. Kuemmerle also notes after 
an INV’s formal creation, the entrepreneur has to strike the right balance between using the 
ventures existing network of contacts and augmenting network relationships further to access 
knowledge that fuels further growth. Consequently, Kuemmerle argues that these 
networking activities are difficult tasks to manage simultaneously (2002: 104). 
The networking capabilities literature also acknowledges the importance of network 
development, but offers scant insight on how INVs invest in network relationships. For 
example, Table 4-3 indicates Mort and Weerawardena (2006) emphasise networking 
capabilities involves “building” relationships, but do not elaborate on this process. Fernhaber 
and McDougall (2005: 118/126) also state a “networking capability refers to the ability of a 
firm to tap external resources through the building and maintenance of relationships” but do 
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not elaborate on these specific processes. By contrast, the “network development” literature 
in entrepreneurship research provides greater insight into the extension of social capital 
(Hoang and Antoncic, 2003; Jack et al. 2008; Slotte-Kock and Coviello, 2010). Jack et al. 
(2010) argues the network development literature aims is to understand “network change” 
(Koka et al. 2006) in response to emerging entrepreneurial requirements. Thus, even though 
there are limited network development contributions (e.g. Butler and Hansen, 1991; Larson 
and Starr, 1993; Hite and Hesterly, 2001; Lechner and Dowling, 2003), research indicates 
this literature provide a more fine-grained understanding of how new ventures networking 
activities emerge and change through various stages of development (Milanov and 
Fernhaber, 2009).  
For example, Larson and Starr (1993) is one seminal contribution that conceptualises 
entrepreneurial networking over a three-stage process. The authors argue exchange 
relationships transform from a set of relatively simply dyadic exchanges into a dense set of 
stable, multidimensional, and multi-layered interorganisational relationships. Their 
conceptual model describes three successive stages of networking activity which support 
new ventures secure critical economic and non-economic resources. These activities are: (1) 
focussing on essential dyads; (2) then converting dyadic ties to socioeconomic exchanges; 
and finally (3) layering these exchanges with multiple exchange processes. Smith and 
Lohrke (2008) explain Larson and Starr’s (1993) model was one of the first to specify that 
networking involves the selection, addition and deletion of ties as the entrepreneurial firm 
determines which resource providers are most critical for early expansion. Hoang and 
Antoncic also argue that Larson and Starr’s model is “the most complete piece of theorizing 
about network process in the entrepreneurial context” (2003: 179). 
In IB research, Johanson and Mattson’s (1988) initial theory on “network extension” 
provides insight into how international firms extend investment in social capital. The authors 
argue that firms internationalise through three modes of networking in order to establish a 
network position with relation to its foreign counterparts (Johanson and Mattsson, 1988: 
296). Thus, they argue “early starters” internationalise through a process of “international 
extension” by building trust and commitment with export agents or distributors who have 
the market knowledge and distribution capability to sell the Early Starter’s products (1988: 
299-300). Indeed, Chetty and Campbell-Hunt (2004) note the early starter has clear 
conceptual overlaps with INVs, since as these firms increase their involvement in 
international markets, they are likely to become “lonely internationals” and use their foreign 
 119 
 
experience and resources to penetrate the local market by integrating its cross-border 
activities. Johanson and Vahlne (2009) thus argue the extension of a firm’s network position 
is a core skill that international firms must learn and they specify that Coviello (2006) is one 
of few IB studies that successfully achieve this aim. 
Interestingly, Coviello (2006) empirically examines the evolution of INV networks. Coviello 
argues that INVs do not build relationships in the conventional manner, as she finds they 
initially increase the diversity of their network (i.e. bridging social capital), which 
consequently decreases their network density (i.e. bonding social capital). As a result, 
Coviello proposes this networking activity extends early-stage INVs social capital. 
Therefore, the author proposes INV growth parallels an evolving network position, as long-
term investments in specific stocks of social capital provide access to new international 
growth opportunities (2006: 725). Coviello also finds that investment in INV networks differ 
to Larson and Starr’s (1993) original theory that proposes entrepreneurial networks evolve 
in a conventional and stabilised manner. Instead, Coviello empirically finds that INV 
networks are volatile and long-term investment is limited to only a few strategically 
important relationships (2006: 726). Thus, this research leads to the assumption that an 
INV’s networking capability predominately supports the modification of social capital, 
which is the focus of the final section.      
4.4.3 Modification of Social Capital 
Conceptual (Fernhaber and McDougall, 2005; Weerawardena et al. 2007) and empirical 
(Mort and Weerawardena, 2006; Tolstoy and Agndal, 2010) research indicates INVs can 
deploy their networking capabilities to modify their social capital. Indeed, one criticism of 
the social capital literature is most contributions make overly positive assumptions on its 
asset value, and overlook the potential liability of specific investments (Adler and Kwon, 
2002; Batjargal and Liu, 2004). Thus, some entrepreneurship (Uzzi, 1997; Burt, 2005; 
Maurer and Ebers, 2006) and IE (Prashantham and Dhanaraj, 2010) research identifies the 
“dark side” of emerging networks and report on the deprecation of over and under-
investment in social capital. For example, empirical research has found that network 
relationships that exhibit a lack of trust (Neergaard, 2005), social interaction (Yli-Renko et 
al. 2001), shared vision (De Carolis and Saparito, 2006) and common language (Bolino et 
al. 2002) all inhibit new venture growth and performance. Relatedly, Yu et al. (2011: 429) 
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argue that INVs must continuously modify their social capital since “network cohesion could 
create a deadly competency trap.”  
Mort and Weerawardena (2006) thus argue INVs must build a networking capability to 
prevent “network rigidity” which limits strategic choices with respect to early and rapid 
internationalisation. Thus, Mort and Weerawardena argue INVs that develop a purposeful 
set of resource reconfiguration routines by “adding” and “deleting” social capital allows 
firms to overcome network rigidity and accelerate international speed (2006: 567). 
Prashantham and Dhanaraj (2010) also report that the “decay” of INV social capital in MNE 
strategic alliances inhibits NVI, particularly within technology led industries. Consequently, 
Hite and Hesterly’s (2001) seminal conceptualisation provides insight on how new ventures 
adapt their evolving network. Central to Hite and Hesterly’s argument is new venture 
networks are initially “identify-based” as they are cohesive and composed of socially 
embedded ties. However, as the new venture expands, it will adapt is network through a 
sparse “calculative” structure where it strategically evaluates the economic costs and benefits 
of adding or removing certain ties. Thus, Hite and Hesterly infer network development is 
initially path dependent, but as the firm builds [networking] capability, it will begin to 
“strategically manage” its network (2001: 279). 
Table 4-3 indicates opinion varies on whether INVs use networking capabilities as an 
incremental or radical way to modify social capital. For example, Fernhaber and McDougall 
(2005: 119) argue that INVs utilise networking capabilities as a source of adaptation to 
uncover unexplored knowledge that resides with the ventures network of relationships. 
Similarly, Chen et al. (2009) empirically find that Chinese technology new ventures with a 
strong networking capability combined with strong technological and financial capabilities 
are more likely to engage in alliance and acquisition activity during internationalisation. 
Thus, implicit in the authors’ findings is the “continuous realignment” of its foreign 
partnerships improves the probability of a new ventures survival and growth (2009: 301). 
Consequently, these views indicate networking capabilities support INVs with strategic 
renewal of their social capital, and when information becomes redundant, the firm has the 
choice to extend or “retrench” this social capital. 
By contrast, some interpretations view networking as a source of revolutionary change (e.g. 
Mort and Weerawardena, Ritala et al. 2009; Ozcan and Eisenhardt, 2009; Tolstoy and 
Agndal, 2010). For example, Mort and Weerawardena (2006) build on Eisenhardt and 
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Martin (2000) and assume that INVs use their networking capability in high-velocity 
markets to reconfigure their network in order to deliver cutting-edge knowledge intensive 
products. By contrast, Tolstoy and Agndal (2010) use Lavie’s (2006) network resources 
framework to examine six biotechnology ventures that operate in foreign markets. In this 
study, the authors categorise INVs on whether they introduce existing products in new 
foreign markets (new international market ventures) or introduce new products in existing 
foreign markets (new international product ventures). Central to their findings is new 
international product ventures build a “network resource combination capability” to exploit 
a broad set of network resources to address the multi-faceted challenges associated with 
redefining the product and market (2010: 33). Thus, innovation in entrepreneurial networks 
are central to these conceptualisations.  
Consequently, these interpretations overlap with research on the “orchestration” of 
innovation networks (Dhanaraj and Parkhe, 2006; Ritala et al. 2009; Ozcan and Eisenhardt, 
2009; Nambisan and Sawhney, 2011). Dhanaraj and Parkhe (2006) propose orchestration in 
innovation networks focusses on the “hub firms” (i.e. focal firm) ability to orchestrate and 
exploit network centric innovation. Ritala et al. (2009: 571) thus define an orchestration 
capability as the firm’s ability to “purposefully build and manage inter-firm innovation 
networks.” Nambisan and Sawhney (2011) argue a focal firm’s network orchestration 
involves the challenge of initially designing an industry architecture (i.e. Ozcan and 
Eisenhardt, 2009) and managing the network as partners begin to use the platform. In 
addition to this research, Dhanaraj and Parkhe (2006) note among the challenges the 
orchestrator faces is the imperative of enhancing knowledge mobility amongst the network, 
whilst policing opportunism, misappropriation, free riding and ensuring network stability. 
The technology new venture’s ability to modify its social capital is then critical in high-
velocity markets that undergo radical change (Maurer and Ebers, 2006; Koka et al. 2006). 
Thus, this research indicates that networking capabilities have various functions, but are 
central for INVs that seek to modify their social capital. 
4.5 Conclusion 
In conclusion, this chapter reviews the networking and social capital literature to shed light 
on the capability building process within NVI. Firstly, it is evident considerable debate exists 
on whether networking is an individual or firm-level concept and whether its core purpose 
is to access external resources (Watson, 2007), build long-term relationships (Chen and 
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Chen, 1998), share ideas (Soh, 2003) or encapsulates a combination (Gilmore and Carson, 
1999) of these objectives. Based on this review the author defines networking as the process 
of forming and strengthening ties through the exchange of information and resources to 
advance each actor’s long-term development. This definition encapsulates the major 
arguments that networking is: (1) an entrepreneurial behaviour; (2) an individual and firm-
level activity; (3) helps form new and strengthen existing ties; (3) functions through the 
exchange of information and; (5) seeks to build long-term relationships. After reviewing 
Nahapiet and Ghoshal’s (1998) structural, relational, and cognitive dimensions of social 
capital, the author adopts the view these three dimensions are indicators of the amount of 
social capital that is embedded in each network relationship (Yli-Renko et al. 2001). 
Therefore, in line with Watson (2007) this study argues the central purpose of networking is 
to enhance an entrepreneurial actor’s social capital.   
This chapter then reviews studies that use a capabilities lens to examine the networking 
behaviour of INVs. Interestingly, numerous capability interpretations of networking have 
emerged within the strategic management and entrepreneurship literature at various levels 
of analysis in established firms and new ventures. Figure 4-2 thus divides this literature on 
six quadrants, which illustrates most dynamic capability studies on networking occur in large 
established firms (e.g. Capaldo, 2007; Kale and Singh, 2007). Whereas, there are few new 
venture studies that use dynamic capabilities to examine networking behaviour (Zhou et al. 
2010; Brinckmann and Hoegl, 2011). Moreover, this review indicates most new venture 
studies address various aspects of networking such as management of individual exchange 
relationships (e.g. De Clercq and Sapienza, 2006), alliance portfolios (e.g. Baum et al. 2000), 
inter-personal (Vissa, 2012) or inter-firm (e.g. Zheng et al. 2010) ties. This review thus 
indicates these capability studies are inconsistent and address various aspects of networking 
behaviour.    
Finally, this chapter reviews dynamic capabilities research that explores the building of 
networking capabilities in NVI. This section outlines that Håkansson’s (1987) initial 
research on networking capabilities have emerged as a useful lens to explore how firms 
manage individual relationships as well as strengthen its overall position within a network. 
However, this review highlights that networking capability studies take different 
perspectives on how firms create, extend, or modify social capital. Table 4-3 highlights that 
each networking capability study uses a different a theoretical lens and examines networking 
at various levels of analysis. For example, some studies examine the role of networking 
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capabilities in entrepreneurial networks (e.g. Fernhaber and McDougall, 2005) while others 
examine their influence in business networks (e.g. Mort and Weerawardena, 2006). More 
importantly, this review finds various types of networking capability facilitate the creation, 
extension, and modification of social capital. This review also indicates networking 
capability studies either assume they seek to realign (e.g. Chen et al. 2009) or transform (e.g. 
Tolstoy and Agndal, 2010) INV social capital. Given this diversity, it is clear this area is ripe 
for further research.  
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5 - Problem Statement and 
Conceptualisation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Aim 
To present the aim, objectives, research questions of this thesis in order to 
conceptualise the problem that motivates this research. 
Chapter Objectives 
 To present a research problem statement that justifies this research. 
 To outline the working thesis statement that guides and informs this 
subsequent empirical research. 
 To present the overall aim, objectives, and theoretical framework that 
underpins this research. 
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5.1 Introduction  
This chapter aims to present the aim, objectives, and research questions of this thesis in order 
to conceptualise the problem that motivates this research. This chapter therefore intends to 
achieve three objectives. Firstly, this chapter will present the research problem that justifies 
this research. Secondly, this chapter will outline the working thesis statement that informs 
and guides this subsequent empirical research. Thirdly, this chapter will present the overall 
aim, objectives, and theoretical framework that underpins this research. This chapter will 
then conclude by summarising the research problem that drives this research. 
5.2 Problem Statement 
The major problem that drives this research is the observation in Chapter 3 that most 
technology start-ups are resource constrained, and do not have  sufficient managerial, 
technological and financial capabilities to compete in international markets (Jolly et al. 1991; 
Shrader et al. 2000; Crick and Jones, 2000). Galbraith (1982) for example was early to 
discuss the “typical” growth stages that technology new ventures encounter, which include: 
(1) proof of principle/prototype, (2) model shop, (3) start-up, (4) natural growth, and (5) 
strategic manoeuvring. Thus, the crux of Galbraith’s argument is inexorable problems occur 
in technology start-ups because entrepreneurs “do not think stagewise” and do not build the 
necessary capabilities to execute new phases of development (1982: 70). Additionally, 
Kazanjian (1988) empirically builds on Galbraith’s research and finds that technology based 
new ventures encounter dominant problems at the (1) conception and development, (2) 
commercialisation, (3) growth, and (4) stability stages. Thus, marshalling financial resource 
is a primary concern at invention (i.e. prototyping) and commercialisation (i.e. NPD) stage, 
while production, distribution, market-share, and diversification problems dominate the 
growth and stability stages (Kazanjian and Drazin, 1990). 
However, Mudambi and Zahra (2007) note despite advances in ICT, the reduced cost of 
travel and increased market access to emerging economies, research continues to find that 
most technology new ventures still end in failure. A central reason for low-survival rates is 
most “technology entrepreneurs” (i.e. those with science and engineering backgrounds) 
struggle to cross the “valley of death” as they do not have the experience or resources to 
launch a commercial venture (Auerswald and Branscomb, 2003). Barr et al. (2009: 371) 
notes the “valley of death” is the “institutional, financial and skill gap” between R&D and 
commercial application. Thus, the authors argue the missing link in a technology 
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entrepreneur’s efforts is when essential start-up costs such as R&D absorb the new ventures 
initial commercialisation resources (e.g. seed capital) and prevent the creation of a 
compelling new market driven business (2009: 371). Section 3.3.1 indicates that the 
founder(s) of most INVs typically have science and engineering backgrounds, but often lack 
experiential knowledge of internationalisation which is often more critical than access to 
financial capital alone (Preece et al. 1997; Kuemmerle, 2002).  
Section 3.3.3 thus indicates that an early stage entrepreneurial team (McDougall et al. 2003), 
formalised TMT (Reuber and Fischer, 1997) and board of directors (Bloodgood et al. 1996) 
are all instrumental for NVI. However, Shrader and Siegel (2007) note that most technology 
entrepreneurs are unable to recruit an experienced TMT until their NPD has reached a certain 
phase of development. Thus, technology new ventures face the paradox of surviving the 
“valley of death” on scant commercialisation resources as they face the imperative of 
learning how to exploit their emerging technology in underdeveloped markets that have brief 
windows of commercial opportunity (Barr et al. 2009). Fernhaber and McDougall-Covin 
(2009) thus note entrepreneurs must quickly build legitimacy in the business community to 
raise venture capital, which enables NVI. However, these ventures face a “double-edged 
sword” as resource constraints inhibit the speed of NPD, which consequently inhibits the 
speed of formalising an internationally experienced TMT (Deeds et al. 2000; Bonardo et al. 
2010). Figure 5-1 thus illustrates the challenge technology entrepreneurs encounter as they 
attempt to cross the valley of death before subsequent aid of a TMT and business community. 
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Figure 5-1: The Valley of Death – Bridging the Gap between Technology and 
Commercial Application 
 
Source: Adapted from Barr et al. (2009: 371) 
Chapter 3 and 4 therefore argues that networking (Dubini and Aldrich, 1991; Watson, 2007) 
and social capital (Yli-Renko et al. 2002; Presutti et al. 2007) compensates for the resource 
constraints that inhibit NVI. However, Mosey and Wright (2007) emphasise that most 
technology entrepreneurs focus on building scientific networks and do not have the skills or 
capabilities to create or manage a valuable commercial network of relationships. Empirical 
research has also found when technology new ventures have access to business networks, 
the founder(s) are often unable to exploit the commercial opportunities or recognise the 
threats that embed this industry specific social capital (Maurer and Ebers, 2006; Prashantham 
and Dhanaraj, 2010). Interestingly, Dubini and Aldrich (1991: 312) were early to specify 
that it is “critical to investigate how an extended network is created, developed, and 
strengthened over time, and how an entrepreneur manages to embed the concept of personal 
network in the company’s “culture” so that the company itself becomes “network oriented.” 
Nevertheless, despite this research problem, few studies examine how technology start-ups 
create, manage, or modify an evolving network of relationships. 
Therefore, Chapter 4 elaborates that such INVs need to build dynamic capabilities in 
networking to overcome these growth challenges. Indeed, the general dynamic capabilities 
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literature (see section 3.4) and with reference to networking (see section 4.3) indicates most 
interpretations focus on large firms and assume they begin with an established resource 
and/or network position. However, recent criticism of the dynamic capabilities (e.g. Autio 
et al. 2011) and networking (e.g. Ozcan and Eisenhardt, 2009) literature have led 
entrepreneurship scholars to argue that these established theories do not reflect the 
entrepreneurial behaviour of these technology new ventures. Moreover, section 4.4 reviews 
IE research on networking capabilities (e.g. Fernhaber and McDougall, 2005; Mort and 
Weerawardena, 2006; Tolstoy and Agndal, 2010), which provides various interpretations on 
the importance of these capabilities on NVI. Nevertheless, although these interpretations 
(see Table 4-3) seek to describe what networking capabilities are, they are less clear on how 
they develop over time, and why certain processes enable or inhibit NVI. Thus the major 
research problem is: 
 
 
 
5.3 Conceptualisation and Theoretical Lens 
Sapienza et al. propose that dynamic capability research that examines what INVs “do and 
the resources they control, including the social capital they and their managers have 
amassed” would be “enlightening” to advance future research (2006: 930). In Chapter 2, the 
author argues that Helfat et al. (2007) asset orchestration framework is a useful theoretical 
lens to examine the development and deployment of dynamic capabilities in technology new 
ventures. Moreover, section 3.4 demonstrates dynamic capabilities is a useful lens to 
examine NVI, while section 4.4 indicates the conceptual appeal of this lens to examine an 
INV’s networking capabilities. This study therefore draws on Helfat et al. (2007: 4) 
definition that a “Dynamic capability is the capacity of an organisation to purposefully 
create, extend, or modify its resource base.” Figure 5-2 thus illustrates that Helfat et al. 
(2007) is a useful lens to examine how INVs (1) create, (2) extend, and/or (3) modify their 
social capital and why certain networking activities enable or inhibit NVI.  
Research Problem Statement 
Existing theories do not sufficiently explain how technology start-ups build 
dynamic capabilities in networking to enable their new venture 
internationalisation. 
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Figure 5-2: Dynamic Capabilities as a Research Lens 
 
Source: The Author 
Andersen (1993: 220) emphasises in any conceptualisation, researchers must provide an 
“operational definition” of an emerging concept in order to outline its boundaries in 
preparation for forthcoming analysis. Nevertheless, Carlile and Christensen (2005: 23) 
argue: “well intentioned academics unwittingly contribute to the [original research] problem 
by articulating tight boundary conditions outside of which they claim nothing.” Therefore, 
drawing on Helfat et al. (2007), the researcher adopts a general working definition of 
networking capability:  
A networking capability is the capacity of a focal actor to purposefully create, extend, 
or modify its social capital. 
This general definition aims to integrate dynamic capability (Helfat et al. 2007) and social 
capital (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998; Adler and Kwon, 2002) perspectives. Firstly, the 
researcher uses Helfat and Peteraf’s (2003) notion of “capacity” to emphasise the focal 
actor’s ability to use network relationships to perform a specific task in at least a minimally 
satisfactory manner. Secondly, in line with Lavie (2006) the researcher replaces the 
“organisation” with the “focal actor” to assume that networking capability is an egocentric 
rather than dyadic concept (e.g. Dyer and Kale, 2007). The term focal actor also assumes 
away the notion that dynamic capability is an organisational capability, and provides 
conceptual scope to consider whether this capability may emerge at individual or team levels 
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of analysis. Furthermore, given the general nature of this definition, researchers can use it to 
examine large and small firms, with the view of exploring contextually specific capabilities. 
Thirdly, the term “purposefully” assumes that entrepreneurial actions reflect some degree of 
intent. Despite the emergence of effectuation logic (e.g. Sarasvathy, 2001), this study 
maintains that dynamic capability is a higher-order capability that is rooted in strategic and 
innovative acts of entrepreneurial behaviour (e.g. Teece, 2007). Therefore, in line with Lavie 
(2006: 162) this study assumes entrepreneurs and their new ventures that exhibit dynamic 
capabilities demonstrate “intended rationality” – that is actors strive to make rational 
decisions, despite the cognitive biases and information constraints that skew their choices 
(Simon, 1961; March, 1994). In other words, this study acknowledges human behaviour is 
irrational, but assumes that actors aim to behave rationally. Following Cui et al. (2011), this 
study will explore signals of strategic intent and determine whether networking behaviour is 
effective in the implementation of strategic change. 
Fourthly, this study draws on section 4.2 discussion and distinguishes between networking 
(Dubini and Aldrich, 1991; Watson, 2007) and social capital (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998; 
Adler and Kwon, 2002). Thus, based on Table 4-1 networking definitions and the discussion 
in section 4.5, the researcher defines “networking as the process of forming and 
strengthening ties through the exchange of information and resources to advance each 
actor’s long-term development.” This definition encapsulates the major arguments that 
networking is an: (1) entrepreneurial behaviour (Zhao and Aram, 1995); (2) is an individual 
(Gilmore and Carson, 1999) and/or firm-level (Jarillo, 1989) process; (3) helps form new 
and strengthen existing ties; (3) functions through the exchange of information (Cromie and 
Birley, 1992) and (5) helps build long-term relationships (Miller et al. 2007).  
Additionally, this study adopts Nahapiet and Ghoshal’s (1998: 243) definition that social 
capital is “the sum of resources embedded within, available through, and derived from the 
network of relationships by an individual or social unit.” In accordance with Maurer and 
Ebers (2006: 263), this study uses Nahapiet and Ghoshal’s (1998) “organizing framework, 
as it offers a reasonably comprehensive conceptualization of social capital that 
accommodates the major concerns of the extant literature.” More specifically, this study 
adopts Pennings et al. (1998) assumption that social capital is an intangible asset that 
organisations can use to achieve individual or company goals. Therefore, the researcher 
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emphasises Watson’s (2007: 855) argument that the core purpose of networking is to 
enhance an entrepreneurial actor’s social capital.  
For analytical purposes, this study also draws on Adler and Kwon (2002) and distinguishes 
between the sources and effects of social capital. That is, the researcher assumes that the 
sources (i.e. the inputs) are identifiable through the structural, relational, and cognitive 
dimensions of social capital (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998). Whereas, the researcher assumes 
the effects (i.e. the outputs) equate to the information and resources the focal actor can obtain 
from their involvement in a specific network of relationships (Adler and Kwon, 2002). 
Therefore, taking a task contingency view (Krackhardt and Hanson, 1993; Helfat and 
Peteraf, 2003), the focal actors capacity to create, extend (i.e. invest), or modify its social 
capital is then dependent on whether the actor can utilise this asset to effectively perform a 
specific “strategic task” in hand. Therefore, based on this capability perspective, the 
researcher proposes that: 
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5.4 Aim, Objectives, and Conceptualisation 
It is important to emphasise that the following aim and research objectives are the eventual 
outcome of several years of “abductive” research (Dubois and Gadde, 2002). Chapter 6 will 
therefore describe how the researcher retrospectively arrived at these eventual research 
objectives. Thus, based on this research problem, the overarching aim of this thesis is:  
To explore how technology start-ups build dynamic capabilities in networking to enable 
their new venture internationalisation. 
The researcher therefore intends to achieve three research objectives through an 
exploration of five research questions: 
 Objective 1: To explore how INVs create, extend, or modify their social capital in 
high-technology markets.  
RQ1: How do INVs create social capital?  
RQ2: How do INVs extend their existing social capital?  
RQ3: How do INVs modify their social capital?  
 
 Objective 2: To examine why specific networking activities enable or inhibit new 
venture internationalisation in high-technology markets. 
RQ4: Why do certain networking activities enable or inhibit new venture 
internationalisation? 
 
 Objective 3: To determine which network processes underpin networking capability 
development in new venture internationalisation? 
RQ5: Which network processes underpin networking capability 
development in new venture internationalisation? 
Figure 5-3 thus presents the theoretical framework that aims to support the researcher 
achieve these three research objectives. 
 133 
 
Figure 5-3: Theoretical Framework 
 
Source: The Author 
Section 5.3 indicates that theoretical framework aims to integrate dynamic capability (Helfat 
et al. 2007) with social capital (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998; Adler and Kwon, 2002) to 
examine the development and deployment of networking capabilities on NVI. Chapter 4 
indicates that networking is a black box within both entrepreneurship and IE research, which 
means research objective one, aims to unlock the black box of networking. Given this thesis 
argues networking is a process of dynamic capability development, this study will use 
Nahapiet and Ghoshal’s (1998) framework to examine the networking activities that involve 
creation, extension and modification of structural, relational, and cognitive social capital for 
to enable NVI.. In line with Autio et al. (2011), this study assumes in INV research, processes 
are a more appropriate unit of analysis than routines due to the de novo nature of some 
entrepreneurial practices. Therefore, research objective one will replace the traditional 
routine based definition with process (Autio et al. 2011) to investigate the various 
networking activities that help firms create, extend, and modify social capital (Nahapiet and 
Ghoshal, 1998; Alder and Kwon, 2002). Following section 4.4, this study takes a broader 
perspective and assumes INV social capital consists of both inter-personal (e.g. Ellis, 2011) 
and inter-firm ties (e.g. Coviello and Munro, 1997). Section 4.4.1 emphasises that most INVs 
will need to create new stocks of social capital to support early and rapid growth (e.g. 
Arenius, 2002; Prashantham and Dhanaraj, 2010). However, section 4.4.1 indicates there is 
scant research that specifically investigates the networking activities that underpin the 
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creation on INV social capital. In response to this gap, this study will seek to examine how 
INVs create social capital. 
Following this, section 4.4.2 reports on how INVs “invest” (i.e. resource extension) in social 
capital. Jones and Coviello (2005) argue the development of specific cross-border 
relationships (e.g. co-R&D and distribution agreements) are “landmarks” in a new ventures 
chronology of internationalisation. Consequently, section 4.2.2 reports on the importance of 
building trust and commitment in relationships, which is a counterstone in the accumulation 
of relational social capital. Nevertheless, section 4.4.2 reports that various conceptual (e.g. 
Slotte-Kock and Coviello, 2010) and empirical (e.g. Ozcan and Eisenhardt, 2009) studies 
report existing literature on “network development” is overly deterministic and does not 
reflect how new ventures build a network of relationships. Therefore, to address this gap, 
this study seeks to explore how INVs extend their existing stocks of social capital. 
Finally, this study seeks to examine how INVs modify their social capital. Section 2.4.3 
indicates that asset orchestration involves several resource modification processes (i.e. 
retrenchment, retirement, renewal, replication, redeployment, and recombination). 
Consequently, the researcher uses these modification processes to examine how INVs adapt 
and transform their new and existing stocks of social capital for the purposes of NVI. Given 
that section 4.4.3 reports on the potential “dark-side” and deprecation of social capital, 
conceptually, it is evident that an INV’s networking can support the realignment and 
transformation of its social capital.  
Research objective two therefore aims to examine the networking activities that influence 
NVI. Ireland et al. (2002) note in strategy content research, why questions are useful in order 
to understand the actual context of phenomena. Research objective two will therefore aim to 
ask why certain networking activities enable and inhibit NVI. This study will therefore 
examine NVI as the major output of networking behaviour. Dutta et al. (2005: 277) [5] define 
a capability as “the efficiency with which a firm employs a given set of resources (inputs) 
[i.e. social capital] at its disposal to achieve certain objectives (outputs) [i.e. NVI].” Dutta et 
al. (2005: 278) notes this reasoning suggests capabilities are an “intermediate transformation 
ability” between resources (inputs) and objectives (outputs). Zahra (2005) notes INVs rarely 
operate with tangible and measurable objectives, and this model therefore assumes ventures 
work towards “outputs” that are congruent with NVI, rather than “objectives” to increase the 
potential scope of analysis. 
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Section 2.3 describes the dynamic capabilities debate, which indicates there is now 
recognition that the core purpose of dynamic capabilities are to implement strategic change 
(e.g. Zahra et al. 2006; Helfat et al. 2007). This study adopts Rajagopalan and Spreitzer 
(1997: 49) definition that strategic change is “a difference in the form, quality, or state over 
time (Van de Ven and Poole, 1995) in an organization’s alignment with its external 
environment.” In the context of INV research, McDougall and Oviatt (1996: 35) note that 
strategic change is relatively unexplored and concerns the changes in a new ventures 
internationalisation strategy (i.e. exporting, licensing, alliances, joint ventures, direct 
investment, etc.) which require unique bundles of competencies. Moreover, section 2.3.3 
emphasises that strategic management research indicates that strategic change can result in 
the realignment (i.e. adaptation) and transformation (i.e. revolution) of organisations 
(Balogun and Hailey, 2008: 21). However, Zahra (2005: 23) argues: “we need to no more 
about the role of the top management team’s experience, in terms of both maturity and of 
learning, and therefore may see opportunities to embark on strategic changes to better 
position their INVs.” Zahra and George (2002) also report that IE research on strategic 
change is rare with the exception of McDougall and Oviatt’s (1996) initial findings. Helfat 
et al. (2007) conceptualisation therefore provides a unique theoretical lens to examine 
strategic change in INVs. 
Finally, objective three will theorise on which network processes underpin networking 
capability development in NVI. Research question will therefore aim to achieve this third 
objective. Through the theoretical framework, the aspiration is to build theory that helps 
explain networking capability development. This abductive research will therefore iterate 
between theory and data, with the expectation of building a conceptual model that has 
potential for future empirical testing.  
5.5 Conclusion 
In conclusion, this chapter presents the aim, objectives, and research question of this thesis. 
Firstly, this chapter presents the problem that most technology start-ups are resource 
constrained, and do not have the sufficient managerial, technological and financial 
capabilities to compete in international markets. Consequently, networking and social capital 
is widely reported as a means to overcome these resource constraints, but this chapter 
indicates that most INVs in technology industries do not have the skills or capabilities to 
originate a high-performing network of relationships. This chapter therefore identifies the 
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research problem that existing theories do not sufficiently explain how technology start-ups 
build dynamic capabilities in networking to enable NVI. Secondly, this chapter argues that 
networking capability is a useful lens to examine this problem, but highlights that existing 
interpretations are less clear on how networking capabilities emerge, and why certain 
networking activities enable or inhibit NVI. As a result, this chapter presents the working 
thesis that networking is a process of dynamic capability development that involves the 
creation, extension, and modification of social capital, which is likely to enable NVI. Finally, 
this chapter presents the overall aim, objectives, and theoretical framework, which now 
drives this subsequent abductive research.  
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6 – Research Methodology 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Aim 
To describe the research methodology of this study. 
Chapter Objectives 
 To underscore the philosophical assumptions of this study. 
 To identify a suitable research strategy for this study. 
 To justify the choice of research design.  
 To discuss the phases of data collection and analysis.  
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6.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to describe the research methodology of this study by providing a 
comprehensive understanding of this research process. Edmondson and McManus (2007: 
1173) note “the process of field research as a journey [that] may involve almost as many 
steps backward as forward.” The authors note this issue conflicts with the traditional implicit 
view that the research process is linear and occurs over a number of sequential steps or stages 
which “starts with a literature review, moves onto research questions, data collection, and 
analysis and ends seamlessly in publication” (Edmondson and McManus, 2007: 1173). 
Instead, Van Maanen et al. (2007: 1150) argue this traditional view is “now an old complaint 
and now something of an institutionalised one, but we seem not to have moved toward much 
of a resolution, beyond that of an infrequently published confession as to how one’s research 
‘actually’ unfolded.” Edmondson and McManus (2007) thus argue researchers’ are more 
likely to achieve “methodological fit’” through an iterative and cyclical learning journey.  
Figure 6-1 therefore illustrates this iterative and cyclical research process. This chapter 
therefore intends to achieve three objectives. Firstly, this chapter will introduce readers to 
the researcher’s doctoral research journey. This is in accordance with Turner (1981) who 
argues to understand a researcher’s philosophical stance; the reader is entitled to know 
something of the aims, expectations, hopes, and attitudes that the writer brought to the field 
with him. Secondly, the researcher will therefore describe the development of his 
philosophical stance. Thirdly, the researcher will discuss his research strategy in response to 
the emergence of his research design. Fourthly, the researcher will discuss the emergent 
phases of data collection and analysis. Finally, this chapter will conclude with an overview 
of the researcher’s methodological approach.  
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Figure 6-1: Field Research as an Iterative, Cyclic Learning Journey 
 
Source: Edmondson and McManus (2007: 1173) 
6.2 Research Journey 
Figure 6-2 depicts the researcher’s doctoral research journey. In accordance with 
Edmondson and McManus (2007), the researcher chronologically maps his research journey 
through cycles of a seven-stage process. Indeed, the researcher would argue his research 
journey has been everything but linear as it has occurred over a series of cyclical stages and 
learning loops. Indeed, to use Mintzberg’s (1979) nomenclature, the researcher’s strategy 
has been emergent in response to challenges, discoveries, conceptual drifts, and 
epistemological shifts that occurred over this research journey. Nevertheless, in line with 
Mintzberg’s (1979) logic on emergent strategy, the researcher has always maintained the 
vision to deliver a theory building PhD thesis. Echoing Alvesson and Sandberg (2011), this 
vision emerged from the desire to address a research problem, which in this case, are the 
challenges of networking capability development in theoretical context of NVI. Moreover, 
Figure 6-2 illustrates this journey unfolded within the global medical technology sector, as 
the researcher wanted to learn about a single industry empirical context that he initially knew 
nothing about (Pettigrew, 1990).    
 
 140 
 
Figure 6-2: Research Journey 
 
Source: The Author
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6.3 Research Philosophy and Approach 
The word ontology derives from the Greek words “ontos” (being) and “logos” (theory or 
knowledge) (Johnson and Duberley, 2000: 67). Eriksson and Kovalainen (2008) summarise 
that ontology is about ideas of existence and the relationship between people, society, and 
the world at the most general. The central tenant of research philosophy is a question of 
whether social entities (people, organisations, industries or societies) should be “considered 
objective entities that have a reality external to social actors, or whether they can and should 
be considered social constructions built up from the [subjective] perceptions and actions of 
social actors” (Bryman, 2008: 18). Thus, Easterby-Smith et al. (2002) argues the 
philosophical debate between objectivism and subjectivism, then offer contrasting views on 
how scholars should conduct social science research.  
Eriksson and Kovalainen (2008) argue objectivism is based on the assumption that social 
reality has an independent existence, which is out with the control of knower (i.e. the 
researcher), while subjectivism lends itself to the view that social actors are the producers of 
social reality through their involvement in social interaction. Therefore, the assumptions we 
make about the nature of reality (objectivism versus subjectivism) allows researchers to base 
our assumptions about the best and most efficient ways of inquiring (epistemology) into the 
nature of the world. Johnson and Dunerley (2000: 2) explain researchers derive the term 
“epistemology” from two Greek words: “episteme” which means “knowledge” or “science” 
and “logos” which means “knowledge” “theory” or “account.” In other words, Johnson and 
Duberley (2000: 2) argue epistemology is concerned “with knowledge about knowledge.” 
Bryman (2008) explains an epistemological issue concerns the question of what is (or should 
be) regarded as acceptable knowledge in a discipline. Thus, Easterby-Smith et al. (2002) 
argue in management research positivism (objectivism) and interpretivism (subjectivism) are 
the epistemological traditions that dominate this philosophical debate. 
Bryman (2008: 13 defines “positivism is an epistemological position that advocates the 
application of the methods of the natural sciences to the study of social reality and beyond.” 
Eriksson and Kovalainen (2008) notes positivists are empiricists as they construe reality 
through observation and measurement. Saunders et al. (2003) note positivists most 
commonly use quantitative methods to conduct deductive research to explain casual 
relationships between variables. Easterby-Smith et al. (2002: 42) also emphasise that the 
main strengths of quantitative methods is they can “provide a wide range of situations, they 
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can be fast and economical, and particularly when statistics are aggregated from large 
samples, they may be of considerable relevance to policy decisions.” Indeed, Ghauri and 
Grønhaug (2005) explain positivistic research is particularly useful when there is a need to 
confirm the validity, reliability, and most crucially, the generalizability of research findings.  
However, since the researcher aims to build theory, it seems this study fits more within an 
interpretivist paradigm (Saunders et al. 2003). Bryman (2008: 694) explains: “interpretivism 
is an epistemological position that requires the social scientists to grasp the subjective 
meaning of social action.” Since the researcher seeks to gain a deeper understanding of the 
research context (i.e. the global medical technology sector) in turn with the meanings and 
mechanisms that entrepreneurs attach to certain events, it seems interpretivism is a more 
appropriate research approach. Consequently, Denzin and Lincoln (1998) note there are 
many forms of interpretivism, but all share the philosophical view that reality is socially 
constructed and understanding (e.g. making sense of the world) can only be achieved 
through the researchers’ subjective interpretations. Van Mannen (1983: 9) notes that 
interpretivists commonly use qualitative methods to conduct inductive research that involves 
“interpretative techniques which seek to describe, decode, translate, and otherwise come to 
terms with the meaning, not frequency of certain more or less naturally occurring phenomena 
in the social world.” 
Denzin and Lincoln (1998) argue phenomenology, hermeneutics, postmodernism and 
poststructuralism are four “philosophical bases” that inform interpretivism. Bryman (2008) 
explains that although these philosophical perspectives largely overlap, they recommend 
researchers should be explicit in the interpretive view they adopt. Briefly, Alvesson and 
Willmott (1996) notes hermeneutics aims to understand a social actor’s unique perspective 
but is insufficient for the study of process. Johnson and Duberley (2000: 91) also argue that 
postmodernism and poststructuralism are “extreme” interpretive approaches that out rightly 
reject positivistic epistemology and support the ontology that reality is a socially 
deconstructive process.  
However, Patton (1990) argues phenomenology aims to gain a deeper understanding of a 
particular phenomenon through the participant’s experiences. Consequently, Cope (2005) 
argues phenomenology empowers the researcher to work within the “context of discovery” 
to interpret the participant’s “world” by exploring the experience and consciousness of a 
phenomenon (i.e. the entrepreneurial firm). Furthermore, Pettigrew (1990) argues that 
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phenomenology enables researchers to build process theories by making comparisons based 
on observed subjective experience. Thus, the researcher would argue that phenomenology is 
the most appropriate form of interpretivism to conduct this exploratory research. The 
following section will now discuss choice of research strategy given the researcher’s 
ontological and epistemological stance. 
6.4 Research Design 
This section outlines the research design of this study. Saunders et al. (2003) argue there is 
a need for a clear research strategy to ensure the researcher creates a suitable research design. 
Consequently, Easterby-Smith et al. (2006) argue the choice of a suitable research strategy 
is primarily dependent on the researcher’s aim and objectives. Figure 6-2 depicts that despite 
various iterative steps the researcher’s overall aim has not dramatically changed throughout 
this process. That is, the researcher has always intended to explore how technology start-ups 
build dynamic capabilities in networking to enable NVI. However, this refined aim is the 
outcome of multiple iterations as the researcher sifted between theory and data. 
Nevertheless, as mentioned in section 6.2, the researcher has always maintained the vision 
to build theory through qualitative research. Therefore, due to this constant iteration between 
theory and data, the researcher followed an “abductive” approach to case study research 
(Dubois and Gadde, 2002).  
Suddaby (2006: 639) refers to the original work of Pierce (1903) who recognise that pure 
induction or pure deduction are “necessarily sterile” and that new ideas result from the 
interplay between induction and deduction, which he termed “abduction.” That is, Suddaby 
(2006: 639) paraphrases Pierce (1903) and describes abduction as the “fallible flash of 
insight that generates new conceptual views of the empirical world.” According to Dubois 
and Gadde (2002: 559) an “abductive approach is fruitful if the researcher’s objective is to 
discover new things – other variables and other relationships.” These authors then propose 
an analytical process of “systematic combining where the researcher’s theoretical 
framework, empirical fieldwork, and case analysis evolve simultaneously, and is particularly 
useful for the development of new theories” (2002: 554). 
Recent IB (Piekkari et al. 2008; Welch et al. 2011) and IE (Nummela and Welch, 2006) 
research has emphasised the growing importance of theorising from case study research. 
Indeed, Langley (1999) argues that case study research is particularly useful for asking how 
and why contemporary events and activities unfold over time. Figure 6-2 therefore illustrates 
 144 
 
since the researcher initially aimed to explore IE within the global medical technology 
sector, it is apparent case study research would help understand these contemporary issues.  
6.4.1 Case Study Research Strategy 
This study draws on both the “Eisenhardt Methodology” (e.g. Eisenhardt, 1989) and “Gioia 
Methodology” (Gioia et al. 2013) as an integrative approach to building theory from case 
study research. Langley and Abdallah (2011: 203) emphasise that unlike quantitative 
research, “the rules, formats, and norms for doing, writing, and publishing [qualitative 
research] are not uniform or well-established.” Consequently, on this research journey, the 
researcher began by using Eisenhardt’s (1989) approach to theory building from case study 
research. However, as data collection and analysis emerged, the researcher became more 
acquainted with Gioia et al. (2013) approach to theorising from case study research. 
Interestingly, Langley and Abdallah (2011) argue that the “Eisenhardt Template” and “Gioia 
Template” have both given rise to some highly influential contributions in strategy process 
research (e.g. Eisenhardt and Bourgeois, 1988; Corley and Gioia, 2004; Nag et al. 2007; 
Ozcan and Eisenhardt, 2009). However, Welch and colleagues (e.g. Marschan-Piekkari and 
Welch, 2004; Welch et al. 2011; Welch et al. 2013) emphasise that there has been a tradition 
in management research that assumes interpretivism underpins all of qualitative research. 
Indeed, recent management research has begun to deconstruct the philosophical and 
methodological foundations that underpin theorising from case study research. For example, 
Welch et al. (2011) emphasises that Eisenhardt (1989) and Yin (2004) actually adopt a 
positivist tradition, whereas case study researchers such as Stake (1995) follow a more 
interpretivist tradition. Interestingly, Langley and Abdallah (2011: 205) emphasise that 
Gioia and his colleagues (e.g. Corley and Gioia, 2004; Nag et al. 2007) similarly adopt an 
interpretivist approach to case study research. Consequently, Langley and Abdallah (2011) 
argue that the Eisenhardt Method strives to develop theory in the form of testable 
propositions, whereas the Gioia Method aims to capture participant meaning through the 
emergence of process models and novel concepts. Section 6.4.3 and 6.4.4 thus describes how 
data collection and analysis emerged, as the researcher was abductive in his approach, as his 
case study research strategy contained both deductive (theory inspired) and inductive (data 
inspired) elements. Therefore, as the researcher’s case study strategy emerged, he took 
inspiration by combining the Eisenhardt Method (e.g. Ozcan and Eisenhardt, 2009; Hallen 
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and Eisenhardt, 2012) and Gioia Method (e.g. Corley and Gioia, 2004; Maitlis and 
Lawrence, 2007; Tippmann et al. 2012) to design this case study research.   
Indeed, Yin (2003: 39-40) suggests that there are four broad types of case study design. 
These case study designs consist of a (1) holistic single case design, an (2) embedded single 
case design with multiple levels of analysis, a (3) multiple-case design, and an (4) embedded 
multiple-case design with multiple levels of analysis. Relatedly, Patton (2002) notes that 
making a decision about the unit of analysis is a critical step in the research process. Yin 
(2003: 23) suggests a general guide to determine the unit of analysis is to consider the initial 
research questions. Nevertheless, Davidsson (2006) argues in entrepreneurship research the 
identification of the unit of analysis can be challenging due to conflicting levels of analysis. 
That is, Davidsson (2006) argues since the individual entrepreneur forms a central part of 
the new venture resource base, their orientation seems to merge with the firm itself. To 
resolve this challenge, Davidsson (2006) argues entrepreneurship researchers can examine 
any (or multiple) levels of analysis – i.e. the individual, firm, or region – but researchers 
must ensure their research design is sufficient to explore the behaviours of these entities, 
whether it be an individual, firm or region. 
Davidsson and Wiklund (2001) thus argues that longitudinal case studies are particularly 
useful for researching the behaviour of such entities. However, Leonard-Barton (1990) 
argues in longitudinal research the unit of analysis is difficult to pinpoint, as this is likely to 
change as the research design emerges over time. For example, Langley (1999: 692) argues 
that process data therefore “consist largely of stories about what happened and who did what 
when – that is, events, activities, and choices ordered over time.” Therefore, in accordance 
with Van de Ven and Huber (1990) the unit of analysis in processual studies are typically 
associated with “how” and “why” questions. Interestingly, Cope and Watts (2000) argue that 
entrepreneurial behaviours are likely to unfold through an array of critical events, which 
provide an exploration of the entrepreneurial actor’s experience and learning. Miles and 
Huberman (1994: 111) define an event as “as a specific action or occurrence mentioned by 
any respondent and not denied or disconfirmed by anyone else.” Moreover, the authors 
define “critical incidents” as those as “important or crucial, and/or limited to an immediate 
setting” (1994: 113). Based on Yin’s (2004) rationale, the researcher made the decision in 
the first phase of this research, to use critical events as a single unit of analysis to create a 
holistic multiple-case study design. 
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Nevertheless, as section 6.4.3 explains, in phase two and three of this research, the 
researcher’s views on the unit of analysis began to change. That is, Figure 6-2 depicts after 
the researcher’s preliminary findings on the importance of networks and social capital his 
attention shifted towards the importance of specific network relationships. Coviello and 
Munro (1997: 365) define network relationships as “social and industrial relationships 
among for example, customers, suppliers, competitors, family, and friends.” Therefore, by 
phase three, this longitudinal research meant the unit of analysis had changed as the 
researcher began to use the critical event as a unit of observation (Ployhart and Vandenberg, 
2010). This change in research focus meant the researcher made the subsequent decision to 
use network relationships as the unit of analysis within this holistic longitudinal multiple-
case study design. Therefore, given dynamic capability research is still at an exploratory 
phase (e.g. Vogel and Güttel, 2013) the researcher argues building theory from case study 
research is the most appropriate research strategy to explore how technology start-ups build 
dynamic capabilities in networking to enable NVI. 
6.4.2 Sampling 
Miles and Huberman (1994: 30) argue sampling not only involves decisions about which 
participants to observe at interview, but also about the settings, events, and social processes. 
This section therefore describes and justifies the researcher’s sampling choices. To being 
with, Table 6-1 summarises researcher’s choices in terms of these sampling parameters:  
Table 6-1: Sampling Parameters 
Sampling Parameters Choices 
Settings: Global medical technology sector 
Focal actor International new venture 
Actors: Founders, top-management team, network members 
Events: Start-up events, commercialisation events, international events 
Processes: Firm founding, internationalisation, bridging social capital, bonding social capital 
Source: Adapted from Miles and Huberman (1994: 30) 
The empirical setting of this study is the global medical technology sector. Section 1.2 
describes the characteristics of this industry sector. The choice of the global medical 
technology sector was important for several reasons. Firstly, this industry sector is what 
Crick and Jones (2000) would describe as an “international high-technology market.” That 
is, the authors argue for high-technology firms that face challenges of new and emerging 
markets that are frequently international and are likely to be involved in a specialised niche 
market that spreads thinly across the world. Secondly, this industry sector is useful to 
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conduct IE research since research has found that for non-US based medical device firms 
internationalisation is a prerequisite for survival and growth (Chatterji, 2009). That is, the 
US medical technology sector is the single largest and most open medical device market in 
the world (Ernst and Young, 2010).  
However, Frost and Sullivan (2008) report for non-US based medical technology firms, such 
as UK and Australian start-ups, their national and local governments strictly govern 
healthcare, which has created an almost impenetrable local barrier to entry. In this empirical 
setting, this means such firms have no choice but to internationalise (Brännback et al. 2007). 
Thirdly, start-ups that operate in the global medical technology sector are what Bell et al. 
(2004) would describe as “knowledge-intensive” firms. The authors define knowledge 
intensive firms as those “having a high added value of scientific knowledge embedded in 
both product and process” (2004: 24). Therefore, this reasoning facilitated the researcher’s 
sampling choice to explore the global medical technology sector as a sufficient empirical 
setting. 
Additionally, given the global nature of the medical technology sector, the researcher 
capitalised on the opportunity to conduct cross-national research in the UK and Australia. 
Therefore, the focal actor of this study is the INV (Oviatt and McDougall, 1994). Ghauri 
(2004) argues multiple case study research is particularly powerful for IB research that aims 
to collect data in cross-national settings. Figure 6-2 thus illustrates in phase two of this 
journey, the researcher secured a visiting scholarship with the University of Queensland in 
Brisbane, Australia. In accordance with the cross-national case study protocols put forth by 
Loane and Bell (2006) and Loane et al. (2007), the researcher used a multi-method approach 
to sampling. Firstly, the researcher used purposeful sampling (Patton, 1987) to create a “non-
representative” sample of Scottish and Queensland located medical technology firms. Unlike 
quantitative research, representativeness is not the criteria for case selection (Stake, 1995). 
Instead, Paton (1987) argues qualitative researchers are more likely to use (1) quota; (2) 
purposeful; (3) snowball; (4) self-selection; and/or (5) convenience as non-probability 
sampling techniques. Following Ghauri and Grønhaug’s (2005) guidance on the design of 
cross-national research, the researcher decided to use purposeful sampling to create this 
multiple-case design. 
Patton (1987) describes there are a variety of purposeful sampling techniques which include 
(1) extreme or deviant case; (2) maximum variation (heterogeneous sampling); (3) 
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homogeneous; (4) typical case; and (5) critical case sampling. On the review of these 
techniques, the researcher decided to source a heterogeneous purposeful sample of medical 
technology firms to capture “central themes or principal outcomes that cut across a great 
deal of participant or program variation” (Patton, 1987: 53). However, in line with Coviello 
and Jones (2004) the researcher followed a number of “sampling equivalence” protocols to 
ensure the validity and reliability of this cross-national research. Firstly, the researcher felt 
the UK (i.e. Scotland) and Australia (i.e. Queensland) would be an interesting comparison 
due to shared history, language, and institutions that characterise the cultures of these 
nations. Moreover, another reason why the researcher felt Queensland would be an 
interesting comparison to Scotland is due to their similar population size and knowledge 
base. For example, both regions have a similar population of five million inhabitants, and a 
similar amount of universities with a comparable academic standard. More specifically, both 
regions are similar in that they are not located in central commerce hub (i.e. 
London/Sydney), while the majority of life science activity takes place in the Central Belt 
of Scotland or in South East Queensland6.  
Secondly, the researcher’s choice of a single industry study helped control the equivalence 
of this cross-national sample. Consistent with other IE research (e.g. Autio et al. 2000; Zahra 
et al. 2000; Jones et al. 2011) the researcher followed a strict protocol that consisted of five 
criteria to build a purposeful sample of medical technology start-ups. Table 6-2 presents 
these sampling criteria. In line with Figure 6-2, it is important to emphasise that the 
researcher sourced a Scottish sample of medical technology firms in the first research phase, 
and then replicated this sampling technique to source a Queensland sample of firms in the 
second research phase. In both phases, the researcher used Table 6-2 criteria to source an 
appropriate sample. 
  
                                         
6 For more details on these regions see:   
Life Sciences Scotland (http://www.lifesciencesscotland.com/) and  
Life Sciences Queensland (http://www.lsq.com.au/). 
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Table 6-2: Purposeful Sampling Protocol 
 Purposeful Sampling Protocol 
1.  Are independently owned and not a subsidiary (Prashantham and Young, 2011: 277). 
 
2.  Employ less than fifty full time employees (FTEs) and were less than seven years in age at first foreign 
market entry (Autio et al. 2000). 
 
3.  Were independently established to exploit a medical technology in the marketplace (Jones et al. 2011b). 
 
4.  Have an involvement in inward or outward cross border activities (e.g. R&D, production, or sales and 
marketing) within five years of inception (Jones, 1999; Zahra et al. 2000).  
 
5.  Could fit within one of Kazanjian’s (1988) “stages of growth” model that examines the growth patterns 
of technology based new ventures.  
 These four stages include (1) conception and development; (2) commercialisation; (3) growth; (4) 
stability 
Source: The Author 
Firstly, the researcher trailed various online government databases such as Scottish 
Enterprise - Life Sciences Scotland, Department of Trade & Industry (DTI), Nexxus 
Scotland, and the Australian Federal Government sponsored site AusBiotech. In line with 
Mudambi and Zahra (2007), the researcher then developed a database of potential firms, 
which included key information such as (1) employee count; (2) firm age; (3) international 
activity; (4) description of technology/company; and (5) contact details including the CEO’s 
name, address, telephone number, website, and email correspondence. Following this search, 
the researcher identified thirty-one potential companies in Scotland and ten potential 
companies in Queensland. Moreover, the researcher identified an additional twenty-three 
Australian companies in the event his local search was unfruitful. In total, researcher 
identified a potential sample of sixty-four medical technology firms. 
The researcher then used Table 6-2 criteria to order and prioritise this sample into groups 
that most closely fitted his selection criteria. Consequently, the researcher then familiarised 
himself with the company by learning about the founder, its products and technologies 
before he made contact with the firm. Once the researcher felt confident about his initial 
knowledge of the company, he then telephoned each firm asking to speak with the CEO 
explaining he was a doctoral student who was conducting exploratory research on small 
medical device firms in both Scotland and Australia. This process was highly effective as 
the researcher secured four Scottish case firms from directly contacting eight firms and 
secured four Queensland firms within one hour as each firm were willing and enthusiastic 
to participate in the research. Table 6-3 lists this purposeful sample of medical technology 
firms. To maintain confidentiality the researcher follows protocols as seen in other case 
study research (e.g. Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997; Ozcan and Eisenhardt, 2009) and used 
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pseudonyms to maintain the anonymity of each participant. Table 6-3 thus presents the initial 
purposeful sample of firms that formed the first and second research phase. 
Table 6-3: Purposeful Sample 
Firm Firm 
Age^ 
Location No of 
found-
ers 
Firm 
sizeˇ 
Medical device 
classification† 
Major 
value chain  
activity□ 
Cross border 
activities◊ 
Speed* 
Inward Outwd 
Fertility 1 Edinburgh 2 <10 Fertility device 
– 
Class II 
Production R&D 
VC 
S&M < 1 
year 
FemMed 5 Glasgow 1 12 Fertility device 
–  Class III 
Production VC Prod 
S&M 
3 years 
StentGraft 7 Dundee 4 <10 Cardiology 
device –  
Class III 
Production VC S&M 6 years 
BioDevice 25 West of 
Scotland 
2 12 Licensor and 
Co-R&D 
partner 
R&D VC R&D 
S&M 
3-5 
years 
PaceMaker 1 Brisbane 1 <10 Cardiology 
device –  
Class III 
R&D R&D R&D < 1 
year 
HeartBeat 4 Gold Coast 1 <10 Cardiology 
device –  
Class I 
Production R&D R&D 
Prod 
S&M 
< 1 
year 
SafeMed 7 Gold Coast 1 <10 Safety syringes 
– Class II 
Production R&D R&D 
Prod 
S&M 
<1 year 
BloodTrack 25 Brisbane 2 25 Diagnostic 
device –  
Class I 
Production R&D R&D 
S&M 
< 1 
year 
      ^ Firm age is at the time of the first semi-structured interview. 
      ˇ Firm size is based on full-time equivalent employees. 
      † There is no global standard of medical device classification (MHRA, 2014). However, the MHRA – the UK regulator of 
medical devices argue most regulatory frameworks encapsulate three classifications of medical device. These are “Class I” 
which is generally regarded as low risk; “Class II” which is generally regarded as medium risk; “Class III” which is generally 
regarded as high-risk (MHRA, 2014). 
      □ This indicates the firm’s major value chain activity. “R&D” refers to research and development; in the case of 
production, this is where the firm is the “legal” manufacturer of a medical device even if they subcontract production. 
      ◊ In accordance with Jones (1999) this refers to the firm’s inward or outward cross-border activities. “R&D” refers to 
research and development, “Prod” refers to production, “S&M” refers to sales and marketing, and “VC” refers to venture 
capital. 
     * “Speed” refers speed to the length of time between foundation and the first cross-border activity. 
Source: The Author 
Figure 6-2 illustrates when the researcher progressed to phase three, he then used theoretical 
sampling (e.g. Eisenhardt, 1989) to choose cases that are likely to replicate or extend 
emergent theory. Consequently, section 6.4.4 describes that after the second phase of data 
analysis, in line with Pettigrew’s (1990) recommendations the researcher selected four 
heterogeneous cases to examine various degrees of networking capability development. 
Since networking capability development is an emergent area of inquiry, the researcher 
selected (1) Fertility, (2) HeartBeat, (3) FemMed, and (4) SafeMed as these four cases were 
theoretically interesting and would support theory development.  
Primarily, this theoretical sample provided the opportunity to replicate the protocols of 
existing longitudinal research that examines new venture performance at various stage of 
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growth (e.g. Kazanjian, 1988; Maurer and Ebers, 2006). Moreover, since initial findings 
show clear evidence that each participant had different perspectives and approaches towards 
networking, the researcher felt these case firms were most relevant to support theory 
development. Finally, the researcher felt this theoretical sample would best facilitate the 
“constant comparison” method, which Eisenhardt (1989) and Gioia et al. (2013) both argue 
is an important process in theory development.   
6.4.3 Data Collection 
Figure 6-2 depicts that data collection took place over a three-year period and unfolded over 
three phases. This involved a series of semi-structured interviews with entrepreneurs, 
unstructured interviews with industry experts and policy makers, observation at industry 
events, and extensive secondary data collection. In total, the researcher used these data 
collection techniques to examine 101 events that the participant firms identified as being 
important and in some cases critical to their overall growth and international development. 
As data collection and analysis emerged into the second and third phase, the researcher 
collected new data on 51 network relationships that the participant firms identified as having 
an influence on their growth and international development. 
Thus, over this three-year period, the researcher conducted 17 semi-structured interviews 
with entrepreneurs, which amassed to 30 hours of transcribed data. During this period, the 
researcher also collected extensive secondary data on each case firm. These secondary data 
mainly consisted of written material such internal and external press reports, memos, along 
with text downloads of each case firm’s company website over time. Moreover, in some 
cases the researcher was also able to collect company documents such as marketing material, 
annual reports, some strategic planning documents, along with email correspondence. In 
addition to this, the researcher collected 5 hours of unstructured interviews with industry 
experts and policy makers in combination with 5 days of observation at UK and Australian 
local industry events, which together helped triangulate this study’s findings. Table 6-4 
summarises these three phases of data collection: 
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Table 6-4: Phases of Data Collection 
Firm Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Totals 
Fertility  Semi-structured 
interview (1.5hrs) 
 External documents 
 Semi-structured 
interview (2.5hrs) 
 Internal documents 
 External documents 
 Semi-structured 
interview (3hrs) 
 External documents 
 3 semi-structured 
interviews 
 7hrs 
FemMed  Semi-structured 
interview (1hr) 
 External documents 
 Semi-structured 
interview (1hr) 
 Internal documents 
 External documents 
 Semi-structured 
interview (1hr) 
 External documents 
 3 semi-structured 
interviews 
 3hrs 
StentGraft  Semi-structured 
interview (1.5hr) 
 External documents 
 Omitted from sample  Omitted from sample  1 semi-structured 
interview 
 1.5hrs 
BioDevice  Semi-structured 
interview (2.5hrs) 
 Internal documents 
 External documents 
 Semi-structured 
interview (2.5hrs) 
 Internal documents 
 External documents 
 Omitted from sample  2 semi-structured 
interviews 
 5hrs 
PaceMaker  Semi-structured 
interviews (1.5hrs) 
 External documents 
 Omitted from sample  Omitted from sample  1 semi-structured 
interviews 
 1.5hrs 
HeartBeat  Semi-structured 
interviews (2.5hrs) 
 Internal documents 
 External documents 
 Semi-structured 
interview (2.5hrs) 
 Internal documents 
 External documents 
 Telephone interview 
(1hr) 
 External documents 
 3 semi-structured 
interviews 
 6hrs 
SafeMed  Semi-structured 
interviews (1.5hrs) 
 Internal documents 
 External documents 
 Semi-structured 
interviews (2hrs) 
 Internal documents 
 External documents 
 Unavailable for 
interview 
 External documents 
 2 semi-structured 
interviews 
 3.5hrs 
BloodTrack  Semi-structured 
interviews (1hr) 
 External documents 
 Semi-structured 
interview (1.5hrs) 
 External documents 
 Omitted from sample  2 semi-structured 
interviews 
 2.5hrs 
Network 
members 
 1 day of UK 
observation 
 1 day of Australian 
observation 
 Two unstructured 
Australian interviews 
(3hrs) 
 1 day of UK 
observation 
 1 day of Australian 
observation 
 Two unstructured UK 
interviews (2hrs) 
 1 day of UK observation 
 4 unstructured 
interviews 
 5hrs 
 5 days of observation 
Total  8 semi-structured 
interviews 
 13 hours of interview 
data 
 2 days of observation 
 6 semi-structured 
interviews 
 2 unstructured 
interviews 
 15 hours of interview 
data 
 2 days of observation 
 3 semi-structured 
interviews 
 2 unstructured 
interviews 
 7 hours of interview 
data 
 1 day of observation 
 17 semi-structured 
interviews 
 30hrs of semi-structured 
interviews 
 4 unstructured 
interviews 
 5hrs of unstructured 
interviews 
 5 days of observation 
 
TOTAL AMOUNT OF DATA COLLECTION 
 21 interviews 
 35 hours of interview 
data 
 5 days of observation 
Source: The Author 
Data Collection Preparation 
In accordance with Yin (2003), the researcher took several steps prior to data collection, to 
ensure the reliability of the emergent findings. Initially, the researcher developed a case 
study protocol, which includes an overview of the project, the goals, objectives, and issues 
surrounding relevant topics. This protocol was particularly useful in the early stages of data 
collection as the researcher could show this protocol to participants who wanted to learn 
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more about this research. This was primarily the case with the Australian case firms who 
shown a genuine interest in this research process.  
Secondly, to improve the reliability of the results the researcher maintained what Yin (2003) 
describes as a case study database, which is included within Appendix 3. Gibbert et al. (2008) 
recommends in the event of longitudinal data collection, the researcher should follow Yin’s 
(2003) protocols and maintain a case study database in order to ensure the reliability of these 
data. Therefore, from the researcher’s experience the construction of this case study database 
was instrumental in helping organise the collection of these longitudinal data. Figure 6-3 
illustrates the logical structure of how the researcher designed, listed, categorised, updated, 
retrieved, and administered this case study database: 
Figure 6-3: Illustration of Database Model 
 
Source: The Author 
Thirdly, prior to data collection, the researcher designed a semi-structured interview guide. 
Saunders et al. (2000) notes semi-structured interviews are useful for conducting exploratory 
research and especially for understanding “what” “how” and “why” questions. Bryman 
(2008) also suggests semi-structured interviews are useful in situations where the researcher 
has developed a list of pre-defined questions derived from theory that researcher needs to 
initially address. Collis and Hussey (2003) also argue that semi-structured guides provide 
the researcher with the ability to ask certain questions, but in an order and sequence that is 
best suited to ensuring all necessary topics are covered. Cope (2005) argues semi-structured 
interview guides are particularly useful for entrepreneurship research in order to ensure a 
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research focus while maintaining a degree of flexibility when new and interesting themes 
emerge.  
Therefore, in accordance with Yin (2003) the researcher used Appendix 2, as a preliminary 
semi-structured interview guide. As this was a preliminary research guide, the researcher’s 
academic supervisor provided him with a template based on her previous research that was 
informed by resource-based (e.g. Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993) and IE based (e.g. Oviatt and 
McDougall, 1994; Jones and Coviello, 2005) theories. The researcher then adapted this 
interview guide for the purpose of his initial research questions with a list of open and closed 
questions to conduct Preliminary Research on Resources, Dynamic Capabilities, and Path 
Dependence in Life Science Firms. Consequently, following Patton’s (1987) 
recommendations that researcher used a number of questioning techniques to ensure rich 
and in some focused participant responses.  
These included the use of “rapport building” questions (i.e. Coffey and Atkinson, 1996), 
which are less intrusive questions at the beginning of the interview (e.g. Appendix 2: Section 
A) to enable the researcher to ask more personal and complex questions as the interview 
progresses. Following that, the researcher then used “experience/behaviour” questions (i.e. 
Appendix 2: Section B) which allow the participant to tell a “chronological story” of events, 
happenings, influences and decisions that the firm took over time (Coffey and Atkinson, 
1996). The researcher then used “opinion/belief” questions (i.e. Appendix 2: Section C/D) 
that are more personal in nature and attempt to understand the cognitive and interpretive 
processes of the participant (Patton, 1987). Initially, the researcher used the critical incident 
technique (Flanagan, 1954) to understand the learning processes and experiences of each 
individual participant. Indeed, entrepreneurship researchers argue, the critical-incident-
technique is particularly powerful to understand the stories of the entrepreneur and his/her 
venture (e.g. Chell and Pittaway, 1998; Deakins and Freel, 1998; Cope and Watts, 2000). 
Finally, the researcher left sensitive questions such as income, sales revenues, and 
profitability to end of the interview in order to build a rapport and minimise the risk of 
irritating the participant at an early stage of the interview.  
Data Collection Phase One 
In the first phase of data collection, the researcher conducted eight semi-structured 
interviews with medical technology firms. This included four firms in Scotland (e.g. 
Fertility, FemMed, StentGraft, and BioDevice) and four firms in Queensland (e.g. 
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PaceMaker, HeartBeat, SafeMed, BloodTrack). In each of these interviews, the researcher 
used Appendix 2 as a semi-structured interview guide. Each interview was scheduled for 
one hour, but Table 6-4 specifies the interviews were between 1 and 2.5 hours in length, 
which meant the average interview time was just over 1.6 hours in length. In each interview, 
location was dependent on participant convenience, which meant the researcher travelled 
throughout the Central Belt of Scotland and South East Queensland to conduct this field 
research. In Fertility and BioDevice interviews, the researcher’s academic supervisor 
attended to help improve the reliability of the data collection (Gibbert et al. 2008). Prior to 
each interview, the researcher introduced the participant to Appendix 1, which is the 
University of Glasgow: Code of Ethics. The researcher then explained all data was strictly 
confidential and would be anonymised and verified prior to any public dissemination. The 
researcher also asked for permission to tape record each semi-structured interview, and in 
all cases, the entrepreneurs agreed to these protocols.  
After these interviews, the researcher played back these digital recordings and took notes on 
his observations of the interview. Transcription of these data then took place quickly after 
these interviews. The researcher then discussed these observations with his academic 
supervisor to talk through the data. The researcher then began to collect secondary data in 
form of newspaper reports and monitoring the firm’s website to gain a more holistic 
understanding of these data. Section 6.4.4 explains the researcher then progressed to the first 
stage of data analysis, which then led to the second phase of data collection. 
Data Collection Phase Two   
Figure 6-2 depicts after preliminary analysis and submission of the researcher’s MSc 
dissertation, the researcher continued to explore the importance of networks and social 
capital. Consequently, the researcher designed a semi-structured interview guide to focus on 
these issues. Firstly, the researcher omitted StentGraft and PaceMaker from his initial 
sample. This was due to data access issues since StentGraft were no longer willing to 
participate in the research, while the entrepreneur of PaceMaker relocated to Texas, U.S.A. 
and were no longer available for interview. This meant in phase two, the researcher 
conducted semi-structured interviews with six of the eight case firms. In each case, the 
researcher interviewed the same respondent (e.g. CEO/founder) and initially asked the 
participant to confirm the validity of his initial findings. The researcher also followed the 
guidance of Chell and Pittaway (1998) and printed a timeline of the entrepreneurial firms’ 
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chronologies on A3 piece of paper, listing all of the major events. In the first section of the 
interview, the researcher asked the participant to confirm the validity of these findings such 
as the sequence and content of each event. The researcher then asked the participant to 
provide an update on any events or developments since the interviews, where the researcher 
would list these events on the timeline “post-it” notes. This process helped triangulate initial 
findings as the participants would confirm or disconfirm the order and content of these 
chronologies.  
Interestingly, section 6.4.4 reveals most of the participants identified the formation of certain 
network relationships as being critical events. Indeed, these findings correspond with 
Edvardsson and colleagues (Edvardsson and Strandvik, 2000; Edvardsson and Roos, 2001) 
research who argue for a relational based view of critical incident methodology. Specifically, 
Edvardsson and Strandvik (2000) found participants often described the formation of 
customer relationships as critical events. Consequently, the researcher followed the logic of 
“narrative sequence methods” (NSM) as a useful technique for theory development (e.g. 
Buttriss and Wilkinson, 2007). That is, these authors argue in the context of IE, the heart of 
NSM are to identify the underlying casual mechanisms or generative processes that unfold 
in new ventures. Consequently, Buttriss and Wilkinson (2007) argue that researchers should 
use NSM over a three stage-process. Although this is primarily an analytical technique, the 
authors argue the researcher should ask the entrepreneur to identify and map the narrative 
sequence of these unfolding events (Buttriss and Wilkinson, 2007).  
Consequently, once the participant listed these new events, the researcher asked new 
questions about the firms’ network relationships. This involved asking the participant to 
identify their most important ties who helped with commercialisation, growth, and 
international activity. The researcher then allocated different coloured “post-it” notes to each 
network relationship and placed this on the timeline. Finally, the researcher asked the 
participant to identify which network relationships were involved in specific events. This 
then encouraged the participant to discuss openly these events and facilitated the collection 
of rich narrative data. Thus, the second round of semi-structured interviews were more open 
ended with more emphasis on encouraging the entrepreneurs to speak openly and freely 
about a specific topic, which in this case was the role of social capital in NVI. Again, these 
interviews were tape recorded, transcribed, and ranged between 1 hour and 2.5 hours in 
length. 
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Finally, after the researcher built a relationship with the participants, he took advantage of 
some “snowball sampling” opportunities (e.g. Patton, 1987) as he conducted semi-structured 
and informal interviews with industry experts and policy makers. For example, HeartBeat’s 
entrepreneur referred the researcher to policy makers in the Queensland Government, who 
then referred the researcher to a local business angel who was involved in the medical 
technology sector. Following the same protocols as above, the researcher then conducted 
semi-structured interviews with these participants. The researcher asked the participants to 
describe their experiences of the global medical technology sector and discuss what they felt 
were the core growth challenges for local medical technology start-ups. In addition to this, 
the researcher continued to collect secondary data on each of the case firms.  
When the researcher returned to Scotland, he continued the second phase of data collection 
by attending local life science industry events, where he held informal conversations with 
policy makers and industry experts. The researcher then followed the advice of Delbridge 
and Kirkpatrick (1994) and wrote up these primary observations through a diary method as 
data collection and analysis progressed. During this phase, the researcher also conducted a 
semi-structured interview with a Scottish industry expert and replicated the same procedures 
as with the Australian participants. Finally, section 6.4.4 emphasises as the researcher 
progressed onto the third phase of analysis, he began to use theoretical sampling (Eisenhardt, 
1989) as a technique to focus on the most theoretically rich cases, which then led to the third 
and final phase of data collection. 
Data Collection Phase Three 
Figure 6-2 depicts the final data collection phase was more refined and helped verify the 
emergent findings. Firstly, the researcher made the decision to select a theoretical sample of 
four cases. Given the richness of primary data and amount of secondary data, the researcher 
choose Fertility, HeartBeat, FemMed, and SafeMed as a theoretical sample. These firms 
were also what Eisenhardt (1989) terms as “theoretically interesting” as they were at various 
stages of international development and had different approaches to networking. 
Consequently, emergent findings also shown signs of various strengths of practicing certain 
networking activities, which helped support the data analysis.  
Following the same protocols as phase two data collection, the researcher asked the 
participants to confirm the validity of his new findings. The researcher also asked each 
participant to provide an update of events since the last interview. Unfortunately, the 
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researcher was unable to conduct face-to-face interviews with the Australian firms due to 
being back in Scotland. Therefore, the researcher conducted a telephone interview with 
HeartBeat whose entrepreneur confirmed his findings. Nevertheless, the researcher was 
unable to pursue a follow-up interview with the CEO of SafeMed as he resigned due to an 
internal company dispute. However, given the weak performance of the firm, and available 
access to secondary data, due to their PLC status, the researcher made the decision to include 
SafeMed within the theoretical sample. Therefore, the major distinction between phase two 
and three semi-structured interviews is the researcher asked the participants to focus on 
specific network relationships and answer a list of pre-defined questions after their open 
discussion on these network relationships. Figure 6-4 illustrates the researcher then used 
“flash cards” (e.g. Bryman 2008) to help guide participants responses.  
Figure 6-4: Research Flashcard 
 
Source: The Author 
As analysis progressed, the researcher continued to collect secondary data on these case 
firms. As the researcher began to identify gaps in these longitudinal data, phase three was an 
essential step to ensure the construct validity of these findings (Yin, 2003). Again, the 
researcher followed similar protocols as all interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed 
were possible, and ranged between 1 hour and 3 hours in length. Therefore, over this three-
year period, total data collection amassed to 21 interviews, 35 hours of interview data, 5 days 
of observation and an extensive collection of secondary data mainly consisting of press 
reports and company documentation. 
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6.4.4 Data Analysis 
The aim of this study’s data analysis was to build theory from case study research (e.g. 
Eisenhardt 1989; Gioia et al. 2013). The researcher thus familiarised himself with high 
impact management contributions to gain an understanding for the “science” (e.g. Yin, 2004)  
and “art” (e.g. Stake, 1995) of theory building from case study research (e.g. Corley and 
Gioia, 2004; Maitlis, 2005; Nag et al. 2007; Maitlis and Lawrence, 2007; Ozcan and 
Eisenhardt, 2009; Hallen and Eisenhardt, 2012; Tippmann et al. 2012). In each of these 
contributions, the authors clearly state their analytical process. Therefore, this section aims 
to demonstrate how the researcher achieved his research objectives over a three-phase 
process.  
Figure 6-2 illustrates the iterative nature of this study’s data analysis. Firstly, Nvivo10© was 
used an organising tool during the three phases of data collection and analysis. The 
researcher found this software particularly powerful to slice and recode data, whilst 
identifying emergent themes across cases. Firstly, the researcher developed a set of 
narratives by constructing a chronological list of key events in each entrepreneurial firm. 
Secondly, the researcher identified various networking activities in each INV with the aid of 
conceptually ordered displays (Miles and Huberman, 1994) and wrote “thick descriptions” 
of each within-case firm (Eisenhardt, 1989). Thirdly, the researcher used cross-case analysis 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2003) to answer the final research questions by identifying the 
various conditions that enable networking capability development in NVI.  
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Data Analysis Phase One 
In the first phase of data analysis, the unit of analysis was the critical event and researcher 
treated each firm as a standalone case. The researcher used Nvivo10© to organise the data 
analysis of each case firm. Firstly, the researcher created a separate “node” for each case 
firm and uploaded the transcripts of the semi-structured interviews into the Nvivo10© 
database. The researcher then sifted through the entrepreneurial narratives to construct a 
chronological list of key events, activities, and interpretations of them, which composed of 
raw data. The researcher then assigned descriptive codes to everything that seemed 
interesting about each technology start-ups growth and development. For example, this 
involved assigning “free nodes” to descriptive codes such as “strategic decision”, 
“technology” “venture capital”, “foreign market entry”, “reputation”, “delays”, “suppliers” 
and so forth. In total the researcher initially allocated 78 free nodes which included a 
combination of descriptive and In-Vivo coding (Saldaña, 2012).  
After this process, the researcher began to categorise the various events. In total, the 
researcher identified 256 events across eight case firms. This analytical process involved a 
combination of description and interpretation, as the participant entrepreneur identified most 
of the events. However, in some cases, analysis of these events was an interpretive exercise 
as the researcher identified events from the entrepreneurs’ storytelling that they did not 
initially connect with being an important in their firm’s history. For example, HeartBeat did 
not identify signing a co-R&D agreement with a US hospital as an event, although this was 
instrumental in their future entry into the US market. This is largely due to entrepreneurs 
who forget or downplay the importance of certain events and activities (Cope and Watts, 
2000). Thus, following Chell and Pittaway (1998), the researcher categorised various 
incidents and identify those that were “critical” events. Flanagan (1954: 327) argues an 
incident is “critical” where “the purpose or intent of the act seems fairly clear to the observer 
and where its consequences are sufficiently definite to leave little doubt concerning its 
effect.”  
Therefore, the researcher initially sifted through this list of events and used “chronological 
coding” (Miles and Huberman, 1994) to identify “critical events” at specific points in time. 
Following Chell and Pittaway (1998), the researcher also assigned descriptive codes as to 
whether each event was proactive or reactive and whether they had a positive or negative 
influence on the firm. During this phase, the researcher also searched for secondary data 
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such as internal and external press reports, company reports, and website activity on these 
specific events to triangulate the respondents’ descriptions to build “thicker” descriptions of 
each event. The researcher then returned to the firms and asked them to verify the validity 
of each event and confirm whether these interpretations were accurate. Chapter 7 provides a 
summary of each chronology of events. 
Data Analysis Phase Two 
The second data analysis phase was a challenging period for the researcher. During this time, 
the researcher had an instinctive feeling there was a gap between his theoretical framework 
and initial data analysis. In an effort to improve construct validity, the researcher’s academic 
supervisor reviewed his initial findings who also felt his initial theoretical framework was 
insufficient to analyse his data. On reflection, this was partially due to the continued 
emergence of the dynamic capabilities perspective. For example, to begin with the researcher 
attempted to “pattern code” (Miles and Huberman, 1994) data by using Winter’s (2003) 
capability hierarchy as lens to observe the “zero-level”, “first-order” and “second-order” 
networking activities. As analysis progressed, the researcher found it particularly difficult to 
pattern code against these categories, and eventually realised that he was “squeezing” and 
“forcing” data into boxes – which Saldaña (2003) argues is a common practice amongst 
junior researchers.  
This analytical challenge forced the researcher to return to the literature to consider a 
theoretical lens that would help make sense of data. This involved a phase of conceptual drift 
in which the researcher attempted to use Zahra and George’s (2002) ACAP framework (i.e. 
acquisition, assimilation, transformation, and exploitation) and Teece’s (2007) dynamic 
capability framework (i.e. sensing, seizing and reconfiguring) to pattern code his data. 
However, as the researcher initially attempted to write-up the within-case analysis by using 
matrix displays (Miles and Huberman, 1994) and “visual maps” (Langley, 1999), he realised 
these pattern codes did not fully reflect the raw data. This iterative process involved 
extensive meetings with the researcher’s academic supervisor, where she would review his 
analysis and play the role of “devil’s advocate” to ensure the refinement of the pattern codes 
(Eisenhardt, 1989).  
As data analysis progressed, the researcher identified the opportunity to use Helfat et al. 
(2007) asset orchestration framework (i.e. create, extend, and modify) combined with 
Nahapiet and Ghoshal’s (1998) social capital framework (i.e. structural, relational, and 
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cognitive) as an analytical lens to pattern code the data. A core reason for this decision to 
switch theoretical lens, was in combination with recent research (i.e. Autio et al. 2011) who 
argue that previous dynamic capability perspectives (i.e. Zollo and Winter, 2002; Teece, 
2007) do not reflect the idiosyncratic processes of INVs (see sections 2.3.2 and 3.4). 
During this abductive process, the researcher used this new theoretical lens to identify 
emergent themes surrounding networking and social capital. By this point, the researcher 
had collected another round of data, which provided fresh insight on the role of the INVs 
network relationships. By this stage, the researcher continued to use pattern coding, but the 
unit of analysis had shifted from the critical event to the network relationship, which required 
a more fine-grained analysis. Following this discovery, the researcher made the decision to 
use theoretical sampling to help refine his data analysis through the selection of four cases. 
Thereafter, the researcher followed the same protocols as in data analysis phase one, and 
used Nvivo10© to create separate nodes for each network relationship. The researcher then 
sifted through each narrative, consulting multiple raw data sources where appropriate to 
build a thick description of each individual network relationship with the use of new pattern 
codes. Table 6-5 summarises the eventual units of analysis across these four case firms.  
Table 6-5: Summary of Events and Network Relationships 
Nature of data collection Number of events or network relationships Total units of 
analysis 
 Fertility HeartBeat FemMed SafeMed  
Events 30 18 24 29 101 
Type of network relationship 
Investors 6 4 1 1 12 
Mentors 6 5 2 4 17 
Buyers 5 2 4 2 13 
Suppliers 1 2 2 4 9 
Total number of network 
relationships 
18 13 9 11 51 
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Source: The Author 
Guided by his emergent theoretical framework, the researcher developed pattern codes on 
nine combinations of how INV (1) create, (2) extend, and (3) modify their (a) structural, (b) 
relational and (c) cognitive social capital. By this stage, the researcher was then able to write-
up the final within-case analysis. The researcher then used “conceptually ordered displays” 
(Miles and Huberman, 1994: 127) as a within-case analysis technique to structure this 
within-case analysis. This involved conceptually organising the displays by using columns 
to introduce the concepts (i.e. create, extend, modify, structural, relational and cognitive) 
and rows to present the empirical findings of each unit of data. Moreover, in line with 
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Saldaña (2003: 173) the researcher used “longitudinal coding” to chronologically categorise 
the use of each pattern code. Table 6-6 lists these final pattern codes. 
Table 6-6: Pattern Codes from Phase Two Data Analysis 
Category Sub-Category Code 
Sources of social 
capital 
  
Create Structural Social Capital   [year] C-STR [YEAR] 
 Relational Social Capital   [year] C-REL [YEAR] 
 Cognitive Social Capital    [year] C-COG[YEAR] 
Extend Structural Social Capital   [year] E-STR [YEAR] 
 Relational Social Capital   [year] E-REL [YEAR] 
 Cognitive Social Capital    [year] E-COG[YEAR] 
Modify Structural Social Capital   [year] M-STR [YEAR] 
 Relational Social Capital   [year] M-REL [YEAR] 
 Cognitive Social Capital    [year] M-COG[YEAR] 
Effects of Social 
Capital 
  
Create Benefits of social capital   [year] C-BEN  [YEAR] 
 Problems of social capital [year] C-PRB  [YEAR] 
Extend Benefits of social capital   [year] E-BEN  [YEAR] 
 Problems of social capital  [year] E-PRB  [YEAR] 
Modify Benefits of social capital   [year] M-BEN [YEAR] 
 Problems of social capital  [year] M-PRB [YEAR] 
Change in Social 
Capital 
  
Increase New to Weak [year a - year b] INC-NW [YR-YR] 
 New to Moderate [year a - year b] INC-NM [YR-YR] 
 New to Strong [year a - year b] INC-NS  [YR-YR] 
 Weak to Moderate [year a - year b] INC-WM [YR-YR] 
 Weak to Strong [year a - year b] INC-WS  [YR-YR] 
Decrease Strong to Moderate [year a - year b] DCR-SM [YR-YR] 
 Strong to weak [year a - year b] DCR-SW [YR-YR] 
 Strong to deletion [year a - year b] DCR-SD  [YR-YR] 
 Moderate to weak [year a - year b] DCR-MW[YR-YR] 
 Moderate to deletion [year a - year b] DCR-MD [YR-YR] 
Source: The Author 
This coding structure then enabled the researcher to focus on the networking activities (i.e. 
the creation, extension, and modification of social capital) before, during, and after an INV’s 
most critical event that unfolded during the time of data collection (2008-2012). By this 
point, the researcher was able to follow the guidance of Alder and Kwon (2002) by 
specifying whether certain structural, relational, or cognitive sources helped INVs create, 
extend, or modify social capital. Moreover, the researcher then examined these units of 
analysis in more depth to determine the benefits or problems – i.e. the effects – this social 
capital had on NVI. The researcher also used visual maps (Langley, 1999) as qualitative data 
analysis technique to triangulate these emergent findings. Following the write-up of the four 
individual case studies, the researcher was then able to progress to the final phase of data 
analysis. 
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Phase Three Data Analysis 
The final phase of data analysis focussed on identifying the various networking activities 
that enable or inhibit NVI. More crucially, these emergent findings on specific networking 
activities were critical to understand the network-processes that underpin networking 
capability development in NVI. The researcher then engaged in a five-step analytical process 
that echoes Gioia et al. (2013) protocols to achieve a higher-level of abstraction. Firstly, the 
researcher used cross-case analysis to examine the patterns of how INVs create, extend, and 
modify their social capital across the four cases. Drawing on Table 6-6 pattern codes, the 
researcher complied a comprehensive list of network ties, and then engaged in first-order 
coding using the constant comparison method (Gioia et al. 2013). The researcher then linked 
similar types of network ties together such as investors, mentors, buyers, and suppliers to 
identify first-order concepts such as “referrals as a source of tie creation”, “global tie origin,” 
and “acceptance as a source of tie creation.”  
Secondly, the researcher took inspiration from Maitlis and Lawrence (2007) and used axial 
coding (Strauss and Corbin, 1990) by grouping these first-order concepts into second-order 
themes. In line Maitlis (2005), the researcher then used axial coding to search for distinct 
forms of networking. For example, when a network tie was sourced through a referral and 
its origin was global in scope, this formed a “global referral bridging” activity. The 
researcher then sharpened these second-order themes by comparing them with existing 
constructs in literature such as referrals (e.g. Burt, 2005) and international scope (e.g. Mors 
2010). Following Maitlis (2005), the researcher then used data grids to experiment with 
various forms of axial coding. Figure 8-1 illustrates one outcome of this process. Figure 6-5 
illustrates the progression and emergence of this theme building where the eventual outcome 
was eleven second-order themes emerged as aggregating several first-order concepts. 
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Figure 6-5: Progression of theme building 
 
Source: The Author 
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Thirdly, the researcher crosschecked these second-order themes (e.g. networking activities) 
against the existing narratives and co-referenced raw data to verify the trail of evidence. For 
example, Table 8-1 provides representative second-order themes that help triangulate Figure 
8-1’s summary of findings. The researcher then replicated this process throughout the cross-
case analysis. Fourthly, and in a third level of abstraction, the researcher sought evidence of 
why certain networking activities form a specific network-process. In accordance with Miles 
and Huberman (1994: 210), the researcher used “case-ordered effects matrices” to move 
beyond exploring and describing, to ordering and explaining. Figure 8-14 illustrates one 
example of case-ordered effect matrix. Most crucially, this analytical step helped the 
researcher determine why certain networking activities enable or inhibit NVI.   
Interestingly, these case-ordered effects matrices helped the researcher identify three 
overarching aggregate categories. Through the combination of networking activities, the 
researcher found evidence of the (1) network-enhancing process; (2) network-delaying 
process; and (3) network-modifying process. Therefore, these three overarching dimensions 
aggregate eleven second-order themes, which aggregate several first-order concepts. 
Nevertheless, it is important to emphasise, these concepts emerged at the end of data 
analysis, in concert with relevant literature, which helped with the refinement of these 
findings. With these thoughts in mind, Figure 6-6 illustrates this study’s overall data 
structure. The researcher then replicated the protocols set out in the third step, and created 
raw data tables for each aggregate category to provide another iteration between the raw data 
and this higher level of abstraction. Table 8-19 provides one example of this theoretical 
abstraction. Finally, in the fifth step of analysis, the researcher identified cycles of 
networking capability development. That is, the researcher examined the narratives for 
conditions that triggered, enabled, and accelerated networking capability development in the 
context of NVI. The analytical process then identified three important cycles (e.g. learning 
from delays, aspiring for internalisation and nurturing core ties) that help make a step 
towards process theory networking capability development. The researcher then discussed 
these abductive findings in relation to the literature to increase the validity and reliability of 
this case study research.  
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Figure 6-6: Data Structure 
 
Source: The Author 
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6.5 Conclusion 
To conclude, this chapter describes the research methodology chosen to explore how 
technology start-ups build dynamic capabilities in networking to enable NVI. To summarise, 
this chapter reveals this study adopts a phenomenological stance given the researcher’s 
interpretivist epistemology. Therefore, this study follows an abductive approach based on a 
longitudinal multiple case study design (Eisenhardt, 1989; Leonard-Barton, 1990; Yin, 
2003; Gioia et al. 2013). This chapter also details the purposeful and refined theoretical 
sample that drove this research. Moreover, this chapter explains that multiple sources of 
primary and secondary data inform this study. These data collection methods include semi-
structured interviews, documents, and observation. The researcher also provides a deep 
insight into the process that underpinned his within-case and cross-case analysis. The next 
chapters now present the analysis and findings of this research.  
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7 – Within-Case Analysis: Summary 
of Events 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Aim 
To provide a summary of events for each case firm. 
Chapter Objectives 
 To provide a summary of events for each case firm. 
 To provide a context for the cross-case analysis.   
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7.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a summary of events for each case firm. Given the “thick descriptions” 
of each individual case study and due to space limitations, these within-cases are available 
upon request. Therefore, this chapter summarises each case firm by providing a chronology 
of events. This chapter therefore provides context on each of the four cases, prior to an in-
depth multiple case study analysis.  
7.2 Case One – Fertility Ltd 
Fertility Ltd was independently founded in October 2007 and is located in Edinburgh, 
Scotland. The company is a manufacturer of class one and two medical devices that focus 
on women’s health and fertility. The company’s core product is a clinically proven “fertility 
lubricant” that supports the motility and fertilising capacity of sperm. The core product 
targets couples who are trying to conceive and the firm offers supplementary products that 
include a moisturiser and a conception kit that aims to assist couples optimise the timing of 
conception. At the time of the final interview [2011], the company employed 10 full-time 
equivalent (FTE) staff, generated sales of £300,000 per annum, and had a gross profitability 
ratio of 75% of total sales for the financial year of 2010/2011. IBIS world (2011) reports the 
US fertility industry is valued at US$2 billion with an annual growth rate of 1.2% per year.  
Prior to foundation, Californian entrepreneur Brad Davis met future co-founder Dr Zhan Shi 
in 2003 while working as Director of Operations for the UK subsidiary of Enhancement 
Corp an American medical technology MME. At the time, Dr Shi was an R&D director for 
Enhancement Corp and a leading academic scientist in the manufacture of biomaterials. 
Consequently, both actors worked on the successful commercialisation of a new cosmetic 
anti-aging product, which in 2006 led Dr Shi to discover a technological opportunity with 
respect to the manufacture of a specific biomaterial. Given that Dr Shi was one of only five 
scientists in the world who had the knowledge to manufacture this biomaterial, the actors 
decided to co-found Fertility in October 2007 to exploit this technological innovation [FER-
I08-C]. The initial founding team of Fertility consisted of the CEO Brad Davis and Chief 
Scientific Officer (CSO) Dr Zhan Shi. At the time of founding, the CEO was a 34-year-old 
American male with a Master’s degree in Biomedical engineering, an MBA, and 10 years 
operations management experience. The CSO was a 41 year-old Chinese-UK male with a 
PhD in biochemistry with 15 years combined academic and R&D experience in medical 
technology MNEs [FER-I08-C].    
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The respondent identifies that joining UniNet – a university led entrepreneurial network for 
local technology start-ups – was an important event in the foundation of the firm [FER-I08-
A]. In early 2008, the respondent identifies that the co-founders filed for a Patent 
Cooperation Treaty (PCT) application that provides provisional patent rights in North 
America, Europe, and the Asia-Pacific [FER-I08-A]. However, in late 2008, the respondent 
emphasises how the firm encountered serious financial difficulty during the emergence of 
the global financial crisis (GFC) of 2007-2009. Figure 7-1 thus presents what the 
entrepreneur describes as the major events in the history of the firm.    
Figure 7-1: Fertility Ltd Chronology of Events 
 
Source: The Author 
This meant the firm was unable to access seed-capital through bank finance or angel 
investment, and were motivated to pursue early sales revenues to ensure the firm’s survival 
during the commercialisation process. This funding crisis triggered a string of networking 
activities in 2008-2009 in an effort to generate income such as attempting to license their 
core technology to European MNE, while attempting to build relationships with large 
venture capital funds and local business angel syndicates (BAS). Unfortunately, most of 
these networking activities were unsuccessful. By 2009, the firm had reached the brink of 
bankruptcy, but during this time, the entrepreneur met a “critical contact” who was 
instrumental in helping the firm survive this funding crisis. By mid-2009, this contact helped 
the firm secure early revenues through various sales channels, which enabled the generation 
of new income from a BAS that subsequently supported the commercialisation of the firm’s 
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core product range. By 2010, the respondent confirmed Fertility had signed three foreign 
agreements with a large European, Chinese and Canadian distributor. It was then widely 
reported that the Chinese distribution agreement was worth an “estimated £70 million 
revenue” potential over the next seven years [FER-I11-A; FER-EPR10-E]. 
7.3 Case Two – HeartBeat Pty Ltd 
HeartBeat Pty Ltd develop and manufacture a range of wireless and mobile health 
monitoring systems for the screening, diagnosis, and management of chronic diseases for 
the consumer health and fitness markets. HeartBeat are headquartered in Gold Coast, 
Queensland, Australia, and in 2009, established an international joint venture (IJV) with an 
American firm in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, U.S.A. At the time of the final interview 
[2010], the respondent noted the company employed 3 FTE but did not reveal their sales or 
profitability ratio. However, the respondent did confirm that 95% of all its annual income 
was from international sales of medical technology hardware and software products within 
the global telemedicine industry. IBIS world (2012) reports the global telemedicine industry 
is currently valued at US$1.4 billion with a growth rate of 15% per annum. 
HeartBeat Pty Ltd was independently founded in 2003. The company was founded to engage 
in a large-scale mobile telemedicine R&D project for a hospital in Baltimore, Maryland, 
U.S.A. The successful completion of this cross-border R&D project, led to the development 
of the firm’s first product – a Bluetooth Heart Monitor – that allows end-users to send a 
personal ECG (electrocardiogram) of their heart rate electronically to a computer via 
Bluetooth technology. In late 2003, this innovative product led HeartBeat to win the 
Australian Government’s prestigious Biotechnology Innovation Award providing the firm 
with a cash injection of AU$100,000 (£60,000) [HEA-I09-C]. In 2004, HeartBeat filed for 
a provisional patent for their wireless technology and filed for EU regulatory approval. 
Figure 7-2 thus presents what the entrepreneur confirmed as the major events in the history 
of the firm. 
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Figure 7-2: HeartBeat Pty Ltd Chronology of Events 
 
Source: The Author 
In 2005, HeartBeat filed for a PCT application and launched the Bluetooth Heart Monitor as 
their core product [HEA-I09-C]. The entrepreneur describes the firm initially decided to sell 
the heart monitor as an academic research device, which meant they were able to “avoid 
some regulatory hurdles” and generate immediate income [HEA-I09-C]. Consequently, the 
entrepreneur describes within one year, HeartBeat had sold 1000 units to universities and 
research consortia around the world who used the Bluetooth device to conduct academic 
research within the area of cardiology [HEA-I09-C]. In late 2005, HeartBeat then used this 
income to invent their second core product – the Bluetooth Pulse Monitor –, which at the 
time worked with the first Window’s mobile phone [HEA-I09-C].  
By 2006, these events resulted in the firm winning a Queensland Government SMART 
award and reaching the Hong Kong finals of the Wall Street Journal’s prestigious Asia 
Innovation Award [HEA-CDA-F]. However, by late 2008, the respondent emphasises the 
firm encountered financial difficulty during the emergence of the GFC of 2007-2009. The 
entrepreneur describes that previous to the crisis the firm was “surviving” on government 
and innovation grants but these were “beginning to dry up” which meant HeartBeat were 
reliant on the limited  sales of the Bluetooth Heart Monitor as the Bluetooth Pulse Monitor 
did not sell due to failure of the early Window’s mobile phone [HEA-I09-C]. Thus, in 2008, 
this funding crisis triggered the firm to search for venture capital from a large Indian and US 
syndicate, but after 6 months of due diligence, both of these attempts were unsuccessful.  
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This crisis then triggered a sting of networking activities in 2008-2009 where the 
entrepreneur “fought for survival” [HEA-I09-C]. The respondent identifies in mid-2008 that 
he confided in his “life-long friend” and US cardiologist Dr Daniel Arthur for help on saving 
the business. Dr Arthur then invested in the business and identified that the emergence of 
Apple’s iPhone as the “next big opportunity” within the telemedicine industry. 
Consequently, in 2009, academic researchers published their empirical findings on the 
“technological superiority” of HeartBeat’s core product in a top-tier academic journal, which 
led to a surge in international sales. By mid-2009, this “surge in sales” had meant HeartBeat 
had survived this financial crisis. Furthermore, by late 2009, this chain of events motivated 
the entrepreneur to co-found HeartBeat USA as an IJV with US cardiologist in response to 
the emergence of Smartphone technology [HEA-I10-A].  
In early 2010, the founders of HeartBeat allocated their attention to the HeartBeat USA 
venture and focussed on the development of an ECG iPhone application. The founders then 
invented the software application in-house and searched for a suitable manufacturer who had 
the technological capabilities to develop new Smartphone hardware. By mid-2010, 
HeartBeat were successful in signing a production agreement with a “prestigious” Hong 
Kong MNE who specialise in the assembly of Smartphones and production of Smartphone 
accessories [HEA-I10-A]. This relationship then enabled the firm to develop a prototype of 
a unique facia that connects to a Smartphone and enables users to read, monitor, and 
electronically send their personal ECG to a nominated recipient such as a clinician or carer 
[HEA-I10-A]. By the end of 2011, HeartBeat had engaged in a successful social media 
campaign, which led to US TV coverage, which enabled them to raise US$10.5 million of 
venture capital prior to even receiving FDA approval [HEA-I11-A]. The firm continues to 
trade internationally under HeartBeat USA. 
7.4 Case Three- FemMed Ltd 
FemMed Ltd was independently founded in 2003 in Glasgow, Scotland and was the legal 
manufacturer of a range of “class three” medical devices that aim to restore female pelvic 
health. At the time of the final interview [2011], the company employed 30 FTE, generated 
sales of £2 million per annum with a profitability ratio of 75% of total sales for the 2010/11 
financial year. The company derived 99% of its annual income from international sales of 
medical technology hardware products within the US urology and gynaecology market [FM-
I11-D]. Frost and Sullivan (2008) report this US market is valued at US$2.4 billion with an 
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estimated annual growth rate of 13% per year [FM-EPR10-G]. Figure 7-3 depicts the major 
events in the history of the firm. 
Figure 7-3: FemMed Ltd Chronology of Events 
 
Source: The Author 
Prior to foundation, Dr Philip Charlie a practising urogynaecologist set out to create a unique 
technological innovation in response to his concern about the quality and efficacy of existing 
surgical implants that aim to restore female pelvic health. In 2001, this medical concern 
motivated Dr Charlie to start-up FemR&D Ltd – an R&D company that focussed on 
exploring ways to improve malleability and efficacy of these surgical implants [FM-I08-A]. 
At this time, the founder was a practising surgeon and R&D director for a local MNE 
subsidiary that specialises in female health. Due to his surgical and commercial R&D 
experience, the founder invented a unique lightweight technology (FemTech) to develop 
superior surgical implants that were not currently available within the marketplace [FM-I11-
C].  
By late 2001, the firm had filed for a PCT application to protect this new technology, which 
subsequently led to the NPD of two core products. In 2002, FemR&D received European 
regulatory approval, which subsequently led to the foundation of FemMed Ltd in 2003. 
FemMed Ltd were therefore authorised to sell their products within the EU upon foundation. 
The initial founding team consisted of CEO and inventor Dr Charlie, and Chief Operations 
Officer (COO) Dr Catherine Styles who was responsible for quality and NPD. Both of the 
founding team had MNE experience and were educated to PhD or MBA level. That is, the 
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CEO was 47 years old at start-up with a Doctor of Medicine (M.D.) and an MBA, while the 
COO was 33 years old with a PhD in Chemistry, and had 10 years’ operations management 
experience within a pharmaceutical MNE [FM-I08-D10]. Figure 7-1 thus presents what the 
COO described as the major events in the history of the firm. 
In the initial 2008 interview, the respondent reports an important event was in 2004, when 
FemMed received its US regulatory (510k) approval to sell their products [M-I08-C]. This 
event triggered a local-based BAS to invest a “significant” sum of capital into the venture 
via partnership with Scottish Enterprise’s Co-Investment Fund (SCF)7. The respondent did 
not reveal the equity share, but did divulge that the BAS invested on multiple occasions from 
2004-2009 but did not reveal the amount. On further investigation, the researcher was able 
to confirm through various press reports that the BAS invested a total of £3.7 million over 5 
years [FEM-EPR09-A; FEM-EPR09-B]. Consequently in 2005, FemMed were granted a US 
and UK patent, which triggered their early internationalisation. In 2005, the respondent 
confirmed their initial cross-border activities consisted of signing a French manufacturing 
agreement to subcontract the production of their products, and a US distribution agreement 
with a large MNE [FM-I09-B]. However, the following section will reveal that despite some 
initial sales, these cross-border activities were unsuccessful and threatened the firm’s overall 
survival.  
On review of the firm’s critical events, the respondent confirmed the new venture’s strategic 
decision to establish a US foreign sales subsidiary was the critical event that changed the 
direction of the firm and supported their international expansion [FEM-I11-B3]. 
Consequently, the respondent identifies that 2007 was the “turning point” in the new 
venture’s history as FemMed were able to marshal enough financial resource to establish a 
foreign sales subsidiary in the US market [FM-I08-C]. In 2007, this decision involved the 
restructure of their executive board and a “significant commitment” to the US medical 
technology market. In 2008, FemMed officially launched their US product range and by 
2009, this US sales subsidiary enabled the firm to secure additional venture capital, expand 
their product lines, and increase their US sales force [FM-I09-A]. Subsequently in 2010, 
these events led DeviceTech – a European MNE – to acquire FemMed in a deal worth £22 
million [FM-I11-B1; FM-EPR10-D]. Incidentally, these data reveal that networking had a 
                                         
7 http://www.scottish-enterprise.com/fund-your-business/scottish-investment-bank/sib-equity-
funding/scif.aspx [Last accessed 20/09/2013] 
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significant impact on the firm’s rapid international growth, which is the focus of following 
cross-case analysis. 
7.5 Case Four - SafeMed 
SafeMed Plc. design and develop a range of safety medical devices within the syringe and 
blood collection device markets. SafeMed is headquartered in Gold Coast, Queensland, 
Australia. At the time of the final interview [2010], the respondent confirmed the company 
employed three FTE and were yet to generate sales revenues. The respondent confirmed that 
SafeMed were “in the process of entering the growth phase” as in 2010, they had just signed 
a US manufacture and distribution agreement with a potential value of “up to US$60 million 
sales per annum over the next five years” [SAF-I10-A]. SafeMed estimate that the US market 
for blood collection devices is valued at US$350 million per annum with a growth rate of 
10% per annum. The firm estimates the US safety syringe sector is currently valued at 
US$100 million within the larger worldwide syringe market that is currently valued at US$2 
billion per annum with a forecasted growth rate of 20% per annum [SAF-WC-A]. 
SafeMed Plc. were founded in 1999. Prior to foundation, Australian academic Dr Perry 
Christopher studied for a PhD in chemistry in the early 1980’s at a US university where he 
met a fellow PhD student and US inventor. By 1995, Dr Christopher maintained contact with 
the US inventor due to his interest in the inventor’s unique safety syringe technology that he 
was trying to commercialise. However, by 1998, the US inventor had “ran out of money” 
but Dr Christopher was such a “believer” in the commercial application of this technology 
that he raised funds in Australia to commercialise this technology [SAF-I09-C]. By mid-
1998, Dr Christopher met local Australian property investor and entrepreneur Bruce Hanks 
who agreed to fund the acquisition of the inventor’s US patent [SAF-09-C]. In 1999, the 
acquisition of these US patent rights led Dr Christopher and Bruce Hanks to found SafeMed 
in their home town, which is located in Gold Coast, Queensland. In 2000, SafeMed 
subsequently secured their first state government grant to drive the commercialisation [SAF-
09-C]. By 2003, SafeMed used this government grant to appoint a formal TMT, which is 
when CEO Pat Eden and Chief Financial Officer (CFO) Pauline Branson joined the start-up 
team. Bruce Hanks then self-appointed himself as company Chairman, while Dr Christopher 
undertook the position of Chief Technology Officer (CTO). 
By 2004, the CEO used his previous corporate law and investment banking experience to 
float SafeMed on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) [SAF-I09-C]. This IPO resulted in 
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SafeMed raising AU$4 million, which funded the firm’s initial commercialisation activity 
[SAF-I09-A]. Following this IPO, SafeMed won a prestigious Australian design award, but 
led to a three year “quiet period” where the firm “focussed on commercialisation activity” 
[SAF-I09-C]. In 2008, the firm were successful with clinical trials and were granted an 
Australian patent for their safety blood collection device. In 2009 – ten years after foundation 
– the firm were granted FDA approval for their blood collection device. The firm then began 
to pursue licensing agreement with a US medical technology MNE [SAF-I09-B]. However, 
in February 2009 this agreement was unsuccessful which “forced the firm to change their 
strategy” [SAFE-I10-B].  
In March 2009, SafeMed returned to shareholders with a “shareholder purchase plan” in an 
attempt to raise an additional AUS$2 million to fund the firm’s commercialisation. However, 
this shareholder purchase plan only raised AUS$300,000, but did keep the business afloat 
[SAF-IPR-09-A]. By late 2009, the firm were granted a US patent for their blood collection 
device, which provided them with the confidence to enter the US market to secure strategic 
partnerships with a manufacturer and distributor. During this time, SafeMed started initial 
negotiations with a US manufacturer but this deal broke down due disagreement on various 
contractual terms [SAF-I10-B]. Eventually however in late 2009, SafeMed signed a US 
distribution and manufacturing heads of agreement [SAF-I10-A]. In the 2010 interview, the 
CEO confirmed that SafeMed had signed a US manufacture and distribution agreement, 
which he identified as the major critical event in the history of the firm. Figure 7-3 thus 
presents what the CEO confirmed as the major events in the history of the firm. 
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Figure 7-4: SafeMed plc. Chronology of Events 
 
Source: The Author 
Following this critical event, the CEO confirmed with the researcher that the US 
manufacture and distribution agreement was contingent on the firm raising new capital to 
pay for the manufacturer’s specialised equipment [SAF-I10-B]. Consequently, in July 2010, 
SafeMed attempted a second shareholder purchase plan to raise new capital, but despite these 
advancements, the shareholders failed to invest in the company [SAF-EPR10-A]. By August 
2010, this unsuccessful attempt to raise new capital triggered a stream of events. Firstly, in 
August 2010 the ASX told the CEO to “retract” his announcement that SafeMed had signed 
an agreement “worth up to US$60 million” as these claims were “unfounded” and “misled” 
shareholders on the potential value of this agreement [SAF-IPR10-B].  
In April 2011, the CEO resigned for “personal reasons” but it was widely reported the CEO 
agreed to exit the company due to these unfortunate chain of events [SAF-EPR11-A]. 
Thirdly, directly after the CEO’s departure, the CTO exited the company “in pursuit of an 
academic career” [SAF-IPR11-B]. Fourthly, in December 2011, SafeMed reattempted to 
raise a share purchase plan, which again was unsuccessful, which led the US manufacturer 
in January 2012 to terminate this agreement due to the firm’s inability to raise capital to 
purchase the specialised equipment [SAF-EPR12-A].  
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7.6 Conclusion 
To conclude, this chapter provides a short description and summary of events for each case 
firm. The purpose of this chapter was to provide a context for each firm prior to the cross-
case analysis. This chapter therefore identifies that Fertility and HeartBeat both identified 
surviving an internal funding crisis during the global financial crisis of 2008-2009 as a major 
critical event in the history of each firm. Additionally, FemMed and SafeMed both identified 
their foreign market entry into the US medical technology sector as a major critical event. 
These events therefore structure the forthcoming cross-case analysis as this research aims to 
explore how INVs create, extend, and modify their social capital before, during, and after 
these critical events. This forthcoming cross-case analysis provides the researcher with the 
ability to analyse the temporal issues that underpin networking capability development in 
NVI.     
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8 .Cross-Case Analysis and 
Emergent Findings 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Aim 
To analyse and report the cross-case findings on how technology start-ups build 
dynamic capabilities in networking to enable their new venture internationalisation. 
Chapter Objectives 
 To achieve research objective one by reporting how INVs create, extend, and 
modify their social capital in high-technology markets. 
 To achieve research objective two by reporting why specific networking 
activities enable or inhibit new venture internationalisation in high-technology 
markets. 
 To achieve research objective three by reporting which network processes 
underpin networking capability development in new venture 
internationalisation. 
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8.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to analyse and report the cross-case findings on how technology start-ups 
build dynamic capabilities in networking to enable their NVI. This chapter therefore intends 
to achieve three objectives. Firstly, this chapter seeks to achieve research objective one by 
reporting on how INVs create, extend, and modify their social capital in high-technology 
markets. Research questions one, two, and three will therefore seek to achieve this objective. 
Secondly, this chapter seeks to achieve research objective two by reporting on why specific 
networking activities enable or inhibit NVI in high-technology markets. Research question 
four will therefore seek to address this objective. Finally, this chapter seeks to achieve 
research objective three by reporting on which network processes underpin networking 
capability development in NVI. Research question five will therefore seek to achieve this 
objective. Finally, this chapter will conclude with a summary of key findings. 
8.2 RQ1: How do INVs create social capital?  
This section reports the cross-case findings on how INVs create social capital. In accordance 
with Miles and Huberman (1994), the researcher uses a range of data displays to examine 
how INVs create social capital. It is also important to emphasise the following data displays 
are aggregates of Appendix 5, which present a more granular cross-case data analysis. To 
draw useful comparisons and contrasts between each case firm, the researcher categorises 
the INVs social capital based on forming ties with (1) investors, (2) mentors, (3) buyers, and 
(4) suppliers. Figure 6-6 presents the overall data structure of this research, which indicates 
the researcher had found across cases that INVs engage in five central networking activities 
to create social capital. Consequently, Figure 6-5 illustrates these five networking activities 
emerged as second-order themes that aggregate several first-order concepts. These second 
order themes are categorised as “bridging activities” which consist of (1) local referral 
bridging (LRB), (2) global referral bridging (GRB), (3) local search bridging (LSB), (4) 
global search bridging (GSB), and (5) global acceptance bridging (GAB). Table 8-1 presents 
representative data of each second-order theme, while Figure 8-1 summarises the cross-case 
findings on how INVs create social capital. The remaining data displays provide a cross-
case comparison on how INVs create social capital with investors, mentors, buyers, and 
suppliers, which the researcher explains in detail within the following sections. 
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Table 8-1: Representative Data supporting Second-Order "Bridging" Themes 
Second-order 
theme 
Representative Data 
Local referral 
bridging 
 
Fertility: LRB3 
We used another guy through [Adam]... another link through [Adam] on that matrix that you’ve got for all the 
networking I did. There’s a guy named [George]. He was also a mentor of ours. So, when he...When you’re on 
[UniNet] you’re supposed to select a mentor. Well, a lot of people choose mentors in their own field but I 
developed a team from all over areas, so I had everything covered. So, I chose a mentor called [George] that 
didn’t know anything about my business. He just knew about struggles of being an entrepreneur and so [Adam] 
ended up helping us make that decision [FER-I09-B5]. 
HeartBeat: LRB12 
Debbie is the coordinator for the Queensland Government. She is very nice and I regularly meet with her. The 
local government actually introduced me to her and I’m sure she would be most interested to hear about your 
project and provide assistance. Call her and let her know I sent you [HEA-CDC-A]! 
Global referral 
bridging 
 
Fertility: GRB1 
[Zhan] is so well connected in China. China does not work on English law it works on relationships, you know 
people will not go and sell you out. So if you’ve got good friendships and people you can trust that you have 
had for a couple of years, they won’t sell you out there’s a loyalty there, so we’re banking on that to help our 
company’s entry into China [FER-I08-A]. 
HeartBeat: GRB7 
[Dr Arthur] has all the connections and everything, so he and I decided to set up a new company just to do all 
this stuff with the iPhone. So he and I took fifty percent each right, and we got fifty grand from some angel 
investors, who are just friends of [Daniel’s] who I met previously. They put in the fifty grand but they actually 
gave us the money doing the classic American angels, they are just [Daniel’s] friends and made money from 
his previous companies before, they just singed cheques – let’s just figure out the structure later [HEA-I10-A]. 
Local search 
bridging 
 
FemMed: LSB4 
It was at technology fairs that we identified key subcontractors. And in actual fact, it just so happens that our 
main subcontractor are local, and we weren’t aware of them before we went to the [US] technology fair. You 
know, it is quite a complex networking activity in the UK, so consultant word of mouth and technology fairs 
were the main ones [FEM-I09-B1]. 
SafeMed: LSB6 
So we went around and seen people who we thought were the right calibre as we didn’t want one of the big 
guys, we wanted a second-tier firm who we knew could help us. So we selected them on the basis of personality 
and capability. Well number one capability – can they do the job. Number two, experience have they done it 
before. Number three, I guess personality, in other words do you think you can work with these guys are they 
good guys. Number four, fees – what is it going to cost us [SAF-I10-B].  
Global search 
bridging 
 
FemMed: GSB3 
How did we search and select this partner, good question, I think we employed a sales director in the States 
who really put an advert I think or used his contacts to see if there was any distribution companies who would 
be interested in selling [FemMed] products. So you really have got to choose someone in the know who has the 
network and that is what we did [FER-I10-C].  
SafeMed: GSB8 
But more recently is identifying, which we think we’ve kind of now done, a [foreign] manufacturer who will 
take us forward, and a series of [foreign] distributors who will take us forward. So that will be a key alliance 
for us in the future, and fundamental, really. Our FDA consultant, the guy who actually helped us get our FDA, 
and his people has helped us search for these partners [SAF-I09-A]. 
Global 
acceptance 
bridging 
 
Fertility: GAB1  
The Canadian guys [Canadian distributor] got in contact with us and I signed a contract with them about 6 
months ago, and they called us up and said look boys we’d love to sell your products and it pretty much evolved 
from there [FER-I10-A]. 
HeartBeat: GAB3 
I’ve been in the wireless health telemedicine space for 20 years. We really see ourselves as innovators in the 
space and I think that’s demonstrated in that most of our customers at the moment are really the research groups 
around the world. We have about 150 research groups as customers, in I think, over 30 countries now, and they 
all get in touch with us when they are looking to buy product [HEA-I09-A]. 
Source: The Author 
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Figure 8-1: Network Creation Activities: Summary of Findings 
 
Source: The Author
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8.2.1 The Creation of Investor Social Capital 
Table 8-2 reports on how INVs create investor social capital. Firstly, the cross-case analysis 
shows that three (Fertility, HeartBeat, FemMed) of the four INVs initial networking 
activities focussed on forming ties with individual or organisational investors. For example, 
Table 8-2 specifies that Fertility attempted to form multiple ties with investors – specifically 
eight investment ties – that consisted of local individual angel investors along with 
commercial organisations such as the UK banks, a local BAS, and a large Canadian VC 
syndicate. HeartBeat’s networking behaviour was also similar due to their attempts to form 
investment ties with both an Indian and US VC syndicate, along with a group of individual 
US angel investors. By contrast, FemMed’s networking with investors was less intensive 
and more focussed as they made the early decision to form ties with Harmony – a local BAS 
– rather than pursuing multiple forms of VC and angel funding. Finally, the cross-case 
findings show that SafeMed differs from the above case firms, as they believed raising 
venture capital was a “waste of time” and decided to pursue an IPO.  
Of all four INVs, SafeMed were the only the INV to pursue an IPO on the ASX in 
comparison to Fertility and HeartBeat who were both explicit they had no interest in 
pursuing an IPO. For example, HeartBeat’s founder tells a story that he had previous 
experience of floating a medical technology start-up on the ASX called SmartHeart, but due 
to the loss of company control, he decided to “avoid” the IPO route. Relatedly, Fertility in 
their initial interview specified they had “no interest in going IPO” as they wanted to “keep 
company control” and over next 15 years become “one of the leading medical device 
companies in the world.” Additionally, FemMed in their first interview discussed an IPO as 
“potential strategic exit” but emphasised the initial importance of forming ties with the BAS 
to grow the firm. FemMed’s entrepreneur then specified they would consider an IPO on 
London’s Alternative Investment Market (AIM), but would only consider that as an option 
for gaining a strategic exit for the founding team.  
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Table 8-2: The Creation of Investor Social Capital 
Tie Tie 
Type^ 
Source of tie 
creation 
Tie 
originˇ 
Initial access to information or resources Future 
referrals 
Network 
creation 
activity† 
Fertility 
Dr Shi 
 
Referral Local Co-founded venture and discovered 
technological opportunity 
Yes LRB 
Canadian VC 
  
 Referral Global None No GRB 
UK banks 
 
 Search Local Banks were unable to provide finance No LRB 
Oxford angels 
 
Search Local Oxford angel investors only invest in local 
start-ups 
No LSB 
BAS  Referral Local BAS provided entrepreneur with early seed 
capital 
No LRB 
Canadian 
distributor 
 Approached Global Canadian distributor agreed to fund 
Canadian regulatory approval 
No GAB 
HeartBeat 
Indian VC  
 
Approach Global None No GAB 
US VC 
 
 Referral Global None No GRB 
US angels 
 
Referral Global US angels provided entrepreneur with seed 
funding, emotional support, and access to 
US networks 
Yes GRB 
HK 
manufacturer 
 Referral Global Hong Kong manufacturer funded the firms 
initial production of a prototype 
Yes GRB 
FemMed 
BAS  Search Local BAS invested seed capital and provided the 
firm with emotional and business support 
Yes LSB 
SafeMed 
Shareholders ◊ Search Global An IPO led to an initial investment of AUS$3 million 
No GSB 
      ^ Following Fernhaber and Li (2013), the author considers three types of ties. Thus, “ ” represents an inter-personal tie, “●” 
represents an inter-firm organisational, while “◊” represents multiple ties which form a network. 
      ˇ The author examines tie origin on whether the connection formed locally or globally. Following Tippmann et al. (2012) the 
author uses the term “global” loosely  to avoid complexity by incorporating various levels of international scope. 
      † Figure 8-1 illustrates the following network creation activities emerged as second-order themes via data analysis. Thus, 
“LRB” refers to local referral bridging, “GRB” refers to global referral bridging, “LSB” refers to local search bridging, “GSB” 
refers to global search bridging, “LAB” refers to local acceptance bridging, while “GAB” refers to global acceptance bridging.  
 
Source: The Author 
Table 8-2 and Appendix 5A also show that each INV drew on various “structural sources” 
to create social capital with investors. Table 8-2 indicates the INVs either relied on (1) 
referrals; decided to (2) search for new contacts; or actors (3) approached the firm with a 
collaboration interest. Moreover, these “bridging activities” either occurred at a local or 
global level. For example, Appendix 4 indicates that Fertility’s entrepreneur relied on Adam 
at UniNet – a local government sponsored university support network – to refer his firm to 
a local BAS. By contrast, HeartBeat used referrals as a mechanism to create social capital 
but within a global context. For example, HeartBeat’s entrepreneur drew on his inter-
personal links (i.e. his friendship) with a US cardiologist to form ties with a US VC syndicate 
then subsequently formed ties with a US group of angel investors. For example, quotation 
GRB7 within Table 8-1, illustrates this GRB activity as HeartBeat’s entrepreneur tells a story 
that:  
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American angels, they are just [Daniel’s] friends and made money from his previous companies 
before, they just signed cheques – let’s just figure out the structure later. HeartBeat [HEA-I10-
A].  
Fertility also show some signs of GRB as Adam at UniNet referred the firm to a Canadian 
VC syndicate. Table 8-2 also indicates that three (Fertility, FemMed and SafeMed) of the 
four firms searched for potential investors within new or existing networks. For instance, 
both FemMed and SafeMed searched for investors within new networks. In FemMed’s case, 
the firm searched for a BAS locally and selected Harmony as their core investor as the 
entrepreneur believed: “We looked at VC’s and we looked at Angels [BAS], and we felt that 
we would have more control over the business and there was more support from an angel 
company than a VC [FEM-I11-B3].” Similarly, Fertility searched within a local mentors 
existing network and identified angel investors in Oxford, England as potential investors. 
However, this networking activity was unsuccessful as the entrepreneur discovered the 
angels “only invest in local start-ups.” By contrast, the only evidence where INVs used GSB 
to create investor social capital was in the case of SafeMed, who decided to use an IPO as a 
platform to search for global investors, which initially raised AUS$3 million of start-up 
capital.  
Table 8-2 also specifies that HeartBeat where the only INV who were directly approached 
by an investor who expressed an interest to invest in the company. In this example, an Indian 
VC syndicate learned of Fertility’s unique technology due to their nomination for the 
prestigious Wall Street Journal Asia Innovation Award, which triggered a stream of early 
investor interest. The entrepreneur then tells a story that he was very “reluctant” to accept 
VC offers, but due to the emergent GFC, he accepted the VC’s initial offer to start 
negotiations. This networking activity shows signs of GAB, as the INV’s involvement in 
global R&D networks and ownership of a unique technology were sources that encouraged 
potential investors to collaborate with the firm.  
Finally, Table 8-2 indicates that most INVs were unable to use their initial investor social 
capital for the purposes of future bridging activities. Fertility, for example, failed to form 
long-standing ties with most investors, which indicates any initial social capital did not help 
with forming future connections. This is also apparent in HeartBeat who were unable to form 
long-term ties with the Indian and American VC, which left no future bridging opportunities. 
Interestingly, SafeMed’s decision to form ties with shareholders provided no future bridging 
opportunities. However, HeartBeat and FemMed’s decision to create social capital with 
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angel investors did pay dividends as both firms benefited from their angels referring them to 
new local and global contacts. Overall, these findings show that these INVs did engage in 
multiple “bridging” activities to create investor social capital.  
8.2.2 The Creation of Mentor Social Capital 
Table 8-3 reports on how INVs create mentor social capital. Firstly, the cross-case analysis 
shows that all firms formed ties with mentors at some stage in their international 
development. Interestingly, both Fertility and HeartBeat discuss the importance of forming 
ties with mentors at early start-up, while FemMed and SafeMed discuss tie formation with 
mentors later on in their international development. For example, Table 8-3 specifies that 
Fertility formed four mentor ties that consisted of local entrepreneurs who were 
predominately involved in the life sciences industry. Whereas, HeartBeat’s networking with 
mentors differed as it primarily involved American ties that were both inter-personal (i.e. a 
US cardiologist) and inter-organisational (i.e. universities). For example, these ties 
approached the entrepreneur as they had similar R&D interests within the telemedicine 
industry. Similarly, FemMed also formed ties with a Californian surgeon who approached 
the firm and acted as a mentor and key opinion leader (KOL) when the new venture expanded 
its involvement in the US medical technology market. SafeMed also formed ties with an 
American FDA consultant to help with regulatory approval, who as the relationship 
developed mentored the firm on their entry into the US market.  
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Table 8-3: The Creation of Mentor Social Capital 
Tie Tie 
type^ 
Source of tie 
creation 
Tie 
originˇ 
Initial access to information or resources Future 
referrals 
Network 
creation 
activity† 
Fertility 
Sean 
 
Referral Local Sean introduced entrepreneur to many 
contacts 
Yes LRB 
Adam at 
UniNet 
 
Referral Local Adam provided the entrepreneur with 
seed capital and business support 
Yes LRB 
George 
 
Referral Local Local angel investor also provided 
entrepreneur with emotional and 
business support 
No LRB 
Harry 
 
Referral Local Local mentor provided entrepreneur with 
access to global networks, emotional and 
business support 
Yes LRB 
Angus 
 
Referral Local Local mentor is the VP of MNE 
subsidiary who provided emotional and 
business support 
Yes LRB 
HeartBeat 
US 
cardiologist 
 
Approached Global US cardiologist built instant friendship 
with entrepreneur providing emotional 
support 
Yes GAB 
US hospital  Referral Global US hospital was the coordinator of a 
R&D project the entrepreneur became 
involved in. 
Yes GRB 
Debbie 
 
Referral Local Debbie a local government advisor 
provided the entrepreneur with access to 
government grants 
Yes LRB 
Universities ◊ Approached Global Universities around the world supported the entrepreneur with R&D and were the 
firm’s major customer 
Yes GAB 
US corporate 
lawyer 
 
Referral Global US corporate lawyer provided legal 
advice on contractual negotiations in the 
US and Hong Kong 
Yes GRB 
FemMed 
Californian 
surgeon 
 
Approached Global Californian surgeon provided access to 
US hospitals and became a key opinion 
leader for their product 
Yes GAB 
M&A 
specialist 
 Search Global M&A specialist provided advice on 
acquisitions and secured a buyer. 
No GSB 
SafeMed 
FDA 
consultant 
 
Search Global FDA consultant provided business 
support on FDA approval 
Yes GSB 
      ^ Following Fernhaber and Li (2013), the author considers three types of ties. Thus, “ ” represents an inter-personal tie, 
“●” represents an inter-organisational tie, while “◊” represents multiple ties which form a network. 
      ˇ The author examines tie origin on whether the connection formed locally or globally. Following Tippmann et al. (2012) 
the author uses the term “global” loosely  to avoid complexity by incorporating various levels of international scope. 
      † Figure 8-1 illustrates the following network creation activities emerged as second-order themes via data analysis. Thus, 
“LRB” refers to local referral bridging, “GRB” refers to global referral bridging, “LSB” refers to local search bridging, 
“GSB” refers to global search bridging, “LAB” refers to local acceptance bridging, while “GAB” refers to global acceptance 
bridging. 
 
Source: The Author 
Table 8-3 and Appendix 5 also show that each INV drew on various “structural sources” to 
create social capital with mentors. Table 8-3 indicates that the INVs predominately relied on 
(1) referrals and (2) search to create social capital with new mentors. However, on separate 
occasions in both HeartBeat and FemMed a US mentor approached each firm as they held a 
personal medical interest in the firm’s medical technology. Indeed, Figures 7-2 and 7-3 
within the Fertility case provide clear evidence the entrepreneur relied on LRB to form ties 
with mentors. For example, quotation LRB3 within Table 8-1 provides evidence of LRB as 
the entrepreneur tells a story whilst on Adam’s UniNet programme: 
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So I chose a mentor called [George] that didn’t know anything about my business. He just knew 
the struggles of being an entrepreneur and so [Adam] ended up helping us make that decision 
[FER-I09-B5].  
HeartBeat also used LRB to form ties with Debbie a local government advisor who helped 
the entrepreneur gain access to government grants. However, the majority of HeartBeat’s 
networking with mentors was international in scope. For example, HeartBeat’s entrepreneur 
used his friendship with Dr Arthur a US cardiologist to form ties with a US hospital to 
conduct R&D within telemedicine. Moreover, HeartBeat also used their social capital with 
this US cardiologist to source a US corporate lawyer who provided legal guidance on 
internationalisation in North American and Asian markets.      
Table 8-3 also indicates that on only two occasions INVs searched for mentors within new 
or existing networks. For instance, both FemMed and SafeMed searched for mentors within 
new foreign networks. In FemMed’s case, the firm used GSB to locate an M&A specialist 
who had the acquisition capabilities to identify and secure a suitable strategic buyer who 
could acquire the firm. Interestingly, section 8.2.3 reports that FemMed originally used GSB 
to locate a strategic buyer, but after unsuccessful due diligence they soon realised they did 
not have the sufficient capabilities to negotiate a trade-sale. Therefore, the entrepreneur tells 
a story that they had learned from this experience and decided to search for a US M&A 
specialist who could support them through the acquisition process. Similarly, SafeMed also 
used GSB to form ties with a US FDA consultant, and the creation of this new social capital 
initially supported their entry into the US market.   
Finally, Table 8-3 indicates that all of the INVs were able to use the majority of their initial 
mentor social capital for the purposes of future bridging activities. For example, Fertility 
relied on Harry and Angus – who are influential life science entrepreneurs – endorsements 
and referrals to help create new social capital with local and global customers. Moreover, 
HeartBeat’s entrepreneur also relied on his friendship with the US cardiologist to connect 
with American hospitals, mentors, customers, and suppliers. These networking activities 
were also apparent in FemMed, as after they formed a tie with a Californian surgeon, he 
became a KOL who promoted the efficacy of their products at US trade fairs and within US 
hospitals. Lastly, SafeMed also used their global connection with their FDA consultant to 
create new social capital with American suppliers (e.g. manufacturers) and distributors who 
shown an initial interest in forming strategic alliances with the firm. These findings then 
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indicate that INVs engage in multiple networking activities both locally and globally in order 
to create mentor social capital.  
8.2.3 The Creation of Buyer Social Capital 
Table 8-4 reports on how INVs create buyer social capital. The cross-case findings show 
that all firms attempted to form ties with potential buyers (i.e. customers) which consisted 
of sales agents, foreign distributors, foreign licensors, and strategic buyers (i.e. acquirers). 
The researcher also found that all of the INVs engage in a diverse range of networking 
activities to create buyer social capital, where most of which was global in scope. For 
instance, Table 8-4 reports that Fertility attempted to create buyer social capital with one 
Chinese, one Canadian, and two European MNEs. Relatedly, HeartBeat’s founder indicates 
that his firm had created social capital with “150 research groups as customers, in, I think 
over 30 countries now [HEA-I09-A]”, while forming a customer tie with a Hong Kong 
MNE. By contrast, Table 8-4 indicates that FemMed and SafeMed’s buyer social capital was 
more international in scope, since both INVs were specifically involved in US medical 
technology markets. That is, FemMed attempted to create initial social capital with a 
strategic buyer who was a US MNE, then subsequently with a US MNE who agreed to 
distribute their products. Finally, SafeMed also attempted to create social capital with US 
customers as they formed initial ties with a US MNE in an attempt to encourage them to sign 
a foreign license agreement, and subsequently with a medium-sized US distributor.     
Table 8-4 and Appendix 5A indicate that each INV drew on a combination of “structural 
sources” such as referrals, search, and being approached to create buyer social capital. To 
begin with, Table 8-4 specifies that all firms used GRB to create buyer social capital. For 
example, this cross-case analysis along with Appendix 4 provides clear evidence that 
Fertility were the most intensive in using GRB to form MNE ties with a Chinese distributor 
along with a European licensor and distributor. Quotation GRB1 within Table 8-1 is one 
notable piece of evidence of GRB as Fertility’s entrepreneur tells a story of how he has used 
his Chinese co-founders ethnic network to create social capital with a Chinese MNE. The 
entrepreneur explains:  
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[Zhan] is so well connected in China. China does not work on English law it works on 
relationships, you know people will not go and sell you out. So if you’ve got good friendships 
and people you can trust that you have had for a couple of years, they won’t sell you out and 
there is a loyalty there, so we’re banking on that to help our company’s entry into China [FER-
I08-A].   
In addition to this, Table 8-4 illustrates that SafeMed also shown clear evidence of using 
GRB as they leveraged their FDA consultant’s existing industrial network to create initial 
social capital with a foreign distributor in North Carolina, U.S.A. Interestingly, both 
HeartBeat and FemMed used this activity, but did so, somewhat indirectly. For example, the 
researcher found that HeartBeat used GRB to create social capital with a Hong Kong 
manufacturer (i.e. a supplier) but as the relation began to evolve, this supplier subsequently 
became the firm’s core customer. Moreover, Table 8-4 also specifies that FemMed initially 
used GSB to identify US customers, but after some unsuccessful attempts at building buyer 
social capital, the firm moved towards using GRB as an activity to create social capital with 
US buyers. This is apparent as FemMed relied on their local BAS’s (e.g. Harmony) contacts 
in the US to identify and collaborate with US sales agents while using an M&A specialist 
(e.g. TechSale) to refer them to a suitable strategic buyer. 
Table 8-4 also indicates that two (FemMed and SafeMed) of the four INVs also engaged in 
GSB to create buyer social capital. Cross-findings show that these networking activities 
seem to occur early on within NVI. That is, FemMed initially used GSB to source a strategic 
buyer (e.g. MediBuy) and US distributor (e.g. MedSale) as they did not have the initial US 
industrial networks in place. Quotation GSB3 within Table 8-1 is one notable example of 
GSB as the entrepreneur of FemMed describes the process of how they identified their first 
US customer. The entrepreneur explains: 
How did we search and select this partner, good question, I think we employed a sales director 
in the States who really put an advert I think or used his contacts to see if there was any 
distribution companies who would be interested in selling [FemMed] products. So you really 
have got to choose someone in the know who has the network and that is what we did [FER-I10-
C]. 
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Table 8-4: The Creation of Buyer Social Capital 
Inter- 
organisational tie 
Source of tie 
creation 
Tie originˇ Initial access to information or 
resources 
Future 
referrals 
Network 
creation 
activity† 
Fertility 
Chinese 
distributor 
Referral Global Chinese distributor provided the 
entrepreneur with foreign market 
knowledge 
No GRB 
EU licensor Referral Global None No GRB 
UK sales agents Referral Local UK sales agents provided access to an 
initial UK sales channel 
No LRB 
EU distributor Referral Global None No GRB 
Canadian 
distributor 
Approached Global Canadian distributor funded the firm’s 
regulatory approval and provided access 
to a Canadian sales channel 
Yes GAB 
HeartBeat 
Universities Approached  Global Universities around the world supported 
the entrepreneur with R&D and were 
the firm’s major customer 
Yes GAB 
HK 
manufacturer 
Referral Global Hong Kong manufacturer funded the 
firms initial production of a prototype 
Yes GRB 
FemMed 
Strategic Buyer 
(1) 
Search Global None No GSB 
US distributor Search Global None No GSB 
US sales agents Referral Global Hired US sales agents to sell product 
and access to local market knowledge 
Yes GRB 
Strategic Buyer 
(2) 
Referral Global The strategic buyer entered into 
discussion with the firm about a 
potential strategic exit 
No GRB 
SafeMed 
US licensor Search Global None No GSB 
US distributor Referral Global None No GRB 
      ˇ The author examines tie origin on whether the connection formed locally or globally. Following Tippmann et al. (2012) 
the author uses the term “global” loosely  to avoid complexity by incorporating various levels of international scope. 
      † Figure 8-1 illustrates the following network creation activities emerged as second-order themes via data analysis. Thus, 
“LRB” refers to local referral bridging, “GRB” refers to global referral bridging, “LSB” refers to local search bridging, “GSB” 
refers to global search bridging, “LAB” refers to local acceptance bridging, while “GAB” refers to global acceptance bridging. 
Source: The Author 
These data indicate that Fertility hired a US sales director in order to search his local network 
to identify a suitable foreign customer. Another example of GSB is apparent in SafeMed, 
who described in the interviews that they concentrated their search on large US based 
medical technology MNEs. The entrepreneur tells story that he individually “cold called” 
each of the US medical technology MNEs about the prospect of a potential licensing 
agreement. This search process then resulted in the firm forming initial ties with one US 
MNE who owned a subsidiary in Sydney, Australia. However, these initial negotiations were 
unsuccessful.  
GAB was also found to be an important “bridging” activity within two (Fertility and 
HeartBeat) of the four INVs. In both these cases, potential customers approached these firms 
as they had a specific interest in their unique technology. For example, at international start-
up, HeartBeat’s early involvement in a US led R&D consortium led to multiple universities 
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wanting to purchase their research-based products. Additionally, at the international 
expansion, a large Canadian distributor approached Fertility who asked and agreed to sell 
the INV’s products.        
Finally, Table 8-4 indicates most INVs were unable to use their initial buyer social capital 
for the purposes of future bridging activities. Fertility, for example, were unable to use their 
initial buyer social capital with Chinese and European MNEs to make future connections. 
This is also apparent in FemMed who were unable to form long-term ties with their US 
distributor, which meant there was no possibility for future bridging activities. This situation 
also occurred in SafeMed, as the firm were unable to form ties with a US licensor and 
distributor, which meant there was no prospect of future tie referrals. Interestingly, 
HeartBeat were the only INV to show clear evidence of bridging their customers’ networks. 
For example, HeartBeat were able to encourage their customers to refer them to new 
customers, which helped create new buyer social capital. Overall, these findings show that 
these INVs engaged in multiple and simultaneous “bridging” activities to create buyer social 
capital.  
8.2.4 The Creation of Supplier Social Capital 
Table 8-5 reports on how INVs create supplier social capital. Firstly, the cross-case analysis 
specify that all four of the INVs initial networking activities sought to create supplier social 
capital. In most cases, these supplier ties were subcontractor manufacturers, but the cross-
case analysis does provide evidence of forming ties with R&D partners, who in many 
respects contribute to the supply of “knowledge” within the overall commercialisation 
process. The researcher also found that three of the four INVs used multiple networking 
activities to create supplier social capital, which unfolded both locally and globally. This is 
apparent from Table 8-5, which reports that all of the INVs initially formed ties with 
subcontractor manufacturers. For example, Fertility initially formed ties with an English 
manufacturer who had the production capabilities to produce product quickly in an attempt 
to generate early sales revenues. Similarly, HeartBeat had also initially formed ties with a 
local manufacturer, as the entrepreneur had known the owner-manager from previous 
business ventures. However, as HeartBeat began to expand, they subsequently had to locate 
an international manufacturer (e.g. EliteTech) who had the manufacturing capabilities to 
produce Heartbeat’s product on a global scale.   
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By contrast, Table 8-5 shows that FemMed and SafeMed’s initial ties with suppliers where 
more international in scope. That is, FemMed created social capital with a French 
manufacturer who had the specialist manufacturing capabilities to produce the INV’s 
medical device. Nevertheless, as section 8.4.2 explains in more depth, FemMed encountered 
quality and timing problems with the French manufacturer. This then encouraged FemMed 
to create new social capital with a Scottish manufacturer who had superior quality control 
procedures than the previous manufacturer. Interestingly, Appendix 4 illustrates that 
SafeMed engaged in a higher intensity of social capital creation with suppliers as they 
attempted to form multiple ties with R&D consultants, a local university, along with two 
medium sized US manufacturers. One interpretation of this high networking intensity was 
that the majority of SafeMed’s TMT had industry backgrounds in both finance and real 
estate, which meant they had to subcontract the majority of their R&D and production 
activities. 
Table 8-5: The Creation of Supplier Social Capital 
Inter-
organisational tie 
Source of 
tie 
creation 
Origin of 
connectionˇ 
Initial access to information or resources Future 
referrals 
Network 
creation 
activity† 
Fertility 
English 
manufacturer 
Referral Local English manufacturer had the capability to 
quickly produce product 
No LRB 
HeartBeat 
Local 
manufacturer 
Search Local Local manufacturer supported the 
entrepreneur with initial production of his 
firm’s medical device 
No LSB 
HK manufacturer Referral Global Hong Kong manufacturer funded the firms 
initial production of a prototype 
Yes GRB 
FemMed 
French 
Manufacturer 
Search Global French manufacturer had specialist 
capabilities to produce the firm’s medical 
device 
No GSB 
Scottish 
manufacturer 
Search Local Scottish manufacturer provided superior 
quality control than existing suppliers 
No LSB 
SafeMed 
R&D consultants Search Global None No GSB 
Local university Search Local Local university conducted FDA approved 
clinical trials 
No LSB 
NC manufacturer Referral Global North Carolina manufacturer initially 
agreed to produce firm’s product, but 
quickly ceased relationship 
No GRB 
NY manufacturer Referral Global None No GRB 
      ˇ The author examines tie origin on whether the connection formed locally or globally. Following Tippmann et al (2012) 
the author uses the term “global” loosely  to avoid complexity by incorporating various levels of international scope. 
      † Figure 8-1 illustrates the following network creation activities emerged as second-order themes via data analysis. Thus, 
“LRB” refers to local referral bridging, “GRB” refers to global referral bridging, “LSB” refers to local search bridging, “GSB” 
refers to global search bridging, “LAB” refers to local acceptance bridging, while “GAB” refers to global acceptance bridging. 
Source: The Author 
Table 8-5 and Appendix 5A indicate that three of the four INVs also drew on a combination 
of referral and search practices at the local and global level in order to create supplier social 
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capital. Table 8-5 illuminates that Fertility were limited in their networking when forming 
supplier ties, as they were the only INV to use LRB to create supplier social capital. In this 
event, Fertility’s mentor Angus referred the firm to an English manufacturer who initially 
produced the firm’s product. However, in most circumstances, referral activities were global, 
as this was evident in HeartBeat and SafeMed who both relied on key contacts to introduce 
them to suitable strategic partners. For example, HeartBeat’s entrepreneur used his 
friendship with a US cardiologist to link-in with a Hong Kong manufacturer who had 
significant production and distribution capabilities. Additionally, SafeMed also relied on 
their FDA consultant to introduce them to a North Carolina and New York manufacturer. 
Table 8-5 also indicates that three (HeartBeat, FemMed, SafeMed) of the four INVs engaged 
in both LSB and GSB. For example, HeartBeat’s entrepreneur describes that he initially 
searched for a local manufacturer, as he wanted to collaborate with a subcontractor that “he 
could trust and not have to manage” who was locally accessible during the 
commercialisation phase. FemMed’s reasoning to form a subsequent strategic alliance with 
a Scottish manufacturer is also similar, as after collaboration problems with their French 
manufacturer (see section 8.4) they discovered the benefits of local collaboration. However, 
quotation LSB4 within Table 8-1 provides evidence of the challenges in using LSB to create 
social capital with suitable suppliers. FemMed’s entrepreneur tells a story that they 
commenced their supplier search in the UK, but once they continued their “local search” in 
the US having established a sales subsidiary, they ironically found a Scottish manufacturer: 
It was at technology fairs that we identified key subcontractors. And in actual fact, it just so 
happens that our main subcontractor are local, and we weren’t aware of them before we went to 
the [US] technology fair. You know, it is quite a complex networking activity in the UK, so 
consultant word of mouth and technology fairs were the main ones [FEM-I09-B1]. 
SafeMed also shown evidence of LSB as they searched for a local university in Queensland, 
Australia who had the capabilities to conduct FDA approved clinical trials. Nonetheless, 
Table 8-5 specifies that both FemMed and SafeMed also engaged in GSB to create supplier 
social capital. For example, it is evident that FemMed used GSB to form initial ties with a 
French manufacturer, prior to forming ties with the above local Scottish manufacturer. The 
above display also indicates that SafeMed used GSB to source R&D consultants in both 
China and the USA, which sections 8.4 and 8.5 describe as major inhibitor in the INVs long-
term development. Finally, Table 8-5 indicates none of the INVs used GAB as mechanism 
to create supplier social capital, while only one supplier – HeartBeat’s Hong Kong 
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manufacturer – were able to use this social capital to source future connections. Overall, 
these findings show that most INVs engaged in local and global bridging activities to create 
supplier social capital. 
8.3 RQ2: How do INVs extend their existing social capital?  
This section reports the cross-case findings on how INVs extend their existing social capital. 
In accordance with Miles and Huberman (1994) and Saldaña (2003), the researcher uses 
longitudinal data displays to examine how INVs extend their existing social capital. It is 
important to emphasise the following data displays are aggregates of Appendix 6, which 
present a more granular cross-case data analysis on the various sources that extend INV 
social capital. Figure 6-5 illustrates that three second-order “bonding” themes emerged 
during this cross-case analysis, which aggregate several first-order concepts. These second-
order themes consist of (1) dependency bonding (DB), (2) impassive bonding (IBG), and (3) 
affinity bonding (AB). Interestingly, this research found that “bonding” is more than just a 
general trust building process. That is, this research found evidence there are different types 
of “bonding” due to the nature and quality of the relationship. Table 8-6 thus presents 
representative data of each of these second-order themes. Figure 8-2 also summarises the 
cross-case findings on how INVs extend their existing social capital. Therefore, this section 
will discuss each of these networking activities with respect to the extension of investor, 
mentor, buyer, and supplier social capital. 
8.3.1 The Extension of Investor and Mentor Social Capital 
Table 8-7 reports on how INVs extend their investor and mentor social capital. To begin 
with, Figure 8-2 illuminates an important finding that the INVs initial bonding activities 
predominately focussed on building relations with investors and mentors. Table 8-7 also 
provides evidence that all of the INVs attempted to extend their investment in exiting stocks 
of social capital with at least one investor and one mentor and in some situations the intensity 
and frequency of their networking was much greater than this. For example, after Fertility 
attempted to create social capital with eight investors, they were only able to extend 
investment with two potential investors. Whereas, the other INVs networking activities was 
less diverse, but in some cases more intensive, as the firms invested more resource in terms 
of time, money and energy into building individual inter-organisational network 
relationships.  
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Table 8-6: Representative Data supporting Second-Order "Bonding" Themes 
Second-order 
theme 
Representative data 
Dependency 
bonding 
 
Fertility: DB3 
Since [Zhan] left, I would say the relationship [Chinese distributor] has definitely got better. As you know we 
are continuing to make trips, they made a trip out to Germany to meet us, so we are definitely trying to grow 
this relationship, and I have sought validation of them constantly. So when I talk about us being valid, I try to 
validate them. When I met the Chinese ambassador, I endorse them. I guess they are taking reference – they are 
the references [FER-I11-A]. 
 HeartBeat: DB4 
This [due diligence] went on for about six months, and the financial crisis just started to impact. It wasted a lot 
of our resources as they went into negotiation and agreements. So that cost us a lot of money in terms of having 
to pay lawyers and accountants. Then their share price collapsed on the Indian stock market, so at the last minute 
they withdrew from the deal, which left us in a very difficult situation, in that we’d been trying to close on this 
deal, and hadn’t been able to focus on our other business [HEA-I09-C]. 
 FemMed:DB5 
We had a lot of interest from a big multinational and what big companies do is they require a certain amount of 
due diligence to determine whether or not the company is something they want to acquire. The amount of 
resource that is diverted into that instead of the day-to-day running was absolutely immense and to get nothing 
at the end of it, I think they probably delayed us a good 3 or 4 months while we devoted resource to getting 
them their due diligence [C-PRB-05].  
 SafeMed: DB8 
I met them at the end of the trip [after the unsuccessful license deal] and that was kind off the beginning of the 
relationship. He said forget [MedUSA], forget the big guys, they are never going to get it out in the marketplace 
for you, stick with me because I have a team of independent sales guys that can actually make this happen for 
you, because the big guys are not going to help you. So I came back from that trip thinking he is probably on 
the right track and we developed it from there [SAF-I10-B] 
Impassive 
bonding 
 
Fertility: IB1 
[Zhan]… he likes to go to work at 9:00 and get done at 5:00 and that’s it. He is an academic scientist and so 
getting him to spread himself…he won’t do it, and then he’s like, oh, I’m going to take a four-week vacation 
in July [2009] and I’m thinking...[FER-I09-B] 
 FemMed: IB3 
The other thing that delayed us quite a lot was distributors. We had a distributor in the US, we tried to go down 
that route and it just simply didn’t work out because the problem with distributors is if they don’t want to sell 
your product they won’t sell it and we lost a good 6 to 8 months on this. The distributor was very keen on our 
product, we signed a deal and shipped products to them, and just absolutely nothing came of it. Either they 
didn’t want to sell it, or they didn’t have the expertise or they were promoting their own product so that was a 
big lesson learned [FEM-I08-B]. 
 SafeMed: IB8 
We basically had our own views about this guy [North Carolina manufacturer], he never gave us any ideas 
about how he was going to make it, he had no credibility really, he made all his previous stuff in China, this 
was the first time he was going to make it in America. We then kept asking how are you going to make it, show 
us some specs, show us how you are going to do it. So we were quite happy, probably by November [2009], 
that listen it ain’t going to happen with the [North Carolina] manufacturer [SAF-I10-B]. 
Affinity 
bonding 
 
Fertility: AB1 
Guys like that give you support every week. You can talk to them and they’re just happy to hear from you and 
it’s that encouragement that, you know, and you can bounce things off. So, it’s having that involvement. I’d 
say he’s definitely one [FER-I09-B]  
 HeartBeat: AB4 
We had a personal friendship and he [Dr Arthur] and I had a meeting of the minds on doing this iPhone sort of 
stuff, but we never had the resources to do this all. So he said I will go and get them. So he built a prototype 
and then we went and got some money to fund what we needed and the small things we needed to do. So he is 
a friend and one I can trust, he does the right thing by me, so that is how it worked out [HEA-I10-B2]. 
 FemMed: AB8 
So many times over the last 8-9 years any of us could bailed out, because sales weren’t picking up, […] but it 
took an investment and a decision in 2007 to go for it in the States to achieve what we were looking for. So 
there was commitment on both sides to making [FemMed] a success. 
Source: The Author 
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Figure 8-2: Network Extension Activities: Summary of Findings 
 
Source: The Author 
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FemMed is one notable example as section 8.2.1 describes that the firm decided to build 
relations with one investor (i.e. Harmony a local BAS) despite having the early choice of 
forming multiple investor ties. The choice to extend social capital with only one investor 
was also apparent in HeartBeat and SafeMed, as the former extended their social capital with 
an Indian VC syndicate, while the latter attempted to extend their social capital with a 
network of shareholders. Interestingly, Table 8-7 and Appendix 6 also show that each INV 
drew on various “relational sources” to extend their investor social capital. In line with 
Maurer and Ebers (2006), Table 8-7 analyses these relational sources through the (1) 
“resource intensity” required to build each network relationship; the (2) “frequency” by 
which the INVs interacted with each tie; and the initial (3) “source of trust” on which each 
relationship developed. Table 8-7 also specifies that over time, bonding activities with 
investors led to either an overall increase or decrease in the value of this social capital, which 
section 8.5 elaborates on.  
Interestingly, Table 8-7 provides evidence that the INVs used different types of bonding to 
extend their investor social capital. For example, during the GFC of 2008-2009, there is 
evidence that Fertility and HeartBeat both engaged in DB to secure venture capital. In 
Fertility’s case, after using GRB to create investor social capital with a Canadian VC 
syndicate, the entrepreneur agreed to engage in the VC’s due diligence process. During this 
time, Fertility’s entrepreneur describes that the firm allocated all of its time and resource to 
the due diligence process. Moreover, the entrepreneur describes they interacted on a weekly 
to daily basis with the VC lawyers in an attempt to satisfy their due diligence procedures, 
which ultimately was unsuccessful. Consequently, this activity indicates since resource 
intensity and interaction frequency were both high, a likely interpretation is that dependency 
was the underlying source of trust as the firm attempted to extend this social capital.  
Similarly, once HeartBeat used GAB to create social capital with an Indian VC syndicate, 
the entrepreneur engaged in their due diligence process. During this event, the entrepreneur 
describes that this due diligence was a resource intensive and interactive process, which 
lasted for six months, but subsequently was unsuccessful. Quotation DB4 within Table 8-6, 
illustrates the nature of this DB when HeartBeat’s entrepreneur describes his experience in 
attempting to collaborate with the Indian VC:  
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This [due diligence] went on for about six months, and the financial crisis just started to impact. 
It wasted a lot of our resources as they went into negotiation and agreements. So that cost us a 
lot of money in terms of having to pay lawyers and accountants. Then their share price collapsed 
on the Indian stock market, so at the last minute they withdrew from the deal, which left us in a 
very difficult situation, in that we’d been trying to close on this deal, and hadn’t been able to 
focus on our other business [HEA-I09-C]. 
A likely interpretation of this analysis is that DB led to a decrease in this investor social 
capital. Consequently, section 8.5 examines these practices in more depth with respect to the 
influence of DB on NVI. However, Table 8-7 also provides evidence that both SafeMed and 
Fertility engaged in IBG with their existing investors. For example, following SafeMed’s 
IPO, they had entered into a complex shareholder network, but had raised less financial 
capital than what they initially anticipated. Consequently, there is strong evidence from the 
narratives, that over time, the firm became increasingly “impassive” with their shareholders. 
That is, SafeMed’s entrepreneur describes that it cost the firm $500,000 per annum to list on 
the ASX, but since they did not generate revenue, this increasingly became a significant cost 
to the firm. Additional primary and secondary data also indicates that SafeMed attempted to 
raise three “shareholder purchase plans” over a two-year period but these attempts were 
unsuccessful. When the researcher asked the entrepreneur, why these attempts were 
unsuccessful, he explained that they had scant resource to personally interact or convince 
shareholders of their growth potential. It would appear a likely interpretation of this gradual 
decrease in social capital, was the firm were becoming increasingly “impassive” in bonding 
with their shareholders.  
Indeed, this IBG was also apparent in Fertility’s relation with their local BAS. To begin with, 
Fertility’s entrepreneur describes they used LRB to create social capital with a BAS, but 
when they encountered the financial crisis, they became dependent on their new cash 
injections into business. However, despite allocating a large amount of resource in terms of 
equity share to extend this social capital, the entrepreneur describes they “rarely” interacted 
with the BAS. Incidentally, in the later interviews, the entrepreneur did not discuss the BAS 
involvement, and when probed, mentioned that he had “other priorities” such as building 
relationships with foreign customers. There are potential conflicting interpretations here, as 
these events could suggest there were internal conflicts between Fertility and the BAS, 
however, since the local BAS were unavailable for interview, the researcher assumes this 
indicates a degree of IBG as this network relationship evolved over time.       
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Table 8-7: The Extension of Investor and Mentor Social Capital 
 Before the 
Event¥ 
During the Event After the 
Event 
Source of tie 
creation 
Resource 
intensity^ 
Interaction 
frequencyˇ 
Source of trust Network 
extension 
activity† 
Change in 
social 
capital 
Investors 
Fertility – 
Canadian VC 
Global referral 
bridging 
High High Entrepreneur was dependent 
on VC investment 
DB Decrease 
Fertility –  
BAS 
Local referral 
bridging  
Low High Entrepreneur was dependent 
on business angel investment 
AB Increase 
HeartBeat – 
Indian VC 
Global 
acceptance 
bridging 
High High Entrepreneur was dependent 
on VC investment 
DB Decrease 
FemMed –  
BAS 
Local search 
bridging 
High Low Firm had trust investor 
would invest 
IB Decrease 
SafeMed - 
Shareholders 
Global search 
bridging 
High Low Firm was dependent on 
shareholder’s investment 
IB Decrease 
Mentors 
Fertility –    Dr 
Shi 
Local referral 
bridging 
High Low Entrepreneur had trust in 
actors competence 
IBG Decrease 
Fertility – 
Adam at 
UniNet 
Local referral 
bridging 
High High Entrepreneur was dependent 
on the UniNet programme 
for funding 
DB Decrease 
Fertility –  
Harry 
Local referral 
bridging 
Low High Entrepreneur was 
comfortable showing his 
vulnerabilities 
AB Increase 
Fertility –  
Angus 
Local referral 
bridging 
Low High Entrepreneur was 
comfortable showing his 
vulnerabilities 
AB Increase 
HeartBeat – 
Debbie 
Local referral 
bridging 
Low High Entrepreneur was 
comfortable showing his 
vulnerabilities 
AB Increase 
HeartBeat – 
US cardiologist 
Global 
acceptance 
bridging 
Low High Entrepreneur had long-term 
friendship with actor 
AB Increase 
HeartBeat – 
Lee (VP of 
EliteTech) 
Global referral 
bridging 
Low High Entrepreneur had long-term 
friendship with Lee while 
working in China 
AB Increase 
HeartBeat – 
US corporate 
lawyer 
Global referral 
bridging 
Low High Entrepreneur had full trust in 
lawyers capabilities 
AB Increase 
FemMed – 
Californian 
surgeon 
Global 
acceptance 
bridging 
Low High Firm was likely to show 
their vulnerabilities to actor 
AB Increase 
SafeMed – 
Local Gov. 
Advisor 
Local search 
bridging 
High Low Firm had no real interest in 
government despite their 
interaction 
IBG Decrease 
SafeMed – 
FDA 
consultant 
Global search 
bridging 
Moderate High Firm believed in actors 
guidance 
DB Decrease 
      ¥ In 1 relation (see *), tie creation took place during the event. However, for analytical purposes all tie creation is listed as 
“before the event” to fully examine the extension of social capital during each event. 
      ^ “Low” refers to commitment of few financial and human resources, i.e. less than 5% of resource base. “Moderate” refers to 
reasonable commitment of resources, i.e. around 25% of resource base. “High” refers to significant commitment of resources, i.e. 
more than 50% of resource base.  
      ˇ “Low” refers to an irregular amount of personal interaction, i.e. less than once a month. “Moderate” refers to a reasonable 
amount of personal interaction, i.e. twice a month. “High” refers to a regular amount of personal interaction, i.e. weekly or even daily 
interaction. 
      † Figure 8-2 illustrates the following network extension activities that emerged as second-order themes via data analysis. Thus, 
“DB” refers to dependency bonding, “IB” refers to impassive bonding, and “AB” refers to affinity bonding. 
Source: The Author 
By contrast, Table 8-7 provides evidence that FemMed also decided to extend their social 
capital investment with a local BAS (e.g. Harmony), but used AB as a mechanism to 
strengthen this tie over time. Drawing on cognitive sources of social capital, the researcher 
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uses the term “affinity” as there was strong evidence that some actors instantly bond through 
an intellectual, cultural, or empathic connection. Incidentally, there is strong evidence of 
FemMed’s AB with Harmony as both actors struck an instant connection over the inventor’s 
altruistic reasons for creating a new technology. Indeed, the depth interviews also specify 
that FemMed decided to collaborate with Harmony as they could commit a lower-equity 
share in return for a smaller cash investment, but with the benefit of gaining frequent local 
access to support and guidance. When the researcher asked the entrepreneur how they 
bonded, she responded the “angels had total belief in the management team and without this 
trust, the relationship would not have never been successful” [M-I11-B3]. Quotation AB8 
within Table 8-6, also illustrates the nature of AB as FemMed’s entrepreneur reflects on this 
bonding experience:      
So many times over the last 8-9 years any of us could bailed out, because sales weren’t picking 
up, […] but it took an investment and a decision in 2007 to go for it in the States to achieve what 
we were looking for. So there was commitment on both sides to making [FemMed] a success 
[FEM-I11-B3]. 
A likely interpretation of this analysis is these data show clear signs of AB as the BAS 
continued “belief” and “shared vision” were evident cognitive sources, which helped extend 
this social capital. Interestingly, Table 8-7 finds that AB was most common in extending 
mentor social capital. That is, in three (Fertility, HeartBeat and FemMed) of the four INVs, 
there was strong evidence of AB with mentors. For example, section 8.2.2 describes after 
Fertility’s entrepreneur used LRB to create social capital with two mentors (e.g. Harry and 
Angus), he quickly built an intellectual connection with them due to their involvement in the 
life sciences industry. Thus, quotation AB1 within Table 8-6 shows signs of Fertility’s 
affinity bonding with Harry a local mentor and life science entrepreneur:  
Guys like that give you support every week. You can talk to them and they’re just happy to hear 
from you and it’s that encouragement that, you know, and you can bounce things off. So, it’s 
having that involvement. I’d say he’s [Harry] definitely one [FER-I09-B] 
Since Fertility regularly confided with these mentors, this indicates the entrepreneur was 
comfortable in showing his vulnerabilities, which is a clear source of trust that helped extend 
this social capital. Thus, a likely interpretation of this analysis is one of AB as the 
entrepreneur frequently interacted with these mentors but allocated a low level of financial 
resource in order to extend this social capital. Similarly, HeartBeat shows clear signs of using 
AB with mentors, with specific reference to the entrepreneur’s long-term friendship with Dr 
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Arthur – a   US cardiologist – as he became a KOL for the business. In this case, the 
narratives provide strong evidence that both actors bonded through an immediate intellectual 
connection, which formed the foundations of a long-term relationship. Quotation AB4 
within Table 8-6 exemplifies HeartBeat’s bonding activity:        
We had a personal friendship and he [Dr Arthur] and I had a meeting of the minds on doing this 
iPhone sort of stuff, but we never had the resources to do this all. So he said I will go and get 
them. So he built a prototype and then we went and got some money to fund what we needed 
and the small things we needed to do. So he is a friend and one I can trust, he does the right thing 
by me, so that is how it worked out [HEA-I10-B2]. 
Moreover, Table 8-7 indicates this “meeting of minds” surrounding an emerging technology 
is one evident cognitive source, which helped increase the value of this social capital. 
Moreover, the entrepreneur’s “friendship” and “trust [that], he does the right thing by me” 
are evident relational sources, which helped increase this social capital. Thus, a possible 
interpretation of this analysis is this low level of resource intensity and high frequency of 
interaction indicates that HeartBeat used AB as a lubricant to extend this mentor social 
capital. 
Finally, despite this repeated practice of AB, in some cases there were signs of DB, where 
firms relied on their mentors for global referrals. For example, Table 8-7 specifies that 
Fertility relied on Adam at UniNet to make initial introductions to foreign investors and 
buyers, which required a large amount of resource and personal interaction. However, there 
is evidence that these initial ties with a foreign investor (i.e. Canadian VC) and buyer (i.e. 
EU licensor) began to severe very quickly, which indicates that Fertility’s DB was likely to 
have decreased the value of this mentor social capital. Similarly, this situation was also 
apparent in SafeMed as Table 8-7 specifies the firm relied on an FDA consultant to connect 
with a potential US manufacturer and distributor, which as section 8.4 describes was 
unsuccessful. Thus, this implicit use of DB appears to have decreased the value of this social 
capital. These findings then indicate that all of the INVs used multiple networking activities 
in an attempt to extend their investor and mentor social capital.    
8.3.2 The Extension of Buyer and Supplier Social Capital 
Table 8-8 reports on how INVs extend their investment in buyer and supplier social capital. 
Figure 8-2 illuminates that the INVs use different types of bonding to extend their buyer and 
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supplier social capital. To begin with, Table 8-8 shows that each INV attempted to use at 
least one type of bonding and in some cases a combination of bonding activities (e.g. 
FemMed and SafeMed) to extend their buyer social capital. For example, after SafeMed 
used GSB to form ties with a US licensor, they attempted to extend their initial social capital 
with this MNE. However, as the narratives describe, the firm allocated a large proportion of 
its human and financial resource to secure a foreign license agreement. This involved flying 
to Sydney on a regular basis to negotiate with their Australian subsidiary, while making three 
trips from Australia to the US in an attempt to sign an agreement. However, despite these 
attempts to extend this initial social capital the firms did not sign a license agreement. 
This indicates since resource intensity and interaction frequency were both high, a likely 
interpretation is that dependency was the underlying source of trust that motivated the 
decision to extend this buyer social capital. However, given SafeMed were unable to 
strengthen this tie, it is evident this implicit use of DB decreased the value of this buyer 
social capital. Table 8-8 also reports that SafeMed subsequently used DB to extend their 
social capital with a North Carolina distributor, which was also unsuccessful. Given that 
these dependencies characterise SafeMed’s overall bonding with buyers, a likely 
interpretation is the firm shown an overall weaknesses in bonding with potential customers. 
Similarly, Table 8-8 also reports that the researcher found Fertility used DB as they 
attempted to extend their social capital with a large Chinese distributor. In this case, after 
using GRB to form ties, Fertility’s entrepreneur describes they entered a “trust building 
phase” which involved making regular trips to China to strengthen this relationship. 
  
 206 
 
Table 8-8: The Extension of Buyer and Supplier Social Capital 
 Before the 
Event¥ 
During the Event After the 
Event 
Source of tie 
creation 
Resource 
intensity^ 
Interaction 
frequencyˇ 
Source of trust Network 
extension 
activity† 
Change 
in social 
capital 
Buyers 
Fertility –  
Chinese 
distributor 
Global referral 
bridging 
High High Entrepreneur was dependent 
on actors business 
DB Increase 
HeartBeat – 
Universities 
Global 
acceptance 
bridging 
Low High Entrepreneur was willing to 
show his vulnerabilities 
AB Increase 
FemMed –  
US distributor 
Global search 
bridging 
High Low Firm had trust in the actors 
reliability 
IB Decrease 
FemMed – 
Strategic buyer 
(1) 
Global search 
bridging 
High High Firm was reliant on the actor 
to agree to a trade sale 
DB Decrease 
FemMed – 
Strategic buyer 
(2) 
Global referral 
bridging 
High High  Firm had trust in actors 
competence but was reliant 
in trade sale 
DB Increase 
SafeMed – 
US licensor 
Global search 
bridging 
High High Firm was dependent on 
signing licensing deal 
DB Decrease 
SafeMed –  
NC distributor 
Global referral 
bridging 
High High Firm had trust in actors 
competence 
DB Decrease 
Suppliers 
FemMed –  
Scottish 
manufacturer 
Local search 
bridging 
Low High Firm had trust in actors 
competence and reliability 
AB Increase 
SafeMed – 
R&D 
consultants 
Global search 
bridging 
High Low Firm had trust in actors 
competence 
IB Decrease 
SafeMed –  
NC 
manufacturer 
Global referral 
bridging 
High Low Firm had initial trust in 
actors competence 
IB Decrease 
SafeMed-  
NY 
manufacturer 
Global referral 
bridging 
High Low Firm had initial trust in 
actors competence 
IB Decrease 
      ¥ In 4 relations (see *), tie creation took place during the event. However, for analytical purposes all tie creation is listed as 
“before the event” to fully examine the extension of social capital during each event. 
      ^ “Low” refers to commitment of few financial and human resources, i.e. less than 5% of resource base. “Moderate” refers 
to reasonable commitment of resources, i.e. around 25% of resource base. “High” refers to significant commitment of 
resources, i.e. more than 50% of resource base.  
      ˇ “Low” refers to an irregular amount of personal interaction, i.e. less than once a month. “Moderate” refers to a reasonable 
amount of personal interaction, i.e. twice a month. “High” refers to a regular amount of personal interaction, i.e. weekly or even 
daily interaction. 
      † Figure 8-2 illustrates the following network extension activities that emerged as second-order themes via data analysis. 
Thus, “DB” refers to dependency bonding, “IB” refers to impassive bonding, and “AB” refers to affinity bonding. 
Source: The Author 
However, when Fertility’s co-founder Dr Shi – a Chinese national – left the company, the 
entrepreneur describes the Chinese MNE began to lose trust. Quotation DB3 within Table 
8-6 therefore illustrates how Fertility attempted to bond with the Chinese MNE after the co-
founder left the company:  
Since [Zhan] left, I would say the relationship [Chinese distributor] has definitely got better. As 
you know we are continuing to make trips, they made a trip out to Germany to meet us, so we 
are definitely trying to grow this relationship, and I have sought validation of them constantly. 
So when I talk about us being valid, I try to validate them. When I met the Chinese ambassador, 
I endorse them. I guess they are taking reference – they are the references [FER-I11-A]. 
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One interpretation is this regular interaction and high resource commitment indicates that 
the INV used DB to extend this social capital. Given this firm signed a multi-million pound 
distribution agreement, it is evident this bonding activity paid dividends due to the increase 
in this social capital value. Nevertheless, there are potential conflicting interpretations here 
as Table 8-7 reports the majority of DB across firms decreased the value of investor and 
mentor social capital. Table 8-8 also reports that FemMed attempted to strengthen ties with 
a US MNE who expressed an interest in acquiring the firm. However, quotation DB5 within 
Table 8-6 describes that FemMed’s attempt at bonding with this strategic buyer was fraught 
with difficulty:  
We had a lot of interest from a big multinational and what big companies do is they require a 
certain amount of due diligence to determine whether or not the company is something they want 
to acquire. The amount of resource that is diverted into that instead of the day-to-day running 
was absolutely immense and to get nothing at the end of it, I think they probably delayed us a 
good 3 or 4 months while we devoted resource to getting them their due diligence [FER-I08-B]. 
These data emphasise this due diligence process involved elements of DB, as this frequent 
interaction with the MNE was a resource intensive exercise. Given FemMed’s attempt to 
extend this social capital was unsuccessful, it is evident this DB decreased the value of this 
social capital. However, Table 8-8 indicates that FemMed engaged in DB to extend social 
capital with another strategic buyer called StarBuy, which eventually was successful as they 
agreed a trade sale. Therefore, this analysis indicates that DB can also increase the value of 
social capital. Consequently, a likely interpretation of these conflicting results is that DB 
appears to consist of stronger and weaker practices, which has a bearing on whether this 
activity increases or decreases the value of social capital. Therefore, moving back to 
Fertility’s case, since the Chinese MNE were unavailable for the interview, the researcher 
assumes the subsequent signing of a distribution agreement indicates that this DB paid 
dividends as there was  in an increase in the value of this buyer social capital.  
Table 8-8 also reports that INVs engaged in IBG as they attempted to extend buyer and 
supplier social capital. However, it is important to emphasise that there is more evidence of 
IBG occurring with suppliers than customers, which is logical given the financial benefits 
and priority to build customer relations. Nevertheless, Quotation IB3 within Table 8-6 show 
that IBG can occur with customers, which is evident from FemMed’s attempt to build ties 
with MedSale a US distributor: 
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The other thing that delayed us quite a lot was distributors. We had a distributor in the US, we 
tried to go down that route and it just simply didn’t work out because the problem with 
distributors is if they don’t want to sell your product they won’t sell it and we lost a good 6 to 8 
months on this. The distributor was very keen on our product, we signed a deal and shipped 
products to them, and just absolutely nothing came of it. Either they didn’t want to sell it, or they 
didn’t have the expertise or they were promoting their own product so that was a big lesson 
learned [FEM-I08-B]. 
In the subsequent interview, the researcher asked the entrepreneur how often FemMed 
interacted with MedSale, which led to the respondent saying “not enough” which confirms 
after they signed this distribution agreement, they rarely interacted with this MNE. 
FemMed’s “disappointment” in not achieving early sales, also indicates a growing sense of 
impassiveness for this customer, as despite the commitment of resource to this tie, they were 
inefficient in the extension of this social capital. Thus, a likely interpretation of this analysis 
is this IBG decreased the value of this buyer social capital. Additionally, Table 8-8 specifies 
that SafeMed implicitly engaged in IBG in various attempts to extend their supplier social 
capital. For instance, after using GSB to create social capital with American and Chinese 
R&D consultants, the firm began to encounter significant quality problems with these 
suppliers. Section 8.5 elaborates on these problems. There is also strong evidence in the 
narratives, that SafeMed were impassive about their new ties with US manufacturers. For 
example, in the initial interview, the entrepreneur describes the benefits of forming ties with 
a North Carolina manufacturer and speaks of them in a positive light. However, in the 
subsequent interview, quotation IB6 within Table 8-6 illustrates that IBG was likely to have 
taken place during their attempt to extend this supplier social capital: 
We basically had our own views about this guy [North Carolina manufacturer], he never gave us 
any ideas about how he was going to make it, he had no credibility really, he made all his previous 
stuff in China, this was the first time he was going to make it in America. We then kept asking 
how are you going to make it, show us some specs, show us how you are going to do it. So we 
were quite happy, probably by November [2009], that listen it ain’t going to happen with the 
[North Carolina] manufacturer [SAF-I10-B]. 
There is also strong evidence from the narratives that these problems meant the firm became 
increasingly impassive about this tie. That is, SafeMed’s entrepreneur describes there was 
little interaction with the North Carolina manufacturer, despite the initial resource it took to 
create this social capital. A likely interpretation of this analysis is this IBG led to an overall 
decrease SafeMed’s supplier social capital. Consequently, section 8.5 examines these 
practices in more depth with respect to the influence of IBG on NVI. Finally, Table 8-8 
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shows there were rare occurrences that INVs use AB to extend buyer or supplier social 
capital. However, this research did find that HeartBeat were the only firm to use AB to build 
an intellectual connection with universities, who subsequently became a core customer. 
FemMed also were the only firm to use AB to build a personal friendship with their local 
manufacturer. Nevertheless, it is apparent that AB seems to occur with actors when an inter-
personal connection emerges over time. Overall, these cross-case findings show that these 
INVs engaged in a combination of bonding activities as they attempted to extend their buyer 
and supplier social capital. 
8.4 RQ3: How do INVs modify their social capital?  
This section reports the cross-case findings on how INVs modify their existing social capital. 
This section replicates the structure of section 8.3 by using longitudinal data displays (Miles 
and Huberman, 1994; Saldaña, 2003) to examine how INVs modify their social capital. 
Figure 6-5 illustrates that three second-order “modifying” themes emerged during this cross-
case analysis, which aggregate several first-order concepts. These second-order themes 
consist of (1) eliminating ties (ETS), (2) prioritising ties (PTS), and (3) reconfiguring ties 
(RTS). Drawing on Helfat and Peteraf’s (2003) various forms of resource modification, the 
researcher found strong evidence that the INVs either “retrench” (i.e. phase out) or 
“redeploy” (i.e. use for another purpose) their social capital. Figure 8-3 also reports the way 
in which INVs modify their social capital was largely dependent on the strength and nature 
of the tie. Table 8-9 thus presents representative data of each of these second-order themes.  
An interesting observation when comparing Figures 8-1, 8-2 and 8.3 is there were less 
instances of how INVs modify their social capital in contrast to how they create or extend 
this asset. A likely interpretation of this finding is since most INVs are young in age and 
small in size, it is appears there is an initial need to create and extend their social capital, 
opposed to modifying this asset. However, Figure 8-3 does report that way INVs modify 
their social capital differs significantly across cases. For example, Figure 8-3 indicates 
Fertility most frequently modified their social capital in comparison to FemMed and 
SafeMed who only modified this asset on a few occasions. There are potential conflicting 
interpretations here, as one could argue Fertility’s regular modification of social capital 
shows a dynamic capability in networking, while another view is the performance of these 
networking activities show less experience in the efficient creation or extension of social 
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capital. Therefore, the following sections will now examine these networking activities in 
depth. 
Table 8-9: Representative Data supporting Second-Order "Modifying" Themes 
Second-order 
themes 
Representative data 
Eliminating 
ties 
Fertility: ETS4 
I think the thing with [Zhan], which was the most disappointment, was the lack of transparency in what he was 
doing. If he was scared, he should have been a man and said I’m scared. But he didn’t and he just didn’t produce. 
So he left us exposed, incredibly exposed and that was quite cowardly, so we took a huge hit for that [FER-I11-
A].  
 HeartBeat: ETS5 & ETS6 
So many friends of mine, you know, they’re trying to get a company off the ground, and they’re just spending so 
much time talking to potential investors and 99% of them aren’t even in a position to invest even if they wanted 
to. So I think we learned that we wasted six months of our lives, that was a very negative kind of thing. So after 
that [elimination of VC] I decided we would just focus on doing what we could with our own resources. First of 
all, you have to survive. There’s no point… if you can’t survive…if you’re not successful in raising capital and 
you’re burning money, then you’re stuck between a rock in a hard place. You’ll just collapse, right? [HEA-I09-C]. 
 SafeMed: ETS10 
We have spent five years doing R&D, that’s another story. You can help me write my book about [SafeMed]. We 
have had several partners on the R&D side. We went through numerous consultants, who helped us then hindered 
us. So we changed design consultants about three times [SAF-I10-B]. 
Prioritising ties Fertility: PTS1, PTS2 & PTS3  
Get rid of those ones [Adam, George, Sean]. They aren’t important anymore. Maybe at the time they were 
instrumental at getting me through those small little stages. But now I’ve got [Bob], and [Stephanie] here. So [Bob] 
is our new consultant who does sales, and [Stephanie] is our product marketing director/consultant. Those ones 
[Adam, George, Sean] are now outside my network but [Harry] he is still core [FER-I11-A]. 
 HeartBeat: PTS4 
So we have finished up with our local manufacturer. The problem is we had to change due to the regulatory, as we 
now have to all the CE mark testing and everything. To sell into Europe we have to have a certified manufacturer 
who meets all the quality standards. So we now have our [Hong Kong manufacturer] up and going. So they will 
be able to scale up our manufacturing and they can produce more product in a day than our [local] manufacturer 
could produce in a month [HEA-I10-A].  
Reconfiguring 
ties 
Fertility: RTS1 
Just off the phone with Canada today and their order is three times what I expected, and they have just doubled 
again, so that is 6 times what I expected as initial order. But I don’t have any money, so we have had to say look, 
we don’t have any money to do this, and they said look, what do we have to give you to get it done. So we brought 
somebody in and they said you can pay them to finish the registration and we will discount it against the order 
when you are placing it. So definitely getting more creative with how we finance ourselves in this time, where 
traditionally banks were there. They are not there for you, they don’t give a shit, I’m not a bank fan [FER-I11-A].  
 HeartBeat: RTS4 
Our lawyer is basically trying to negotiate that [EliteTech] sell our products to their customers as well. So part of 
the negotiation is whether they will finance this. The big problem with contract manufacturing is you often have 
to pay upfront because they have to go out and buy the components. So if you can negotiate and get [EliteTech] to 
agree to you only paying them for the finished product then you haven’t really got a cash flow problem because 
you can line the customers up, which means you wouldn’t be manufacturing unless you have customers [HEA-
I10-A].  
 FemMed: RTS6 
When [FemMed] went into the US market, direct selling, that surgeon became our best preceptor surgeon. He 
trained a lot of our surgeons for us. He had the experience and because he was involved from a very early stage he 
has been amazing in terms of the clinical data. We have been able to publish that he has done all of these surgeries, 
these are the complications, these are the success rates, so that really gave us a good start in terms of having a good 
preceptor surgeon we could work with and also somebody who really has been shouting about [FemMed] from the 
hill tops [FEM-I11-B2]. 
Source: The Author 
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Figure 8-3: Network Modification Activities: Summary of Findings 
 
Source: The Author
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8.4.1 The Modification of Investor and Mentor Social Capital 
Table 8-10 reports how INVs modify their investor and mentor social capital. Figure 8-3 
also reports that all of these INVs used a variety of networking activities to modify their 
investor and mentor social capital. Interestingly, Table 8-10 provides evidence that the INVs 
predominately used ETS to modify their investor social capital. The researcher uses the term 
“eliminating ties” when there was strong evidence that the INVs decided to retrench (i.e. 
gradually phase out) a weak tie when it emerged this social capital provided no immediate 
benefit or became a liability to the firm. For example, Table 8-10 indicates that after Fertility 
formed ties with a Canadian VC syndicate in 2008, they attempted to extend this social 
capital over a six-month period. During this time, section 8.3.1 specifies that Fertility 
engaged in DB to extend this investor social capital, but after six months of due diligence 
the Canadian VC terminated this agreement.  
A potential interpretation of these events is that Fertility were slow to modify this investor 
social capital. Consequently, this is most likely due to Fertility’s DB with both Adam at 
UniNet and with the Canadian VC themselves. For example, Table 8-10 indicates that 
Fertility had no choice but to retrench this investor social capital after it became a liability 
to the firm. Figure 8-4 illustrates these social capital dynamics. That is, before this change, 
section 8.2.1 describes that Fertility used GRB via Adam at UniNet to connect with this tie. 
However, it appears Fertility’s DB with both Adam at the Canadian VC syndicate led to a 
gradual decrease in the value of this social capital. Thus, when Fertility eventually decided 
to retrench this tie – e.g. after the VC withdrawn from negotiations – it appears that ETS had 
no real value, as this social capital was already a liability. Indeed, after this change, Fertility 
describes they continued to search for new investors and eventually formed ties with a local 
BAS who invested seed capital, but as section 8.3.1 outlines the firm also became impassive 
about bonding with potential investors. One interpretation of these findings indicates that 
Fertility shown weakness in being able to create, extend, or modify investor social capital.  
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Table 8-10: The Modification Investor and Mentor Social Capital 
 Before the change During the change After the change 
 Tie year 
formation 
Tie 
duration 
Tie 
strength† 
Source of 
change 
Action^ Change in 
social 
capital 
Change in 
networking 
activities 
Investors 
Fertility – 
Canadian VC 
2008 6 months Weak VC terminates 
agreement with 
firm 
Retrenches the 
relationship after 
it became a 
liability 
 
↓ 
Entrepreneur 
continues to 
create investor 
ties 
HeartBeat – 
Indian VC 
2007 6 months Weak VC terminates 
agreement with 
firm 
Retrenches the 
relationship after 
it became a 
liability 
 
↓ 
Entrepreneur 
continues to 
create investor 
ties 
HeartBeat- 
US venture 
capitalist 
2009 1 month Weak Entrepreneur 
has no trust that 
the VC would 
invest 
Retrenches the 
relationship 
before it became a 
liability 
 
↓ 
Entrepreneur 
creates ties with 
US angels 
FemMed - 
BAS 
2004 6 years Strong Angel’s became 
“friends to us 
all” 
Redeploys the 
relationship to 
support formation 
of US sales 
subsidiary 
 
↑ 
Firm extends 
personal 
friendship with 
angel investors 
Mentors 
Fertility – 
Co-founder 
2003 6 years Strong 
then 
weak 
Entrepreneur 
loses trust in co-
founder’s 
commitment to 
venture 
Retrenches 
relation after it 
became a liability 
 
↓ 
Entrepreneur 
extends ties 
with business 
mentors 
Fertility – 
Adam 
2007 2 years Strong Entrepreneur 
felt contact was 
no longer 
important 
Retrenches the 
relationship as no 
longer a priority 
 
↓ 
Entrepreneur 
extends ties 
with other 
mentors 
Fertility – 
George 
2007 2 years Strong Entrepreneur 
felt contact was 
no longer 
important 
Retrenches the 
relationship as no 
longer a priority 
 
↓ 
Entrepreneur 
extends ties 
with other 
mentors 
Fertility – 
Sean 
2007 2 years Strong Entrepreneur 
felt contact was 
no longer 
important 
Retrenches the 
relationship as no 
longer a priority 
 
↓ 
Entrepreneur 
extends ties 
with other 
mentors 
HeartBeat – 
US 
cardiologist 
1995 14 years Strong Entrepreneur 
had great trust 
in cardiologist 
as a friend 
Redeploys the 
relationship by 
making mentor a 
business partner 
 
↑ 
Entrepreneur 
extends ties 
with US 
cardiologist 
HeartBeat – 
Universities 
2006 3 years Strong Entrepreneur 
encouraged 
universities to 
buy his products 
Redeploys the 
relationship by 
making mentor a 
core customer 
 
↑ 
Entrepreneur 
extends ties 
with 
universities 
FemMed – 
Californian 
surgeon 
2006 1 year Strong Californian 
surgeon offered 
to be a key 
opinion leader 
Redeploys the 
relationship by 
making mentor a 
key opinion leader 
 
↑ 
Firm extends 
friendship with 
surgeon 
SafeMed – 
Local 
government 
advisor 
2000 5 years Weak Loss of trust in 
actor’s ability to 
source start-up 
grants 
Retrenches this 
relationship as no 
longer a priority 
 
↓ 
Firm decides to 
source investors 
through IPO 
     † There is no standard measure of tie strength in the literature because the nature of tie strength depends on the types of relations 
involved (Ozcan and Eisenhardt, 2009: 276). Thus, in line with Capaldo (2007) this study measures tie strength through the 
interaction frequency, resource intensity, and duration of each relationship. Thus, “weak” ties are those where there is a low 
frequency, low resource intensity and have formed over a short time period, i.e. less than one year. Whereas, “strong” ties are those 
where there is a high level of frequency, high allocation of resources and have formed over a long-time period, i.e. more than one 
year.  
      ^ The author uses Helfat and Peteraf’s (2003) various forms of resource modification (see section 2.4.3) to analyse the way in 
which INVs modify their social capital. 
Source: The Author  
Table 8-10 also indicates that after HeartBeat used GAB to create social capital with an 
Indian VC syndicate in 2007, they used DB over a six-month period to extend this social 
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capital. However, due to the GFC on 2008-2009, the Indian VC syndicate also terminated 
their agreement. A similar interpretation of these events is HeartBeat’s initial use of DB 
meant they were slow to modify this investor social capital. Table 8-10 then indicates that 
HeartBeat also had no choice but to retrench this social capital after it became a liability to 
the firm. Additionally, Figure 8-4 illustrates their late and slow response with using ETS to 
retrench their relationship with the Indian VC had no real value, as this social capital had 
become a liability. By contrast, Table 8-10 indicates that HeartBeat did re-attempt to create 
social capital with a US VC in 2009, which was at the peak of the GFC. However, after their 
experience with the Indian VC, HeartBeat’s entrepreneur decided to retrench this tie before 
this social capital became a liability. Quotation ETS4 and ETS5 within Table 8-9, 
summarises the use of ETS to change these Indian and US VC relationships: 
So many friends of mine, you know, they’re trying to get a company off the ground, and they’re 
just spending so much time talking to potential investors and 99% of them aren’t even in a 
position to invest even if they wanted to. So I think we learned that we wasted six months of our 
lives, that was a very negative kind of thing. So after that [elimination of VC] I decided we would 
just focus on doing what we could with our own resources. First of all, you have to survive. 
There’s no point… if you can’t survive…if you’re not successful in raising capital and you’re 
burning money, then you’re stuck between a rock in a hard place. You’ll just collapse, right? 
[HEA-I09-C]. 
A likely interpretation of this analysis is ETS led to a general decrease in this investor social 
capital. However, Figure 8-4 illustrates that HeartBeat retrenched this tie with the US VC 
syndicate much earlier, which meant they modified this social capital before it became a 
liability for the firm. Consequently, section 8.5 examines these practices in more depth with 
respect to the influence ETS has on NVI. However, as Table 8-10 highlights, this triggered 
a change in networking as HeartBeat used GRB via his friendship with the US cardiologist 
to create social capital with local US business angels who subsequently invested and 
supported the new venture’s internationalisation. 
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Figure 8-4: The Modification of Investor Social Capital 
 
Source: The Author 
Table 8-10 also reports that FemMed decided to modify their investor social capital with 
Harmony a local BAS. However, by contrast there is evidence that Harmony used RTS as a 
mechanism to modify their investor social capital. Drawing on dynamic capability 
perspectives on redeployment (see section 3.4.3), the researcher uses the term 
“reconfiguring” to show that firms can modify an existing asset to serve a new, but closely 
related product or service market. From a social capital perspective, there is strong evidence 
that FemMed “redeployed” their existing relationship with Harmony by encouraging them 
to invest in the establishment of a US sales subsidiary as quotation AB8 within section 8.3.1 
previously identifies. Figure 8-4 thus illustrates a likely interpretation of this analysis is that 
RTS with Harmony led to an overall increase in the value of this social capital. Thus, as the 
local BAS committed additional financial and human resource to FemMed’s foreign 
operations, this increase in the value of social capital helped support NVI. Section 8.5 
therefore elaborates on RTS influence on NVI.   
Table 8-10 also reports on how INVs modify their mentor social capital. In contrast to the 
above, these cross-case findings show that this sample of INVs rarely used ETS to modify 
mentor social capital, with the exception of SafeMed and Fertility who retrenched two 
mentor ties. For example, after SafeMed’s IBG with their local government advisor, which 
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section 8.3.1 elaborates on, they lost trust in their mentor’s ability to source start-up funding, 
which meant eliminating this tie led to an overall decrease in the value of this social capital.  
Whereas, Table 8-10 indicates that after Fertility’s implicit use of IBG to extend social 
capital with its co-founder Dr Shi, the entrepreneur began to lose trust in the co-founder’s 
commitment for the venture. This involved a six-month period, where the co-founder did not 
communicate with the executive board, which led to allegations that Dr Shi was working on 
Chinese R&D projects without the permission of Fertility’s board. Incidentally, Fertility’s 
entrepreneur describes that this relationship “went south very quickly” after they had 
discovered the co-founder no longer wanted to conduct R&D for the business. Quotation 
ETS4 within Table 8-9 emphasises these tensions:  
I think the thing with [Zhan], which was the most disappointment, was the lack of transparency 
in what he was doing. If he was scared, he should have been a man and said I’m scared. But he 
didn’t and he just didn’t produce. So he left us exposed, incredibly exposed and that was quite 
cowardly, so we took a huge hit for that [FER-I11-A]. 
One interpretation of these events is that Fertility were slow to use ETS, which led to a 
decrease in the value of this social capital. Therefore, Table 8-10 reports that this strong tie 
had become a weak tie, due to the low level of trust and irregular interaction between actors. 
Therefore, Figure 8-5 illustrates that Fertility’s late and slow response at using ETS to 
change the relationship with Dr Shi had no real value since this social capital had already 
become a liability. By contrast, Table 8-10 also provides evidence that Fertility used PTS to 
modify their mentor social capital. The researcher uses the term PTS when there was strong 
evidence that the INVs decided to retrench (i.e. gradually phase out) a strong tie when the 
entrepreneurs no longer considered this tie as priority in the firm’s international 
development. For example, Table 8-10 reports that Fertility were the only INV to use PTS 
as a mechanism to modify their investor social capital. Section 6.4 describes that over a 
three-year period, the researcher combined the critical incident and narrative sequence 
techniques to collect rich longitudinal data on Fertility’s network development. During this 
iteration between data collection and analysis, the researcher and a second researcher8 used 
depth interviews with the entrepreneur to map out the evolution of Fertility’s network. 
Quotation PTS1, PTS2 and PTS3 is one narrative that illustrates this networking activity:  
                                         
8 The ‘second researcher’ is the researcher’s academic supervisor who attended all of Fertility’s semi-
structured interviews. 
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Get rid of those ones [Adam, George, Sean]. They aren’t important anymore. Maybe at the time 
they were instrumental at getting me through those small little stages. But now I’ve got [Bob], 
and [Stephanie] here. So [Bob] is our new consultant who does sales, and [Stephanie] is our 
product marketing director/consultant. Those ones [Adam, George, Sean] are now outside my 
network but [Harry] he is still core [FER-I11-A]. 
A clear interpretation of these data is that following this research exercise, Fertility’s 
entrepreneur was cognizant that they were PTS with individual mentors. The researcher also 
classifies these mentors as strong ties since the entrepreneur confirms that he had known 
them for over two years and committed a large amount of resource through regular 
interaction with them. A likely interpretation of the above narrative is since the entrepreneur 
believes these mentors were “instrumental” at the “small stages” – i.e. at international start-
up – it is evident this triggered a decision to gradually modify this social capital as the firm 
began to internationally expand. Indeed, Figure 8-5 illustrates that Fertility’s prioritising of 
these mentor ties decreased the value of this social capital, but not to the stage where these 
assets became a liability, as they maintained a reasonable level of value.   
By contrast, Table 8-10 reports that HeartBeat and FemMed both used RTS as a mechanism 
to modify their mentor social capital. For example, HeartBeat’s entrepreneur redeployed his 
existing relationship with Dr Arthur a US cardiologist through the joint agreement to 
establish a US-based IJV. Thus, section 8.3.1 reports that the use of AB meant they “had a 
meeting of minds” with respect to the commercialisation of a medical device for the iPhone. 
Consequently, Figure 8-4 illustrates a likely interpretation of this analysis is the use of RTS 
to modify the US cardiologist relationship led to a gradual increase in the value of this social 
capital. Thus, since Dr Arthur committed new financial and human resource to HeartBeat’s 
foreign operations, this increase in the value of social capital helped support the new 
venture’s international expansion, which section 8.5 examines in more depth.   
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Figure 8-5: The Modification of Mentor Social Capital 
 
Source: The Author 
Table 8-10 also reports that HeartBeat used RTS as a mechanism to modify its mentor social 
capital with universities. That is, section 8.2.2 reports that HeartBeat initially used GAB as 
mechanism to create this mentor social capital. However, there is strong evidence from 
section 8.3.2 that once the HeartBeat used AB to strengthen these ties, the entrepreneur 
identified an opportunity to redeploy this social capital, as these mentors became the firm’s 
core customer. Consequently, the entrepreneur describes that HeartBeat collaborated with 
the universities on co-R&D projects, which meant they were compelled to buy the firm’s 
products. Moreover, the universities also published that they used HeartBeat’s products in 
top-tier academic journals, which led to surge in international sales. Therefore, Figure 8-5 
illustrates that HeartBeat’s use of RTS lead to an increase the value of this mentor social 
capital. Section 8.5.1 therefore elaborates on RTS influence on HeartBeat’s subsequent 
international expansion. 
Table 8-10 similarly reports that FemMed used RTS as mechanism to modify its mentor 
social capital. Namely, section 8.2.2 reports that FemMed also used GAB to create mentor 
social capital with a Californian surgeon. As section 8.3.2 describes, FemMed and the 
Californian surgeon implicitly engaged in AB to form an intellectual and emphatic 
connection over the altruistic value of the firm’s unique technology. Consequently, there is 
strong evidence that FemMed identified an opportunity to redeploy this initial social capital, 
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when the Californian surgeon expressed his willingness to have a greater involvement in the 
business. Quotation RTS6 within Table 8-9 illustrates how FemMed’s use of RTS helped 
modify this mentor social capital: 
When [FemMed] went into the US market, direct selling, that [Californian] surgeon became our 
best preceptor surgeon. He trained a lot of our surgeons for us. He had the experience and because 
he was involved from a very early stage he has been amazing in terms of the clinical data. We 
have been able to publish that he has done all of these surgeries, these are the complications, 
these are the success rates, so that really gave us a good start in terms of having a good preceptor 
surgeon we could work with and also somebody who really has been shouting about [FemMed] 
from the hill tops [FEM-I11-B2]. 
One interpretation of these data is that FemMed shown strength in practicing RTS to change 
their relation with the Californian surgeon. That is, the above narrative explains the 
Californian surgeon became a “preceptor surgeon” whose endorsement amongst American 
surgeons evidently helped the firm’s US expansion. There is then clear evidence that 
FemMed changed and strengthened the nature of this tie since the Californian surgeon 
committed additional resource and became a KOL who regularly interacted with the firm. 
Consequently, Figure 8-5 then illustrates this networking activity led to a rapid increase in 
the value of this mentor social capital. These cross-case findings then indicate that this 
sample of INVs used a combination of networking activities in order to modify their investor 
and mentor social capital.  
8.4.2 The Modification of Buyer and Supplier Social Capital 
Table 8-11 reports how INVs modify their buyer and supplier social capital. In contrast to 
section 8.4.1, Figure 8-3 reports that only two of the INVs (e.g. Fertility and FemMed) were 
found to modify their buyer social capital, while all of INVs appear to use a variety of 
networking activities to modify their supplier social capital. For example, Table 8-11 
indicates that FemMed formed ties with a US distributor in 2005, and attempted to extend 
this social capital over a nine-month period. During this time, section 8.3.2 specifies that 
FemMed were impassive in their bonding with this US distributor, which meant despite 
perfunctory attempts to extend this social capital, they decided to retrench this tie. A clear 
interpretation of these data is that FemMed retrenched its tie with this US distributor. There 
is also strong evidence that this relation was a weak tie, as the entrepreneur describes their 
increasing lack of trust in the US distributor, and the irregular interaction that took place 
between actors. Consequently, it appears that FemMed’s IBG with the US distributor led to 
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a gradual decrease in the value of this buyer social capital. Thus, when FemMed eventually 
decided to retrench this weak tie – e.g. after realising the distributor would not sell their 
products – it appears that using ETS had little value, as this social capital was already a 
liability. Figure 8-6 also illustrates that FemMed were slow to modify this tie despite the 
gradual decrease in the value of this social capital.  
Nevertheless, section 8.5.3 describes despite the firm’s slow response, this decision to 
retrench this social capital did trigger the firm’s re-entry into the US through the 
establishment of a foreign sales subsidiary. Therefore, despite the decrease in this social 
capital, section 8.5.3 does specify that ETS helped modify this buyer social capital. Table 8-
11 also reports that Fertility used ETS as a mechanism to modify its buyer social capital. For 
example, section 8.2.3 reports that Fertility used GRB as a mechanism to create buyer social 
capital with an EU MNE who agreed to license their technology. 
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Table 8-11: The Modification of Buyer and Supplier SC 
 Before the change During the change After the change 
 Tie 
formation 
year 
Tie 
duration 
Tie 
strength† 
Source of change Action^ Change 
in social 
capital 
Change in 
networking 
activities 
Buyers 
Fertility – 
European 
licensor 
2008 1 year Weak Entrepreneur loses 
focus to implement 
license strategy 
Retrenches the 
relationship 
before it became 
a liability 
 
↓ 
Entrepreneur 
creates new ties 
with sales 
agents and 
suppliers 
Fertility – 
Canadian 
distributor 
2010 6months Strong Distributor is 
encouraged to 
financially invest in 
firm  
Redeploys 
relationship as 
buyer becomes 
an investor 
 
↑ 
Entrepreneur 
becomes more 
“creative” in 
raising finance 
FemMed – 
US distributor 
2006 9months Weak Distributor does 
not sell the firm’s 
products 
Retrenches the 
relationship after 
it became a 
liability 
 
↓ 
Firm creates ties 
with a US key 
opinion leader 
Suppliers 
Fertility – 
English 
manufacturer 
2009 9months Weak Loss of trust in 
manufacturers 
production 
capabilities 
Retrenches the 
relationship due 
to quality issues 
 
↓ 
Entrepreneur 
decides to 
internalise 
production 
HeartBeat– 
Local 
manufacturer 
2005 5 years Strong Manufacturer did 
not have FDA 
regulatory approval  
Retrenches the 
relationship 
before it 
becomes a 
liability 
 
 
Entrepreneur 
avoids 
relational lock-
in 
HeartBeat– 
HK 
manufacturer 
2010 6months Strong Manufacturer is 
encouraged to 
financially invest in 
the firm 
Redeploys 
relationship as 
supplier became 
a buyer and 
investor 
 
↑ 
Entrepreneur 
creates new ties 
in this US 
market 
FemMed – 
French 
manufacturer 
2005 2 years Weak Lost trust in 
manufacturers 
production 
capabilities 
Retires the 
relationship 
before it became 
a liability 
 
↓ 
Firm creates 
new ties with 
local Scottish 
manufacturer 
SafeMed – 
R&D 
consultants 
2005 3 years Weak Lost trust in 
suppliers R&D 
capabilities 
Retrenches 
relationship after 
it became a 
liability 
 
↓ 
Firm decides to 
internalise R&D 
     † There is no standard measure of tie strength in the literature because the nature of tie strength depends on the types of relations 
involved (Ozcan and Eisenhardt, 2009: 276). Thus, in line with Capaldo (2007) this study measures tie strength through the 
interaction frequency, resource intensity, and duration of each relationship. Thus, “weak” ties are those where there is a low 
frequency, low resource intensity and have formed over a short time period, i.e. less than one year. Whereas, “strong” ties are those 
where there is a high level of frequency, high allocation of resources and have formed over a long-time period, i.e. more than one 
year.  
      ^ The author uses Helfat and Peteraf’s (2003) various forms of resource modification (see section 2.4.3) to analyse the way in 
which INVs modify their social capital. 
Source: The Author 
 
 
 
 
 222 
 
Interestingly, the entrepreneur describes that after this initial agreement, it became apparent 
the licensor began to lose interest following the emergence of similar technology. 
Consequently, the entrepreneur describes that following this event, they rarely interacted 
with the EU licensor. Subsequently, the entrepreneur describes after bonding with Harry and 
Angus, these mentors encouraged Fertility to change their internationalisation strategy and 
focus on selling products through agents and distributors. This advice then motivated 
Fertility to retrench this weak tie, which indicates ETS was an important mechanism that 
helped modify this buyer social capital. Figure 8-6 therefore illustrates that Fertility 
retrenched this tie with the EU licensor much earlier than FemMed’s attempt, which 
indicates a more proactive attempt to modify buyer social capital before it became a liability 
to the firm.  
Figure 8-6: The Modification of Buyer Social Capital 
 
Source: The Author 
Table 8-11 also reports that Fertility used RTS as mechanism to modify its buyer social 
capital. That is, there is strong evidence that Fertility encouraged the Canadian distributor to 
fund their Canadian regulatory approval and product launch. Quotation RTS1 within Table 
8-11, summarises the nature of how Fertility were reconfiguring ties with this foreign 
customer:   
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Just off the phone with Canada today and their order is three times what I expected, and they 
have just doubled again, so that is 6 times what I expected as initial order. But I don’t have any 
money, so we have had to say look, we don’t have any money to do this, and they said look, 
what do we have to give you to get it done. So we brought somebody in and they said you can 
pay them to finish the registration and we will discount it against the order when you are placing 
it. So definitely getting more creative with how we finance ourselves in this time, where 
traditionally banks were there. They are not there for you, they don’t give a shit, I’m not a bank 
fan [FER-I11-A]. 
One interpretation of these data is that Fertility used RTS to redeploy their tie with the 
Canadian distributor, which helped increase the value of this buyer social capital. For 
example, the above narrative explains that Fertility encouraged the Canadian distributor to 
invest in the business if they wanted to secure their products. There is then clear evidence 
that Fertility had strengthened the nature of this tie since the Canadian distributor committed 
financial resource by funding the Canadian regulatory approval and the initial production 
launch. Consequently, Figure 8-6 illustrates that the redeployment of this tie led to an overall 
increase in the value of this buyer social capital.  
By contrast, Table 8-11 reports there is strong evidence on how INVs modify their supplier 
social capital. For example, cross-case findings indicate that three (e.g. Fertility, FemMed 
and SafeMed) of the four INVs used ETS as a mechanism to modify their supplier social 
capital. For example, one point of comparison is that Fertility and FemMed both describe 
how they changed their relations with local manufacturers. However, it is evident from the 
cross-case analysis that these firms differed in using ETS at local or global level. In 
Fertility’s case, section 8.2.4 reports that the firm used LRB to form ties with an English 
manufacturer in order to quickly get products to market. However, during this time Fertility 
began to encounter quality problems with the English manufacturer, which led to a loss in 
trust in the manufacturer’s existing production capabilities. Furthermore, the entrepreneur 
also confirms that they rarely interacted with the English manufacturer and did not resolve 
these quality issues.  
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Figure 8-7: The Modification of Supplier Social Capital 
 
Source: The Author 
Instead, Table 8-11 reports that Fertility decided to retrench this weak tie due to quality 
issues, which indicates the firm used ETS as a mechanism to modify this supplier social 
capital. Consequently, Figure 8-7 illustrates that eliminating this tie led to a decrease in the 
value of this supplier social capital. Moreover, Fertility were slow to retrench this tie with 
the English manufacturer, which meant the use of ETS had little value since this social 
capital was already liability. Similarly, section 8.4.1 reports that Fertility were also slow at 
using ETS with a Canadian VC, which indicates some weakness with respect to how they 
modify their social capital.  
Table 8-11 also reports that FemMed were slow to modify their supplier social capital. That 
is, section 8.2.4 specifies that FemMed attended US trade fairs and used GSB as mechanism 
to form ties with a French manufacturer. Like Fertility, FemMed also began to encounter 
quality problems with their French manufacturer, which led to a loss in trust in the 
manufacturer’s production capabilities. Additionally, the entrepreneur also confirms that 
given their French location, the firm found it difficult to interact with this subcontractor and 
resolve these quality issues. Consequently, Table 8-11 confirms that FemMed decided to 
retrench this weak tie, and used ETS as a way to modify this supplier social capital. Figure 
8-7 also illustrates the similarities between these firms as this late response at using ETS 
meant this social capital had already become a liability. 
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Evidence of this networking activity was also apparent in SafeMed as they used ETS as a 
way to modify their social capital with a group of Chinese and American R&D consultants. 
In this case, section 8.2.4 specifies that SafeMed used GSB to form ties with R&D 
consultants who supported the firm’s commercialisation. Consequently, section 8.3.2 reports 
that SafeMed had become increasingly impassive about extending this social capital. Indeed, 
one interpretation is over a three-year period, there is strong evidence this relationship would 
hinder their NVI. Incidentally, quotation ETS1 within Table 8-9 emphasises SafeMed’s 
decision to modify this supplier social capital:  
We have spent five years doing R&D, that’s another story. You can help me write my book about 
[SafeMed]. We have had several partners on the R&D side. We went through numerous 
consultants, who helped us then hindered us. So we changed design consultants about three times 
[SAF-I10-B]. 
A clear interpretation of these data is that SafeMed used ETS as a mechanism to modify this 
social capital. However, this narrative in combination with Figure 8-7 is the clearest 
indication that SafeMed’s impassiveness towards their R&D consultants had led to gradual 
decrease in the value of this social capital. Consequently, it is evident that SafeMed were 
slow to modify this social capital, which indicates this was a significant burden for the firm. 
Therefore, an interesting finding is that each of the firm’s attempt at using ETS was in 
response to a decrease in the value of supplier social capital. Therefore, this indicates that 
firms are most likely to use this networking activity when there is scant chance of improving 
the strength of a relationship. By contrast, Table 8-11 reports that HeartBeat retrenched its 
ties with a local manufacturer, but unlike Fertility and FemMed, they decided to modify a 
strong tie. That is, section 8.2.4 reports that HeartBeat used LSB as a mechanism to form 
ties with a local manufacturer in order to start production. However, the entrepreneur 
describes despite their trustworthy relationship with the local manufacturer, they had reached 
a phase that required a partner with advanced production capabilities to support their 
international expansion. Quotation PTS4 within Table 8-9 consequently provides additional 
context on this situation: 
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So we have finished up with our local manufacturer. The problem is we had to change due to the 
regulatory, as we now have to all the CE mark testing and everything. To sell into Europe we 
have to have a certified manufacturer who meets all the quality standards. So we now have our 
[Hong Kong manufacturer] up and going. So they will be able to scale up our manufacturing and 
they can produce more product in a day than our [local] manufacturer could produce in a month 
[HEA-I10-A]. 
A clear interpretation of these data is that HeartBeat used PTS as a mechanism to modify 
this supplier social capital. Moreover, Figure 8-7 illustrates that HeartBeat’s use of PTS 
decreased the value of this social capital, but not to the extent where this asset became a 
liability. Incidentally, the narratives indicate that HeartBeat shown a strength in being able 
to reduce its dependency with a supplier by moving to a new supplier with advanced 
production capabilities. Finally, Table 8-11 reports that HeartBeat were only the firm to use 
RTS as a mechanism to modify their social capital. In this case, section 8.2.3 specifies that 
HeartBeat used GRB as mechanism to form ties with a Hong Kong manufacturer who as 
quotation PTS4 describes agreed to mass-produce their product. The entrepreneur then 
describes that within a six-month period, HeartBeat attempted to redeploy this social capital. 
Quotation RTS4 within Table 8-9 provides insight into the firm’s attempt at reconfiguring 
this tie:  
Our lawyer is basically trying to negotiate that [EliteTech] sell our products to their customers 
as well. So part of the negotiation is whether they will finance this. The big problem with contract 
manufacturing is you often have to pay upfront because they have to go out and buy the 
components. So if you can negotiate and get [EliteTech] to agree to you only paying them for 
the finished product then you haven’t really got a cash flow problem because you can line the 
customers up, which means you wouldn’t be manufacturing unless you have customers [HEA-
I10-A]. 
One interpretation of these data is that HeartBeat were effective at using RTS to change their 
relation with the Hong Kong manufacturer. That is, the above narrative explains that the 
Hong Kong manufacturer became a customer and investor in the business. There is then 
clear evidence that HeartBeat strengthened the nature of this tie since the Hong Kong 
manufacturer committed additional resource as they agreed to fund the cost of production 
prior to the sale of product. Consequently, Figure 8-7 illustrates this networking activity led 
to a rapid increase in the value of this supplier social capital. Section 8.5.2 therefore 
examines RTS influence on NVI. These cross-case findings then indicate that the sample of 
INVs primarily used ETS to modify their buyer social capital, while they used a combination 
of networking activities to modify their supplier social capital.  
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Table 8-12: Networking Activities Induced from Data Analysis 
Networking activities (second-
order concepts) 
Definition 
A. Local referral bridging 
(Referrals + local connection) 
When the ego uses an alters referral to create a local tie 
B. Global referral bridging 
(Referrals + global connection) 
When the ego uses an alters referral to create a foreign tie 
C. Local search bridging 
(Search + local connection) 
When the ego searches new networks to create a local tie 
D. Global search bridging 
(Search + global connection) 
When the ego searches new networks to create a foreign tie 
E. Global acceptance bridging 
(Approach + global connection) 
When an ego accepts an alter’s request to form a global tie 
F. Impassive bonding 
(High intensity + Low frequency)  
When the ego commits a large amount of resource to the alter but limits 
interaction following disinterest in this social capital 
G. Dependency bonding 
(High intensity + High 
frequency) 
When the ego commits a large amount of resource to interact frequently with 
the alter due to their reliance on the future outcomes of this social capital 
H. Affinity bonding 
(Low intensity + High frequency) 
When two actors instantly bond through an intellectual, cultural, or empathic 
connection 
I. Eliminating ties 
(Weak ties + Retrenchment)  
When the ego decides to retrench a weak tie 
J. Prioritising ties 
(Strong ties + Retrenchment) 
When the ego decides to retrench a strong tie 
K. Reconfiguring ties 
(Strong ties + Redeployment)  
When the ego decides to redeploy a strong tie for a new purpose 
Source: The Author 
Finally, Table 8-12 defines the various networking activities that create, extend, and modify 
their social capital. Thus, this cross-case analysis found that INVs use a combination of 
eleven networking activities in an implicit attempt to increase the value of their social capital. 
The next section will therefore consider why certain networking activities enable or inhibit 
NVI. 
8.5 RQ4: Why do certain networking activities enable or inhibit new venture 
internationalisation? 
This section reports the cross-case findings on why certain networking activities enable or 
inhibit NVI. This section uses case-ordered effects matrices (Miles and Huberman, 1994) as 
an analytical tool to order and explain why certain networking activities enable or inhibit 
NVI. However, in accordance with Saldaña’s (2003) arguments on longitudinal qualitative 
data analysis, the researcher examines the “influence” rather than “effects” of specific 
networking activities to avoid over precise predictions. Moreover, the following displays 
report longitudinal data that provide evidence on the initial and subsequent influence of 
networking activities on NVI. Table 8-13 therefore presents a summary of this section’s 
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cross-case findings and will now discuss the influence of each of these networking activities 
on NVI. 
Table 8-13: Enablers and Inhibitors: Summary of Findings 
 Fertility HeartBeat FemMed SafeMed Outcome 
Network creation activities 
Local referral bridging Both Enabler - - Capability based 
Global referral bridging Both Both Enabler Inhibitor Capability based 
Local search bridging - Enabler Enabler Inhibitor Capability-based 
Global search bridging Inhibitor Inhibitor Inhibitor Inhibitor Inhibitor 
Global acceptance bridging Enabler Enabler Enabler - Enabler 
Network extension activities 
Affinity bonding Enabler Enabler Enabler - Enabler 
Dependency bonding Both Inhibitor Enabler Inhibitor Capability based 
Impassive bonding Inhibitor - Inhibitor Inhibitor Inhibitor 
Network modification activities 
Eliminating ties Enabler Enabler Enabler Inhibitor Capability based 
Prioritising ties Enabler Enabler - - Enabler 
Reconfiguring ties Enabler Enabler Enabler - Enabler 
      “Enabler” refers to when there was multiple evidence across cases that a specific networking activity enabled NVI. 
      “Inhibitor” refers to when there was multiple evidence across cases that a specific networking activity inhibited NVI. 
       “Both” refers to when there was evidence of both strong and weak practice when performing a networking activity, which 
enabled and inhibited NVI. 
        “Neutral” indicates there was not enough evidence to determine whether the networking activity enabled or inhibited 
NVI. 
        “Capability based” assumes the strength of capability determines whether a networking activity enables or inhibits NVI 
opposed to the specific activity itself.  
Source: The Author 
8.5.1 Network Creation Activities Influence on NVI 
Table 8-14 reports why certain network creation activities enable or inhibit NVI. It is also 
important to emphasise that Table 8-14 aggregates Appendix 7, which presents a more 
granular cross-case data analysis. To begin with, Table 8-13 reports that two (e.g. Fertility 
and HeartBeat) of the four INVs were found to use LRB as a mechanism to create social 
capital. Consequently, Table 8-13 reports that LRB appears to have a varied influence on 
each of these new ventures’ internationalisation. Incidentally, this finding indicates there is 
evidence of stronger and weaker practices in terms of how these INVs perform this 
networking activity. These stronger and weaker practices therefore give insight into why 
certain LRB activities enable or inhibit NVI.  
Firstly, Table 8-14 reports on Fertility’s attempts at using LRB to create social capital. 
Indeed, Appendix 7A specifies that Fertility initially used LRB to form ties with mentors, 
and subsequently used LRB to form ties with buyers and suppliers. Consequently, Appendix 
7A provides evidence that Fertility’s early use of LRB was effectual in forming ties with 
Harry and Angus, but these mentors did not initially enable NVI. However, Fertility’s 
entrepreneur describes the biggest benefit of forming ties with Harry and Angus was they 
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provided early emotional and business support on how to commercialise a medical device. 
However, over a three-year period, the entrepreneur does describe that these mentors 
introduced Fertility to an EU MNE labelled as HealthMed who initially provided 
international marketing advice and subsequently agreed to distribute the firm’s products. 
Nevertheless, section 8.3.1 specifies that Fertility also used AB to extend this social capital. 
Thus, one possible interpretation of these data is that Fertility shown strong practices in LRB 
with mentors, which combined with AB brought long-term benefits and enabled NVI.    
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Table 8-14: Network Creation Activities Influence on New Venture Internationalisation† 
 Fertility HeartBeat FemMed SafeMed 
 Initial influence on 
NVI^ 
Subsequentˇ 
influence on NVI 
Initial influence on 
NVI 
Subsequent 
influence on NVI 
Initial influence on 
NVI 
Subsequent 
influence on NVI 
Initial influence on 
NVI 
Subsequent 
influence on NVI 
Local referral bridging (LRB) 
Stronger 
practises  
 
 
( ) Local mentors 
provided business 
and emotional 
support but no 
influence on NVI 
(+AB) These 
mentors introduced 
the entrepreneur to an 
EU distributor which 
enabled NVI 
(+) Local mentor 
helped secure R&D 
grants, PCT patent 
applications and US 
FDA approval 
(+AB) Mentor 
provided emotional 
and business support 
which enabled NVI 
( ) No involvement 
in LRB 
 ( ) No involvement 
in LRB 
 
Weaker 
practices 
( ) Used LRB to 
connect with 
investors, mentors, 
suppliers and buyers 
who had no influence 
on NVI 
(+ DB & IB) New 
ties with investors, 
mentors and suppliers 
formed through LRB 
inhibited NVI 
( ) The majority of 
the entrepreneur’s 
bridging activities 
were globally 
focussed 
       
Global referral bridging (GRB) 
Stronger 
practises  
 
 
(+) Used GRB to 
form ties with foreign 
buyers who brought 
sales, reputational 
benefits and access to 
foreign market 
knowledge 
(+DB)  New ties 
with foreign buyers 
continued to generate 
international sales 
which enabled NVI 
(+) Used GRB to 
form ties with 
mentors, investors, 
suppliers and buyers 
who had a positive 
influence on NVI 
(+AB & RT) GRB 
helped gain access to 
foreign R&D 
networks, angel 
investment, and 
signed production 
and distribution 
agreements   
( ) Did not use GRB 
until later on its 
international 
development 
() Used GRB to 
source by using an 
M&A specialist to 
identify and secure 
an suitable strategic 
buyer 
  
Weaker 
practices 
(+) Used GRB to 
form ties with EU 
licensor and 
Canadian VC which 
had growth 
opportunities 
(+ DB) Buyer and 
investor both 
terminated 
agreements which 
inhibited NVI 
(-) Used GRB to form 
ties with a US VC, 
despite lack of 
commitment from VC 
to invest 
(+ ET)  No longer 
used GRB and 
retrenched ties to 
prevent additional 
costs 
( ) No sign of 
weaker practices due 
to limited 
performance of the 
activity 
 (+) Used GRB to 
form ties with two 
USA suppliers and 
one buyer, which 
initial reputational 
benefits 
(+ DB & IB)   
Signed imbalanced 
production and sales 
agreements which 
inhibited NVI 
Local search bridging (LSB) 
Stronger 
practises  
 
 
( ) No involvement 
in LSB 
 (+) Used existing 
local networks to 
source a trustworthy 
local manufacturer, 
which had a positive 
influence on NVI 
( + PT) Local 
manufacturer never 
had regulatory 
approval to produce 
product, which meant 
firm used GRB 
instead 
(+) Used LSB to 
source a BAS and  
suitable manufacturer 
while operating with 
the US market  
(+AB & RT)  
Local investor and 
supplier was they 
both enabled NVI 
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Weaker 
practices 
      (+) Used LSB to 
source a government 
advisor and a 
corporate law firm to 
source grants and 
launch an IPO 
(+ IB)  stopped 
interacting with 
mentor and the IPO 
meant they were not 
eligible for 
government grants, 
which inhibited NVI 
Global search bridging (GSB) 
Stronger 
practises  
( ) No involvement 
in LSB 
- ( ) No involvement 
in LSB 
-     
Weaker 
practices 
    (-)  Used GSB to 
source strategic 
buyer, distributor and 
manufacturer who 
delayed NVI 
( + DB & IB) Poor 
use of GSB as both 
ties were unsuitable 
and inhibited NVI  
(-) Used GSB to 
initially source 
investors, mentors, 
buyers and suppliers 
who all delayed NVI 
( + DB & IB) Poor 
uses of GSB as all 
these ties inhibited 
NVI 
Global acceptance bridging (GAB) 
Stronger 
practises  
 
 
(+) Used GAB with 
foreign buyer to tap 
into their sales 
network 
( +DB & RT) GAB 
led to foreign sales 
revenues which 
enabled NVI 
(+) GAB with a US 
mentor provided 
friendship, R&D, 
sales expertise 
(+AB & RT) US 
mentor became key 
opinion leader who 
enabled NVI 
(+) GAB with a US 
mentor encouraged 
them to establish a 
US sales subsidiary 
(+AB & RT) US 
mentor became key 
opinion leader who 
enabled NVI 
( ) No opportunity 
of GAB 
 
Weaker 
practices 
  (-) GAB with Indian 
VC became a burden 
(+ DB) GAB with 
Indian VC inhibited 
NVI 
    
      † This table is a summary of Appendix 7, which provides a more granular cross-case analysis. 
      ^ “NVI” refers to NVI. In accordance with Zahra and George (2002), Jones and Coviello (2005) and Oviatt and McDougall (2005) the researcher analysed NVI with respect to: (1) inward/outward cross-border 
activities (i.e. R&D, production or sales), (2) speed (i.e. the length of time between foundation and foreign market entry) and scope (i.e. the (3) extent to which the new venture enters foreign markets outside its 
home region)   
      (+) refers to the initial benefits a specific networking activity had on NVI: while (-) refers to the initial problems a networking activity had on NVI 
     () refers to networking activities that enabled NVI over the long-term: while () refers to networking activities that inhibited NVI or the long term 
     (+…) indicates that a combination of networking enable NVI: (+…) indicates that a combination of networking activities inhibit NVI 
     “AB” refers to affinity bonding; “DB” refers to dependency bonding; “IB” refers to impassive bonding; “ET” refers to eliminating ties; “PT” refers to prioritising ties; “RT” refers to reconfiguring ties 
     ( ) refers to networking activities that appear to have no clear influence on NVI 
Source: The Author 
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By contrast, Table 8-14 reports that Fertility’s LRB practices also inhibited NVI. For 
example, section 8.2.1 specifies that Fertility used LRB to form ties with Adam, George, and 
Sean who were a local group of mentors. Consequently, the entrepreneur describes George 
and Sean as both “local guys” who appear to have had no influence on their NVI. Whereas, 
Appendix 7A reports that Adam at UniNet initially provided the firm with an interest-free 
start-up loan, workspace and mentoring. Subsequently, after this LRB, Adam referred 
Fertility to an EU licensor and Canadian VC syndicate. In both cases, Fertility signed an 
initial agreement to collaborate with these firms. However, within less than one year, 
sections 8.3.1 and 8.4.1 specify that due to Fertility’s DB and IBG, the EU licensor and 
Canadian VC both terminated their initial agreements, which placed a six-month delay on 
the firm’s commercialisation. Therefore, a possible interpretation of these findings is that 
Fertility were weak in using LRB given the entrepreneur’s decision to create social capital 
with Adam at UniNet, who subsequently inhibited NVI.  
Whereas, Table 8-14 reports evidence that HeartBeat’s use of LRB in combination with AB 
enabled NVI. For example, section 8.2.1 specifies that HeartBeat’s entrepreneur initially 
used LRB to form ties with Debbie – a local government advisor – who helped the firm 
secure R&D grants, file for a PCT application and US FDA approval. Subsequently, section 
8.3.1 specifies that the entrepreneur used AB to build an inter-personal relation with Debbie, 
which helped the firm secure innovation grants and provided emotional and business 
support. Thus, one possible interpretation of these findings is that HeartBeat shown a 
strength in using LRB as these practices subsequently enabled NVI. Given that Table 8-14 
reports cross-case evidence of both stronger and weaker practices, the researcher assumes 
that LRB can either enable or inhibit NVI. Thus, the ability of each INV to practice LRB in 
combination with bonding activities seems to influence whether these activities will enable 
or inhibit NVI. 
Table 8-14 also reports that the INVs’ vary in their ability to use GRB as a mechanism to 
create social capital, as there is evidence this activity can enable or inhibit NVI. That is, three 
(e.g. Fertility, HeartBeat and FemMed) of the four INVs show a strength in using GRB as 
they formed ties with investors, mentors, buyers and suppliers. For example, Fertility used 
GRB to form ties with foreign buyers, who provided international sales, reputational and 
foreign market knowledge benefits. Incidentally, section 8.3.2 specifies that following a 
period of DB, these ties with foreign buyers (e.g. EU distributor and Chinese distributor) 
helped generate international sales and subsequently enabled NVI. Moreover, Appendix 7B 
 233 
 
reports that HeartBeat also used GRB to create social capital with mentors, investors, buyers, 
and suppliers, which had the initial benefit of gaining access to foreign R&D networks and 
angel investment. Consequently, sections 8.3.1 and 8.3.2 specify that after a period of using 
AB and RTS, the firm was able to sign a foreign production and distribution agreement with 
EliteTech, a Hong Kong based MNE. Thus, one likely interpretation of these findings is this 
repeated practice of GRB in combination with the above networking activities helped enable 
HeartBeat’s NVI.       
Interestingly, section 8.2.3 reports that FemMed initially used GSB as mechanism to create 
social capital with strategic buyers, which was unsuccessful. However, Table 8-14 reports 
that during the firm’s international expansion, HeartBeat decided to hire an M&A specialist 
and use GRB in a reattempt to create social capital with a new strategic buyer. Consequently, 
FemMed used GRB to identify and secure a suitable strategic buyer, which provided the 
founders and investors with a strategic exit. Nevertheless, Table 8-14 provides evidence that 
Fertility, HeartBeat, and SafeMed shown a weakness in practicing this GRB activity. For 
example, section 8.2.1 specifies that SafeMed used GRB to form ties with a US distributor 
and two US manufacturers, which brought initial reputational and financial benefits as news 
of this agreement increased the firm’s share price. However, there is strong evidence that 
SafeMed shown a weakness in practicing GRB as section 8.3.2 describes that they had 
formed ties with the wrong foreign actors. 
This led the US buyers and suppliers to terminate these initial agreements with SafeMed, as 
they were unable to deliver the terms of their initial contract. Thus, one possible 
interpretation of these findings is that SafeMed’s initial practice of GRB appears to have 
indirectly inhibited their NVI. That is, if SafeMed conducted more extensive due diligence 
and negotiated a superior agreement before forming strategic alliances with these partners, 
it is likely there would have been a greater chance of increasing the value of this social 
capital. Thus, one possible interpretation of these findings is the ability of each firm to 
practice GRB is also contingent on using bonding activities, which seems to influence 
whether this networking activity will enable or inhibit NVI. 
Table 8-14 also reports that three (HeartBeat, FemMed and SafeMed) of the four INVs used 
LSB as a mechanism to create social capital, yet, this activity was only used to form ties with 
a limited range of actors. For example, HeartBeat initially used LSB to source a local 
manufacturer, but this supplier did not have the regulatory approval to produce medical 
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products outside its domestic market. Interestingly, section 8.2.1 indicates that SafeMed also 
used LSB to form ties with a local government advisor and corporate law firm. That is, Table 
8-14 reports this initial activity helped SafeMed secure two early stage R&D grants. Soon 
after these grants, SafeMed then decided to pursue an IPO to raise start-up capital. 
Nevertheless, Appendix 7C reports that SafeMed’s IBG and early pursuit of an IPO meant 
they were unable to secure future R&D grants. One possible interpretation of these findings 
is that SafeMed shown a weakness in practicing LRB as after they formed a connection with 
a mentor, they did not extend these ties, which decreased this social capital value. Thus, this 
initial use of LRB in combination with IBG appears to have inhibited their NVI. 
By contrast, Table 8-14 reports that FemMed’s use of LSB in combination with AB and RTS 
enabled their NVI. For example, Appendix 7C reports that FemMed used LSB to form ties 
with Harmony – a local BAS – who initially provided seed capital and access to foreign 
market knowledge. Subsequently, sections 8.3.1 and 8.4.1 specifies that the firm used AB to 
build an inter-personal connection and used RTS as mechanism to support their continued 
expansion within the US market. Thus, one possible interpretation of these findings is that 
FemMed shown an initial strength in practising LSB through the selection of a valuable 
partner, which combined with the above activities, enabled NVI. Given that Table 8-14 
reports cross-case evidence of both stronger and weaker practices, the researcher assumes 
that LSB can either enable or inhibit NVI. 
Interestingly, there is strong evidence that GSB inhibits NVI. That is, Table 8-14 reports that 
only two (FemMed and SafeMed) of the four INVs used GSB as a mechanism to create inter-
organisational social capital. Nevertheless, in these cases there is strong evidence that early 
use of GSB had a negative influence on each of the firm’s immediate and long-term 
development. For example, section 8.2.3 reports that FemMed used GSB to form ties with 
foreign buyers and suppliers, who initially delayed NVI. Moreover, section 8.4.2 reports that 
FemMed engaged in DB and IBG with these ties, which indicates a weakness in being able 
to practice GSB in order to source and select suitable strategic partners. Consequently, 
Appendix 7D reports a similar situation in SafeMed as they predominately used GSB to 
create social capital with a wide range of investors, mentors, buyers, and suppliers.    
There are potential conflicting interpretations here, as these weaker practices could simply 
suggest that both FemMed and SafeMed did not have the sufficient networking capability to 
perform this activity. However, given these firms used GSB at an early stage of their 
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development to form inter-organisational rather than inter-personal ties, another 
interpretation is this activity is more effectual at later stages of international development. 
Moreover, given Fertility and HeartBeat did not use GSB as initial networking activity and 
are younger in age, a likely interpretation is this activity is more likely to be effectual when 
INVs are in a unique strategic position to form ties with such buyers and suppliers. 
Furthermore, since section 8.3.2 reports that both firms used DB and IBG after their use of 
GSB when they initially formed buyer ties. Therefore, one possible interpretation of these 
findings is these firms never had the unique resources to create this social capital. Thus, 
based on these specific data, the researcher assumes the early use of GSB before they own 
unique resources is likely to inhibit NVI.   
By contrast, there is strong evidence that GAB enables NVI. That is, Table 8-14 reports that 
three (Fertility, HeartBeat and FemMed) of the four INVs used GAB to create social capital. 
In each of these cases, Appendix 7E reports that GAB had a positive influence on NVI. For 
example, section 8.2.3 reports that that a Canadian distributor approached Fertility with an 
interest in their products. Consequently, sections 8.3.2 and 8.4.2 explain that Fertility 
increased the value of this social capital by using DB and RTS that led the foreign distributor 
to invest in the business, which enabled NVI. Appendix 7E also reports a similar situation 
in HeartBeat and FemMed who used GAB as a mechanism to create highly valuable mentor 
social capital. Specifically, Table 8-14 summarises that HeartBeat and FemMed both used 
GAB, AB, and RTS as a combined process to enable NVI. 
Interestingly, HeartBeat were the only firm to show a weakness in practicing GAB, as they 
agreed to form ties with an Indian VC syndicate despite their reluctance to source venture 
capital. Section 8.3.1 explains that HeartBeat were unsuccessful in securing venture capital, 
which delayed their commercialisation by six-months, and consequently inhibited their NVI. 
Since SafeMed did not have the opportunity to take advantage of GAB, this is another factor, 
which emphasises the firm’s poor performance as few buyers or independent investors 
shown any interest in their existing technology or products. One possible interpretation of 
these findings is that engaging in GAB provides an initial indication that the focal actor owns 
or has access to strategically valuable resources and capabilities. Therefore, these findings 
indicate a central attribute of INVs capability to practice GAB, is having the foresight and 
intuition to collaborate with actors who can have a positive influence on their growth and 
development. Thus, within these contextual settings, the researcher assumes GAB is likely 
to enable NVI.   
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8.5.2 Network Extension Activities Influence on NVI 
Table 8-15 reports why certain network extension activities enable or inhibit NVI. It is 
important to emphasise that Table 8-15 aggregates Appendix 8, which presents a more 
granular cross-case data analysis. To begin with, Table 8-15 reports that all of the four INVs 
used DB as a mechanism to extend their social capital. However, Table 8-13 reports that DB 
appears to have a varied influence on NVI. Incidentally, Table 8-15 indicates there is 
evidence that the INVs shown signs of stronger and weaker practices in terms of using DB 
to extend their social capital. Thus, the following sections indicate that these stronger and 
weaker practices give insight into why certain DB activities enable or inhibit NVI.  
Firstly, Table 8-15 reports the way in which these INVs use DB to extend their social capital 
appears to differ across cases. For example, Appendix 8A reports that Fertility used DB to 
start building trust with a Chinese MNE with the long-term view of signing a distribution 
agreement to sell their products in mainland China. Sections 8.2.3 and 8.3.2 therefore 
describe that Fertility used GRB to form ties with this Chinese distributor and immediately 
entered the “trust building phase” which required a high commitment of human and financial 
resource to maintain regular contact with the MNE. Consequently, Table 8-15 report after a 
three-year period of DB, Fertility were successful in signing a foreign distribution agreement 
with this buyer who is one of China’s largest MNEs. Thus, a likely interpretation of these 
findings is the initial use of GRB in combination with this continuous use of DB helped 
enable Fertility’s NVI. 
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Table 8-15: Bonding Activities Influence on New Venture Internationalisation 
 Fertility HeartBeat FemMed SafeMed 
 Initial influence on 
NVI† 
Subsequentˇ 
influence on NVI 
Initial influence on 
NVI 
Subsequent 
influence on NVI 
Initial influence on 
NVI 
Subsequent 
influence on NVI 
Initial influence on 
NVI 
Subsequent 
influence on NVI 
Dependency Bonding (DB) 
Stronger 
practises  
 
 
(+) Uses DB to start 
building trust with 
Chinese MNE 
(+GRB)  Firm 
signs distribution 
agreement with 
Chinese MNE 
  (+) Uses DB to raise 
interest from foreign 
strategic buyer 
(+GRB) Strategic 
buyer acquires firm, 
enabling NVI 
  
Weaker 
practices 
(-) Uses DB with VC 
investor to secure 
seed capital 
(+ GRB)  VC does 
not invest which 
inhibits NVI 
(-) Uses DB with VC 
investor due to secure 
seed capital 
(+ GAB)   Due 
diligence delays NVI 
by six months 
  (-) Uses DB to build 
trust with mentors 
and suppliers 
(+ GRB & GSB) 
Mentors  suppliers 
inhibit NVI 
Impassive Bonding (IBG) 
Stronger 
practises  
 
  ( ) No involvement 
in IBG which is a 
strength 
     
Weaker 
practices 
(-) Used IBG with co-
founder and BAS as 
entrepreneur lost 
interest in actors 
(+ LRB, DB & 
ET) Ties delayed 
Chinese relations 
which inhibited NVI 
  (-) Engaged in IBG 
with distributor as 
they no longer sold 
products 
(+ GSB & ET) US 
distributor delayed 
and inhibited NVI 
(-) Engaged in IBG 
with foreign 
investors, buyers and 
suppliers 
(+ GSB) This IBG 
led to elimination of 
ties which inhibited 
NVI 
Affinity Bonding (AB) 
Stronger 
practises  
 
 
(+) Used AB to build 
trust with mentors 
who introduced firm 
to “global contacts” 
(+LRB)   Mentors 
endorsement led to  
EU distribution 
agreement which 
enabled NVI 
(+)  Used AB to build 
trust with foreign 
mentor who helped 
with 
commercialisation 
(+GAB & RT) 
Mentor promoted the 
firm’s products 
globally, which 
enabled NVI 
( )  Used AB with 
investors, mentors & 
suppliers which had 
no initial influence 
on NVI 
(+GAB & RT) 
Mentors helped the 
firm establish a US 
sales subsidiary 
which enabled NVI 
  
Weaker 
practices 
      ( ) No AB which is 
a weakness 
 
      † This table is a summary of Appendix 8, which provides a more granular cross-case analysis. 
      ^ “NVI” refers to NVI. In accordance with Zahra and George (2002), Jones and Coviello (2005) and Oviatt and McDougall (2005) the researcher analysed NVI with respect to: (1) inward/outward cross-border activities (i.e. 
R&D, production or sales), (2) speed (i.e. the length of time between foundation and foreign market entry) and scope (i.e. the (3) extent to which the new venture enters foreign markets outside its home region)   
      (+) refers to the initial benefits a specific networking activity had on NVI: while (-) refers to the initial problems a networking activity had on NVI 
     () refers to networking activities that enabled NVI over the long-term: while () refers to networking activities that inhibited NVI or the long term 
     (+…) indicates that a combination of networking enable NVI: (+…) indicates that a combination of networking activities inhibit NVI 
     “LRB” refers to local referral bridging; “GRB” refers to global referral bridging; “LSB” refers to local search bridging; “GSB” refers to global search bridging; “GAB” refers to global acceptance bridging; “ET” refers to 
eliminating ties; “PT” refers to prioritising ties; “RT” refers to reconfiguring ties 
      
Source: The Author
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However, Table 8-15 indicates under certain contextual conditions, particularly in the case 
of buyer social capital, DB is a necessary and unavoidable activity. Nonetheless, there is 
evidence that the firms shown stronger and weaker practices in performing this networking 
activity. For example, Appendix 8A reports on SafeMed’s DB with a foreign mentor who 
initially provided FDA consultancy, but as the relation evolved the firm continued to access 
the mentor’s US network by using GRB to create buyer and supplier social capital. However, 
section 8.3.1 explains that SafeMed were over-reliant on this US mentor and placed too 
much trust in these referrals. Moreover, section 8.4.1 reports that this buyer and supplier 
social capital eventually became a liability to the firm, which indicates that SafeMed’s DB 
inhibited their NVI. Given Table 8-15 reports cross-case evidence that all of the firms shown 
strengths and weaknesses in practicing this networking activity, the researcher assumes that 
DB can either enable or inhibit NVI. Thus, one possible interpretation is the ability to avoid 
an over-reliance on DB seems to be an important condition on whether this activity will 
either enable or inhibit NVI.  
There is also strong evidence that IBG inhibits NVI. Firstly, Table 8-15 reports that three 
(Fertility, FemMed and SafeMed) of the four INVs implicitly used IBG in attempts to extend 
their social capital. In these cases, there is strong evidence that the use of IBG had a negative 
influence on each of these INV’s initial and long-term development. For example, section 
8.3.1 reports Fertility engaged in IBG with Dr Shi their co-founder and their local BAS, as 
in both cases, the firm became impassive about interacting with these actors. For example, 
Appendix 8B suggests, when Dr Shi exited the company, this had a negative impact on 
relations with the Chinese distributor, which inhibited NVI. Similarly, section 8.3.2 reports 
FemMed used IBG as they attempted to extend social capital with a US distributor. However, 
Appendix 8B reports that FemMed had a false sense of trust that the US distributor would 
sell their products. Nevertheless, section 8.4.2 reports that when FemMed’s entrepreneur 
reflected on this experience, she admitted despite the initial resource they had invested in 
this tie, they did not interact with this distributor or encourage them to sell their products. 
Thus, a clear interpretation of these findings is that FemMed’s IBG inhibited their NVI.  
Interestingly, Appendix 8B reports that SafeMed were most intensive in using IBG with their 
investors, a US buyer, and multiple US suppliers. In three of these relations, Appendix 8B 
reports on section 8.5.1 discussion that SafeMed had initially used GSB to create social 
capital that quickly became a liability, which explains the firm’s impassiveness. Thus, given 
SafeMed’s retrenchment of these ties, it is apparent that IBG inhibited their NVI. Finally, 
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Table 8-15 reports that HeartBeat did not engage in IBG whilst attempting to extend their 
social capital. Instead, Figure 8-2 illustrates that HeartBeat were found to use AB as a 
lubricant to extend their social capital, which the below discussion reports in depth. 
Nevertheless, a likely interpretation of this finding is that HeartBeat was able to avoid IBG, 
which shows strength in being able to focus on other networking activities such as AB in 
order to extend their social capital. Therefore, based on these specific data, the researcher 
assumes that IBG is likely to inhibit NVI. 
By contrast, there is strong evidence that AB enables NVI. That is, Table 8-15 reports that 
three (Fertility, HeartBeat and FemMed) of the four INVs used AB a lubricant to extend 
their social capital. In each of these cases, Appendix 8C reports that AB had a positive 
influence on the INVs initial and long-term development. For example, section 8.3.1 reports 
that Fertility’s AB with two life science entrepreneurs – Harry and Angus – led to initial 
benefits such as access to business and emotional support. Table 8-15 reports that these 
mentors endorsement subsequently led Fertility to sign an EU distribution agreement, which 
enabled their NVI. Appendix 8C also reports a similar situation in both HeartBeat and 
FemMed who used AB as a mechanism to extend ties with their mentors. In both cases, these 
mentors were US-based surgeons who had a strong interest in each of the firms’ technologies 
and existing products. Consequently, in both cases, Table 8-15 specifies that these US 
surgeons became KOLs for the firms within the US medical technology sector, which 
evidently enabled both of their NVI. 
Interestingly, SafeMed are the only firm who did not engage in AB, which the researcher 
interprets as a weakness given the clear importance of this networking activity. Since 
SafeMed did not engage in AB, this indicates they could not connect on an intellectual or 
emphatic level with mentors, buyers, and suppliers who are involved in the life sciences 
industry. One possible interpretation of these findings is given that the majority of 
SafeMed’s TMT’s industry experience was within investment banking and commercial real 
estate, it is apparent the founders were unable to strike an inter-personal connection with 
actors within the medical technology sector. Therefore, these findings indicate a central 
attribute of an INV’s capability to practice AB, is having the intellect and empathy to connect 
with actors in contextually specific industries. Thus, based on these contextual conditions, 
the researcher assumes that AB is likely to enable NVI. 
 240 
 
8.5.3 Network Modification Activities Influence on NVI 
Tables 8-16 and 8-17 report on why certain network modification activities enable or inhibit 
NVI. To begin with, Table 8-16 reports that all of the INVs used ETS as a mechanism to 
modify their social capital. Consequently, Table 8-13 reports that ETS appears to have a 
varied influence on NVI. Incidentally, Table 8-16 indicates there is evidence of stronger and 
weaker practice in terms of how these INVs perform this networking activity. These stronger 
and weaker practices therefore provide insight on why ETS enables or inhibits NVI. One 
important observation from Table 8-16 is the majority of INVs used ETS as a reactive 
mechanism to modify social capital that was having a negative impact on the firm. Whereas, 
Table 8-16 also reports that were some instances where INVs used ETS as a proactive 
activity to modify their social capital. In most cases, irrespective of whether this 
retrenchment of weak ties was a reactive or proactive action, there is strong evidence that 
once these INVs used ETS to modify their social capital, this activity would subsequently 
enable their NVI. 
For example, Table 8-16 reports that FemMed used ETS as a reactive activity to modify their 
ties with a US distributor. Incidentally, section 8.4.2 explains the US distributor shown a 
lack of commitment and did not attempt to sell the firm’s products. Therefore, this situation 
left the firm in a vulnerable position as they had forecasted to generate international sales 
revenues that did not materialise which initially had a negative impact on NVI. 
Consequently, Figure 8.6 illustrates that FemMed used ETS to prevent an additional 
decrease in the value of this buyer social capital, before it became a serious liability. 
However, Table 8-16 reports Fertility’s use of ETS did bring a certain amount of serendipity 
as a Californian surgeon who was a customer of the US distributor approached the firm and 
“refused to accept he could no longer buy [FemMed’s] products.” Therefore, this decision 
to retrench this weak tie did trigger the firm to form a new R&D partnership with the 
Californian surgeon and establish a US sales subsidiary, which both enabled NVI. 
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Table 8-16: Eliminating Weak Ties 
  Reason for change Nature of 
change 
Initial influence on NVI Subsequent influence on NVI 
Eliminating ties – Evidence of stronger practices 
HeartBeat –  
US VC  
Investor VC shown lack of interest in 
the venture 
Proactive Retrenched the relation early to 
prevent additional costs 
Positive Firm targeted universities to generate 
international sales 
Enabler 
FemMed – 
French 
manufacturer 
Supplier Quality problems with 
product along with 
collaboration difficulties due 
to foreign location 
Proactive Searched for new manufacturer 
who had stronger production 
capabilities 
Positive Firm built long term strategic alliance with a 
local Scottish manufacturer who had superior 
production capabilities 
Enabler 
Fertility –  
EU licensor 
Buyer EU licensor had lost interest 
in firm’s technology 
Proactive This relationship delayed the  
generation of international 
revenues 
Negative Retrenchment triggered the firm  to focus on its 
core product range which enabled indirect and 
direct exporting 
Enabler 
Eliminating ties – Evidence of weaker practices 
Fertility – 
English 
manufacturer 
Supplier Loss of trust in the firm’s 
production capabilities due to 
ongoing quality issues 
Reactive Firm did not have suitable 
product to export 
Negative The retirement of this tie triggered the decision to 
internalise production 
Enabler 
FemMed –  
US distributor 
Buyer US distributor shown lack of 
commitment and did not 
generate international sales 
Reactive Firm was left in a vulnerable 
position as they anticipated sales 
revenues which did not 
materialise 
Negative Retirement triggered firm to conduct new R&D 
in partnership with Californian surgeon and the 
decision to establish US sales subsidiary 
Enabler 
Fertility – 
Dr Shi 
Mentor Co-founder felt 
uncomfortable with 
commercial aspect of the 
venture 
Reactive Firm had lost a core R&D 
partner with influence in China 
 
Negative The retirement of this tie triggered the decision to 
reconfigure the TMT 
Enabler 
SafeMed – 
R&D 
consultants 
Supplier R&D consultants did not 
deliver a quality service 
Reactive Retrenched ties after it became a 
liability 
Negative Retrenchment motivated firm to internalise R&D 
which helped over growth challenges 
Enabler 
SafeMed – 
Local gov. 
advisor 
Mentor Firm lost interest in seeking 
advisors help 
 
Proactive Firm found itself unable to apply 
for government innovation 
grants 
Negative The firm’s IPO meant they were no longer 
eligible for start-up government grants 
Inhibitor 
Fertility – 
Canadian VC 
Investor Canadian VC no longer 
wanted to invest 
Reactive Retrenched ties after it became a 
liability 
Negative This due diligence process delayed the firm’s 
commercialisation by six-months 
Inhibitor 
HeartBeat – 
Indian VC 
Investor Indian VC no longer wanted 
to invest 
Reactive Retrenched ties after it became a 
liability 
Negative This due diligence process delayed the firm’s 
commercialisation by six months 
Inhibitor 
Source: The Author
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By contrast, Table 8-16 reports that Fertility used ETS as a proactive activity to modify their 
ties with an EU licensor. Section 8.4.2 explains that this EU licensor had lost interest in 
Fertility’s technology due to the emergence of similar technologies. Figure 8-6 illustrates 
that Fertility used ETS to retrench these ties before this social capital became a liability. 
Moreover, Figure 8-6 also illustrates that Fertility retrenched this tie with the EU licensor 
much earlier than FemMed’s attempt, which indicates a more proactive attempt to modify 
buyer social capital. Consequently, this decision to retrench this weak tie also triggered the 
firm to focus on building a core product range, which encouraged the firm to use indirect 
and direct exporting as a new internationalisation strategy, which enabled NVI. One possible 
interpretation of these findings is that Fertility shown a greater strength in practicing ETS in 
comparison to FemMed, as Fertility’s decision to retrench these ties was more proactive in 
nature. Nevertheless, these findings do provide strong evidence that ETS with buyers did 
enable these firms’ NVI. 
However, Table 8-16 also provides mixed results on whether INVs use of ETS with investors 
enables or inhibits NVI. For example, section 8.4.1 specifies that both Fertility and 
HeartBeat used ETS to modify their investor social capital with Canadian and Indian VC 
syndicates. Nevertheless, Table 8-16 reports that both firms initially used ETS as a reactive 
activity to modify this investor social capital. Consequently, Figure 8.4 illustrates that both 
firms were slow in their use of ETS, which indicates this social capital had become a liability 
as this due diligence delayed the firms’ commercialisation by six-months and initially had a 
negative influence on NVI. Table 8-16 thus, reports in both cases, given the slow response 
to use ETS, the weak use of ETS subsequently inhibited NVI as it put a long-term strain on 
both businesses. However, section 8.4.1 does specify that HeartBeat had learned from these 
previous mistakes, and used ETS much earlier to modify its social capital with a US VC 
syndicate. In this event, Table 8-16 reports HeartBeat used ETS as a proactive activity to 
modify their weak ties with these investors, which prevented this social capital from 
becoming a liability. Consequently, Table 8-16 reports that since the firm changed its 
strategy and exported its products to universities, it is evident that ETS subsequently enabled 
NVI.  
Similarly, Table 8-16 reports there were stronger and weaker attempts at using ETS to 
modify supplier social capital, but in all cases, these attempts appear to enable NVI. For 
example, Table 8-16 reports that FemMed used ETS as a proactive activity to modify their 
ties with a French manufacturer. Section 8.4.2 explains that FemMed decided to retrench 
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this weak tie, as there was on-going quality problems since the firm found it difficult to 
collaborate with this supplier across borders. Consequently, Figure 8-6 also illustrates that 
FemMed were early to use ETS before this social capital became a liability. Therefore, Table 
8-16 reports that this proactive use of ETS encouraged the firm to use LSB to create social 
capital with a local Scottish manufacturer, who had superior production capabilities, and 
subsequently enabled their NVI.  
By contrast, Table 8-16 reports that Fertility and SafeMed both used ETS, but as a reactive 
activity to modify their supplier social capital. For example, Figure 8-6 illustrates that both 
Fertility and SafeMed were slow to retrench these weak ties, which led to a greater loss in 
social capital. For instance, section 8.4.2 reports that Fertility had lost trust in their 
manufacturers production capabilities due to ongoing quality issues, while SafeMed had lost 
trust in their Chinese and American R&D consultants who did not deliver on their 
contractual obligations. Nevertheless, Table 8-16 does indicate this use of ETS did 
encourage both Fertility and SafeMed to internalise R&D and/or production, which over the 
long-term enabled their NVI.  
Interestingly, both firms used ETS to modify their mentor social capital. However, Table 8-
16 reports both firms differ on whether they were proactive or reactive in modifying this 
social capital. For example, Fertility used ETS as a reactive activity to retrench ties with Dr 
Shi the firm’s co-founder, while SafeMed were proactive in using ETS to retrench ties with 
a local government advisor. Interestingly, Figure 8-5 illustrates that Fertility were slow to 
retrench this social capital, which meant the firm had lost a core R&D partner and influence 
in China. Nevertheless, Table 8-16 reports that Fertility’s use of ETS did encourage the firm 
to recruit a more internationally experienced TMT, which subsequently enabled NVI. By 
contrast, Figure 8-5 illustrates that SafeMed were fast to retrench ties with a local 
government advisor as they focused on an IPO, but Table 8-16 reports this use of ETS meant 
the firm were unable to apply for government innovation grants. Consequently, there is 
strong evidence that the firm were unable to secure future government grants, which over 
the long-term inhibited NVI.
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Table 8-17: Prioritising and Reconfiguring Strong Ties 
 Tie type Reason for change Nature of 
change 
Initial influence on NVI Subsequent influence on NVI 
Prioritising ties  
Fertility – Adam Mentor Entrepreneur felt the mentor was no 
longer a priority 
Reactive Adam referred the entrepreneur to an 
EU licensor and Canadian VC who 
both delayed NVI 
Negative Retrenchment triggered decision to focus on indirect 
exporting opposed licensing 
Enabler 
Fertility – George Mentor Entrepreneur felt the mentor was no 
longer important in the business 
Proactive None Neutral Retrenchment provided the entrepreneur with 
opportunity to build new sales & marketing relations 
Enabler 
Fertility –  
Sean 
Mentor Entrepreneur felt the mentor was no 
longer important in the business 
Proactive None Neutral Retrenchment provided the entrepreneur with 
opportunity to build new sales & marketing relations 
Enabler 
HeartBeat – Local 
manufacturer 
Supplier Local manufacturer didn’t have FDA 
regulatory approval or suitable 
production capabilities 
Proactive Maintained link, but reallocated time 
to sourcing cross-border production 
relationships 
Positive Retrenchment meant the entrepreneur signed an 
overseas production and distribution agreement with 
HK manufacturer 
Enabler 
Reconfiguring ties 
Fertility – 
Canadian 
distributor 
Buyer Entrepreneur encouraged distributor 
to invest in the firm’s NPD 
Proactive Signed Canadian distribution 
agreement and distributor agreed to 
fund regulatory approval 
Positive Redeployment meant Canadian distributor helped the 
fund the expansion of its domestic production facility, 
which enabled greater exporting 
Enabler 
HeartBeat –  US 
cardiologist 
Mentor Entrepreneur wanted to involve the 
US cardiologist more in the business 
Proactive Founded 50/50 IJV with US 
cardiologist in USA 
Positive Redeployment triggered US cardiologist to encourage 
HK manufacturer to sign production & distribution 
agreement 
Enabler 
HeartBeat – 
Universities 
Mentor Entrepreneur identified universities 
as core customer to generate 
international sales 
Proactive North American and European 
universities became the firm’s core 
customer 
Positive Redeployment meant academics began to promote 
entrepreneur’s products, which encouraged a surge in 
international sales 
Enabler 
HeartBeat – HK 
manufacturer 
Supplier Entrepreneur encouraged HK 
manufacturer to distribute his 
products 
Proactive Signed outward distribution 
agreement 
Positive Redeployment meant new distribution agreement 
enabled growth in international sales for the business 
Enabler 
FemMed –  
BAS 
Investor Firm began to build an inter-
personal relation with BAS 
Reactive BAS encouraged firm to source a 
strategic buyer to acquire the 
company 
Positive Redeployment lead to angels becoming “friends to us 
all” following a successful trade sale 
Enabler 
FemMed – 
Californian 
surgeon 
Mentor Surgeon offered have more 
involvement in the business 
Reactive Surgeon became a key opinion leader 
for US sales subsidiary 
Positive Redeployment led preceptor surgeon to have more 
involvement which led to growth in international sales 
Enabler 
Source: The Author
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Interestingly, there is also evidence that PTS enables NVI. That is, Table 8-17 reports that 
Fertility and HeartBeat predominately used PTS a proactive activity to modify their strong 
ties with mentors and suppliers. For example, section 8.4.1 reports that Fertility used PTS to 
modify its mentor social capital as they felt certain mentors were no longer important in the 
firm’s international development. Incidentally, this use of PTS is in direct contrast to the 
above discussion on SafeMed use of ETS to modify their mentor social capital. Incidentally, 
Table 8-17 reports this use of PTS initially had a neutral influence on NVI as the firm 
maintained contact with these strong ties, but reallocated their limited resources to other 
relations. Consequently, Figure 8-6 illustrates that Fertility were early to use PTS which 
meant this social capital maintained a reasonable level of value. Moreover, Table 8-17 
reports this proactive use of PTS motivated the firm to create new sales and marketing 
contacts, whose industry experience subsequently helped enable NVI.    
Interestingly, HeartBeat were the only the firm to use PTS as a mechanism to modify 
supplier social capital. That is, section 8.3.2 reports that HeartBeat were unique in building 
an inter-personal relation with their local supplier. However, Table 8-17 reports that this 
local manufacturer did not have the sufficient production capabilities or US FDA regulatory 
approval to manufacture the firm’s products. Therefore, section 8.4.2 describes that 
HeartBeat maintained these ties, but relocated their resources to building ties with a Hong 
Kong manufacturer who had more extensive production capabilities. Consequently, Table 
8-17 reports HeartBeat’s proactive use of PTS was a trigger to modifying this new social 
capital, as the Hong Kong manufacturer agreed to distribute the firm’s products, which 
subsequently enabled NVI. Therefore, based on these specific data, the researcher assumes 
that PTS is likely to enable NVI. 
There is also strong evidence that RTS enables NVI. That is, Table 8-17 reports that three 
(Fertility, HeartBeat and FemMed) of the four INVs used RTS as mechanism to modify their 
social capital. Moreover, Table 8-17 indicates that Fertility and HeartBeat were both 
proactive in using RTS to modify their social capital, while FemMed appear to be reactive 
in the use of RTS to modify their social capital. Additionally, section 8.4.1 explains that both 
HeartBeat and FemMed used RTS to modify their mentor social capital, as they wanted to 
redeploy their mentors’ involvement within the business. That is, section 8.4.1 explains that 
both HeartBeat and FemMed redeployed their strong ties with US surgeons as they 
encouraged them to become KOLs within the business. Incidentally, Table 8-17 reports that 
for both firms this use of RTS had a positive influence on NVI as these intellectual 
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connections helped with their US expansion. Consequently, Table 8-17 also reports that this 
proactive use of RTS helped HeartBeat accelerate the development of Hong Kong 
manufacturer relation, while helped FemMed increase US sales and secure a trade-sale, 
which indicates this activity subsequently enabled NVI.  
Table 8-17 also reports that these three firms used RTS, which increased the multiplexity of 
their investor and buyer social capital. That is, section 8.4.1 reports that HeartBeat were early 
to use RTS in order to increase the multiplexity of their relations with universities. For 
example, section 8.4.1 specifies that HeartBeat initially formed mentor ties with universities 
but redeployed these relations, and encouraged these ties to become a core customer. 
Consequently, Table 8-17 reports that this redeployment meant academic institutions began 
to promote HeartBeat’s products that led to a surge in international sales, which enabled 
NVI. Similarly, section 8.4.2 also reports that Fertility were early to use RTS in order to 
redeploy their relations with a Canadian distributor. That is, Table 8-17 reports that Fertility 
encouraged the distributor to invest in the firm’s NPD and regulatory approval. 
Consequently, this redeployment meant the Canadian distributor helped fund the expansion 
of Fertility’s domestic production facility, which increased the level of direct exports and 
enabled NVI. 
Finally, Table 8-17 reports that FemMed used RTS to modify their strong ties with Harmony 
a local BAS, as the firm built an inter-personal relation with this investor. This inter-personal 
tie then encouraged the BAS to invest additional financial capital into the business, despite 
their initial inability to generate international sales. Consequently, Table 8-17 reports that 
this friendship meant the firm received extensive mentoring in terms of business and 
emotional support that helped with the foundation of a US sales subsidiary, which evidently 
enabled NVI. Interestingly, SafeMed were the only firm who did not engage in RTS, which 
the researcher also interprets as a weakness given the clear importance of this networking 
activity. Therefore, these findings indicate RTS is a central activity, as redeployment appears 
to be crucial practice for resource constrained innovation based firms. Thus, based on these 
contextual conditions, the researcher assumes that RTS is likely to enable NVI. 
8.6 RQ5: Which network processes underpin networking capability development in 
new venture internationalisation?  
This section reports the cross-case findings on which network processes underpin 
networking capability development in NVI. Firstly, Figure 6-8 illustrates that three network 
 247 
 
processes emerged as overarching dimensions that aggregate several second-order themes. 
Thus, these aggregate categories are the (1) network-enhancing process, (2) network-
delaying process, and (3) network-modifying process. Consequently, these various 
networking activities (e.g. second-order themes) undergird these three network processes 
(e.g. aggregate categories), which were found to conceptually underpin an INV’s networking 
capability. Figures 8-8, 8-9, 8-10, and 8-11 therefore illustrate the development of 
networking capability in NVI. Table 8-18 also presents a summary of these cross-case 
findings, which the following sections will now explain in depth. 
Table 8-18: Networking Capability Development: Summary of Findings 
 Fertility HeartBeat FemMed SafeMed 
 Initialˆ Subsq† Initial Subsq Initial Subsq Initial Subsq 
Local referral bridging Weak   Strong Strong Strong - - Weak  Weak 
Global referral bridging Weak Strong Strong Strong Strong Strong Weak Weak 
Local search bridging - - Strong - Strong Strong Strong - 
Global search bridging - - - - Weak Weak Weak Weak 
Global acceptance bridging Weak Strong Strong Strong Strong Strong Weak Weak 
Affinity bonding Weak Strong Strong Strong Strong Strong Weak Weak 
Dependency bonding (avoiding) Weak Strong Weak Strong Weak Strong Weak Weak 
Impassive bonding (avoiding) - - - - Weak Strong Weak Weak 
Eliminating ties Weak Weak Strong Weak Weak Strong Weak Weak 
Reducing ties Weak - - - - - - - 
Prioritising ties Weak Strong Strong - - - - - 
Reconfiguring ties Weak Strong Strong Strong Strong Strong - - 
   ˆ “Initial” refers to initial evidence of a specific networking activity.      
   † “Subsq” is shorthand for subsequent and refers to subsequent evidence that indicates this networking activity was used to bridge, 
bond, or change the content of a new tie.   
      “Weak” practices refers to when the firm performs a networking activity on more than two occasions, which ultimately inhibited 
NVI. 
      “Strong” practices refers to when the firm performs a networking activity on more than two occasions, which ultimately enabled 
NVI. 
       “-“refers to when there was no evidence of the firm performing this specific networking activity. 
Source: The Author  
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Figure 8-8: Fertility – Networking Capability Development 
 
Source: The Author 
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Figure 8-9: HeartBeat – Networking Capability Development 
 
Source: The Author 
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Figure 8-10: FemMed – Networking Capability Development 
 
Source: The Author 
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Figure 8-11: SafeMed – Networking Capability Development 
 
Source: The Author
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8.6.1 Network-Enhancing Process 
Tables 8-19 and 8-20 report the various networking activities that underpin the network-
enhancing process. Firstly, section 8.5.2 reports that within knowledge-intensive industries 
such as the medical technology sector, there is strong evidence that AB enables NVI. Section 
8.5.1 reports the strength of the INV’s capability to practice network creation activities has 
a varied influence on NVI. Therefore, this section reports on evidence that indicates the use 
of stronger practices to perform network creation activities in combination with AB leads to 
what the researcher terms as a “network-enhancing process.” The researcher defines the 
network-enhancing process, as when the focal actor engages in networking activities that 
“enhances” the value of its social capital. Furthermore, the conceptual aggregation of these 
abductive findings is that this network-enhancing process is integral to the development of 
networking capability in NVI. It is also evident from this cross-case analysis that three 
(Fertility, HeartBeat and FemMed) of the four INVs show clear signs of using the network-
enhancing process to enable NVI.  
Table 8-19 indicates that Fertility’s combined use of LRB and AB is one example of the 
network-enhancing process. That is, Figure 8-8 illustrates that Fertility at the international 
start-up phase were initially weak in their networking capability to create or extend social 
capital. Section 8.5.1 reports after Fertility used LRB to create ties with various local 
mentors, they struggled to maintain the value of this social capital. Incidentally, Appendix 
7A reports Fertility had become too reliant on LRB since local mentors such as Adam at 
UniNet inhibited their NVI. Moreover, section 8.5.2 also reports that Fertility initially shown 
a weakness in practicing AB as the entrepreneur struggled to build inter-personal relations 
with mentors. Nevertheless, Figure 8-8 illustrates as Fertility moved into the international 
expansion phase, they began to show signs of networking capability development as they 
turned this weakness of practicing LRB into a strength. That is, Table 8-14 reports that 
Fertility used LRB to create ties with two local mentors (e.g. Harry and Angus) who were 
instrumental in their NVI. This is evident in quotation NEP1 within Table 8-19, which 
emphasises their combined use of LRB and AB was apparent as these mentors “were happy 
to hear from you” and would “provide support every week.” Consequently, Tables 8-14 and 
8-15 confirm that Fertility’s use of LRB and AB led to an increase in the value of their 
mentor social capital as they helped the firm sign an EU distribution agreement, which 
enabled NVI.   
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Table 8-19: Representative Data for Network-Enhancing Process 
 Affinity bonding  Aggregate category 1  – Network-enhancing process  
Local 
referral 
bridging 
Fertility – Firm shown initial 
weakness in using LRB to create 
mentor social capital, but after using 
AB to extend this social capital, this 
enabled NVI 
NEP1 
Guys like that give you support every week. You can talk to them and 
they’re just happy to hear from you and it’s that encouragement that, 
you know, and you can bounce things off. So, it’s having that 
involvement. I’d say he’s definitely one [FER-I09-B]. 
HeartBeat – Firm shown initial 
strength in using LRB and AB to 
create and extend their mentor social 
capital, which enabled NVI. 
NEP2 
[Debbie] is the coordinator for the [Local] government. She is very nice 
and I regularly meet with her, she is like a friend to me. I actually had 
a meeting with her this morning and she has been fantastic in helping 
us secure R&D grants and promote our products internationally at 
tradeshows [HEA-I09-B]. 
Global 
referral 
bridging 
HeartBeat – Firm shown strength in 
using GRB and AB to create mentor 
social capital  with US hospitals, 
which enabled NVI 
NEP3 
I do have an advisor/friend/mentor in the US who’s a cardiologist, but 
he’s a kind of a serial entrepreneur himself. So [Dr Arthur] is our 
medical advisor chum… and he’s the guy who helped us enter the US 
market by introducing us to the hospitals. You know, I think the US 
market in particular is such a strange beast to us in Australia that you 
really need to have people on the ground there who can provide you 
with that advice [HEA-I09-D].  
Local 
search 
bridging 
FemMed –  Firm shown strength in 
using LSB to search for new 
contacts such as investors and 
suppliers and building inter-personal 
relations with them to enable NVI 
NEP4 
We looked at VCs and we looked at Angels [BAS], and we felt that we 
would have more control over the business and there was more support 
from an Angel company than a VC. Because the thing about a VC is if 
you don’t hit the milestones, they essentially come in, run the company 
and mothball you if they think it wasn’t working. We felt with an Angel 
that they would let us, maybe not free-rain as such, but there would be 
more support than just finance [FER-I11-B3]. 
Global 
acceptance 
bridging 
HeartBeat – Firm shown strength in 
using GAB and AB as a mechanism 
to increase the value of their mentor 
social capital, which enabled NVI 
NEP5 
I have known him for fifth-teen years through my previous company. 
He had another company called [HeartCritical] and we just met at a 
tradeshow. And I have just kept in contact. His company – 
[HeartCritical] – got bought by a [large US MNE], and he became the 
chief cardiologist in [the MNE], but he is an entrepreneur so he stayed 
there for two or three years. And then he left and we started inventing 
this new device, but I have always kept in touch with him. Every time 
I go to the States, I always go and see him, as he is a friend of mine 
[HEA-I10-A].  
FemMed – Firm shown strength in 
using GAB and AB as a mechanism 
to increase the value of their mentor 
social capital, which enabled NVI 
NEP6 
Probably the biggest benefit was we found a fantastic surgeon in 
California who used our products, so when the distribution agreement 
came to a halt, or ceased, the Californian surgeon was such a believer 
in [FemMed’s] products that he refused to accept that he couldn’t get 
the product anymore and he insisted that we sold the products to him 
[FEM-I11-B2]. 
Source: The Author 
By contrast, Table 8-18 reports that HeartBeat shown a greater strength in using LRB and 
AB as a network-enhancing process. That is, Figure 8-9 illustrates that HeartBeat at the 
international start-up phase initially shown evidence of strong networking capability as they 
had the capacity to create and extend their mentor social capital. For example, section 8.5.1 
reports that after HeartBeat used to LRB to create ties with a local government advisor (e.g. 
Debbie) it is apparent the entrepreneur struck an instant connection with this mentor. 
Incidentally, quotation NEP2 within Table 8-19 emphasises that the entrepreneur mentions 
that Debbie is “very nice” that “he regularly meets with her” and describes her as “like a 
friend to me.” Figure 8-9 also illustrates that as HeartBeat moved into the international 
expansion phase there was a shift in their networking capability development as this period 
was characterised with less bridging and more AB with mentors. Consequently, Tables 8-14 
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and 8-15 confirm that HeartBeat’s use of LRB and AB helped increase the value of mentor 
social capital, as this networking-enhancing process enabled the firm secure R&D grants, 
PCT applications and US FDA regulatory approval, which together enabled NVI.  
Interestingly, Table 8-19 reports that HeartBeat were the only firm to use GRB and AB as a 
network-enhancing process. That is, Figure 8-1 illustrates that most of the INVs used GRB 
to create social capital with foreign buyers and suppliers. Whereas, HeartBeat were the only 
INV to use GRB as a mechanism to create mentor social capital and then use AB to extend 
this social capital. For example, section 8.2.2 describes that HeartBeat used GRB and AB to 
ask a US cardiologist (e.g. Dr Arthur) to introduce them to a US hospital who chaired a 
global R&D consortium. That is, quotation NEP3 in Table 8-19 describes Dr Arthur as an 
“advisor/friend/mentor” who had helped them “enter the US market by introducing [them] 
to US hospitals.” Figure 8-9 also illustrates that HeartBeat continued to use GRB and AB, 
which indicates the increasing strength of their networking capability as they progressed to 
the international expansion phase. Consequently, Appendix 7B and 8C both confirm that 
HeartBeat’s use of GRB and AB led to an increase in mentor social capital, as this network-
enhancing process helped the firm gain access to a global R&D consortium that provided 
reputational benefits within the academic community, which were vital for enabling NVI. 
Similarly, Table 8-19 reports that FemMed were the only firm to use LSB and AB as a 
network-enhancing process. That is, Figure 8-1 illustrates that most INVs used LSB to create 
social capital with mentors and suppliers, however Figure 8-2 illustrates that most of these 
INVs did not bond with these mentors or suppliers. Whereas, FemMed were the only INV 
within this sample to use LSB and AB to create and extend their investor social capital. For 
example, quotation NEP4 within Table 8-19 describes that FemMed: “looked at VC’s and 
we looked at Angles [BAS], and we felt that we would have more control over the business 
and there was more support from an Angel company than a VC.” Figure 8-10 also illustrates 
that FemMed shown strength in using LSB as they were successful in their selection of a 
strategically valuable partner, but it is also evident they only began to use AB once the firm 
reached the international expansion phase. Consequently, Tables 8-14 and 8-15 confirm that 
Fertility’s use of LSB and AB led to an increase in investor social capital, as this network-
enhancing process helped the firm establish a US sales subsidiary, which enabled NVI. 
Interestingly, Table 8-19 reports that HeartBeat and FemMed were the only firms to use 
GAB and AB as a network-enhancing process. This is an important observation as although 
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these cross-case findings cannot be generalised, there was strong evidence in each of these 
cases that GAB and AB is a network-enhancing process that accelerates relationship 
development, which consequently enables NVI. That is, Table 8-19 reports that both 
HeartBeat and FemMed shown a strength in using GAB and AB to quickly create and extend 
their mentor social capital. For example, section 8.2.2 describes that HeartBeat initially used 
GAB to form ties with Dr Arthur a US cardiologist as they struck an instant connection due 
to their shared interest in telemedicine. That is, quotation NEP5 within Table 8-19 describes 
that HeartBeat’s entrepreneur “met [Dr Arthur] at a tradeshow” about fifth-teen years ago 
and “just kept in contact” as Dr Arthur was as a “friend” who helped HeartBeat with 
“inventing a new [medical] device.” Consequently, as section 8.6.3 describes, this network-
enhancing process led to Dr Arthur becoming a KOL for the business whose endorsement 
provided reputational benefits within the US medical community, which enabled NVI.  
Table 8-19 also reports that FemMed used GAB and AB as a network-enhancing process to 
increase the value of their mentor social capital. That is, quotation NEP6 within Table 8-19 
describes “probably the biggest benefit [from this process] was we found a fantastic surgeon 
in California who used our products”, then describes that “he was such a believer in 
[FemMed’s] products that he refused to accept that he couldn’t get the product anymore and 
he insisted that we sold the products to him.” Similarly, section 8.6.3 describes this network-
enhancing process meant the Californian surgeon also became a KOL for the business, 
whose endorsement had reputational benefits within the US medical community, which 
enabled NVI. These findings then indicate that GAB and AB is a network-enhancing process 
that supports the development of networking capability in NVI. 
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Table 8-20: Representative Data for Network-Enhancing and Delaying Process 
 Dependency bonding Representative Quote 
Aggregate category 1 – Network-enhancing process 
Global 
referral 
bridging 
Fertility – Firm shown 
strength in using existing 
network to create and extend 
social capital with a Chinese 
MNE which enabled NVI 
NEP7 
They [Chinese distributor] haven’t hindered us at all, they have supported 
us through this period. I think it is us who has hindered them, because of 
our manufacturing problems for the last nine-twelve months, those delays 
have cost them, you know they have hired people just to help us, not us 
personally, but helping get our products through and it’s been a let-down 
for them [FER-I11-B].  
FemMed – Firm shown 
strength un using 
professional network to 
create and extend social 
capital with a strategic buyer 
which enabled NVI 
NEP8 
Essentially, five people from [StarBuy] came over to the [FemMed] UK 
office, and also to our manufacturing/subcontractor site and poured over 
every single document that I think we have ever produced. I think they had 
a checklist obviously that went into financial, legal, IP, regulation, quality, 
manufacturing. They asked for a list of documents as evidence of what we 
done and it was just a week of us pulling out the documents, them going 
through it and just ticking boxes. They were very professional and we did 
everything to keep them happy [FEM-I11-B1].  
Global 
acceptance 
bridging 
Fertility - Firm began to 
show strength in attracting 
foreign customers and 
bonding with these customers 
to enable NVI 
NEP9 
The Canadians got in contact with us and I signed a contract with them 
about six months ago, with the plan that they would register the product 
into Canada. They called us up and said look boys we’re pretty happy with 
this idea, where are we this, we have pitched your product to a [a large 
Canadian pharmacy chain], and they liked it so much they wanted it. So 
that situation was a big ball opportunity, where we had to rededicate, 
rearrange resources to ensure we didn’t drop that ball [FER-I11-A]. 
Aggregate category 2 – Network-delaying process 
Local 
referral 
bridging 
Fertility – Firm shown 
weakness in relying too 
heavily on the advice of local 
mentors, whose referrals 
inhibited NVI 
NDP1 
Well, [Adam] directed me to all that stuff.  Once we’d met [Harry] and 
[Adam], everything kind of came through them.  I mean, I’ve got hundreds 
more contacts from the two of them.  And a lot of that is just company 
stuff [FER-I09-B1]. 
Global 
referral 
bridging 
Fertility – Firm shown 
weakness in determining 
which investor referrals 
where of most benefit and 
became over-reliant on an  
VC investor tie 
NDP2 
Well, we were completely dependent on them [VC]. We didn’t have any 
back-up alternatives and we were out of money [FER-I09-A]. 
Global 
search 
bridging 
SafeMed – Firm shown 
weakness in being able to 
determine which foreign 
buyer referral was most 
beneficial and they became 
over-reliant on this 
recommendation 
NDP3 
Well, probably we should have been a little bit more aware of who we 
were actually dealing with. We should have got to a higher level and we 
always contemplated that. I was always dealing with the guy who said he 
was in charge, but I don’t think he really was. So the lesson there is to 
always find out who are the decision makers, the real decision makers. 
And I contemplated going right to the CEO who is based in the UK actually 
and I also tried to get our chairman to ring him, but he wimped out [SAF-
I10-B]. 
SafeMed – Firm shown 
weakness in being unable to 
search for a suitable mentor 
they had found through a 
global search which 
eventually inhibited NVI 
NDP4 
I met the [FDA guy] at end of a US trip and that was kind off the beginning 
of the relationship. He said forget the big guys, they are never going to get 
it out in the marketplace for you, stick with me because I have a team of 
independent sales guys that can actually make this happen for you, because 
the big guys are not going to help you. So I came back from that trip 
thinking he is probably on the right track and we developed it from there 
[SAF-I10-B] 
Global 
acceptance 
bridging 
HeartBeat - Firm shown 
weakness in ignoring the 
prospect of venture capital 
and became over-reliant on a 
potential  VC investment 
NDP5 
I think a lot of companies find when trying to deal with potential [VC] 
investors, that they can hold you back a lot. I think in general the whole 
venture capital industry, there’s a lot of what I call… there’s a lot of 
parasites out there and people running around pretending they’ve got 
money; they haven’t got money, they’re not serious [HEA-I09-D]. 
Source: The Author 
Interestingly, Table 8-20 reports that in some cases, the INVs used DB as part of the network-
enhancing process. That is, Table 8-20 reports that Fertility and FemMed both shown a 
strength in using GRB and DB as a network-enhancing process to increase the value of their 
buyer social capital. For example, sections 8.2.3 and 8.3.2 describe that Fertility used this 
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network-enhancing process to create and extend ties with a Chinese distributor. Quotation 
NEP7 within Table 8-20 also describes that Fertility’s Chinese distributor “hadn’t hindered 
[them] at all,” but the entrepreneur argues that they “had hindered them, because of our 
manufacturing problems.” One possible interpretation of these findings is that DB was a 
necessary activity in this network-enhancing process if they were to secure a distribution 
agreement with one of China’s largest MNEs. Similarly, Table 8-20 also specifies that 
FemMed used this network-enhancing process to create and extend ties with StarBuy a 
foreign strategic buyer. That is, quotation NEP8 within Table 8-20 describes that FemMed 
engaged in a due diligence process with StarBuy officials which meant they “poured over 
every single document that I think we have ever produced.” FemMed’s entrepreneur then 
describes them as a “very professional and [they] did everything to keep them happy.”  
One interpretation of these findings is due diligence is one practice that underpins the DB 
activity, as the candidate under investigation is likely to be reliant on this outcome. Section 
8.6.2 also describes there is strong evidence that the majority of the INVs shown a weakness 
in participating in a strategic buyers due diligence, which indicates that DB practice can also 
be a network-delaying process that inhibits NVI. However, Figure 8-10 illustrates as 
FemMed moved into the international expansion phase, they began to develop networking 
capability as they increased their capacity to extend this social capital. For example, section 
8.3.2 explains FemMed’s initial due diligence with a strategic buyer inhibited their NVI, but 
after this experience, the firm hired an M&A specialist and used GRB to create then extend 
ties with a new strategic buyer. Thus, this use of GRB and DB was a network-enhancing 
process that enabled their NVI. Interestingly, Figure 8-8 illustrates that Fertility began to 
develop their networking capability as they used DB and GAB as a network-enhancing 
process to create and extend ties with a foreign customer. That is, Fertility’s entrepreneur 
describes the Canadian distributor as a “big ball opportunity, where we had to rededicate, 
rearrange resources to ensure we didn’t drop that ball.” This reallocation of resources 
indicates this combined use of DB and GAB was a network-enhancing process that enabled 
NVI. Therefore, these findings provide evidence that this network-enhancing process 
enabled networking capability development in NVI. 
8.6.2 Network-Delaying Process 
The researcher found evidence that a central process which underpins networking capability 
development, is the network-delaying process, which is when the focal actor engages in 
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networking activities that “delays” their NVI. Tables 8-20 and 8-21 report the various 
networking activities that underpin the network-delaying process. Firstly, and in contrast to 
section 8.6.1, there is strong evidence that DB also inhibits NVI. This section reports that 
once INVs engage in DB, there is evidence that this dependency can evolve into 
“impassiveness” or some cases denial about the current state or future value of asset-specific 
social capital. Therefore, this section reports on evidence that indicates the use of DB and/or 
IBG in combination with various network creation activities leads to what the researcher 
terms as a “network-delaying process.” Nevertheless, the conceptual aggregation of these 
abductive findings is that this network-delaying process is somewhat conducive to the 
development of networking capability in NVI. That is, section 2.3 and 5.3 adopts Helfat et 
al. (2007) view that dynamic capabilities central purpose is for firms to overcome or avoid 
inertia by modifying their resource base. Therefore, there is evidence from the cross-case 
analysis that this network-delaying process triggers networking capability development, as 
the firm will ideally deploy this capability to modify its social capital before it becomes a 
liability.  
Consequently, this cross-case analysis provides evidence that INVs use their networking 
capability to modify network-delaying processes, which can erode the value of social capital. 
Table 8-20 presents evidence that all of the INVs show signs of engaging in the network-
delaying process, which appears to inhibit NVI. For example, Table 8-20 indicates Fertility’s 
use of LRB or GRB in combination with DB are manifestations of the network-delaying 
process. Figure 8-8 also illustrates that Fertility shown a weakness in networking capability 
at the international start-up phase as this network-delaying process meant they over-extended 
their investment in mentor and investor social capital. For instance, Table 8-20 reports after 
Fertility used LRB to form ties with local mentors, they engaged in DB as section 8.5.2 
confirms they were over-reliant on mentor referrals. Moreover, this network-delaying 
process is evident in quotation NDP1 within Table 8-20, as the entrepreneur describes that 
he had gained access to “hundreds of contacts from the two of them.”  
One interpretation of these findings is Fertility were more engaged in increasing the quantity 
rather than improving the initial quality of their social capital. Incidentally, Table 8-20 
highlights that Fertility were also involved in this network-delaying process as these mentors 
introduced them to a Canadian VC who consequently inhibited their NVI. That is, quotation 
NDP2 within Table 8-20 describes that the entrepreneur felt “we were completely dependent 
on them [Canadian VC]. We didn’t have any back-up alternatives and we were out of 
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money.” Thus, section 8.4.1 describes Fertility retrenched these ties after this asset became 
a liability. This indicates Fertility’s initial weakness in practicing these networking activities 
meant they had engaged in a network-delaying process that inhibited NVI. Similarly, Table 
8-20 reports that HeartBeat use of GAB and DB was a network-delaying process that 
inhibited NVI. That is, quotation NDP5 within Table 8-20 describes the entrepreneur felt “a 
lot of companies find when trying to deal with potential [VC] investors, that they can hold 
you back a lot” Section 8.3.1 describes HeartBeat shown a weakness in performing these 
networking activities to secure venture capital as like Fertility, they were dependent on VC 
investor. Thus, this evidence indicates that the use of GAB and DB is one network-delaying 
process that can inhibit NVI. 
Interestingly, Tables 8-20 and 8-21 report there is strong evidence that within this contextual 
setting, the use of GSB in combination with DB and/or IBG is a network-delaying process 
that inhibits NVI. However, Figure 8-1 reports a variation in practicing these activities as 
FemMed used GSB to create social capital with foreign buyers and suppliers, while 
SafeMed’s GSB was more diverse as they used this activity to create buyer, supplier, 
investor, and mentor social capital. Nevertheless, Figure 8-11 illustrates SafeMed’s their use 
of GSB was inadequate as they attempted to collaborate with actors that they were highly 
dependent on who subsequently inhibited their NVI. For example, quotation NDP3 within 
Table 8-20 describes that SafeMed “should have been a little bit more aware of who we were 
actually dealing with” when attempting to collaborate with the strategic decision makers of 
MNEs. Thus, this combination of GSB and DB appears to be a network-delaying process 
that is likely to inhibit NVI. Table 8-21 also reports on the dangers of DB. That is, section 
8.6.1 explains there is strong evidence in some instances that an INV’s over-dependence on 
certain actors, can evolve into an “impassiveness” or denial, especially when this social 
capital begins to decrease in value. Section 8.5.2 therefore reports that there is strong 
evidence that under these contextual conditions IBG is likely to inhibit NVI. 
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Table 8-21: Representative Data for Network-Delaying Process 
 Impassive Bonding  Aggregate category 2  – Network-delaying process 
Global 
search 
bridging 
FemMed –  Firm shown 
weakness in being able to 
search for a suitable foreign 
distributor and were unable to 
successfully bond with this tie 
NDP6 
How often did we communicate or interact with this partner, well not 
enough. They did come over and meet with us, but essentially everything 
was done remotely. Once we signed the distribution agreement we had 
very little communication with them, apart from an update on how they 
were doing and any knowledge transfer that needed to happen. We 
probably met them perhaps every couple of months if you were lucky but 
most communication was either done verbally on the phone or through 
email that was a bit more regular [FER-I11-B2].  
SafeMed – Firm shown 
weakness in bonding as they 
had scant resources to form 
ties with investors, buyers and 
suppliers who inhibited NVI 
NDP7 
Two [R&D partners] are in China and we have had some bad experiences 
there. Quality, timeliness, the Chinese guys we think were screwing us. On 
the design side we had an American guy who were taking far too long, 
charging big fees, and we then realised we could do this ourselves. So the 
R&D prototyping phase has been problematic. Not smooth sailing as I say 
through three different partners. And again causing us the same problems, 
delay, hence time problems, hence money problems [SAF-I10-B]. 
Local 
search 
bridging 
SafeMed – Firm stopped 
interacting with mentor, which 
meant after their IPO, they 
were not eligible for 
government grants, which 
inhibited NVI 
NDP8 
The government have been, well we have had three grants. So they have 
been useful but some could say they could have been more useful. We 
didn’t get any big grants, the government hasn’t given us any money apart 
from some small amounts of money. Could they have? Well I suppose that 
is a philosophical view on whether they should or shouldn’t be investing 
in PLC’s like us. You know they are all interested in our story. [Dr 
Christopher] has been up there doing presentations. They all say the right 
thing, but no one has ever come-forth with any real money [SAF-I10-B]. 
Local 
referral 
bridging 
Fertility – Firm shown 
weakness in bonding with local 
mentors and investors, as 
actors became impassive about 
interacting with each other, 
which inhibited NVI 
NDP9 
[Zhan]… he likes to go to work at 9:00 and get done at 5:00 and that’s it. 
He is an academic scientist and so getting him to spread himself…he won’t 
do it, and then he’s like, oh, I’m going to take a four-week vacation in July 
[2009] and I’m thinking...[FER-I09-B] 
Global 
referral 
bridging 
SafeMed – Firm shown 
weakness in being able to 
refuse certain manufacturers 
(suppliers) that came as a 
result of a global referral, 
which is evident as they shown 
a lack of interest in the 
bonding process 
NDP10 
Well you know it has been up and down sort of thing. Getting deals has 
obviously been a challenge. Being let down by the [North Carolina 
manufacturer] is a challenge. What that leads to is time, hence money. 
Because that means that everything is wasted. All those efforts, two or 
three year’s effort basically trying to do this. You know we are being 
stretched out, every day we sit here burning cash is a day we got less and 
less money. And to be honest we are still not over the negotiation process 
yet. American’s aren’t easy they are pretty tough [SAF-I10-B]. 
Source: The Author 
For example, section 8.3.2 reports FemMed engaged in DB with a US distributor, but then 
became impassive, as they were unable to extract value from this social capital. Quotation 
NDP6 within Table 8-21 also emphasises that after they signed the US distribution 
agreement they had “very little communication” with this actor. Consequently, quotation 
IB3 within Table 8-6 indicates the US distributor had “delayed us quite a lot” which meant 
they lost interest in this tie as “[e]ither they didn’t want to sell it, or they didn’t have the 
expertise, or they were promoting their own product so that was a big lesson learned.” Thus, 
one possible interpretation of these data is FemMed had shown a weakness in these 
networking activities as they were unable to search for a suitable foreign distributor and 
struggled to bond with this tie, which inhibited their NVI. 
Similarly, Table 8-21 also reports that SafeMed’s use of GSB and IBG was a network-
delaying process that inhibited their NVI. For example, section 8.5.2 reports that SafeMed 
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shown a weakness in bonding as they had scant resources to extend their buyer, supplier, 
and investor social capital. There is also strong evidence a large amount of SafeMed’s social 
capital was beginning to burden the firm, which inhibited NVI. For example, quotation ND7 
within Table 8-21 indicates that: “the Chinese guys [R&D consultants] we think were 
screwing us. On the design side, we had an American guy who were taking far too long, 
charging big fees, and then we realised we could this ourselves.” A likely interpretation of 
these data is that FemMed were either overwhelmed or in denial about the growing liability 
of this social capital.  
Additional evidence also indicates when SafeMed also practiced GRB and IBG this was a 
network-delaying process, which inhibited their NVI. For example, SafeMed shown a 
weakness in being able to conduct a critical evaluation of their mentor’s referrals (e.g. North 
Carolina and New York manufactures) despite their initial collaboration concerns with these 
actors. Consequently, quotation ND10 within Table 8-21 emphasises that this IBG had led 
SafeMed to being “stretched out, every day we sit here burning cash is a day we got less and 
less money. And to be honest we are still not over the negotiation phase yet. Americans’ 
aren’t easy they are pretty tough.” Figure 8-11 thus illustrates that SafeMed were initially 
weak in performing these networking activities, but shown no signs of improvement, as the 
subsequent networking period was characterised by weak practices in both bridging and 
bonding. A likely interpretation of these data is SafeMed’s use of GSB and GRB in 
combination with IBG meant their networking capability was weak as they were unable to 
overcome these network-delaying processes, which inhibited their NVI. 
Finally, Table 8-21 specifies even within local settings, the use of LSB or LRB in 
combination with IBG are network-delaying processes that inhibit NVI. For example, Table 
8-21 indicates both Fertility and SafeMed’s IBG with their mentors consequently inhibited 
NVI. For example, section 8.3.1 reports Fertility shown a weakness in being able to resolve 
conflict with local mentors, as their increasing impassiveness about this social capital 
delayed their NVI. Section 8.4.1 reports SafeMed decided to retrench ties with it government 
mentors, which meant after their IPO they were not eligible for government grants, which 
inhibited NVI. For example quotation ND8 within Table 8-21 emphasises this IBG had led 
to the view “I suppose that is a philosophical view on whether they should be investing in 
PLC’s like us. You know they are all interested in our story. [Dr Christopher] has been up 
there doing presentations. They all say the right thing, but no one has ever come-forth with 
any real money.” One interpretation of these data is SafeMed did not have the capacity to 
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foresee the potential value of this mentor social capital. Thus, together these findings indicate 
there is strong evidence that the network-delaying process triggers networking capability 
development in NVI. 
8.6.3 Network-Modifying Process 
Tables 8-22 and 8-23 report the various networking activities that underpin the network-
modifying process. Firstly, Tables 8-16 and 8-17 report there is strong evidence that ETS 
and PTS both enable NVI. However, section 8.5.3 reports that the strength of the INV’s 
capability to practice network modification activities has a varied influence on NVI. Table 
8-22 also reports there is strong evidence that these INVs predominately use ETS and/or 
PTS in order to overcome or prevent the network-delaying process. Whereas, Table 8-23 
reports in some cases there is evidence that these INVs use RTS to lubricate the network-
enhancing process. Together, this section indicates these network modification activities in 
combination with these network-delaying and/or enhancing-processes lead to what the 
researcher terms as a “network-modifying process.” Furthermore, the conceptual 
aggregation of these abductive findings is that this network-modifying process is 
fundamental for the development of networking capability in NVI. It is also evident that all 
of the INVs shown signs of stronger and weaker practices in using the network-modifying 
process to enable NVI. 
Table 8-22 indicates that FemMed’s use of ETS to overcome the network-delaying process 
is one example of the network-modifying process. That is, Table 8-16 confirms FemMed 
were reactive in using ETS to retrench their buyer social capital with a US distributor. Figure 
8-6 also illustrates that FemMed’s social capital lost a significant amount of value, as they 
were slow in preventing this asset from becoming a liability. 
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Table 8-22: Representative Data for Network-Modifying Process 
 Network-delaying 
process 
Aggregate category 3  – Network-modifying process 
Eliminating 
ties 
 
Fertility – Firm shown 
weakness in inefficiently 
using ET to retrench 
mentor and supplier social 
capital after it became a 
liability, but over the 
long-term this enabled 
NVI  
NMP1 
And the other major situation through the last year was that we set up a new 
supplier in June and had three unsuccessful batches in July 2009, which we sold 
onto our customer. The next 9 months were fraught with batch after batch failure 
by the subcontractor, where we probably lost close to 6 figures, of just constant 
batch failure, trying to figure out why they failed. So I think the real culminating 
event was in July 2010, we said, right lets buy our old facility, let’s do the 
production ourselves [FER-I11-A].  
HeartBeat – Firm shown 
initial weakness in using 
ET to retrench investor 
ties, but over time as they 
became stronger as they 
retrench investor social 
capital before it became a 
liability, which enabled 
NVI  
NMP2 
At the end of the day, the problem is if you just bring in VCs then they will 
really tell you what to do, especially if you raise a few million, because you are 
going to have to give them some stupid numbers and they know that it is a joke, 
but they will use that to nail you. So if you get off-side with them about 
anything, if they cease for any reason and become true believers that there is a 
product problem, they will then use that and it becomes a nightmare. So we 
decided to walk away and raise cash the old fashioned by generating early sales 
[HEA-I10-B2]. 
FemMed – Firm shown 
weakness in efficiently 
using ET to retrench 
buyer and supplier social 
capital as it became a 
liability, but this 
subsequently enabled NVI  
NMP3 
In 2007, we had the deal break up with our distributor in the States because of 
low sales they just simply weren’t promoting our products. We then sat back and 
said we could do one of two things, we can go for another multinational but 
chances are they won’t be interested because we don’t fulfil all their criteria. So 
we decided lets raise the money ourselves and go into the States and fight with 
the big players in their own territory. So I think that was a significant change 
[FEM-I08-C]. 
SafeMed – Firm shown 
weakness in incorrectly 
using ET as they decided 
to retrench mentor social 
capital which still had 
value, which inhibited 
NVI 
NMP4 
Yes, our early design partnership, which we had for a couple of years, didn’t 
progress to any great extent.  We, in fact, you know, looking at it with hindsight, 
you know, you would say that there was no incentive or desire on their part to 
push our products fast, because they kept getting paid.  So the more they could 
kind of, not so much delay it, but not really progress it, they just kept getting 
paid, so in the end we ditched them and did a lot of our own things.  So, yes, on 
the design and development side there are people that have held us back [SAF-
I09-D]. 
Prioritising 
ties 
Fertility – Firm was 
reactive in using PTS to 
modify mentor social 
capital, but when used, 
this activity enabled NVI. 
NMP5 
Yep. In my view it’s very important especially in the biotech industry. In terms 
of business development and trying to find out deals for commercialisation, 
networks are huge. So after those guys [Adam, Sean, George] we focussed our 
efforts on [Harry], he’s a really good strategy guy.  He also makes other 
networking connections.  So, from a Board level, CEO kind of thing, he’s a 
good spot.  He’s also been helping us with R&D connections, connections at the 
university.  So, yes, he’s now a very key person for us [FER-I09-A]. 
HeartBeat – Firm was 
proactive in using PTS to 
modify their supplier 
social capital, which 
enabled NVI 
NMP6 
So we’ve been kind of in a somewhat of a holding pattern, just to make 
incremental progress, but slower than what we would want to. We’re just 
snowed under with demand at the moment. It’s just crazy. So I think the 
market’s changing. Now we’re back, we’re overflowing with people wanting 
the product. But because we have limited resources, we also have limited 
manufacturing capacity and when someone comes and says they want 30 
monitors, it’s not like you have a stock of 30 monitors; we manufacture them 
more or less to order. So we’re actually losing orders at the moment. It’s crazy 
so we need to make that change [HEA-I09-C]. 
Source: The Author 
Therefore, Figure 8-10 illustrates that FemMed had shown an initial weakness in their 
networking capability, as they were inefficient in using ETS to retrench this buyer social 
capital. Nevertheless, quotation NMP3 within Table 8-22 emphasises that this process had 
long-term benefits as it enabled NVI:  
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In 2007, we had the deal break up with our distributor in the States because of low sales they just 
simply weren’t promoting our products. We then sat back and said we could do one of two things, 
we can go for another multinational but chances are they won’t be interested because we don’t 
fulfil all their criteria. So we decided lets raise the money ourselves and go into the States and 
fight with the big players in their own territory. So I think that was a significant change [FEM-
I08-C]. 
One interpretation of these data is this network-delaying process triggered FemMed’s 
decision to use ETS as a mechanism to retrench this social capital. Moreover, Table 8-16 
confirms after FemMed used ETS, they were successful in building a relation with a 
Californian surgeon who helped establish a US sales subsidiary. Therefore, Tables 8-22 
confirms that FemMed’s use of the network-modifying process helped overcome the 
network-delaying process, which over the long-term enabled their international expansion. 
Fertility were also similar as they were reactive in their use of ETS to retrench their supplier 
social capital with an English manufacturer. Moreover, Figure 8-6 also illustrates that 
Fertility had lost a significant amount of value as their slow response meant this social capital 
became a liability. Nevertheless, quotation NMP1 within Table 8-22 confirms that the firm 
“had lost close to six figures” due to “constant batch failure” but “the real culminating event 
was in July 2010, when [they] said right lets buy our old facility, let’s do production 
ourselves.” Therefore, one possible interpretation of these data is this network-delaying 
process triggered a network-modifying process that encouraged them to internalise 
production, which consequently enabled NVI.  
Similarly, Table 8-22 also reports that SafeMed were reactive in their use of ETS to retrench 
supplier social capital that had become a liability. That is Figure 8-6 illustrates that due to 
SafeMed’s use of DB and IBG, this led to their supplier social capital losing a significant 
amount of value. Table 8-22 discussion of SafeMed’s strategic alliances with Chinese and 
American R&D consultants is one example of this. That is, quotation NMP4 within Table 
8-22 indicates SafeMed’s entrepreneur views on the liability of this social capital: 
Looking at it with hindsight, you know, you would say that there was no incentive or desire on 
their part to push our products fast, because they kept getting paid. So the more they could kind 
of, not so much delay it, but not really progress it, they just kept getting paid, so in the end we 
ditched them and did a lot of our own things. So, yes, on the design and development side there 
are people that have held us back [SAF-I09-D]. 
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Quotation ND7 within Table 8-21 also confirms that after SafeMed retrenched these foreign 
supplier ties, they then realised “we could do the [R&D] ourselves.” Consequently, a likely 
interpretation of these data is this network-delaying process triggered this network-
modifying process that encouraged SafeMed to internalise R&D, which consequently 
enabled NVI. Nevertheless, Figure 8-11 illustrates that SafeMed shown no sign of 
networking capability development despite this event, as this subsequent networking period 
was characterised by weak practices in GSB along with DB and IBG. By contrast, Table 8-
16 confirms that HeartBeat were stronger in their use of ETS as they retrenched investor 
social capital with a US VC before it became a liability. For example, quotation NMP2 
within Table 8-22 indicates that HeartBeat felt “if you get off-side with them [VCs] about 
anything, if they cease for any reason and become true believers that there is a product 
problem, they will then use that and it becomes a nightmare. So we decided to walk away 
and raise cash the old fashioned way by generating early revenues.” Thus, a possible 
interpretation of these data is this network-delaying process triggered a network-modifying 
process as this encouraged HeartBeat to implement an early product launch, which 
consequently enabled NVI.  
Table 8-22 also reports that Fertility and HeartBeat’s involvement in network-delaying 
processes encouraged the use of PTS, which together form part of a network-modifying 
process. For example, Table 8-16 confirms that Fertility were mainly proactive in using PTS 
to retrench their strong ties with a group of local mentors. Figure 8-5 illustrates that 
Fertility’s use of PTS did decrease the value of this mentor social capital, but not to the 
extent that this asset became a liability as it maintained a reasonable level of value. Figure 
8-8 therefore illustrates that Fertility had begun to show signs of networking capability 
development as they began to improve the way they practice PTS. Quotation NMP5 within 
Table 8-22 emphasises this increased use of PTS:  
In my view [networking is] very important especially in the biotech industry. In terms of business 
development and trying to find out deals for commercialisation, networks are huge. So after those 
guys [Adam, Sean, George] we focussed our efforts on [Harry], he’s a really good strategy guy. 
He also makes other networking connections. So, from a Board level, CEO kind of thing, he’s a 
good spot. He’s also been helping us with R&D connections, connections at the university. So, 
yes, he’s now a very key person for us [FER-I09-A]. 
Quotations PTS1, PTS2 and PTS3 within Table 8-9 indicates Fertility’s entrepreneur 
believed these mentors were “instrumental” at the “small stages” – i.e. at international start-
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up – but they were no longer pertinent to their NVI. One likely interpretation of these data 
is that Fertility had anticipated these ties could “delay” the firm’s long-term development. 
Therefore, this network-modifying process helped Fertility prevent a potential network-
delaying process as they refocused and extended their ties with Harry, which increased the 
value of their mentor social capital. Table 8-17 therefore confirms that Fertility’s use of PTS 
eventually enabled their NVI. Similarly, Table 8-26 also reports that HeartBeat were 
proactive in using PTS to retrench their strong ties with a local manufacturer. Interestingly, 
Figure 8-7 illustrates that Heartbeat also used PTS to change a supplier relationship, but this 
activity only decreased the value of this supplier social capital by a marginal amount as it 
maintained a reasonable level of value.  
For example, quotation NMP6 within Table 8-22 describes since HeartBeat “have limited 
resources, we also have limited manufacturing capacity, [which means we] manufacture 
more or less to order. So we’re actually loosing orders at the moment. It’s crazy so we need 
to make that change.” Section 8.3.2 explains that SafeMed’s entrepreneur tends to “deal with 
smaller people who I’ve known, you know, previously, who I can kind of trust. Because 
what you can’t afford to do is make too many mistakes, if you’ve got limited resources in 
terms of dollars and time, you people you can trust [HEA-I09-B].” Nevertheless, quotation 
PTS4 within Table 8-19 explains that HeartBeat “finished up with our local manufacturer 
[as the Hong Kong manufacturer…] could scale up our manufacturing and they can produce 
more product in a day than our [local] manufacturer could produce in a month.” Therefore, 
one possible interpretation of these data is this network-delaying process triggered a 
network-modifying process as this encouraged the firm to switch suppliers, which 
consequently enabled NVI. 
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Table 8-23: Representative Data for Network-Modifying Process (Cont.) 
 Network-enhancing 
process 
Representative Quote 
Reconfiguring 
ties 
Fertility – Firm shown 
strength in using RTS to 
redeploy its customer 
into investor social 
capital, which enabled 
NVI 
NMP7 
Chasing money is a waste of time, the only place where you should chase 
money is through a customer, you are wasting your time with a bank, you 
are wasting your time with equity people, they are going to take so long 
and they are under no pressure to invest. So this is at least my conclusion, 
I’m sure people would disagree, but that is how we have got through the 
last three years [FER-I11-A]. 
HeartBeat – Firm shown 
strength in using RTS to 
redeploy their mentor 
into investor social 
capital which enabled 
NVI  
NMP8 
So he [Dr Arthur] brings some credibility to it as well since he is a 
cardiologist and we use his reputation to bring in the venture capital and 
impress on people. If you have a cardiologist as one of the principles of 
the company they don’t doubt what you say it does right. So it gives you 
credibility in that regard [HEA-I10-A].  
HeartBeat – Firm shown 
strength in using RTS to 
redeploy its mentor into 
buyer social capital, 
which enabled NVI 
NMP9 
We really market by word of mouth. So what’s happened, we’ve built up, 
in the research market, we’ve built up a critical mass. so we have so many 
people using our product who we initially done research with, and they go 
to conferences and present their papers, and immediately after some of the 
big conferences in wireless health or whatever, we get a rash of emails 
from other researchers who want to use our devices [HEA-II09-B]. 
HeartBeat – Firm shown 
strength in using RTS to 
redeploy its supplier into 
buyer social capital, 
which enabled NVI 
NMP10 
Our lawyer is basically trying to negotiate that [EliteTech] sell our 
products to their customers as well. So part of the negotiation is whether 
they will finance this. The big problem with contract manufacturing is you 
often have to pay upfront because they have to go out and buy the 
components. So if you can negotiate and get [EliteTech] to agree to you 
only paying them for the finished product then you haven’t really got a 
cash flow problem because you can line the customers up, which means 
you wouldn’t be manufacturing unless you have customers [HEA-I10-A].  
FemMed – Firm shown 
strength in using RT to 
redeploy its investor and 
mentor social capital to 
enable NVI 
NMP11 
They [Harmony] have become friends to all of us. There is complete trust, 
and they were there one hundred percent and got their return on their 
investment at the end of it. Which is fantastic not just for them, but for 
Scotland, which is a great success story [FER-I11-B3]. 
FemMed – Firm shown 
strength in using RT to 
redeploy its buyer into 
mentor social capital, 
which enabled NVI 
NMP12 
We have been able to publish that he has done all of these surgeries, and 
say what are the complications, what are the success rates, so that really 
gave us a good start in terms of having a good preceptor surgeon we could 
work with. Also he is somebody who really has been shouting about 
[FemMed] from the hill tops, that we have done over 4000 cases with less 
than 1% error rate whereas other companies have 6-30% error rate, so 
these are the benefits of that [FEM-I11-B2]. 
Source: The Author 
Interestingly, Table 8-23 reports there was strong evidence that three (e.g. Fertility, 
HeartBeat and FemMed) of the four INVs used RTS as means to accelerate the network-
enhancing process. That is, cross-case findings up until this point suggest the network-
modifying process is predominately a reactive process in response to the erosion of social 
capital. Nevertheless, there is strong evidence that the network-modifying process has a dual 
purpose, as it seems to complement and indeed accelerate the networking-enhancing process. 
However, Table 8-23 indicates that RTS also facilitates this process as this encapsulates the 
decision to redeploy strong ties for new industrial purposes. For example, Table 8-17 
confirms Fertility were proactive in using RTS to redeploy their strong ties with a Canadian 
distributor. Figure 8-6 also illustrates that Fertility used RTS to change this customer 
relation, which helped accelerate the value of this social capital. Relatedly, quotation NMP7 
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within Table 8-23 emphasises why this networking-modifying process accelerated the value 
of this buyer social capital:  
Chasing money is a waste of time, the only place where you should chase money is through a 
customer, you are wasting your time with a bank, you are wasting your time with equity people, 
they are going to take so long and they are under no pressure to invest. So this is at least my 
conclusion, I’m sure people would disagree, but that is how we have got through the last three 
years [FER-I11-A]. 
Additionally, quotation RTS1 within Table 8-9  indicates Fertility were “getting more 
creative in how we finance ourselves, in this time, where traditionally banks were there” 
which in this case was in the midst of the GFC. One possible interpretation of these data is 
that Fertility shown a strength in using RTS to redeploy this buyer tie into an investor tie, 
which evidently increased the value of this social capital. Therefore, in line with Table 8-17 
it is evident that this network-modifying process enabled NVI. Similarly, Table 8-23 also 
confirms that HeartBeat were proactive in using RTS to redeploy their strong ties with a 
Hong Kong manufacturer. That is, Figure 8-7 illustrates that HeartBeat’s use of RTS to 
change this supplier tie helped accelerate the value of this social capital. Consequently, 
quotation NMP10 within Table 8-23 confirms that HeartBeat’s “lawyer is trying to negotiate 
that [EliteTech will] sell our products to our customers as well. So part of the negotiation is 
whether they will finance this.”  
Quotation NMP10 also specifies: “The big problem with contract manufacturing is you often 
have to pay upfront because they have to go out and buy the components. So if you can 
negotiate and get [EliteTech] to agree to you only paying them for the finished product then 
you haven’t got a cash flow problem.” A likely interpretation of these data is HeartBeat 
shown a strength in using RTS to redeploy this supplier into both a customer and investor, 
which evidently helped increase the value of social capital. This interpretation indicates 
HeartBeat were successful in making this social capital multiplex as this tie could be used 
for multiple purposes. Therefore, in line with Table 8-17 it is evident this network-modifying 
process accelerated the network-enhancing process, which enabled HeartBeat’s NVI. 
In similar vein, Table 8-23 confirms that HeartBeat and FemMed both shown a strength in 
using RTS to redeploy its strong mentor ties with US surgeons. That is, Figure 8-5 illustrates 
that HeartBeat and FemMed use of RTS helped accelerate the value of this mentor social 
capital. For example, quotation NMP8 within Table 8-23 confirms within HeartBeat that: 
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“[Dr Arthur] brings some credibility to it [the venture] as well since he is a cardiologist and 
we use his reputation to bring in the venture capital and impress people.” Additionally, 
quotation NMP12 within Table 8-23 specifies within FemMed: “We have been able to 
publish that he [Californian surgeon] has done all of these surgeries, and say what are the 
complication, what are the success rates, so that really gave us a head start in in terms of 
having a good preceptor surgeon we could work with.” Consequently, a likely interpretation 
of these data is both INVs shown a strength in using RTS to redeploy their strong ties as 
both surgeons agreed to become KOLs (e.g. preceptor surgeons), which evidently 
accelerated the value of this mentor social capital. Therefore, in line with Table 8-17 it is 
evident this network-modifying process enabled both firms NVI. 
Table 8-23 also confirms that HeartBeat and FemMed were able to build deep and multiplex 
inter-personal relations with mentors. That is, Figure 8-5 illustrates that HeartBeat’s use of 
RTS with their university network, helped accelerate the value of this mentor social capital. 
That is, quotation NMP9 within Table 8-23 specifies that HeartBeat have “built up a critical 
mass in the research market, [as they] have so many people using our product we initially 
did research with [and once] they go to conferences and present their papers […] we get a 
rash of emails from other researchers who want to use our devices.” Additionally, section 
8.2.2 specifies HeartBeat initially formed ties with universities as a R&D partner and mentor, 
but as they struck an intellectual connection with the academic community, they were able 
to redeploy this mentor social capital, as these academic relations eventually became 
customers. Therefore, in line with Table 8-17 it is evident that this network-modifying 
process enabled NVI. Overall, Figure 8-9 then illustrates that HeartBeat had shown signs of 
networking capability development as this subsequent networking period was characterised 
by a strength in AB and tie transformation.  
Finally, Table 8-23 confirms that FemMed were also able to build an inter-personal relation 
with what began as an inter-organisational tie. That is, Figure 8-4 illustrates that Fertility’s 
use of RTS with Harmony their local BAS helped transform this social capital. Quotation 
NMP11 within Table 8-23 exemplifies this strength in AB and RTS since:  
They [Harmony] have become friends to all of us. There is complete trust, and they were there 
one hundred percent and got their return on their investment at the end of it. Which is fantastic 
not just for them, but for Scotland, which is a great success story [FER-I11-B3]. 
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Section 8.4.1 explains that FemMed had built a strong relation with Harmony over a six-
year turbulent period, as this concluded with the firm achieving a trade-sale, which provided 
the founders and the BAS with a strategic exit. A likely interpretation of these data is given 
that, Harmony had “become friends to us all,” and that “there was complete trust” it is 
evident that FemMed shown a strength in using RTS to redeploy this strong investor tie into 
mentor tie. Therefore, this change evidently increased the value of this social capital. 
Moreover, a likely interpretation is this friendship was clear a relational source, while 
Harmony’s “continued belief and shared-vision” was evidently a cognitive source that laid 
the foundations of this long-term friendship. Given these ties were with some of Scotland’s 
leading business investors, it is clear that this social capital would have personal and career 
benefits in the years to come. Overall, Figure 8-10 then illustrates that FemMed had shown 
clear signs of networking capability development as this subsequent networking period was 
characterised by a high intensity of AB and tie transformation. Therefore, there is strong 
evidence that this network-modifying process accelerates the network-enhancing process, 
which enables networking capability development in NVI. 
8.7 Conclusion 
In conclusion, this chapter reports the cross-case findings on how technology start-ups build 
dynamic capabilities in networking to enable NVI. Table 8-24 therefore summarises these 
cross-case findings. Firstly, Table 8-24 indicates that this chapter achieves research objective 
one and reports on how INVs create, extend, and modify their social capital in high-
technology markets. The major findings to emerge from this research objective is the 
researcher found strong evidence that these INVs use eleven specific networking activities 
to create, extend, or modify their social capital 
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Table 8-24: Summary of Cross-Case Findings 
 Summary of Cross-Case Findings 
Objective 1 – 
To explore how 
INVs create, 
extend, or 
modify their 
social capital in 
high-technology 
markets. 
RQ1: How do INVs create social capital? 
 Findings indicate that the INVs used a combination of five networking activities to create social capital. 
 These networking activities consisted of (a) LRB, (b) GRB, (c) LSB, (d) GSB, and (e) GAB and emerged as second-order themes.  
 The practice of these networking activities involved using referrals, search, or being approached by new actors, which originated either at the local 
or global level. These practices emerged as ten first-order concepts. 
 GRB was the most widely practiced networking activity (14 instances) which helped create buyer, investor, and supplier social capital, whereas 
LRB was rarely practiced with the exception of Fertility who used this activity on 11 occasions to create social capital.  
 LSB and GSB were specifically used to create inter-organisational social capital. None of the INVs used these networking activities to create inter-
personal social capital, which suggests that LSB and GSB are predominately firm-level activities. 
 GSB was mainly used to create buyer and investor social capital, while LSB was mainly used to create mentor and supplier social capital. 
 Three of the four INVs used GAB to create social capital. Data analysis suggests that each firm’s unique technology enabled them to engage in this 
networking activity with predominately mentors and investors. 
RQ2: How do INVs extend their existing social capital? 
 Findings indicate that the INVs used a combination of three networking activities to extend their existing social capital. 
 These networking activities consisted of (f) IBG, (g) DB, (h) AB and emerged as second-order themes. 
 The practice of these networking activities either involved a high or low resource intensity, along with a high or low interaction frequency. These 
practices emerged as six first-order concepts.  
 IBG and AB emerged as networking activities that occur at opposite ends of the emotional spectrum. IBG was implicitly used after the formation of 
weak ties, while AB was used to accelarse the formation of strong ties. 
 SafeMed was found to use IBG most frequently (5 instances), while HeartBeat was found to use AB most frequently (5 instances). 
 DB was found to be an inevitable networking activity in the extension of investor and buyer social capital. In Fertility and SafeMed case, they also 
used DB to extend their mentor social capital, which subsequently became a liability for these firms’. 
RQ3: How do INVs modify their social capital? 
 Findings indicate that the INVs used a combination of three networking activities to modify their social capital. 
 These networking activities consisted of (i) ETS, (j) PTS, (k) RTS and emerged as second-order themes.  
 The practice of these networking activities either involved the retrenchment (i.e. phase out) of weak or strong ties, or the redeployment (i.e. use for 
another purpose) of strong ties. These practices emerged as six first-order concepts.  
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 The use of ETS – the retrenchment of weak ties – was found to be the most widely practiced networking activity in order to modify buyer, supplier, 
and investor social capital. 
 The use of PTS – the retrenchment of strong ties – was the least practiced networking activity, but was used to modify mentor and supplier social 
capital. 
 Three of the four INVs used RTS – the redeployment of strong ties – as a networking activity to modify their social capital. In each case, these 
firms were able to use this social capital for multiple purposes such as encouraging customers to invest financial capital in the business. 
Objective 2 – 
To examine 
why certain 
networking 
activities enable 
or inhibit NVI. 
RQ4: Why do certain networking activities enable or inhibit NVI? 
 The major finding to emerge from this research objective is each networking activity had a varied influence on NVI.  
 There is strong evidence that AB and GAB enables NVI. Specifically, in three of the four case firms, these networking activities were found to 
accelerate relationship development and enable their NVI. 
 Additionally, there is strong evidence that GSB and IBG inhibits NVI. Specifically, it was found that when INVs use GSB before they own unique 
resources, this is likely to inhibit NVI. Moreover, there was strong evidence across cases that the use of IBG inhibits NVI. 
 Findings show these case firms’ vary in their ability to practice certain networking activities, which determines whether they enable or inhibit NVI.  
 For example, Fertility and HeartBeat were both strong at practicing GRB to create buyer social capital which enabled their NVI, whereas, they both 
were weak at practicing GRB to create investor social capital which inhibited their NVI. 
 Similarly, all case firms varied in their ability to use DB to extend social capital. That is, FemMed were strong in practicing DB to extend investor 
social capital as this activity enabled NVI, whereas HeartBeat and SafeMed were weak in practicing DB to extend investor social capital as these 
activities inhibited NVI.  
 Finally, there is strong evidence that PTS and RTS enables NVI. However, it emerged when the case firms were proactive in practicing ETS this 
enabled NVI, whereas when they were reactive in practicing ETS this initially inhibited NVI.  
Objective 3 – 
To determine 
which network 
processes 
underpin 
networking 
capability 
development in 
NVI. 
RQ5: Which network process underpin networking capability development in NVI? 
 Emergent findings indicate that three overarching network-processes underpin networking capability development in NVI. 
 These network-processes consist of the (1) network-enhancing process, the (2) network-delaying process, and (3) the network-modifying process 
that emerged as three overarching aggregate categories, that aggregate eleven second-order themes, which aggregate several first-order concepts.  
 AB in combination with GAB and stronger practices in LRB, GRB, LSB, and DB was found to underpin the network-enhancing process. 
 IBG in combination with GSB and weaker practices in LRB, GRB, LSB, and DB was found to underpin the network-delaying process. 
 All firms encountered the network-delaying process but differed in their ability to learn from delays that occurred from the creation and extension 
of social capital. 
 The network-delaying process was found to trigger the use of ETS, PTS, and RTS, which underpins the network-modifying process. 
 The use of RTS in the network-modifying process involved the nurturing of core ties, which helped accelerate the network-enhancing process. 
 The use of ETS and PTS in the network-modifying process was found to shift the firms’ reliance from impersonal relations towards future 
aspirations to internalise operations, which helped create new network-enhancing processes. 
 
Source: The Author 
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Specifically, section 8.2 reports INVs use what the researcher terms as (a) LRB, (b) GRB, 
(c) LSB, (d) GSB, and (e) GAB as mechanisms to create social capital. Moreover, Table 8-
24 reports contrary to existing literature, there are various types of bonding that help INVs 
extend their social capital. Specifically, there is strong evidence INVs use what the 
researcher terms as (f) IBG, (g) DB, and (h) AB in order to extend their social capital. 
Finally, section 8.4 reports strong evidence that INVs use what the researcher terms as (i) 
ETS, (j) PTS, (k) and RTS as mechanisms to modify their social capital.   
Secondly, Table 8-24 indicates that this chapter achieves research objective two as the 
researcher reports on why specific networking activities enable or inhibit NVI in high-
technology markets. The major findings to emerge from this case analysis is the researcher 
found strong evidence that in most cases the strength of an INV’s capability to practice these 
networking activities determine whether they enable or inhibit NVI. For example, section 
8.5 reports that there is strong evidence that the strength of the INVs networking capability 
to practice LRB, GRB, LSB, and DB will determine whether these activities enable or inhibit 
NVI. However, despite the capability-based nature of these activities, there is also strong 
evidence that the practice of GAB, AB, ETS, PTS, and RTS all enable NVI. There is also 
strong evidence within these cases that GSB and IBG inhibit NVI. Consequently, these 
findings provide insight into why certain networking activities enable or inhibit NVI in high-
technology markets.  
Table 8-24 also specifies that this chapter has achieved research objective three as the 
researcher reports on which network processes underpin networking capability development 
in NVI. The major findings to emerge from this cross-case analysis is the researcher found 
evidence of three overarching aggregate dimensions that categorise the development in 
networking capability in NVI. Specifically, section 8.6 reports that INVs use what the 
researcher terms as the (1) network-enhancing process, the (2) network-delaying process, 
and the (3) network-modifying process. Specifically, section 8.6.1 reports that the researcher 
found strong evidence that INVs use AB in combination with strong network creation 
activities as network-enhancing process. Consequently, these cross-case findings indicate 
that this network-enhancing process enables networking capability development in NVI. 
Secondly, the researcher also found evidence when INVs use IBG in combination with 
weaker network creation practices this leads to a network-delaying process. Interestingly, 
contrary to initial impressions, the researcher found strong evidence that this network-
delaying process actually triggers the network-modifying process. That is, there is evidence 
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that the network-delaying process triggers a learning process that creates the need for a 
network-modifying process, which together underpins networking capability development.  
Finally, Table 8-24 reports that the researcher found strong evidence that INVs use ETS, 
PTS, and RTS as a network-modifying processes. For example, there is evidence that INVs 
use ETS and PTS as network-modifying processes, which help overcome the network-
delaying process. Thus, it is apparent that the network-delaying process triggers the use of 
this network-modifying process, which consequently enables NVI. Whereas, there is also 
evidence that INVs can use RTS as network-modifying process to accelerate the network-
enhancing process. Therefore, together there is evidence that these network processes 
underpin networking capability development in NVI. The next chapter will therefore discuss 
these findings in relation to the literature and conclude on the implications of this abductive 
research. 
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9 – Discussion and Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Aim 
To discuss the research findings in relation to existing literature and conclude on the 
contributions of this research. 
Chapter Objectives 
 To discuss the emergent findings in relation to existing literature that examines 
technology start-ups involvement in networking and internationalisation. 
 To discuss the theoretical contributions of this research by proposing a process 
theory of networking capability development. 
 To discuss the implications for public policy and practitioners.  
 To discuss the research limitations and make recommendations for future research. 
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9.1 Introduction  
This study explores how technology start-ups build dynamic capabilities in networking to 
enable their NVI. The primary contribution of this study makes an important step towards a 
process theory of networking capability development. The core purpose of this theory seeks 
to explain how firms build dynamic capabilities in networking to enable their growth and 
development. This study specifically contributes to NVI theory and to the wider field of 
strategic management within the context of high-growth potential entrepreneurial firms. The 
overarching revelation of this study is the thesis that “networking capability development is 
an affect-based emergent process that enables NVI.” The implications of this argument are 
far reaching. Firstly, this argument offers an alternative assumption for NVI theory that 
entrepreneurs “affect” can enable NVI. This argument also moves toward reconciling the 
research problem that existing theories do not sufficiently explain how technology start-ups 
build dynamic capabilities in networking to enable NVI.  
This chapter will now unfold these findings in relation to existing literature, develop a set of 
propositions to interpret these findings, and present an emergent process model that explains 
how firms build dynamic capabilities in networking to enable growth and development. This 
chapter will also discuss the limitations of this research and the implications that these 
findings have for future research, for policy-makers and for practice. Finally, this study will 
close with concluding remarks on the role a theory of networking capability development 
seeks to have within IE and wider strategic management research.  
9.2 Toward a Process Theory of Networking Capability Development 
The primary contribution of this research makes an important step towards a process theory 
of networking capability development. Therefore, this study contributes to the limited 
literature that identifies networking capability as one particular type of dynamic capability 
(e.g. Fernhaber and McDougall, 2005; Mort and Weerawardena, 2006; Tolstoy and Agndal, 
2010). However, this study advances these contributions by responding to Zahra et al. (2006: 
920) discussion that few empirical studies examine “how dynamic capabilities develop, 
emerge, or evolve in new or established organizations.” Moreover, this study directly 
contributes to Sapienza et al. call for dynamic capability research that examines what INVs 
“do and the resources they control, including the social capital they and their managers have 
amassed” as this would be “enlightening” to advance future research (2006: 930). Indeed, 
Vogel and Güttel (2013) confirm in a recent bibliometric review that the dynamic 
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capabilities perspective “still lacks consensual concepts that allows for comparisons of 
empirical studies and advance the theoretical understanding of dynamic capabilities.” 
Moreover, empirical research on the process by which dynamic capabilities emerge and 
solidify in the context of NVI is still an unsettled question in IE and wider strategic 
management research (Autio et al. 2011). This study therefore contributes to the dynamic 
capabilities debate within the theoretical context of IE research. 
Interestingly, Dubini and Aldrich (1991: 312) were early to specify that it is “critical to 
investigate how an extended network is created, developed, and strengthened over time, and 
how an entrepreneur manages to embed the concept of personal network in the company’s 
‘culture’ so that the company itself becomes ‘network orientated’.” Despite this early 
observation, Chapter 4 explains that few studies have yet to explore how technology start-
ups create, manage, or modify an evolving network of relationships. Indeed, Chapter 3 and 
4 emphasise that most interpretations of dynamic capabilities (e.g. section 3.4) and 
networking (e.g. section 4.3) focus on large organisations and assume that actors begin with 
an established resource and/or network position. Consequently, Chapter 5 emphasises that 
the existing assumption that organisations begin with an established resource and/or network 
position does not fully reflect the reality of most technology-based new ventures (Ozcan and 
Eisenhardt, 2009; Autio et al. 2011). Additionally, Chapter 4 and 5 indicates that the existing 
networking capability interpretations do not resolve the research problem mentioned above. 
Namely, existing networking capability interpretations describe what networking 
capabilities represent and entail, but are less clear on how networking capability develops 
over time, and why certain networking activities enable or inhibit NVI. Consequently, this 
thesis addresses the research problem outlined in Chapter 5 that existing theories do not 
sufficiently explain how technology start-ups build dynamic capabilities in networking to 
enable NVI. To overcome this research problem, this study makes a significant contribution 
to IE and wider strategic management research by proposing a process theory of networking 
capability development. To achieve this contribution, Chapter 5 explains the researcher used 
Helfat et al. (2007) asset orchestration framework and Nahapiet and Ghoshal’s (1998) 
conceptualisation of social capital as a combined theoretical lens to examine the networking 
activities that enable or inhibit NVI. Since the use of this lens is still at an early phase of 
strategic management research (e.g. Nambisan and Sawhney, 2011; Chadwick et al. 2014), 
to the researchers knowledge this is the first entrepreneurship study to use Helfat et al. (2007) 
lens to explore dynamic capability development within the context of NVI. More 
 278 
 
significantly, to the best of the researcher’s knowledge, this is the first study to combine 
Helfat et al. (2007) and Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) as a unique theoretical lens to facilitate 
this theory building research. 
Therefore, this primary contribution emerged on the basis that section 5.3 conceptualised 
networking capability as the capacity of a focal actor to purposefully create, extend, or 
modify its social capital. This conceptualisation then guided the researcher’s working-thesis, 
which after initial cycles of data collection and analysis was that networking is a process of 
dynamic capability development that involves the creation, extension, and modification of 
social capital, which is likely to enable NVI. Consequently, by using this lens, this thesis has 
begun to unlock the black box of networking by identifying eleven distinct networking 
activities that technology start-ups use to create, extend, and modify their social capital. 
Consquently, the identification of these distinct networking activities is an important 
contribution to entrepreneurial network (e.g. Slotte-Kock and Coviello, 2010; Jack et al. 
2010) and wider social capital (e.g. Seibert et al. 2001; McFadyen et al. 2004) research. For 
example, social capital researchers traditionally assume that bridging and bonding are 
general networking activities (e.g. Gittell and Vidal, 1998; Leonard, 2004), whereas, this 
study contributes to knowledge through the identification of specific types of bridging and 
bonding activities. 
This process theory of networking capability development also contributes to recent calls in 
strategic management (e.g. Foss, 2011; Barney et al. 2011), entrepreneurship (e.g. Corner 
and Wu, 2011), and IE (e.g. Prashantham and Floyd, 2012) for more granular “micro-
process” based research. This study has therefore explored how strong and weak practices 
of specific networking activities underpin what emerged as the (1) network-enhancing 
process, (2) network-delaying process, and (3) network-modifying process. Emergent 
findings indicate that together these three network-processes trigger, enable, and accelerate 
a virtuous cycle of networking capability development. Namely, this abductive research 
found that “learning from delays” and “nurturing core ties” were mechanisms that helped 
shift technology start-ups reliance from impersonal relations towards future aspirations to 
internalise operations. Therefore, this process theory contributes to recent research on how 
entrepreneurs “create something from nothing” (e.g. Baker and Nelson, 2005; Zott and Huy, 
2007) on the assumption that cycles of networking capability development are an “affect-
based” (Barron, 2008) emergent process that enables NVI.  
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Finally, the researcher used the “affect” concept – i.e. the feelings and moods of individual 
entrepreneurs – to problematize the traditional assumption (e.g. Larson and Starr, 1993; Hite 
and Hesterly, 2001) that networking is a calculated, efficient, and intentional process. 
Instead, these emergent findings indicate that the affect concept points to the emotional 
qualities of the entrepreneur, and assumes that networking capability development is more 
intuitive than it is calculated, and more emergent than it is intentional. Consequently, 
findings emphasise that entrepreneur’s ability to “nurture core ties” helps accelerate 
networking capability development. Moreover, these core ties were found to help shift INVs 
reliance from impersonal relations to focus on how to internalise operations. Therefore, this 
thesis argues that early stage entrepreneurial firms should focus on “nurturing core ties,” 
which challenges the efficiency assumption that organisations are able to optimially manage 
a growing network of strong and weak ties. Figure 9-1 therefore depicts this virtuous cycle 
of networking capability development. This chapter will now discuss these contributions by 
unfolding the core findings in relation to existing literature and will propose how technology 
start-ups build dynamic capabilities in networking to enable NVI. 
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Figure 9-1: Virtuous Cycles of Networking Capability Development: A Theory Building Approach 
 
Source: The Author
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9.2.1 Aggregate Category 1: Network-Enhancing Process 
A central mechanism of how technology start-ups build dynamic capabilities in networking 
is what the researcher terms as the network-enhancing process, which is when the focal actor 
engages in networking activities that “enhances” the value of its social capital. Figure 9-1 
illustrates this network-enhancing process is the first element that underpins this process 
theory of networking capability development. To begin with, an important finding is INVs 
use what the researcher labels as (a) LRB, (b) GRB, (c) LSB, (d) GSB, and (e) GAB as 
mechanisms to create social capital. These networking activities emerged from data analysis 
that practicing these activities either involved using (1) referrals, (2) search, or involved 
being (3) approached by new actors. Thus, this study found the origin of these ties 
encapsulate various forms of international scope, but to avoid complexity, the researcher 
followed the logic of Mors (2010) and Tippmann et al. (2012) by categorising these 
“bridging” activities as being either local or global in scope.  
The identification of specific “bridging” activities is an important contribution to both the 
dynamic capabilities and social capital literature. In terms of dynamic capabilities, this 
research contributes to Helfat et al. (2007) argument that asset orchestration consists of 
organisational and managerial (i.e. entrepreneurial) processes that primarily involve (1) 
search and selection activities and (2) configuration and deployment activities. 
Consequently, LSB and GSB are clearly search activities, while one likely interpretation is 
LRB and GRB are selection activities since INVs leverage their referrals to “select” specific 
social capital. More importantly, these findings directly contribute to the social capital 
literature as most networking studies continue to discuss network creation as simply a 
“bridging” activity (e.g. Gittell and Vidal, 1998) when the focal actor seeks to capitalise on 
external “brokerage opportunities” (e.g. Burt, 1992, 2005). Nevertheless, rather than viewing 
referrals, search, or acceptance as a structural source of social capital (e.g. Nahapiet and 
Ghoshal, 1998; Adler and Kwon, 2002) it was apparent that these sources are indicators of 
specific networking activities, which consequently have various influences on NVI.  
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Consequently, Figure 9-1 illustrates the findings that when INVs show strength in practicing 
LRB, GRB, and LSB these bridging activities will form part of the network-enhancing 
process. For example, findings show that all of the INVs use GRB to create social capital. 
The researcher defines GRB as when the ego uses an alter’s referral to create a foreign tie. 
Specifically, findings show INVs use GRB as a mechanism to create investor, mentor, buyer 
and supplier social capital and this was the most widely practiced bridging activity. 
Interestingly, findings show that HeartBeat and FemMed shown greater strength in using 
GRB to create investor, mentor and buyer social capital, whereas Fertility and SafeMed were 
weaker in practicing this activity. For example, HeartBeat shown evidence of using GRB to 
create investor social capital by asking their mentor (e.g. a US cardiologist) to connect them 
with a group of US angel investors. Additionally after FemMed’s unsuccessful use of GSB 
– which section 9.2.2 elaborates on – the firm used GRB to connect with buyers. This activity 
was also apparent in Fertility who after various unsuccessful attempts at GSB, shown signs 
of capability development by using GRB to create buyer social capital. 
These findings contribute to IE research as few studies consider the capabilities technology 
start-ups need to create social capital. For example, Sharma and Blomstermo (2003) found 
born-globals accumulate knowledge by creating an “optimal amount of weak ties” but are 
less specific on network content as they do not detail (1) which weak ties create knowledge 
and (2) the type of knowledge these weak ties create. Whereas, most IE research examines 
how technology start-ups existing social capital with core customers influences NVI (e.g. 
Yli-Renko et al. 2002; Presutti et al. 2007). Additionally in IE research, numerous 
networking studies focus on the choice of entry mode. For example, Coviello and Munro 
(1997) empirically report three of their four case firms were able to create foreign 
distribution agreements by piggybacking on their existing involvement in overseas 
production agreements. Freeman et al. (2006) also refer to the seminal work of Bell (1995) 
and found technology start-ups use client-followership as a strategy to mitigate risk when 
entering export markets. That is, Freeman et al. (2006) found technology start-ups use their 
existing client referrals to create new sales opportunities. Additionally, Freeman and 
Cavusgil (2007) report that technology start-ups choice of entry mode varies depending on 
the diversity and availability of foreign network ties. That is, Freeman and Cavusgil (2007) 
found technology start-ups show a complex networking behaviour where they create 
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“layers” of ties with foreign agents and distributors to “break-in” to new marketing and 
distribution networks.    
Despite these contributions, this study found stronger evidence that INVs actually draw on 
their mentor social capital as an initial activity before using GRB to create buyer social 
capital. These findings then correspond with Coviello and Munro (1997) findings that it is 
not only existing customers who support the creation of new buyer social capital. 
Consequently, there is also evidence INVs initially use LRB or LSB to create mentor social 
capital. The researcher defines LRB as when the ego uses an alter’s referral to create a local 
tie, while he defines LSB as when the ego searches new networks to create a local tie. For 
example, HeartBeat shown strength in practicing LRB to form ties with a government 
mentor who helped the firm with cross-border R&D activities. Fertility also used LRB to 
form ties with mentors, and then used GRB to create buyer social capital with MNEs. 
Additionally, FemMed shown a strength in using LSB as they formed ties with mentors and 
suppliers who enabled their NVI.  
These findings contribute to IE research as few empirical studies exam how technology start-
ups use local bridging to form foreign ties. However, one exemplar is Fontes and Coombs 
(1997) who found that Portuguese technology start-ups created external links with local 
distributors and agents as an initial step to enter unknown foreign markets. Fontes and 
Coombs (1997) suggest technology start-ups engage in an identification and evaluation 
process that involved (1) searching local intermediaries for synergies, (2) setting up 
specialist international groups, and (3) targeting large MNEs as potential customers to 
leverage their position on the value chain. Al-Laham and Souitaris (2007) also found that 
German biotechnology new ventures create a combination of local, national, and 
international R&D links to support early internationalisation. Specifically, the authors found 
that technology start-ups that centrally position themselves in local clusters and national 
research networks are more likely to form R&D alliances.  
In addition to these findings, Collinson and Gregson (2003) found that technology start-ups 
embedded in local UK, US and Canadian knowledge clusters were more likely to create 
R&D alliances, which enables NVI. Moreover, Brännback et al. (2007) found evidence that 
knowledge diffusion predominately takes place through local channels and it is not until 
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born-globals exploit innovation (i.e. in form of patents or products) that knowledge diffuses 
across national borders. Prashantham (2011) also found from a survey of 102 Indian software 
SMEs that they use their local co-ethnic ties to enable the use of “higher-commitment entry 
modes” that are beyond exporting. Interestingly, three (HeartBeat, FemMed and SafeMed) 
of the four INVs were not centrally located in a “knowledge cluster” (e.g. a science park) 
per se, but did engage with the local R&D community to exploit their innovations across 
borders. Thus, these findings indicate that when INVs have a strength in practicing LRB and 
LSB these networking activities are likely to enable NVI. 
Figure 8-1 also illustrates findings that when INVs have a strength in practicing DB this 
bonding activity will form part of the network-enhancing process. The researcher defines 
DB as when the ego commits a large amount of resource to interact frequently with the alter 
due to the ego’s reliance on the future outcomes of this social capital. Interestingly, the 
researcher found under certain conditions DB is likely to enable NVI. Most notably, these 
findings indicate a certain amount of DB is inevitable when attempting to extend initial 
social capital with would-be foreign investors and customers. That is, all of the INVs 
engaged in DB, but Fertility and FemMed were the only firms to use this activity in a 
productive manner. For example, Fertility engaged in DB with a Chinese MNE to overcome 
the “trust-building” phase, before they could sign a major distribution agreement. 
Additionally, FemMed’s successful involvement in due diligence with a large strategic 
buyer, shows signs of DB as they reallocated the majority of their resource to eventually 
secure a strategic exit. 
The degree to which actors can manage dependency is an unsettled question in 
entrepreneurship and strategic management research. On the one hand, some researchers use 
resource dependency theory (e.g. Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) as a power lens to explain how 
focal actors control exchange relations. Other researchers use transaction cost theory (e.g. 
Williamson, 1981, 1991; Dyer, 1996) as an efficiency lens to explain how focal actors reduce 
the costs of exchange relations. Consequently, the researcher’s findings AB offers one way 
to help reconcile these conflicting views to help understand how firms enhance their social 
capital under conditions of resource scarcity and dependency. The researcher defines AB 
when two actors instantly bond through an intellectual, cultural, or empathic connection. 
Crucially this study found strong evidence when entrepreneurs form inter-personal relations 
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with actors before any economic involvement, these actors went on to have critical role 
within the business.  
Findings also provide strong evidence that most of the entrepreneurs use AB as a mechanism 
to extend their mentor social capital. However, HeartBeat and FemMed were two cases who 
shown evidence that AB was not only limited to an individual, as all of the TMT were 
involved in building intimate connections with specific investors, mentors and even 
suppliers. For example, one of FemMed’s entrepreneurs describe that their angel investors 
“have become friends to us all” and speak fondly of their local Scottish manufacturer. 
HeartBeat’s entrepreneur also shows an innate quality to build inter-personal relations with 
local government officials, universities, health professionals and global R&D consortia, who 
had an intrinsic belief in the firm’s products.  
One interpretation of these findings is AB relates to what cognitive psychologists would 
term as “affect” (e.g. Forgas, 1995, 2000; Isen, 2002) which are the feelings and emotions 
that exert a strong effect on entrepreneurs cognitive schemas (Baron, 2008). Baron and 
Markman (2003) empirically report entrepreneurs “social competence” – i.e. their ability to 
interact effectively based on discrete social skills – enhances social capital and leads to 
greater financial success. Interestingly, De Carolis and Saparito (2006) propose 
entrepreneurs involved in sparse rather than cohesive networks are more likely to show 
cognitive biases through (1) overconfidence, (2) illusions of control, i.e. underestimation, 
and (3) representativeness, i.e. belief in validity of incomplete data. In other words, “hubris” 
(i.e. overconfidence) is more likely to reduce rather than increase the probability of new 
venture survival (Hayward et al. 2006). De Carolis et al. (2009: 527) test the influence of 
social capital and cognition on a sample of 269 entrepreneurs to find “that social capital is 
not enough; the type of person involved in network relationships matters to new venture 
creation.” Therefore, these findings show that AB helps accelerate the creation and extension 
of social capital. 
Another interpretation is these findings contribute to Hallen and Eisenhardt’s (2012) recent 
revelations on tie formation efficiency. That is Hallen and Eisenhardt (2012) found “casual 
dating” with investors such as “simply asking for advice” is a subtle but effective cognitive 
tactic to ensure tie formation is less overt and more efficient. However, the authors warn 
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casual dating can show the new venture’s vulnerabilities, so entrepreneurs must be cautious 
about their timing and focus of tie formation. Incidentally, the researcher’s findings show 
when INVs have a strength in practicing these bridging activities, they were more likely to 
use AB to extend their social capital. Moreover, AB differs from Hallen and Eisenhardt’s 
(2012) notion of casual dating, as AB is more intuitive than it is calculated, and more 
emotional than it is efficient. Figure 9-1 also depicts that when firms combine the use of 
these activities, this triggers what the researcher labels as a network-enhancing process, 
which is likely to enable NVI. Therefore, these findings lead to the researcher’s first 
proposition: 
P1: Technology start-ups that have a strength in local referral bridging, global referral bridging, 
local search bridging and dependency bonding are more likely to engage in affinity bonding 
which (a) triggers a network-enhancing process that (b) enables new venture 
internationalisation.  
Jack (2010) notes that a “Ptolemaic/Copernican analogy” provides a useful way to appreciate 
how the network appears from either the individual’s perspective or that of the outside 
observer. That is, the Ptolemaic view of social networks suggests everything develops 
around the focal actor (i.e. the ego), while the Copernican view is less concerned with the 
ego, but the interdependent relationships that undergird a network structure (Jack, 2010: 
130). Although this study does not research network structure, findings do show instances 
of where alters’ initially approached the ego, which means the ego (i.e. the INV) accepted 
an alter’s initial request to form a tie. For example, findings show that three (e.g. Fertility, 
HeartBeat, and FemMed) of the four INVs used GAB to create social capital. The researcher 
defines GAB as when an ego accepts an alter’s request to form a global tie. Interestingly, 
there was strong evidence that when the focal actor accepted the alter’s request to form a 
global tie, this social capital over the long-term enabled NVI. Findings show in each 
instance, the alter was attracted to the ego after the focal firm accumulated unique resources, 
which in all cases was a leading edge medical device. More crucially, findings show in most 
cases, alters did not initially approach the ego with an economic interest to sell their products, 
but with a scientific or medical interest in their unique technology.  
Consequently, findings show after tie formation, the INVs engaged in AB with these actors 
due to an intellectual connection, which helped extend the value of this social capital. In 
 287 
 
most cases, since these actors were medical professionals and university research groups 
they formed mentor and in some case customer relations with the firm. Therefore, these 
findings reinforce the economic argument put forth by resource based (Barney, 1991; 
Peteraf, 1993), resource dependence (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) and NVI (Oviatt and 
McDougall, 1994) theories that unique resources (i.e. inimitability) are the sufficient 
condition for sustained advantage. A likely interpretation of these findings is that INVs 
unique technology and products are what “attracted” these alter requests.  
Additionally, networking based research on “homophily” provides an alternative 
interpretation of these results. That is entrepreneurship research on homophily has 
empirically found even when two actors occupy similar network positions, there is a 
tendency for alters to collaborate with partners who they share a personal and emotional 
attachment with (Uzzi and Gillespie, 2002; Ruef et al. 2003; Milanov and Fernhaber, 2009). 
Autio et al. (2011) found that INVs involved in technology-led industries develop a 
“language of organizing” in which the TMT uses cognitive processes (e.g. a shared 
vocabulary) to create new capabilities to respond to highly uncertain situations. Vissa and 
Bhagavatula’s (2012) survey research also found strong empirical evidence that technology 
entrepreneurs improve their chances of initiating economic exchanges with persons that 
spoke the same language and whose objectives were congruent with the entrepreneurs’ 
immediate task priorities. These findings then indicate unique resources are likely to attract 
desirable partners who do not threaten the business and the use of AB is what strengthens 
such ties. Therefore, these networking behaviours lead to the researcher’s next proposition: 
P2: Technology start-ups are more likely to use global acceptance bridging after they 
accumulate unique resources and when used with affinity bonding will (a) trigger a network-
enhancing process that (b) enables new venture internationalisation.  
9.2.2 Aggregate Category 2: Network-Delaying Process 
An important mechanism that underpins how technology start-ups build dynamic 
capabilities in networking is what the researcher terms as the network-delaying process, 
which the researcher defines when the focal actor engages in networking activities that 
“delays” an organisations growth and development. Figure 9-1 depicts this network-
delaying process, which is the second element that underpins this process theory of 
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networking capability development. Contrary to initial impressions, findings show the 
network-delaying process can trigger the network-modifying process, which is a critical 
mechanism for networking capability development in NVI. Consequently, when INVs 
engage in what the researcher terms as “learning from delays” there is evidence that this 
learning mechanism contributes to a virtuous cycle of networking capability development. 
The researcher defines learning from delays as experiential learning that emerges when 
attempting to overcome delays from social capital. However, Figure 9-1 does illustrate 
findings that when INVs are weak in practicing LRB, GSB, LSB, and DB, these activities 
will form a network-delaying process that inhibits NVI. Therefore, it is how the INV 
responds to such delays is what drives networking capability development. 
Interestingly, findings show if INVs use LRB, LSB, or GRB to form ties with the wrong 
partner, there is clear evidence that some firms would then use DB in attempt to extend this 
social capital. However, in some cases these weaker practices would evolve into what the 
research terms as IBG. The researcher defines IBG as when the ego commits a large amount 
of resource to the alter but limits interaction following disinterest in this social capital. 
Therefore, findings indicate that IBG and AB are at opposite ends of the emotional spectrum. 
These networking activities thus contribute to inter-organisational network theory’s 
discussion on the distinction between “arm’s-length” and “embedded ties” (Thorelli, 1986; 
Powell et al. 1996; Uzzi, 1997). That is, Uzzi (1997) argues transactions either take place 
through loose connections of individuals who maintain impersonal and constantly shifting 
market based exchange ties (e.g. arm’s length) or through stable networks of exchange 
partners who maintain close social relations (e.g. embedded ties). IBG thus contributes to 
discussion on arm’s length ties, while AB contributes to discussion on embedded ties. 
However, since most network research focusses on inter-organisational ties, it is evident 
entrepreneurial firms use these bonding activities after the formation of both inter-personal 
and inter-organisational ties. 
Consequently, findings show when INVs are weak in practicing bridging activities they are 
likely to engage in IBG, which is a network-delaying process that inhibits NVI. For example, 
Fertility used LRB to form inter-personal ties with Dr Shi who was the inventor and patent 
holder of the firm’s unique technology. Despite Dr Shi being a “co-founder” it is evident he 
did not desire a “commercial involvement” and only wanted to consult on R&D. However, 
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Fertility were dependent on Dr Shi’s links to Chinese MNEs, which led to DB, and to a 
period of IBG as Fertility’s TMT no longer interacted with the mentor, which inhibited NVI. 
Interestingly, SafeMed engaged in the most IBG of the four case firms. One episode is when 
SafeMed used LSB to create ties with a local government advisor who helped secure 
government grants, but given their desire to raise an IPO, they felt this local advisor was no 
longer relevant and decided to limit interaction. However, after their IPO, they were still 
unable to raise a sufficient financial capital, and then realised they were not eligible for future 
government grants, which meant this IBG inhibited their NVI. 
These findings contribute to the IE literature on the local challenges that inhibit NVI. For 
example, Styles and Genua (2008) found that Australian academic entrepreneurs 
encountered difficulties in creating global R&D networks as their location limited research-
based opportunities to access specialised knowledge. Gilding (2008) also reports on the 
“intensive regionalism” and “precocious internationalism” that Australian dedicated 
biotechnology firms endure when operating in regional clusters. In their social network 
study, Gilding (2008) found involvement in local Australian clusters meant access to 
international ties was “precarious” and cultural hurdles exacerbated these challenges where 
firms favoured UK and US partners opposed to Japanese and South Korean firms. Moreover, 
Gassman and Keupp (2007) discuss the network delays born-global firms encounter who are 
active in the Australian, Swiss, and German biotechnology industries. Specifically, Gassman 
and Keupp (2007) found born-globals have a tendency to overinvest in their scientific 
networks, which helps access technological knowledge cost efficiently, but limits their 
interaction with industrial networks as this prevents access to market sensitive knowledge.  
Findings also show when INVs are weaker in practicing GRB in the formation of inter-
organisational ties, this can lead to DB and IBG, which is a network-delaying process that 
inhibits NVI. For example, SafeMed used GRB as they relied on a US FDA consultant to 
connect them with a North Carolina distributor and manufacturer. Consequently, 
longitudinal findings show SafeMed were dependent on these referrals after it emerged they 
collaborated with the wrong strategic partners. That is, since this three-way agreement was 
contingent on the North Carolina manufacturer funding the specialised equipment this led to 
a period of DB. However, when the manufacturer refused to pay for the production 
equipment this led to a period of IBG as SafeMed lost interest in this tie, which inhibited 
 290 
 
their NVI. Similar results are also apparent in Freeman and Cavusgil (2007) who found born-
globals in technology-industries will often decide on their first foreign market entry on the 
basis of where they can create new connections irrespective of geographic and cultural 
considerations. Thus, Freeman and Cavusgil (2007) found that only relying on global 
referrals is risk intensive and highly uncertain process due to the unfamiliarity of building 
network relationships in geographical or culturally distant markets. Based on these findings, 
this leads to the researcher’s third proposition:  
P3: Technology start-ups that are weak in practicing local referral bridging, global referral 
bridging, local search bridging and dependency bonding are more likely to engage in 
impassive bonding, which (a) forms a network-delaying process that (b) inhibits new venture 
internationalisation.  
Oviatt and McDougall (1994) argue unique resources are the sufficient condition of 
sustainable INVs. Consequently, this study contributes to this proposition, but indirectly, as 
there was strong evidence when INVs engage in certain networking activities without unique 
resources this was likely to inhibit NVI. For example, findings show FemMed and SafeMed 
both used GSB to create investor, buyer, and supplier social capital. The researcher defines 
GSB as when as when the ego searches new networks to create a foreign tie. Interestingly, 
there was strong evidence that when INVs used GSB before they accumulate unique 
resources they were likely to engage in IBG, which inhibits NVI. For example, FemMed 
used GSB to create ties with a large US distributor prior to owning a granted patent or a 
unique portfolio of products. Therefore, findings show the firm had decided to collaborate 
with the wrong partner as despite engaging in DB to strengthen this tie, the MNE failed to 
sell their products. FemMed then became increasingly impassive about this tie, which 
indicates this network-delaying process inhibited their NVI.  
Similarly, SafeMed also used GSB as their central mechanism to create investor, mentor, 
buyer, and supplier social capital. In this case, longitudinal findings show that the INV 
shown a weak capability in using GSB to create social capital with suppliers. For example, 
SafeMed made the decision to partner with a Chinese and US R&D consultancy who 
“charged big fees” and “delayed” their NVI. Findings show the INV had become 
increasingly impassive about interacting with these foreign suppliers, as they no longer had 
any trust in these ties, which meant these activities formed a network-delaying process that 
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inhibited their NVI. These findings then support the limited IE literature and wider 
entrepreneurship literature that investigates how technology start-ups identify, select, and 
form suitable strategic alliances. For example, Baum et al. (2000) empirically found when 
biotechnology start-ups search for R&D partners and form alliances with potential rivals, on 
average, these technology start-ups tended to experience weaker performance. Fontes and 
Coombs (1997) also found Portuguese technology start-ups performed various search 
activities but did not have the sufficient “technological scanning” capabilities to identify 
suitable R&D partners who could support NVI. 
These findings also correspond with Burgal and Murray’s (2000) survey based research who 
empirically found that technology start-ups who are able to identify and evaluate suitable 
intermediaries are more likely to enable NVI. Specifically, Burgal and Murray (2000) found 
when technology start-ups target intermediaries such as foreign agents and distributors by 
promoting their unique complementary products they were more likely to form long-
standing alliances. Relatedly Hallen (2008) reports technology start-ups that establish their 
initial network positions through “organisational accomplishments” are more likely to 
extend investor ties. That is, Hallen (2008) empirically found organisational 
accomplishments allow technology start-ups to convert the actions of their founders (e.g. 
granting of patents, the development of the right products) into valuable firm-level social 
capital. Based on these findings, this leads to the researcher’s fourth proposition:  
P4: Technology start-ups that use global search bridging before they accumulate unique 
resources are more likely to engage in impassive bonding that (a) forms a network-delaying 
process, which (b) inhibits new venture internationalisation.    
Despite this network-delaying process, there is evidence that when INVs are “learning from 
delays” this can trigger a virtuous cycle of networking capability development. More 
specifically, findings show the network-delaying process is an organisational learning 
mechanism that underpins networking capability development. That is, findings show all of 
the INVs learned from previous delays, which encouraged them to modify their existing 
social capital. For example, after FemMed’s unsuccessful experience with the large US 
distributor, there is evidence they had learned from this delay as this experience motivated 
them to modify this social capital and internalise their sales and marketing through the 
formation of a US foreign sales subsidiary. Whereas, after SafeMed’s unsuccessful 
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experience in attempting to collaborate with US and Chinese R&D consultancies, they 
eventually learned that these “delays” as the TMT realised they could internalise their R&D. 
These findings support existing research that INVs networking capabilities develop and 
emerge through organisational learning (Fernhaber and McDougall, 2005; Mort and 
Weerawardena, 2006; Tolstoy and Agndal, 2010). Given the continued debate on whether 
dynamic capability development is idiosyncratic (e.g. Teece et al. 1997) or exhibits 
commonalities (e.g. Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000), the above findings indicate that learning 
from delays is a specific learning mechanism with respect to networking capability 
development. Consequently, these findings support Mort and Weerawardena’s (2006) 
argument that Eisenhardt and Martin’s (2000) learning mechanisms underpin networking 
capability development in NVI. That is, this study found strong evidence that network delays 
meant INVs were learning from mistakes and organisational crises, which motivate the need 
to build a networking capability in order to modify social capital. Therefore, based on this 
argument, this leads to the researcher’s fifth proposition:  
P5: When technology start-ups are learning from delays this is likely to (a) trigger a network-
modifying process that helps (b) build a networking capability, which (c) enables new venture 
internationalisation. 
9.2.3 Aggregate Category 3: Network-Modifying Process 
A critical mechanism of how technology start-ups build dynamic capabilities in networking 
is what the researcher terms as the network-modifying process, which is when the focal actor 
engages in networking activities that “modify” its social capital. Figure 9-1 depicts this 
network-modifying process, which is the third element that underpins this process theory of 
networking capability development. Interestingly, findings show three central networking 
activities underpin the network-modifying process. That is, findings show ETS, PTS and 
RTS underpin the network-modifying process. The researcher defines ETS as when the ego 
decides to retrench a weak tie, while he defines PTS as when the ego decides to retrench a 
strong tie, and defines RTS as when the ego decides to redeploy a strong tie for a new 
purpose. Interestingly, findings show these networking activities have varied functions, but 
as a combined network-modifying process, create new or accelerate existing network-
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enhancing process, which together form a virtuous cycle of networking capability 
development.  
Interestingly, findings show when INVs use ETS and PTS as a network-modifying process 
this cycle is likely to encourage “aspirations to internalise” that shifts the reliance from 
impersonal “arms-length” relations towards future aspirations to internalise operations. For 
example, Fertility used ETS to modify social capital with an English manufacturer due to 
continuous quality problems that delayed their NVI. After Fertility retrenched this tie, this 
encouraged them to internalise production to gain more control over the manufacturing 
process. When Fertility began to grow, findings then show they used PTS to retrench social 
capital with local mentors who could no longer advise on their international expansion. 
These events then created a network-enhancing process as Fertility invested in core ties who 
could support their NVI. Similarly, after HeartBeat used ETS to retrench social capital with 
a US VC syndicate, they then used what technology entrepreneurs describe as a “pivoting 
strategy” (e.g. Blank, 2013) to generate early sales revenues. That is, they deviated from 
their initial commercialisation (e.g. a class two medical device) and leveraged their unique 
technology to launch a quick and cost efficient product for the research market. When 
HeartBeat began to grow, findings show they used PTS to retrench existing social capital 
with a local manufacturer who no longer had the production capacity to manufacture their 
products. This then created a network-enhancing process, as HeartBeat were then able to 
invest in a core tie who could support their NVI. 
These findings contribute to recent IE and entrepreneurship research that examines the 
“dark-side” of social capital (Maurer and Ebers, 2006; Prashantham and Dhanaraj, 2010; Yu 
et al. 2011). That is, these studies indicate most research takes an overly positive view on 
the influence social capital has on technology new venture growth and development. 
However, the researcher’s findings provide evidence that INVs can engage in ETS or PTS 
to modify social capital before it becomes a liability. For example, these findings contributes 
to Prashantham and Dhanaraj (2010) argument that “network learning” is one network 
process that overcomes inertia such as “tie decay” and “tie obsolescence” which facilitates 
greater NVI. Therefore, the researcher’s findings on future aspirations to internalise 
contribute to Maurer and Ebers (2006) revelations that biotechnology start-ups adapt the 
configuration of their social capital to changing resource needs, and when inertia turns a 
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firm’s social capital into a liability. Specifically, Maurer and Ebers (2006) argue 
biotechnology start-ups use “horizontal and vertical differentiation” along with “integration 
of relationship management” as a “unique” network processes to overcome relational and 
cognitive lock-in in entrepreneurial networks. However, this study advances this existing 
research, as it identifies ETS and PTS as specific networking activities that modify weak or 
strong ties. Therefore, based on these findings, this leads to the researcher’s sixth 
proposition: 
P6: Technology start-ups who aspire to internalise operations are more likely to use 
eliminating and prioritising ties as a network-modifying process to (a) create new network-
enhancing processes that (b) enables new venture internationalisation. 
Findings also show the second cycle of the network-modifying process is when INVs use 
RTS to redeploy their social capital. That is, there is strong evidence when INVs use RTS 
they are likely to engage in “nurturing core ties” which involves cherishing the most valuable 
stocks of social capital. Consequently, there is strong evidence this network-modifying 
process can accelerate the network-enhancing process, which enables NVI. For example, 
three (e.g. Fertility, HeartBeat and FemMed) of the four INVs used RTS to redeploy their 
mentor, investor, buyer, or supplier social capital. That is, both HeartBeat and FemMed used 
RTS to redeploy their mentor ties with US based surgeons. In both cases, the INVs initially 
used AB to strengthen these inter-personal relations. However, after  critical events (e.g. 
surviving the financial crisis and establishing a US sales subsidiary) both firms used ETS 
and PTS to retrench what Prashantham and Dhanaraj (2010) would term “obsolete” social 
capital and focus on what the researcher would term as nurturing these core ties. 
Consequently, the INVs then used RTS to redeploy these core ties as both surgeons agreed 
to become KOLs, which accelerated the future network-enhancing process and enabled NVI. 
Interestingly, both Fertility and HeartBeat also used RTS to redeploy their inter-
organisational social capital. Although there is stronger evidence of this network-modifying 
process enhancing inter-personal social capital, there are instances were firms redeploy 
buyer or supplier social capital. For example, Fertility were able to reconfigure their buyer 
social capital due to the Canadian distributor emotional connection as they “loved their 
product” and would “do anything it takes to sell it.” Consequently, Fertility were able to 
encourage the distributor to invest in the business, which meant they agreed to finance the 
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Canadian regulatory approval and the production process. HeartBeat’s founders were also 
able to use their long-standing inter-personal connection with a Chinese VP to form a 
strategic alliance with a Hong Kong manufacturer. However, since the founders had an 
established relation with this individual, they were able to redeploy this tie with the supplier, 
as the Hong Kong manufacturer agreed to finance production and distribute their products 
throughout Hong Kong and mainland China. Consequently, nurturing core ties helped 
accelerate the network-enhancing process as their subsequent bonding with the manufacturer 
enabled their NVI. 
One interpretation of these findings is that RTS is a networking activity that helps create 
“fungible” social capital for an alternative use at a lower cost (e.g. Eisenhardt and Martin, 
2000; Sapienza et al. 2006). The fungibility of social capital is an important finding as it 
contributes to the limited conceptual (e.g. Larson and Starr, 1993; Hite and Hesterly, 2001; 
Slotte-Kock and Coviello, 2010) and empirical (e.g. Schutjens and Stam, 2003; Batjargal, 
2003; Steier and Greenwood, 2000; Newbert et al. 2013) entrepreneurship research on the 
evolution of entrepreneurial networks. For example, Hite and Hesterly (2001) argue new 
ventures begin with “identity-based” networks and move towards “calculative-based” 
networks as they adapt to changing resource needs and resource challenges. That is, Hite 
and Hesterly (2001) argue new venture networks primarily consist of dense socially 
embedded ties, but as the new venture grows, they will begin to calculate the costs and 
benefits of forming sparsely related arms-length ties. However, despite this seminal theory, 
the researcher found evidence that young technology start-ups show signs of networking 
capability development when they actually reduce the size of their entrepreneurial network 
in order to leverage the fungibility of their social capital by nurturing core ties. 
Indeed, these findings resonate with recent empirical research on the calculative nature of 
emerging entrepreneurial networks (e.g. Ozcan and Eisenhardt, 2009; Hallen and Eisenhardt, 
2012; Sepulveda and Gabrielsson, 2013). For instance, Ozcan and Eisenhardt (2009) found 
executives in technology start-ups with high-performing portfolios visualise their alliance 
portfolios in the context of an entire network, but not as a series of single ties. That is, Ozcan 
and Eisenhardt (2009: 269-270) propose when technology start-ups (1) advocate a vision of 
the embryonic industry architecture, (2) synchronise multiple exchange partnerships and (3) 
exploit industry uncertainties, they are more likely to form high-performing alliance 
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portfolios and achieve superior performance. Their core argument is technology start-ups 
who achieve high-performing alliance portfolios create strong collaborations between a 
small cohesive team of diverse partners, rather than forming a sparse network of arm’s-
length ties. Therefore, Ozcan and Eisenhardt (2009: 268) argue this cognitive view of 
nurturing industry networks broadens the range of strategic alternatives from which 
entrepreneurs can choose and enrich their strategic possibilities.  
These findings also correspond with Baum et al. (2000) who report biotechnology start-ups 
that understand and envision the composition of their alliance network are more likely to 
avoid inter-partner conflict and rivalry between partners. Stuart (2000) reports empirical 
evidence that industry analysts were found to look unfavourably at technology start-ups who 
form extensive, inefficient webs of alliances comprised of multiple and duplicate partners. 
Therefore, the researcher would argue to improve relational quality (e.g. Yli-Renko et al. 
2001) involvement in cycles of nurturing core ties is a more valuable activity for technology 
start-ups than simply increasing network size. Based on these findings, this leads to the 
researcher’s seventh proposition:  
P7: Technology start-ups that nurture core ties are more likely to use reconfiguring ties as 
network-modifying process, which (a) accelerates network-enhancing processes, and (b) enables 
new venture internationalisation. 
Finally, an overarching revelation from this study is that networking capability development 
is not a calculated or intentional behaviour, but an affect-based emergent process. More 
interestingly, findings show the extension of inter-personal ties – particularly through cycles 
of nurturing core ties – can help initiate the formation of future exchange partnerships. Thus, 
findings indicate networking capability development shifts the reliance from impersonal-
based relations to the nurturing of core ties that motivates and supports the firm to internalise 
its operations. Moreover, these findings indicate networking capability development is not 
driven by an increase in network size (e.g. arm’s length-ties), but by overcoming 
impassiveness and striving for affinity, which motivates future aspirations to internalise 
operations.  
Vissa’s recent entrepreneurship research on the value of inter-personal ties supports these 
arguments (Vissa and Chacar, 2009; Vissa, 2011; Vissa, 2012; Vissa and Bhagavatula, 
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2012). For example, Vissa and Chacar (2009) empirically found when the “advice networks” 
of technology start-ups have a (1) strategic consensus on key goals and strategies, and have 
a (2) internal cohesion in terms of inter-personal friendships, they are more likely to 
experience higher performance. Vissa (2011) also reports that Indian entrepreneurs who co-
found technology start-ups are more likely to secure exchange partnerships when the co-
founders are friends and share an ethnic caste, language, and have greater task 
complementarity.  
In addition to these findings, Vissa and Bhagavatula (2012: 273) argue that technology 
entrepreneurs engage in “network-broadening” and “network-deepening” to secure 
exchange partners. Vissa and Bhagavatula (2012) argue when entrepreneurs encounter 
change in their personal network – this is likely to lead to a growth in the focal venture’s 
portfolio of exchange partners. Therefore, the researcher’s findings on the network-
enhancing, network-delaying, and network-modifying processes contribute to this existing 
research. However, the major distinction between these concepts is this research provides a 
more fine-grained interpretation of the various networking activities that underpin these 
network-processes. Moreover, Figure 9-1 depicts that networking capability development 
occurs through affect-based (e.g. Barron, 2008) emergent process (e.g. Covin et al. 2006; 
Shah and Tripsas, 2007) which enables sustained NVI. Therefore, based on these findings, 
this leads to researcher’s eighth proposition:  
P8: Technology start-ups involved in affect-based and emergent cycles of networking capability 
development are more likely to (a) learn from delays, (b) nurture core ties, and (c) aspire to 
internalise operations, which (d) enables new venture internationalisation. 
9.3 Implications for Public Policy and Practice 
This study has several implications for public policy and practice. The major implication 
stems from the connection between specific networking activities and outcomes, which in 
this study’s case is NVI. Namely, this study identifies and describes eleven distinct 
networking activities, which provides guidance on how and when entrepreneurs should 
perform these activities. Since “networking” is an elusive term, this thesis contributes to 
policy and practice by providing a more fine-grained interpretation on what this behaviour 
entails within the context of high-growth entrepreneurship.  
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Firstly, this study’s discussion on the network-enhancing process may be particularly 
valuable for entrepreneurs in situations when they need to create early stage unique 
resources. Central to the network-enhancing process is AB, which is about striking an 
intellectual, cultural, or empathic interpersonal connection with a new tie. In most cases, 
these core ties are mentors, such as experienced entrepreneurs, business advisors, and 
scientific or medical professionals. Thus, they are “socially embedded ties” (Uzzi, 1997) 
who care more about their relationship with individual entrepreneurs than the performance 
of their ventures. In line with Vissa (2011, 2012), when technology start-ups use the 
network-enhancing process to strengthen these inter-personal ties, they are likely to have a 
major influence on the new ventures growth and development.  
One example is when the medical technology start-ups formed inter-personal ties with US 
based KOLs. Stremersch and Van Dyck (2009) note KOLs are practicing surgeons who are 
major marketing authorities as they can endorse and promote a firm’s products. Therefore, 
findings show these core ties had an instrumental involvement in the business as they 
provided the firm with legitimacy and access to US based marketing channels. However, 
findings show only three of the original eight case firms had formed inter-personal 
relationships with KOLs. Therefore, non US-based medical technology start-ups who intend 
to enter the US medical technology industry need to be more aware of the benefits of creating 
and strengthening ties with KOLs. Consequently, this research indicates that the network-
enhancing process is one mechanism to help form and strengthen such ties. Moreover, these 
findings indicate that policy makers in both the UK and Australia need to provide additional 
support mechanisms on how to identify and attract these critical success contacts. These 
support mechanisms might include government workshops with invited speakers, 
government sponsored trade delegations, or domestic trade summits where US-based KOLs 
have the opportunity to meet medical technology start-ups in their home territory.   
A second implication for policy and practice is discussion on the network-delaying process, 
which may be of particular interest to executives of technology start-ups who want to 
overcome, mitigate the risk, or avoid delays that are inevitable with commercialisation in a 
global context. Mehta (2008) notes legal, regulatory, production, and sales delays are 
inevitable forces in the commercialisation of successful biomedical technologies. Pisano and 
Verganti (2008) also note since innovators need to commercialise their technology within 
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networks, they must leverage their network position to avoid competency traps by choosing 
the “right type” of collaboration. However, findings show all of the technology start-ups 
became entrenched in the network-delaying process at some point in their development. 
These findings have important implications for technology entrepreneurs as they provide 
signals about the barriers that might delay their growth and development. 
Central to the network-delaying process is IBG, which is when a firm commits a large 
resource to a tie, but then limits interaction following an unsuccessful collaboration. 
Findings show firms became involved in the network-delaying process when they 
collaborated with the wrong partners. That is, when technology start-ups lack experience in 
specific bonding and bridging activities, they had a tendency to engage in IBG, which 
inhibits their NVI. Moreover, this was most common when technology start-ups attempted 
to create foreign exchange partnerships before they accumulate unique resources, which 
entrench them in network-delaying process. Findings also indicate technology start-ups are 
likely to avoid the network-delaying process when they use GRB before they accumulate 
unique resources, or when they use GSB after they accumulate unique resources. These 
preliminary findings indicate the timing of tie formation is critical, since owning unique 
resources such as a granted patent or unique product range help increase bargaining power 
and improve network position. These findings compliment Hallen and Eisenhardt’s (2012) 
recent research on “timing around proof points” which recommends technology start-ups 
should accelerate, pre-empt, or delay tie formation based on organisational 
accomplishments.   
Therefore, an important implication for policy makers is these findings indicate some 
medical technology start-ups rely too heavily on local government agencies to help with 
GRB before they were in a strategic position to form such ties. That is, some medical 
technology firms were encouraged to form ties with large MNEs before they owned unique 
resources, which over the long-term, delayed their NVI. Ironically, in the Scottish context, 
findings show medical technology start-ups relied too heavily on global referrals, due to the 
pressures to internationalise their operations due to the lack of collaboration opportunities 
with institutions such as the National Health Service (NHS). Despite the NHS being the 
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world’s single largest purchaser of medical technology (MHRA, 20149), the researcher 
found an increasing frustration within the local life sciences community that firms were 
unable to collaborate or sell to the NHS. Consequently, such policy has meant local medical 
technology start-ups have no choice but to internationalise. Indeed, in the researcher’s 
sample, the US was the initial core target market and given these high barriers to entry, the 
researcher would assume these local and global challenges would continue to stifle new 
venture creation and have negative influence on existing survival rates. Thus, these findings 
indicate the Scottish and UK government need to adjust policy to facilitate innovation, 
entrepreneurship, and collaboration with local institutions such as the NHS.   
A third implication for policy and practice is discussion on the network-modifying process, 
which may be of particular interest to technology entrepreneurs who seek to increase the 
value of their social capital. Central to the network-modifying process is eliminating, 
prioritising, and reconfiguring ties. The above findings show firms use ETS or PTS to 
overcome the network-delaying process, while they use RTS to accelerate the network-
enhancing process. These findings have implications for entrepreneurs as they provide 
insight into preventing social capital turning into liability. For example, findings show RTS 
is one activity that helps redeploy existing social capital for an alternative use at a lower 
cost. Crucial to this network-modifying process is nurturing core ties, as these ties pay 
dividends due to their versatile and long-term involvement in NVI. These findings then 
provide entrepreneurs with guidance on the importance of nurturing core ties, rather than 
simply increasing the overall size of their ventures network.    
Finally, policy makers should create support mechanisms to help entrepreneurs nurture these 
core ties. For example, findings show an overwhelming support for the SCF, which is a 
partnership between Scottish Enterprise and local BAS. Interestingly, all of the case firms 
who approached VCs had negative experiences as they inhibited their NVI. Whereas, there 
was strong support for the SCF as this policy enables BAS’ to commit more resource to 
technology start-ups over the long-term. Consequently, one example shows the technology 
start-up was able to reconfigure ties with their BAS, as they became “friends” who provided 
finance, international business, and emotional support. Interestingly, state funded co-
                                         
9 MHRA. (2014). Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency. Available: 
http://www.mhra.gov.uk/index.htm#page=DynamicListMedicines Last accessed 23/03/2014. 
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investment funds are rare as limited examples include the New Zealand Co-Investment, 
London Seed Capital Fund, and Germany’s Technologie-Beteiligungs-Gesellschaft mbH 
(Paul and Whittam, 2010). Relatedly, in a recent interview with the founder of a Scottish 
BAS, the respondent confirmed foreign investors now recognise the SCF as the most 
developed state funded co-investment in the world [FER-O11-A].  
However, Vitale et al. (2006) report the business angel market in Australia is still 
underdeveloped as Federal and State Governments have yet to implement such policies. This 
study’s findings also show that Australian firms struggled to raise start-up capital and in 
some cases had no belief in raising state funded grants or equity based finance. Thus, these 
findings have implications for Australian policy makers as regions such as South East 
Queensland who have a similar population and knowledge base to Scotland or New Zealand 
are likely to benefit from replicating this funding model. Since the Queensland Government 
replicates their policy on existing UK based initiatives such as SMART awards, and due to 
growing demand for local BASs, it is likely that Australia has a similar policy infrastructure 
in place to replicate a similar investment model. Therefore, such a policy initiative would 
move towards supporting technology start-ups nurture core ties, which would support 
networking capability development. 
9.4 Limitations and Implications for Future Research 
As with all exploratory research this study is not without limitations, meaning further 
research is required to establish the generalizability of the researcher’s findings. Despite 
some limitations, this study makes three overarching contributions to knowledge that raises 
important questions for future research on networking capability development. The primary 
contribution of this thesis makes an important step towards a process theory of networking 
capability development. On this journey, the researcher achieved three objectives that 
contribute to the IE, entrepreneurship, and wider strategic management literature.  
Firstly, this study explored how INVs create, extend, or modify their social capital in high-
technology markets. To begin with, this research contributes to the entrepreneurship and 
wider strategic management literature by using Helfat et al. (2007) asset orchestration 
framework with Nahapiet and Ghoshal’s (1998) conceptualisation of social capital as a 
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combined theoretical lens (e.g. Okhuysen and Bonardi, 2011). That is the researcher uses 
Helfat et al. (2007) and Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) to conceptualise networking capability 
as one particular type of dynamic capability. To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, this 
is the first study to combine these theoretical lenses, as a framework to guide this research.  
Therefore, by using this lens, a second contribution to emerge from this first research 
objective was the researcher discovered INVs engage in eleven distinct networking activities 
that create, extend, or modify their social capital. Consequently, the identification of these 
distinct networking activities is an important contribution as it helps unlock the black box of 
networking in the entrepreneurship (e.g. Soh, 2003; Watson, 2007) and wider social capital 
(e.g. Seibert et al. 2001; McFadyen et al. 2004) research. For example, network scholars 
have traditionally assumed that bridging and bonding are general networking activities that 
help accumulate social capital (e.g. Gittell and Vidal, 1998; Leonard, 2004). Nevertheless, 
this research moves toward identifying specific types of bridging and bonding activities that 
unfold over time with respect to how focal actor’s accumulate social capital.  
However, a potential limitation of these findings was the egocentric nature of this research. 
That is, the researcher collected data with one entrepreneur per firm, rather than depth-
interviews with multiple informants, which is often recommend for case study research. This 
was due to time, resource, and access limitations that would emerge from collecting 
longitudinal data from multiple respondents. Consequently, to mitigate the risk of researcher 
bias, the researcher followed a strict protocol to ensure the methodological rigour of this 
multiple-case research. Firstly, the researcher followed guidance from entrepreneurship 
research that during firm emergence, the network of the individual entrepreneur is virtually 
synonymous with the new venture’s network (e.g. Hite and Hesterly, 2001). Moreover, Hite 
and Hesterly (2001: 279) argue in most new ventures, two or more individuals co-found the 
firm, which means their existing networks form the new venture network. Therefore, 
Coviello (2006) argues the “entrepreneur” as the core respondent, is a reliable source to 
pursue network-based research, as this individual has an overarching knowledge of the 
network relationships that form a new venture’s network.  
Thus, the researcher made the decision that an individual entrepreneur within the TMT was 
the most valuable informant to collect data on specific network relationships due to their 
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direct involvement in NVI. However, to increase the validity of this research, the researcher 
collected multiple data sources such as archival data in form of internal and external press 
reports, monitored each firm’s website, and conducted unstructured interviews with local 
industry experts to triangulate this data collection. Additionally, the regular maintenance of 
a case study database (e.g. Appendix 3) helped ensure the reliability of these findings. 
Nevertheless, despite these protocols the researcher acknowledges the value of using 
multiple informants in network-based research. Incidentally, one lucrative avenue for future 
research is an exploration of the dyadic nature of network relationships (e.g. Dyer and Singh, 
1998; Newey and Zahra, 2009). That is, to improve the validity of these findings, future 
research should explore the ego and alter’s perspective on the creation, extension and 
modification of social capital. Therefore, since social capital is a shared asset (e.g. Anderson 
and Jack, 2002) it would seem more qualitative dyadic research is needed to understand the 
content and context of tie formation.  
Secondly, this study examined why specific networking activities enable or inhibit NVI in 
high-technology markets. Miles and Huberman (1994) recommend that qualitative 
researchers should move beyond exploring and describing and move towards ordering and 
explaining why a phenomenon influences a particular outcome. Thus, the third contribution 
was that the researcher moved beyond exploring and describing how these various 
networking activities unfold, by ordering and explaining why these specific activities 
influence NVI. More specifically, these findings contribute to IE research as they identify 
that specific networking activities such as AB enable NVI, while networking activities such 
as IBG inhibit NVI. Findings also indicate the firm’s strength to practice specific networking 
activities such as GRB or DB determines whether they enable or inhibit NVI.  
Again, there are limitations to these findings. Firstly, the researcher’s decision to select a 
theoretical sample of four cases is at the lower end of what most case study researchers 
would recommend as a valid sample (Eisenhardt, 1989; Miles and Huberman, 1994; Yin, 
2003). However, in following a similar design to that of Maurer and Ebers (2006), the 
researcher does not aim to predict the effects of these emergent networking activities, but 
rather understand the influence of these activities within a specific context, which in this case 
is NVI. Therefore, to ensure the internal validity of these findings, the researcher followed 
Yin’s (2003) recommendations and used Figure 5-3 as a theoretical framework to analyse 
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and interpret these data. Subsequently, the researcher followed Eisenhardt’s (1989) guidance 
and used “pattern matching” as a technique by “unfold” these findings with those published 
in existing literature. However, despite such protocols, and the aim to interpret rich data, 
future research needs to establish the generalizability of these findings. 
Therefore, the identification and influence of specific networking activities opens a new 
avenue for future research. For example, more qualitative research needs to use Helfat et al. 
(2007) asset orchestration framework as a lens to explore how firms create, extend, and 
modify their social capital. That is, future qualitative research would be useful to explore 
networking capability development within a variety of empirical contexts within both new 
ventures and established firms. This research can then confirm, identify new or raise 
potentially conflicting interpretations on the influence specific networking activities have on 
various directions (e.g. market penetration, internationalisation, NPD) or methods (e.g. 
organic, acquisitions, alliances) of growth. Moreover, an interesting avenue for future 
research would be to operationalise the various networking activities highlighted in this 
study by using survey-based research to test their effect on NVI. The researcher attempts to 
define these networking activities, but now quantitative research is needed to build scales 
that can measure these networking activities within a larger sample of firms to confirm the 
generalizability of these findings.     
Thirdly, this study determined which network processes underpin networking capability 
development in NVI. This is the primary and fourth contribution to emerge from this 
research, as this third research objective takes an important step towards a process theory of 
networking capability development. Specifically, Figure 6-2 illustrates three overarching 
dimensions – e.g. (1) network-enhancing process, (2) network-delaying process, and (3) 
network-modifying process – aggregate eleven second-order themes (e.g. the above 
networking activities), which aggregate several first concepts. Therefore, this abductive 
research contributes to the entrepreneurship and wider strategic management research by 
providing a process model on how technology-based firms build dynamic capabilities in 
networking to enable various forms of growth.  
One possible limitation of this emergent process theory is that the empirical context of young 
technology-based firms limits its wider application. Moreover, Figure 9-1 proposes these 
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various activities, processes, and cycles are the underpinnings of networking capability 
development. Central to this model is networking capability is an affect-based emergent 
process that enables NVI. Given the abductive nature of this research, this theory contributes 
to recent research on how entrepreneurs “create something from nothing” (e.g. Baker and 
Nelson, 2005; Zott and Huy, 2007). One avenue for future research should therefore question 
whether there are different types of networking capabilities for different purposes. For 
example, a networking capability needed to create a license agreement is likely to differ from 
a networking capability to manage a co-development agreement. Thus, an interesting 
research question would be to consider which types of networking capabilities help perform 
various cross-border activities. Additionally, building a networking capability at the start-up 
phase is likely to differ from networking capability development at the growth phase. 
Therefore, in line with McKelvie and Wiklund (2010), it would appear networking 
capabilities that influence organic growth are likely to differ from methods such as 
acquisitive growth.  
Finally, a fascinating direction for future research would be to build on Baron’s (1998; 2004; 
2008) existing research that feelings and moods that individuals experience (i.e. their affect) 
will influence many aspects of entrepreneurs’ cognition and behaviour. Consequently, this 
study’s emergent findings show compelling evidence that networking capability 
development is an affect-based emergent process that enables NVI. Thus, technology start-
ups might be able to build a networking capability through various networking activities, but 
cycles of networking capability development appears to be an affect-based emergent process. 
An interesting avenue for future research could therefore explore how technology 
entrepreneurs’ positive or negative affect (Baron, 2008) influence tie formation and the 
nurturing of core ties. Further empirical research should also examine the finding that 
nurturing core ties helps shift technology start-ups reliance from impersonal relations to 
future aspirations about internalising their operations.       
9.5 Concluding Remarks 
In summary, this study has explored how technology start-ups build dynamic capabilities in 
networking to enable NVI. Through longitudinal case study research, the primary 
contribution of this thesis takes a step towards a process theory of networking capability 
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development. This chapter reports on how the researcher arrived at his thesis that networking 
capability development is an affect-based emergent process that enables NVI. This chapter 
then discussed the core findings in relation to existing literature, which internally validates 
this study’s three overarching contributions to knowledge. Firstly, the researcher combined 
dynamic capabilities and social capital as a theoretical lens to conceptualise networking 
capability. Secondly, the researcher used this theoretical lens, to induce specific networking 
activities from longitudinal data, which contributes to unlocking the black box of 
networking. Finally, the researcher built a process model from these abductive findings, 
which makes an important step towards a process theory of networking capability 
development. In addition, this thesis also reports on the implications for both policy-makers 
and practice. Overall, despite some limitations, the researcher believes this thesis is one-step 
on a journey towards exploring the role entrepreneurial affect might have in sustaining what 
could be termed as interpersonal competitive advantage. 
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2. We will handle all confidential information with appropriate levels of discretion and compliance with the law and with due diligence 
as to the security of that data. We will normally prevent the publication or use of data in any way that could compromise the subject's 
confidentiality or identity. 
 
3. Any material being prepared for publication both inside and outside of examination purposes will be produced in such a way as to 
reduce the possibility of breaches of confidentiality and / or identification. If necessary, this process will be subject to a written statement 
as to agreed process between any sponsors of research, research subjects and the Department. 
 
4. We will try to avoid overburdening subjects, causing them inconvenience and intruding into their private and personal domains. 
 
5. Subjects will be informed as to the purpose and nature of any inquiry in which they are being asked to participate. 
 
6. We will avoid misleading subjects or withholding material facts about the research of which they should be aware. 
 
7. Where the research methodology allows for it, a research subject will be expected to be provided with a copy of these Statements of 
Principles along with a consent form which will also indicate a subject's right of referral and appeal to a higher authority in the 
Department and through Faculty to the University Ethics Committee. 
 
8. Where the research methodology suggests that a different kind of consent is the only one possible this will be made clear in the ethical 
approval form but subjects will be referred to departmental web pages or made aware of these principles by the researcher in order to 
understand the issues as at paragraph 7 above.  
 
9. All staff, researchers and their supervisors are required, before the project begins, to submit to the chair of the departmental ethics 
committee, either a short-form or a long form ethical approval form. Only on formal approval by the ethics committee will the project be 
permitted to begin. 
 
10. In the situations listed in the following subsections, staff, researchers and their supervisors must produce a justified case using a 
standard Application Form for Ethical Approval.  
 
a. When the research methods employed might be regarded by the lay public to have delicate or controversial elements or when the 
research might be considered to give rise to adverse publicity for the University. 
 
b. When the research involves the use of individual medical records 
 
c. Where there might be difficulties in obtaining the subject's informed consent. This to include but not be limited to the following 
examples: with vulnerable people, including children; and those with learning difficulties; when proposing to use covert observation; or 
when employing a methodology in which the practicalities of obtaining signed consent forms are infeasible. 
 
Only if and when the Departmental or subsequently the Faculty Ethics Committee has approved the research can it commence. 
 
11. All members of staff and all student at all levels are required to read and agree to comply with these statements and to operate them 
in the full spirit in which they are written. Failure to comply with these statements will be regarded as a disciplinary offence. 
 
12. All researchers and all supervisory staff at all levels must sign an agreement on an annual basis, indicating their acceptance of these 
Principles. 
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Appendix 2: Semi structured interview guide 
 
Preliminary Research on Resources, Dynamic Capabilities and Path 
Dependence in Life Science Firms 
 
Professor Marian V Jones 
Dr Anna Morgan-Thomas 
Mr Karl Warner 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Company Name: 
Address: 
 
 
Telephone:   e-mail 
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Section A. Open Questions: The Firm’s current position 
Q. Please tell us about this firm. In your own words please describe your firm, the business it does, the nature of its products, its role within the industry, 
its core competencies and its competitiveness in domestic and any international markets? 
Prompts (for guidance) Please allow the respondent to answer in their own way, and record their responses in their own words 
 Core competence -  What is the 
basis of the firm’s commercial 
existence  
 Product nature – Products  
manufacturing or production 
processes 
 Industry – Role within industry 
(identify the industry). 
 Value Chain – What is your 
position on the industry value chain? 
Suppliers, buyers, new entrants, 
substitute products, concentration. 
 Customers – Who and where are 
your customers? Domestic or 
international 
 Competitive position - market 
share, unique niche, etc. source of 
competitive advantage in domestic 
market and international markets 
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Section A. Closed Questions: The Firm’s current position  
(Please ask questions and record answers precisely in this section) 
 
A1. Business and Products 
 
1.1 Would you classify your firm primarily as: 1. a manufacturing firm ______ 2. a firm producing services ______  3. an R&D laboratory_________ or 4. other, please 
describe_______________________? (tick one) 
 
1.2 What percentage of your firm’s annual income comes from: 1. Sale of hardware products________ %, 2. Sale of software products__________ %, 3. Sale of services_________ 
%, 4. Research grants_________ %, 5. Other  _____________% (check total  = 100%) 
 
1.3 What proportion of your firm’s annual income comes from: 1. Business activities/ sources in the Australia ________%, 2. Business activities / sources overseas ___________ % ? 
(check total = 100%) 
 
1.4 What is your major product/service? __________________________________________________________________________ ? 
 
1.5 Is your major product/service sold to: 1. consumer markets _________ , 2. organisational markets ________ 3. both _________ ? 
 
1.6 Would you describe your product as: (tick all that apply) 
 
 Having a narrow range of applications within one or a few industries / markets______________,  
 Having a wide range of industry applications across a number of industries / markets_________________ 
 Specific to a  target group of customers with particular  needs_______________ 
 A niche product with local applicability (Australia) only)_________________________ 
 A niche product with global applicability (foreign markets) __________________ 
 General to a wide range of industries / markets in Australia and abroad  ______________ 
 
1.7 Would you describe your major product as: (tick one only) 
 Innovative, leading edge technology  ___________________________ 
 An incremental innovation of relatively new technology_______________ 
 Other, please describe 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________  
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1.7 Do you have a portfolio of products/services?  1. Yes __________,  2. No  __________? (tick one) 
 
1.8 Could any of your products be described as a Cash Cow?  1. Yes ____ 2. No ____ 3. Might be in the future _______ ? 
 
A2. Industry Structure 
 
2.1 Approximately how many direct competitors do you have in the Australia _________ ? 
 
2.2 Are your main competitors large firms ____________, or small firms _____________ ? 
 
2.3 If you have few competitors, can you identify them by name? ______________________________________________? 
 
2.4 If you have few competitors are these firms Australia owned _________________, foreign owned ___________, both ______ ? 
 
2.5 How unique is your product or service ______________________________  ? 
 
2.6 How important is your product e.g. could customers use something else in its place _____________?  What _____________________________ ? 
 
A3. Competitive Advantage 
3.1 Please describe the source of your competitive advantage in the Australia? 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
3.2 Please describe the source of your firm’s competitive advantage in its overseas markets if any? 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Section B. Open Questions: The Firm’s Foundation Process 
Q.In your own words, please describe how your firm was founded, who was involved, how it was supported, why it was founded and the aspirations, aims and objectives of the founding 
members 
Prompts (for guidance) Please allow the respondent to answer in their own way, and record their responses in their own words 
 Foundation Reason - Was there a 
particular reason for the firms foundation 
eg to exploit a new technology or 
innovation, or other? 
 Pre-foundation history - that influenced 
the establishment of this firm eg spin-out 
or spin-off, MBO etc.? Reasons? 
Opportunities or threats? 
 Who were the founders - describe, them, 
what role did they play in founding, what 
role do they play now? 
 International connections & Growth – 
What international connections did the 
firm, or its founders have at foundation and 
how did this contribute to growth? 
 Resources at foundation - How was the 
firm resourced at foundation (financial, 
physical resources, human resources).  
 Resource accumulation - Where did the 
resources come from, how did the firm go 
about getting them? 
 
 
 
 
 341 
 
 Section B. Closed Questions: The Firm’s Foundation Process 
 (Please ask questions and record answers precisely in this section) 
 
1. In what year was the firm founded? ________________ 
 
2. a). Was the firm founded specifically to develop a scientific/technological innovation? Yes______________(goto 2.1) 
 b). Since founding, has your firm developed a scientific / technological innovation ? Yes______________(goto 2.1) 
  (If no to both 2a and 2b, go to 3) 
 
2.1 Please describe that innovation 
 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________ 
 
2.2 What was the source of the firm’s first scientific/ technological innovation?  
 Yes/No Source Country 
 In-house development  ______ ______________ 
 University ______ ______________ 
 Other firm ______ ______________ 
 Previous employer ______ ______________ 
 Acquisition of patent rights from third party ______ ______________ 
 Other__________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
2.3 Does the firm have intellectual property rights for that innovation here, and/or abroad? (note all countries and sequence in which IPRs were sought). 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________ 
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2.4 Does the firm have FDA approval for the US Market? Yes _________ Date __________         No _______     Pending__________ 
 
3. Why was the firm founded? 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
4. How was the firm financed? (tick all that apply) 
 Research Grant ____________________________________________ 
 Enterprise / start-up funding from Government ______________________ 
 Bank loan ___________________________________________ 
 Founder’s personal sources _____________________________________ 
 Angel/Venture Capital _________________________________________ 
 Other __________________________________________________ 
5. Was the firm founded as an independent new firm with no corporate history? Yes________(go to 7), No _____ (go to 6) 
 
6. Was the firm founded as:  (tick one only) 
a. A spin-off from another firm ___________________________________ 
b. A spin-off from a university __________________________________ 
c. Merger/takeover ____________________________________________ 
d. Management worker buy-out___________________________________ 
e. Other _________________________________________________ 
 
 
7. How many founders were there?  _________________________.  
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7.1.1 The table below relates to the human and social capital of the firm at founding. Please record relevant details on each of the founders. 
 
 Founder 1 Founder 2 Founder 3 Founder 4 Founder 5 
Age      
Gender      
Nationality      
Current role/position?      
Previous entrepreneur? 
Yes/No 
     
Family history of entrepreneurship 
Yes/No 
     
Highest Level of education, e.g 
School Cert, College degree/diploma 
(CD), 
University 1st Degree (UD), 
Advanced degree  (AD), 
Doctoral degree (Dr), 
Professional bodies, 
     
Overseas education? 
Where ? Country (ies) 
     
Overseas working experience 
Where? Country (ies) 
SME/MNE?  
Role Position? 
     
Working experience in a Domestic 
internationalising firm? 
     
Foreign language ability? 
Languages? 
Spoken/written/fluent? 
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Section C. Open Questions: Critical Events and Milestones (Timeline) 
Q. Please tell us about the events in the history of the firm, that you see as major milestones, or critical incidents which have triggered change internally or externally, during the firm’s 
development process?  
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Section C. Open Questions: Prompts Relating to Events on the Firm’s Timeline 
 
Q. Please allow the respondent to discuss each event as fully as possible. The prompts relate to each relevant event 
Prompts (for guidance) Please allow the respondent to answer in their own way, and record their responses in their own words 
 What triggered each event? 
 Critical events trigger new routines or strategies - Towards 
R&D, manufacture, marketing, distribution, new product 
development, commercialisation, funding etc. 
 Revenues – How did critical events impact on profitability, 
financing, sales, revenues etc? Was there need for cut-backs? 
 New networks - emerge from this event? 
 Entry modes- Did any critical events impact on the entry mode 
choice (export, licensing in or out of technology, FDI) 
 International Motivations - What were the motivations for 
international events? Increase knowledge, expand sales, exploit 
opportunities, avoid unfavourable conditions in home country? 
 Learning - What did the firm learn from any of the international 
events? 
 Path dependencies – Have there been any long effects (good or 
bad) as consequence of any critical events mentioned? 
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Section D. Open Questions: The Value of Networking, Partnerships & Alliances  
 
Q. Please tell us about your involvement in networks/ partnerships and alliances with other firms/ individuals / institutions / other and how they have influenced the growth of the firm? 
Prompts (for guidance) Please allow the respondent to answer in their own way, and record their responses in their own words 
 Inception of firm - What types of networks (business and 
social) were you involved in before the inception of the 
firm? 
 Resource Base - How has networks improved the firm’ 
resource base (tangible & intangible).   
 Importance – Which networks are most important and 
why? 
 Difficulties – What difficulties have you encountered when 
trying to enter a new network?  
 Example of change - needing to change the firm’s 
relationship within a network, partnership or alliance to 
work towards future aims of the firm?   
 Location – On what location (local, national, international) 
are personal and business networks being built 
 Strategy – Do you have a strategy to build networks?  
 Network rigidity – Can you give an example when a 
network/partnership held the company back 
 Routines – What are the day to day tasks when dealing 
with networks or partnerships? 
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Section E. Closed Questions Only (Please ask questions and record answers precisely in this section) 
 
F.1 Strategy and Planning 
1.1 Would you describe your firm’s development as: (tick one only) 
1. Organic (evolutionary process in response to events and triggers) ______________  
2. Strategic (develops according to our pre-determined plans)___________ 
3. A combination of 1. and 2. __________  
 
1.2 Does your firm have a formal, written strategic plan? Yes / No. 
 
1.3  If yes, does that plan make explicit reference aims and objectives relating to your firm’s involvement or future involvement in international business activity? Yes / No. 
 
1.4 If yes, does that plan contain explicit targets for Research and Development? Yes / No . For 1year, 2 years, 3 years, 4 years, 5years, over 5 years?  
 
1.5 If yes, does that plan make explicit reference to:  (Yes/No) 
1. Product portfolio planning ____________ 
2. New product / service development____________,  
3. Adaptation of products for foreign markets _________,  
4. Entry into new foreign markets_________ 
5. Withdrawal from any current international business activities _________ 
6. Cessation of R&D _________ 
 
.2 Firm Performance and Projections 
 
2.1 How would you rate the performance of this firm in its first five years, on a scale of 1-10, with 1 being unsuccessful, 10 being successful? 
Unsuccessful  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  Successful 
 
2.2 Was the firm profitable in the each of the first five years? 
 
Year 1 Y/N   Year 2 Y/N  Year 3 Y/N  Year 4 Y/N  Year 5 Y/N 
 
2.3  What percentage of the firm’s revenue was derived from overseas in each of the first five years? 
 
Year 1 _____%   Year 2 _____% Year 3 _____% Year 4 _____% Year 5 _____% 
 
2.4  What is your firm’s current percentage of profits is derived from foreign operations? ________% of total profits? 
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2.5  What is your firm’s current percentage of sales is derived from foreign operations? ________% of total sales? 
 
2.6  Would you mind telling us the approximate total sales of your firm in the last financial year £_________________ ? 
 
2.7 Would you mind telling us the profitability of your firm in the last financial year as a percentage of total sales______ % 
2.8 How many staff (FTEs), including working directors does your firm currently employ_________  
2.9  
Thank You for Your Participation 
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Appendix 3: Case Study Database Example 
Fertility Ltd – Case Study Database 
Data Code Data Source 
Interviews   
Interview 1 (2008)   
FER-I08-A A - The Firms Current Position 
FER-I08-A1 A1 Business and Products 
FER-I08-A1.1 A1.1 Classifcation 
FER-I08-A1.2 A1.2 Percentage of annual income 
FER-I08-A1.3 A1.3 Percentage of international revenues 
FER-I08-A1.4 A1.4 Major product or service description 
FER-I08-A1.5 A1.5 Product or service market 
FER-I08-A1.6 A1.6 Product applicability 
FER-I08-A1.7 A1.7 Product innovation 
FER-I08-A1.8 A1.8 Product portfolio 
FER-I08-A1.9 A1.9 Cash cow 
FER-I08-A2.1 A2.1 Direct competitors 
FER-I08-A2.2 A2.2 Size of competitors 
FER-I08-A2.3 A2.3 Name competitors 
FER-I08-A2.4 A2.4 Competitors location 
FER-I08-A2.5 A2.5 Uniqueness of product 
FER-I08-A2.6 A2.6 Product substitutes 
FER-I08-A3.1 A3.1 Competitive Advantage 
FER-I08-B D - The Firms Foundation Process 
FER-I08-B1.1 D1.1 Firms foundation 
FER-I08-B2.1 D2.1 Reasoning for foundation 
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FER-I08-B2.2 D2.2 Source of innovation 
FER-I08-B2.3 D2.3 Intellectual property rights 
FER-I08-B2.4 D2.4 FDA approval 
FER-I08-B3.1 D3.1 Why firm founded 
FER-I08-B4.1 D4.1 How firm was financed 
FER-I08-B5.1 D5.1 Independent or corporate history 
FER-I08-B6.1 D.6.1 Foundation details 
FER-I08-B7.1 D7.1 Number of founders 
FER-I08-B8.1 D.8.1 Social capital 
FER-I08-B9.1 D9.1 Network relationships 
FER-I08-B10 D10 Human and social capital 
FER-I08-C C - The Value of Networking and Partnering 
FER-I08-D D - Critical Events and Milestones 
FER-I08-E E - Strategy and Planning 
FER-I08-E1.1 E1.1 Firms development 
FER-I08-E1.2 E1.2 Strategic planning 
FER-I08-E1.3 E1.3 Aims and objectives 
FER-I08-E1.4 E1.4 R&D targets 
FER-I08-E1.5 E1.5 R&D specifics 
FER-I08-F F - Firm Performance and projections 
FER-I08-F1.1 F1.1 Performance rating 
FER-I08-F1.2 F1.2 Profitability 
FER-I08-F1.3 F1.3 Revenue percentage  
FER-I08-F1.4 F1.4 Foreign profit percentage 
FER-I08-F1.5 F1.5 Foreign sales  percentage 
FER-I08-F1.6 F1.6 Total sales in last financial year 
FER-I08-F1.7 F1.7 Profitability 
FER-I08-F1.8 F1.8 Full time employees 
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FER-I08-G G - Additional Research Issues 
Interview 2 (2009)   
FER-I09-A A - The Firms Current Position 
FER-I09-B B - The Value of Networks for Technology, Growth and Internationalisation 
FER-I09-C C - Critical Events and Network Relationships 
FER-I09-D D - Technology, Growth and Internationalisation 
FER-I09-D1 D1 Stage of development 
FER-I09-D2 D2 Stage of development over time 
FER-I09-D3 D3 Critical events 
Interview 3 (2011)   
FER-I11-A A - The Firms Current Position 
FER-I11-B B - Value of Networks for Technology, Growth and Internationalisation 
FER-I11-B1 B1 - Network contact 1 - Wife 
FER-I11-B2 B2 - Network contact 2 - Co-founder 
FER-I11-B3 B3 - Network contact 3 - EU Distributor 
FER-I11-B4 B4 - Network contact 4 - Chinese Distributor 
FER-I11-C C - Knowledge Transfer  
FER-I11-D D - Firm Performance and Projections 
Data Code Data Source 
Company 
Documents   
A Scottish Enterprise Reports 
FER-CDA-A A - Scottish Enterprise Annual Report - 2004-2005 
FER-CDA-B B - Scottish Enterprise Annual Review - 2008-2010 
B Patents 
FER-CDB-A A - PCT patent publication application - 2009 
FER-CDB-B B - PCT patent publication application - 2010 
Data Code Data Source 
Press Releases   
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External 2008 
FER-EPR08-A A - SoS Fertility hopes £2m will ease to profit 
FER-EPR08-B B - Scotsman Fertility posied to gel with market 
FER-EPR08-C C - UniNet FemMed multi-million pound deal 
FER-EPR08-D D - UniNet Brad Davis 
  2009 
FER-EPR09-A A - TalentScotland 2009 Burdica 
FER-EPR09-B B - Hearld Scotland Fertility Secures £200,000 funding 
FER-EPR09-C C - Blog - Fertility launches products 
FER-EPR09-D D - Biotech Innovation Fertility Launches First Product 
FER-EPR09-E E - Young Company Finance Fertility Speeds to Market 
  2010 
FER-EPR10-A A - Nexxus Fertility Signs Contract with China 
FER-EPR10-B B - UniNet Biotech firm signs major Chinese deal 
FER-EPR10-C C - Scotsman Lucrative China deal for Scottish Biotech Firm 
FER-EPR10-D D - Herald Scotland Fertility Signs deal to supply drug to Chinese 
FER-EPR10-E E - FT - Fertility in £70million Chinese Deal 
FER-EPR10-F F- Compute Scotland Scottish Start-up China Deal 
FER-EPR10-G G - Business Blog - China business opportunities 
FER-EPR10-H H- UK fertility blog - Fertility signs Chinese agreement 
  2011 
FER-EPR11-A A - MediLink World Leading Innovations Honoured 
FER-EPR11-B B - WHI News Fertility wins innovation award 
FER-EPR11-C C - Life Science Scotland Fertility wins innovation award 
FER-EPR11-D D - Nexxus News Summer 2011 - Fertility wins innovation award 
 
  
Data Code Data Source 
Website   
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A About Us 
FER-WA-A A - About Fertility 
M-WA-B B - Ferility History 
M-WA-C C - Fertility Team 
B China 
M-WB-A A - Fertility China 
C News 
M-WC-A A - Fertility News 
D Technology 
M-WD-A A - Fertility FDA guidelines 
M-WD-B B - Fertility Investors 
M-WD-C C - Fertility Regulations 
M-WD-D D - Fertility Overview 
E Products 
FER-WE-A Product 1 - Fertility Lubricant 
FER-WE-B Product 2 - Moisturiser  
FER-WE-C Product 3 - Conception Kit 
F Contact Us 
M-WF-A A - Fertility Contact Us  
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Appendix 4: Within-Case Analysis Example 
Fertility’s Network Process before Event 
 
Source: The Author 
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Fertility Network Content before Critical Event 
  Sources of Social Capital Effects of Social Capital 
Network 
contact 
NC Structural Relational Cognitive Benefits Problems Change in 
Stock 
Level 
2003: Dr 
Shi 
Create Met Dr Shi 
whilst 
working for 
medical 
technology 
MNE 
 Actors shared a 
scientific 
interest in a 
unique 
technology 
Dr Shi 
discovered 
technological 
opportunity 
 New 
2007: Co-
Founder 
(Dr Shi) 
Modify  Both actors had 
trusted each 
other from 
previous NPD 
project  
Shared 
ambition to 
start-up a 
medtech firm 
Reputational of 
being globally 
recognised 
scientist 
 Redeploy↑ 
 
2007: 
Chinese 
distributor 
Create Met 
distributor at 
Chinese 
trade-show 
 Chinese 
distributor 
shared language 
with co-founder 
Significant 
growth 
opportunities in 
Chinese market 
Substantial 
investment 
required to 
build 
relationship 
New 
2007:  
Marcus 
(Enhance-
ment Corp) 
Extend Met Marcus 
while 
working for 
medtech 
MNE 
  Marcus 
introduced 
entrepreneur to 
new contacts. 
 Invest↑ 
2007: Sean 
(Corporate 
lawyer) 
Create Introduced to 
Sean through 
Marcus 
 Sean was very 
supportive of 
Scottish 
technology 
start-ups 
Introduced 
entrepreneur to 
Adam at 
UniNet 
 New 
2007: 
Adam 
(university 
start-up 
network - 
UniNet) 
Create Introduced to 
start-up 
network 
through 
previous 
MNE 
contacts 
Entrepreneur 
placed trust in 
Adam’s start-up 
accelerator 
programme 
 Interest free 
start-up loan 
 
Workspace 
 
Mentoring 
 New 
2007: 
George 
(investor) 
Create Introduced to 
George 
through 
Adam’s start-
up network 
George had 
trust in the 
entrepreneur’s 
ability to grow 
a business 
 Angel 
investment 
 
Local networks 
 New 
2008: 
Adam at 
UniNet 
Extend  Entrepreneur 
continued to 
invest his time 
in UniNet 
programme 
 Adam referred 
entrepreneur to 
potential 
strategic 
partnerships 
Entrepreneur 
was unable to 
concentrate 
on NPD 
 
2008: 
European 
licensor 
Create Met licensor 
through  
Adam’s 
university 
start-up 
network 
Signed  
European 
license and co-
development 
contract 
 Access to a 
global 
distribution 
channel 
No clear 
prospect of 
international 
sales 
New 
2008: 
Canadian 
venture 
Capitalist 
Create Introduced to 
VC through 
university 
start-up 
network 
Entered due 
diligence 
process 
 Prospect of 
venture capital 
funding 
Resource 
intensive 
process 
New 
2008: 
Business 
angel 
syndicate 
Create Introduced to 
BAS through 
university 
start-up 
network 
Trust in contact 
to provide 
finance 
 Secured 
£100,000 of 
seed funding 
 New 
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Fertility’s Network Process during Event 
 
Source: The Author 
  
Fertility Networking Activities during Critical Event 
  Sources of Social Capital Effects of Social Capital 
Network 
contact 
NC Structural Relational Cognitive Benefits Problems Change in 
Stock 
Level 
2008:  
Harry 
Create Met Harry 
through Scottish 
Enterprise 
network 
Reputation as 
influential life 
science 
entrepreneur 
Early belief in 
Fertility’s 
success 
Business and 
emotional 
support 
 
Finance 
 New 
2009: 
Canadian 
venture 
capitalist 
Extend  Entrepreneur 
had trust VC 
would invest 
and dedicated 
significant 
resource to the 
relationship 
  VC did not 
invest. 
Fertility was 
totally 
dependent on 
VC 
investment 
Invest↓ 
2009: 
Business 
angel 
syndicate 
(BAS) 
Extend  New investment 
was contingent 
on VC funding 
but gave the 
firm more time 
to source 
investment 
  Unable to 
secure ‘long-
term’ 
government 
SMART 
award 
Invest↑ 
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2009:  
Harry 
Extend Harry used his 
industry 
network to 
search for 
emergency 
funding 
Increase in 
Harry’s 
commitment as 
he allocated 
more time to 
Fertility 
Both actors 
shared the 
vision to 
make Fertility 
successful 
Harry 
introduced 
entrepreneur to 
Angus who was 
a ‘critical’ 
contact 
 Invest↑ 
 
2009: UK 
Banks 
Create Approached 
banks for 
finance 
   Unsuccessful 
with bank 
finance 
New↓ 
2009: 
Oxford 
Investors 
Create Approached 
investors for 
seed capital 
   Unsuccessful 
with seed 
capital 
New↓ 
2009: 
Angus (VP 
of MNE) 
Create Met VP through 
Harry’s MNE 
network 
Harry’s 
endorsement 
helped with 
building trust 
Angus took a 
personal 
interest in 
entrepreneurs 
journey 
Provided NPD 
guidance and 
introduced 
Fertility to UK 
sales agents 
 New 
2009: UK 
sales 
agents 
Create Sourced sales 
agents through 
VP’s formal 
network 
Signed UK 
sales agent 
contracts 
through new 
product 
classification 
 Generation of 
sales revenues 
 New 
2009: 
European 
Licensor 
Modify  Lack of focus to 
implement 
license strategy 
  Loss of 
revenues 
Retrench 
2009: 
English 
manufactur
er 
Create Sourced 
manufacturer 
through VP’s 
formal network 
  Had the 
capability to 
quickly produce 
product 
 New 
2009: 
Business 
angel 
syndicate 
Extend  Increase in BAS 
trust by 
awarding 
Fertility a 
SMART award 
Both actors 
shared a 
vision on the 
firm’s 
international 
expansion 
Fertility 
survives 
funding crisis 
 
Supports 
product launch 
 Invest↑ 
 
2009: 
Adam 
Modify  Entrepreneur no 
longer 
considered 
Adam as a 
priority contact 
  This contact 
was no longer 
relevant for 
the business 
Retrench 
2009: 
George 
Modify  Entrepreneur no 
longer 
considered 
George as a 
priority contact 
  George was a 
“local guy” 
not a “global 
guy” 
Retrench 
Source: The Author 
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Fertility’s Network Process after Event 
 
Source: The Author 
 
Networking Activities after Critical Event 
  Sources of Social Capital Effects of Social Capital 
Network 
contact 
NC Structural Relational Cognitive Benefits Problems Change in 
Stock Level 
2009: 
Industry 
consultants 
Create Sourced a 
TMT of 
consultants 
through Harry 
and Angus’s 
network 
All consultants 
were willing to 
work for 
SWEAT equity 
Early belief in 
Fertility’s success 
Access to 
foreign market 
knowledge 
 
No upfront 
labour costs 
 New 
2009: Co-
founder 
Extend  Co-founder 
begins to lose 
interest in the 
venture 
Co-founder wants 
to concentrate on 
science 
 Threat of 
losing angel 
investor and 
lack of 
transparency 
Invest↓ 
2009: 
English 
manufactur
er 
Modify  Loss of trust in 
their 
production 
capabilities 
 Decrease in 
social capital 
triggered 
decision to 
internalise 
production 
Quality 
problems with 
product 
 
Loss of sales 
revenues 
Retire↓ 
 
2009:  Co-
founder 
Modify  Co-founder 
agrees to exit 
the company 
through a share 
deferment 
Co-founder felt 
uncomfortable 
with commercial 
aspect of the 
venture 
 Overall 
disappointment 
and loss of 
trust in co-
founders 
commitment to 
venture  
Retrench↓ 
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2009: 
Chinese 
distributor 
Extend  Entrepreneur 
had to 
participate in 
regular face-to-
face visits to 
help build trust 
Entrepreneur 
attempts to learn 
Mandarin to 
overcome 
language barriers 
Regulatory 
approval in 
China 
Ten year 
distribution 
agreement - 
£60 million 
expected 
revenues 
Delay in 
international 
sales due to 
Chinese 
regulatory 
process 
Invest↑ 
 
2009: 
Angus (VP 
of 
HealthMed 
a large 
MNE) 
Extend VP referred to 
Fertility to his 
MNEs 
business 
development 
unit 
VP’s trust in 
entrepreneur 
supported the 
negotiation 
process 
VP expressed a 
personal interest 
to help 
entrepreneur 
grow the 
company 
Signed 
European 
distribution 
agreement 
 Invest↑ 
 
2010: 
European 
distributor 
Create Sourced 
European 
distributor 
through VP’s 
insider 
network 
Distributor 
received 
endorsement 
from VP on 
Fertility’s 
capabilities 
 International 
sales and 
reputation 
benefits 
 
Foreign market 
and 
technological 
knowledge 
Communicatio
n problems 
with MNE 
 
No longer 
interacting 
with one 
person 
New 
2010: 
Canadian 
distributor 
Create Canadian 
distributor 
contacted 
Fertility 
 Distributor shown 
genuine 
excitement about 
product 
Signed 
Canadian 
distribution 
agreement 
 
 
Canadian 
regulatory 
approval 
delayed 
international 
revenues by 
six months 
New 
 
2010 Modify  Multiplex 
relationship as 
customer 
willing to 
finance extra 
production 
capacity 
 Increased 
production and 
international 
sales growth 
  
Source: The Author 
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Appendix 5: The Sources of INV Social Capital: Cross-Case Analysis 
Source and 
Firm 
Fertility HeartBeat FemMed SafeMed 
INVESTORS 
Structural Adam at UniNet referred 
the firm to three investors. 
A Canadian VC, a local 
BAS and angel 
VC approached the firm. US 
cardiologist referred two 
investors – one US VC and 
one angel 
Searched for an 
appropriate investor and 
selected a local BAS 
Raising venture capital 
“was a waste of time” 
so the firm pursued an 
early IPO 
Relational Was “dependent” on 
investors. Contact was 
regular and formal. Firm 
trusted business angel 
Was “dependent” on 
investors. Contact was regular 
and formal 
Quickly built a 
“personal” relation with 
local BAS through 
regular interaction 
Shareholders had not 
invested what firm 
initially anticipated 
Cognitive Professional connection 
with all investors. Also had 
personal connection with 
angel 
Professional connection with 
all investors. Also had 
personal connection with 
angel 
Professional and 
intellectual connection 
with BAS 
Only had professional 
connection with 
shareholders 
MENTORS 
Structural Founder met Harry through 
government network. Harry 
referred founder to Angus. 
Both were influential 
contacts 
Founder met US cardiologist 
at trade fair who introduced 
the founder to many US based 
contacts 
Californian surgeon 
approached founder 
through foreign 
distributor network. 
Searched for mentors 
through professional 
network. CEO found 
their “FDA guy” 
Relational Regular interaction with 
influential contacts. Had 
early trust in them 
Founder built friendship with 
US cardiologist. Had regular 
contact 
Founder had regular 
contact Californian 
surgeon 
Firm had great trust in 
FDA consultant 
Cognitive Personal, intellectual and 
personal connection with 
mentors. Similar vision 
Intellectual and personal 
connection with cardiologist. 
Shared vision on future of 
industry 
Intellectual, personal, 
professional connection 
with surgeon about 
industry problems 
Professional connection 
with FDA consultant 
SUPPLIERS 
Structural Angus referred the firm to 
an English manufacturer 
Founder searched his 
entrepreneurial network for a 
local subcontractor  
Searched trade fairs for 
suitable subcontractors. 
Initially formed ties with 
a French manufacturer 
Searched for R&D 
partners at trade fair. 
FDA consultant 
referred firm to US 
manufacturers 
Relational Founder selected English 
manufacturer based on 
Angus’s recommendation 
Founder selected local 
manufacturer on the based on 
“who he could trust” 
Firm selected 
subcontractors on 
certifications and existing 
competencies 
Firm selected 
subcontractors on 
“belief” they could 
perform the job 
Cognitive Professional connection 
with English manufacturer. 
No evidence of shared 
vision 
Personal and professional 
connection with local 
manufacturer. No evidence of 
shared vision 
Mainly professional 
connections, but personal 
connection with Scottish 
manufacturer 
Professional connection 
with subcontractors. No 
evidence of shared 
vision 
BUYERS 
Structural Adam referred the firm to 
European licensor. Angus 
referred the firm to UK 
sales agents and European 
distributor. 
Universities approached the 
firm as they are the industry 
“innovator”. Universities 
were the firm’s core 
customer. 
Firm searched for early 
strategic buyer but were 
unsuccessful. Firm then 
searched for US 
distributor 
Firm searched for US 
licensor but were 
unsuccessful. FDA guy 
then sourced a US 
distributor. 
Relational Firm had trust in all buyers 
capabilities to sell products. 
Firm had regular 
discussions with foreign 
licensors, agents and 
distributors 
Firm had regular and open 
discussions with university 
customers on how to improve 
product  
Firm was dependent on 
both strategic buyer for 
an exit, then on US 
distributor to sell their 
products 
Firm was dependent on 
signing a US license 
agreement and then a 
US distribution 
agreement 
Cognitive Professional connection 
with most customers. No 
signs of shared vision 
Intellectual, professional and 
personal connection with 
university customers 
Professional connection 
with buyers. Did not 
share same vision 
Professional connection 
with buyers. Did not 
share same vision 
      ^ Consultant Appendix 5B, 5C and 5D for a more granular interpretation on how INVs create social capital 
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Appendix 5B: Structural Sources that Create Social Capital 
 
Category 
and Firm 
Network Contact Source of tie 
creation 
Future 
referrals 
Access to information or 
resources 
INVESTORS     
Fertility  George 
 Canadian VC 
 BAS 
 Canadian distributor 
 Referral 
 Referral 
 Referral 
 Approached 
 Local 
 None 
 Local 
 Canada  
 Seed capital / ES /BS 
 No 
 Seed capital 
 Credit / sales 
HeartBeat  Indian VC 
 US VC 
 US angels 
 Approached 
 Referral 
 Referral 
 None 
 None 
 Local 
 No 
 No 
 Seed capital 
 HK manufacturer  Referral  Global  Credit 
FemMed  BAS  Search  Global  Seed / ES / BS 
SafeMed  Shareholders  Approached  None  Start-up funding 
BUYERS     
Fertility  Chinese distributor 
 European licensor 
 UK sales agents 
 European distributor 
 Canadian distributor 
 Search 
 Referral 
 Referral 
 Referral 
 Approached 
 Asia 
 None 
 UK 
 Europe 
 Canada 
 Market knowledge 
 No 
 UK sales 
 Int’ sales / NPD 
 Int’ sales / credit 
HeartBeat  Universities  Approached  Global  Int’ Sales / R&D 
 HK manufacturer  Referral  Global  Int’ Sales / credit 
FemMed  Strategic buyer (1) 
 US distributor 
 Strategic buyer (2) 
 Search 
 Search 
 Referral 
 None 
 None 
 None 
 No 
 No 
 Strategic exit 
SafeMed  US licensor 
 US distributor 
 Search 
 Referral 
 None 
 None 
 No 
 No 
SUPPLIERS     
Fertility  UK manufacturer 
 
 Referral  None   Product launch 
HeartBeat  Local manufacturer  Search  None  Production 
 HK manufacturer  Referral  Global  R&D / production 
FemMed  French manufacturer 
 Local manufacturer 
 Search 
 Search 
 None 
 None 
 Production 
 Production 
SafeMed  Designers 
 NC manufacturer 
 NY manufacturer 
 Search 
 Referral 
 Referral 
 None 
 None 
 None 
 No 
 No 
 No 
MENTORS     
Fertility  Adam at UniNet 
 George 
 Search 
 Referral 
 Global 
 Local 
 Finance / BS 
 Seed funding / ES / BS 
 Harry 
 Angus 
 Referral 
 Referral 
 Global 
 Global 
  BS / ES / seed funding 
 BS / ES / NPD 
 Executive consultants  Referral  Global  NPD / BS / ES / Sales 
HeartBeat  US cardiologist  Mutual  USA  ES 
 US Hospital 
 Debbie 
 US corporate lawyer 
 Referral 
 Referral 
 Referral 
 USA 
 Local 
 Global 
 R&D 
 Start-up grants / BS 
 BS - negotiations  
FemMed  Californian surgeon  Approached  USA  ES / BS 
 M&A specialist  Search  Global  BS – strategic exit 
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SafeMed  Corporate lawyer  Search  Australia  BS - IPO 
 FDA consultant  Search  USA  BS / regulatory 
Key:  
Shaded gray – Identified by respondent as critical success contact 
BAS – Business angel syndicate;  
BS – Business support;  
ES – Emotional support; 
Int’ Sales – International Sales; 
NPD – New Product Development 
Appendix 5C: Relational Sources that Create Social Capital 
Category 
and Firm 
Network Contact Safeguards Initial 
interaction 
Source of trust 
INVESTORS     
Fertility  George 
 Canadian VC 
 BAS 
 Canadian distributor 
 Informal 
 Formal 
 Formal 
 Formal 
 Frequent 
 Weekly 
 Frequent 
 Frequent 
 COMP / VUL 
 DEP 
 DEP 
 COMP 
HeartBeat  Indian VC 
 US VC 
 US angels 
 Formal 
 Formal 
 Informal 
 Weekly 
 Weekly 
 Infrequent 
 DEP 
 - 
 OPEN / COMP 
 HK manufacturer  Both  Frequent  COMP / VUL / REL 
FemMed  BAS  Both  Frequent  COMP / VUL / REL 
SafeMed  Shareholders  Formal  Infrequent  No 
BUYERS     
Fertility  European licensor 
 UK sales agents 
 European distributor 
 Canadian distributor 
 Formal 
 Formal 
 Both 
 Formal 
 Weekly 
 N/A 
 Frequent 
 Frequent 
 COMP 
 COMP / REL 
 COMP / REL / OPEN 
 COMP / REL / OPEN 
HeartBeat  Universities  Informal  Frequent  VUL / OPEN / COMP 
 HK manufacturer  Both  Frequent  COMP / VUL / REL 
FemMed  Strategic buyer (1) 
 US distributor 
 Strategic buyer (2) 
 Formal 
 Formal 
 Formal 
 Frequent 
 Infrequent 
 Frequent 
 COMP 
 COMP / REL 
 COMP / REL 
SafeMed  US licensor 
 US distributor 
 Formal 
 Formal 
 Frequent 
 Frequent 
 REL / VUL / REL 
 COMP 
SUPPLIERS     
Fertility  UK manufacturer 
 
 Formal  Infrequent   COMP / REL 
HeartBeat  Local manufacturer  Informal  Frequent  R EL/ COMP 
 HK manufacturer  Both  Frequent  COMP / VUL / REL 
FemMed  French manufacturer 
 Local manufacturer 
 Formal 
 Informal 
 Infrequent 
 Frequent 
 COMP 
 COMP / OPEN / REL 
SafeMed  Designers 
 NC manufacturer 
 NY manufacturer 
 Formal 
 Formal 
 Formal 
 Infrequent 
 Infrequent 
 Infrequent 
 COMP 
 COMP 
 COMP 
MENTORS     
Fertility  Adam at UniNet 
 George 
 Formal 
 Informal 
 Frequent 
 Frequent 
 VUL / REL / COMP 
 VUL / REL / COMP 
 Harry  Informal  Frequent  VUL / REL /COMP 
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 Angus  Informal  Frequent  VUL / REL / COMP 
 Executive consultants  Informal  Frequent  VUL / REL / COMP 
HeartBeat  US cardiologist  Friendship  Frequent  VUL / REL / COMP 
 US Hospital 
 Debbie 
 US corporate lawyer 
 Formal 
 Both 
 Formal 
 Infrequent 
 Frequent 
 Infrequent 
 COMP 
 VUL / REL / COMP 
 COMP / REL 
FemMed  Californian surgeon  Informal  Frequent  VUL  / REL / COMP 
 M&A specialist  Formal  Frequent  COMP / REL 
SafeMed  Corporate lawyer  Formal  Infrequent  COMP / REL 
 FDA consultant  Informal  Frequent  VUL / COMP / REL 
Key:  
Shaded gray – Identified as critical success contact 
COMP – Ego’s trust in alters competence;  
DEP – Ego’s dependency on alter; 
REL – Ego’s trust in alters reliability;  
VUL – Ego’s likelihood to show their vulnerabilities to alter; 
Appendix 5D: Cognitive Sources that Create Social Capital 
COGNITIVE SOURCES THAT CREATE SOCIAL CAPITAL 
Category 
and Firm 
Network Contact Shared culture 
(Local or global) 
Shared goals Outcome of 
connection 
INVESTORS     
Fertility  George 
 Canadian VC 
 BAS 
 Canadian distributor 
 Local 
 Global 
 Local 
 Global 
 Yes 
 No 
 - 
 Yes 
 PER / PROF 
 PROF 
 PROF 
 PROF 
HeartBeat  Indian VC 
 US VC 
 US angels 
 Global 
 Global 
 Global 
 No 
 No 
 Yes 
 PROF 
 PROF 
 PER / PROF 
 HK manufacturer  Global  -  PER / PROF 
FemMed  BAS  Local  Yes  PROF / INTEL 
SafeMed  Shareholders  -  -  PROF 
BUYERS     
Fertility  European licensor 
 UK sales agents 
 European distributor 
 Canadian distributor 
 Global  
 Local 
 Global 
 Global 
 No 
 - 
 Yes 
 - 
 PROF 
 PROF 
 PER / PROF 
 PROF 
HeartBeat  Universities  Global  -  INT / PROF / PER 
 HK manufacturer  Global  -  PER/ PROF 
FemMed  Strategic buyer (1) 
 US distributor 
 Strategic buyer (2) 
 Global 
 Global 
 Global 
 No 
 No 
 Yes 
 PROF 
 PROF 
 PROF/ INT/ PER 
SafeMed  US licensor 
 US distributor 
 Global 
 Global 
 No 
 - 
 PROF 
 PROF 
SUPPLIERS     
Fertility  English manufacturer 
 
 Local  -   PROF 
HeartBeat  Local manufacturer  Local  -  PER/PROF 
 HK manufacturer  Global  -  PER/PROF 
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FemMed  French manufacturer 
 Local manufacturer 
 Global 
 Local 
 - 
 Yes 
 PROF 
 PROF / PER / INT 
SafeMed  R&D consultants 
 NC manufacturer 
 NY manufacturer 
 Global 
 Global 
 Global 
 No 
 - 
 - 
 PROF 
 PROF 
 PROF 
MENTORS     
Fertility  Adam at UniNet 
 George 
 Local 
 Local 
 Yes 
 Yes 
 PROF/ PER 
 PROF/PER 
 Harry 
 Adam 
 Local 
 Local 
 Yes 
 Yes 
 INT / PROF / 
PER 
 PROF / PER 
 Executive consultants  Local  Yes  PROF/PER 
HeartBeat  US cardiologist  Global  Yes  INT / PER 
 US Hospital 
 Debbie 
 US corporate lawyer 
 Global 
 Local 
 Global 
 - 
 Yes 
 Yes 
 PROF 
 PROF/ PER 
 PROF 
FemMed  Californian surgeon  Global  Yes  INT / PER / 
PROF 
 M&A specialist  Global  Yes  PROF 
SafeMed  Corporate lawyer  Local  Yes  PROF / PER 
 FDA consultant  Global  -  PROF / PER 
Key:  
Shaded gray - Identified as critical success contact; 
Local – Domestic connection that shares culture; 
Global – International connection that crosses borders    
INT – Intellectual connection; 
PER – Personal connection (e.g. socially embedded/outside of business);  
PROF – Professional connection (e.g. primarily based on  business); 
Dash “-“ – No Evidence 
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Appendix 6: The extension of INV social capital: Cross-case analysis 
Appendix 6A 
STRUCTURAL SOURCES THAT EXTEND SOCIAL CAPITAL 
  Source of tie 
extension 
Future 
access 
Information or resources 
Investors     
Fertility     
HeartBeat     
FemMed  BAS  Referral  USA  New TMT 
SafeMed  Shareholders  Search  None  No resources 
Mentors     
Fertility  Harry 
 Angus 
 Search 
 Referral 
 Global 
 Global 
 Emergency funding 
 Sales and marketing 
HeartBeat  US cardiologist  Referral  USA  Market knowledge 
  Lee (EliteTech)  Referral  Asia  Sales and Marketing 
FemMed  Californian Surgeon  Referral  USA  Market knowledge 
SafeMed  FDA consultant  Referral  USA  Production / sales 
Suppliers     
Fertility     
HeartBeat     
FemMed     
SafeMed     
Buyers     
Fertility     
HeartBeat     
FemMed  US distributor  Search  USA  Emotional support 
SafeMed     
Key: 
Shaded gray - Identified as critical success contact; 
TMT – Top management team 
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Appendix 6B 
RELATIONAL SOURCES THAT EXTEND SOCIAL CAPITAL 
Category 
and Firm 
Network Contact Commitment / 
Intensity 
Interaction Source of trust 
INVESTORS     
Fertility  Canadian VC 
 BAS 
 High 
 Low 
 High 
 Moderate 
 DEP / VUL 
 REL 
HeartBeat  Indian VC  High  High  DEP 
FemMed  BAS  High  High  COMP / VUL / REL 
SafeMed  Shareholders  Moderate  Low  - 
MENTORS     
Fertility  Harry 
 Angus 
 High 
 Informal 
 High 
 Frequent 
 VUL / REL /COMP 
 VUL / REL / COMP 
HeartBeat  US Cardiologist  High  High  VUL / REL / COMP 
  Debbie  Low  Moderate  VUL / REL / COMP 
FemMed  Californian surgeon  High  High  VUL / REL / Comp 
SafeMed  FDA consultant  Moderate  High  VUL / COMP / REL 
SUPPLIERS     
Fertility     
HeartBeat  US corporate lawyer  Moderate  Moderate  COMP / REL 
FemMed  Local manufacturer  High  High  COMP / OPEN / REL 
SafeMed  Designers 
 NC manufacturer 
 NY manufacturer 
 High 
 High 
 High 
 Low 
 Low 
 High 
 COMP 
 COMP 
 COMP 
BUYERS     
Fertility  Chinese distributor  High  High  - 
HeartBeat  Universities  Low  High  VUL / OPEN / COMP 
FemMed  US distributor 
 Strategic buyer (2) 
 High 
 High 
 Low 
 High 
 - 
 COMP / REL 
SafeMed  US licensor 
 NC distributor 
 High 
 High 
 Low 
 High 
 REL / VUL / REL 
 COMP 
Key:  
Shaded gray – Identified as critical success contact 
COMP – Ego’s trust in alters competence;  
DEP – Ego’s dependency on alter; 
REL – Ego’s trust in alters reliability;  
VUL – Ego’s likelihood to show their vulnerabilities to alter; 
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Appendix 6C 
COGNITIVE SOURCES THAT EXTEND SOCIAL CAPITAL 
Category 
and Firm 
Network Contact Shared culture/ 
language 
Shared 
goals 
Outcome of connection 
INVESTORS     
Fertility     
HeartBeat  Indian VC  High  High  DEP 
FemMed  BAS  High  High  COMP / VUL / REL 
SafeMed     
MENTORS     
Fertility  Harry 
 Angus 
 Moderate / Yes 
 Moderate / Yes 
 Yes 
 Yes 
 INT / PROF / PER 
 PROF / PER 
HeartBeat  US Cardiologist  High  High  VUL / REL / COMP 
  Debbie  Low  Moderate  VUL / REL / COMP 
FemMed  Californian surgeon  High  High  VUL / REL / Comp 
SafeMed  FDA consultant  Moderate/Yes  -  PROF / PER 
SUPPLIERS     
Fertility     
HeartBeat     
FemMed     
SafeMed     
BUYERS     
Fertility  Chinese distributor  Low / No  High  PROF / PER 
HeartBeat  Universities  High /Yes  -  INT / PER / PROF 
FemMed  Strategic buyer (2)  High  High  PROF / INT / PER 
SafeMed     
Key:  
Shaded gray – Identified as critical success contact 
COMP – Ego’s trust in alters competence;  
DEP – Ego’s dependency on alter; 
REL – Ego’s trust in alters reliability;  
VUL – Ego’s likelihood to show their vulnerabilities to alter; 
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Appendix 7: Bridging influences on new venture internationalisation 
Appendix 7A: Local Referral Bridging Activity – Stronger and Weaker Practices 
 Tie Type Source of 
referral 
Initial benefits or problems with 
networking activity 
Initial influence on NVI Subsequent influence on NVI Further 
networking 
activities 
Inward / outward 
cross-border activity 
Speed Scope 
Local referral bridging – Stronger practices 
Fertility – Harry Mentor Scottish 
enterprise 
(+)  Provided business and 
emotional support 
None None None Introduced entrepreneur to 
Angus the VP of a EU 
distributor, who subsequently 
signed a distribution agreement 
Enabler Affinity 
bonding 
Fertility – 
Angus  
Mentor Harry (+)  Provided guidance on NPD 
and introduced to UK sales agents 
None None None Angus introduced entrepreneur 
to TMT of EU distributor, who 
subsequently signed a 
distribution agreement 
Enabler Affinity 
bonding 
HeartBeat – 
Debbie 
Mentor Queensland 
Government 
(+)  Helped secure innovation 
grants, file for foreign patents and 
regulatory approval 
Outward R&D –  
Filed for PCT patent 
application and USA 
FDA approval 
<1 year Extra-region 
(USA) 
Debbie continued to support 
the new venture’s 
internationalisation 
Enabler Affinity 
bonding 
Local referral bridging – Weaker practices   
Fertility –  
Dr Shi  
Investor   (+)  Co-founder discovered 
technological opportunity 
Outward sales & 
marketing –  
Dr Shi introduced 
entrepreneur to 
Chinese distributor 
<1 year Extra-region 
(China) 
Three years later, firm signs 
Chinese distribution agreement 
with an estimated international 
sales value of £60 million  
Inhibitor Impassive 
bonding 
 
Eliminating 
ties 
Fertility – 
Adam at 
UniNet 
Mentor  (+)  Provided an interest free 
start-up loan, workspace and 
mentoring 
(+)  Introduction to EU licensor  
(+)  Introduction to Canadian VC 
Outward sales & 
marketing –  
Signed EU license 
agreement 
 
<1 year Intra-region 
(Europe) 
Extra-region 
(Canada) 
EU licensor terminated 
agreement as they lost interest 
in firms technology, while 
Canadian VC failed to invest 
and delayed the firm’s 
commercialisation 
Inhibitor 
 
 
 
 
Prioritising 
ties 
Fertility – 
English 
manufacturer 
Supplier   (+)  Had the capability to quickly 
produce product 
None None None Foreign customers were not 
satisfied with product quality  
Inhibitor Eliminating 
ties 
Fertility – 
George 
Investor 
Mentor 
 (+)  Provided angel investment  
and access to local networks 
None - None None Neutral Prioritising 
ties 
Fertility –  
BAS 
Investor  (+)  Provided seed capital and 
commercialisation knowledge 
None - None None Neutral Affinity 
bonding 
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Fertility – Sean Mentor  (+)  Sean introduce the 
entrepreneur to many domestic 
contacts 
None None None None Neutral Prioritising 
ties 
Fertility – 
UK sales agents 
Buyer  (+)  Access to UK sales channel 
and generation of domestic sales 
revenues 
None None None None Neutral None 
SafeMed – 
Local 
government 
advisor 
Mentor  (+)  Helped secure two early 
stage innovation grants 
None None None None Neutral Eliminating 
ties 
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Appendix 7B: Global Referral Bridging Activity – Stronger and Weaker Practices 
 Tie formation Initial influence on NVI Subsequent influence on NVI  Further  
networking 
activities 
 Tie Type Source of 
referral 
Initial benefits or problems with 
networking activity 
Inward / outward cross-
border activity 
Speed Scope 
Global referral bridging – Evidence of stronger practice 
Fertility –  
EU distributor 
Buyer Adam at 
UniNet 
(+)  Provided a source of 
international sales, reputational 
benefits and access to foreign 
market knowledge 
 
(-)  Communication problems with 
MNE 
Outward sales & marketing 
–  
Signed distribution 
agreement 
3 years Intra-region 
(Europe) 
Distribution agreement 
continues to generate 
international sales 
Enabler 
 
New contact 
Fertility – 
Chinese 
distributor 
Buyer Co-founder 
(Dr Shi) 
(+)  Co-founder shared language 
with Chinese distributor 
 
(-)  An initial substantial investment 
was required to build the 
foundations for long-term relation 
Does not sign official 
agreement but enters “trust 
building” phase 
<1 year Extra-region 
(China) 
Three years later, firm 
signs Chinese 
distribution agreement 
with an estimated 
international sales 
value of £60 million 
Enabler Dependency 
bonding 
HeartBeat – US 
hospital 
Mentor US 
cardiologist 
(Dr Arthur) 
(+)  Gained access to global R&D 
consortia providing reputational 
benefits within academic 
community  
Outward R&D –  
Became official R&D 
partner on global research 
consortium 
<1 year Extra-region 
(USA) 
US hospital introduced 
the entrepreneur to 
USA and Finish 
universities 
Enabler Global referral 
bridging 
HeartBeat – US 
angels 
Investor US 
cardiologist 
(Dr Arthur) 
(+)  Secured angel seed capital 
investment 
Inward finance –  
US angels invest $50,000 
6 years Extra-region 
(USA) 
Investment supported 
US product launch 
Enabler None 
HeartBeat – US 
corporate 
lawyer 
Mentor US 
cardiologist 
(Dr Arthur) 
(+)  No upfront labour costs and 
provided access to foreign market 
knowledge 
Outward legal –  
US corporate lawyer took 
equity share in return for 
his expertise 
6 years Intra-region 
(Hong Kong) 
Helped negotiate HK 
manufacturer 
production and 
distribution agreement 
Enabler Affinity 
bonding 
HeartBeat – 
HK 
manufacturer 
Supplier  Lee (VP of 
EliteTech) 
(+)  Has extensive production and 
regulatory capabilities  
Outward production –  
Signed manufacturing 
agreement with Hong 
Kong manufacturer 
7 years Intra-region 
(Hong Kong) 
HK manufacturer 
agreed to distribute 
firms products within 
Asia 
Enabler Reconfiguring 
ties 
Buyer Lee (VP of 
EliteTech) 
(+)  Extensive access to Asian 
distribution channels 
 
 
 
Outward sales & marketing 
–  
Signed distribution 
agreement with Hong 
Kong manufacturer 
7 years Intra-region 
(Hong Kong) 
HK manufacturer 
became the firm’s core 
customer 
Enabler Reconfiguring 
ties 
FemMed – 
Strategic buyer 
(2) 
Buyer M&A 
specialist 
(TechSale) 
(+)  Secured successful trades-sale. 
Strategic buyer continued to expand 
the firm’s product range 
Firm enters a 6 month 
cross-border due diligence 
process 
 
7 years Intra-region 
(Europe) 
Strategic buyer 
acquires FemMed 
 
Enabler None 
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Global referral bridging – Evidence of weaker practice  
Fertility – 
EU licensor 
Buyer Adam at 
UniNet 
(+)  Potential access to a global 
distribution channel 
(-)  No clear prospect of 
international sales 
Outward R&D –  
License out technology to 
European MNE 
1 year Intra-region 
(Europe) 
EU licensor terminates 
agreement due to loss 
of interest in the firm’s 
technology 
Inhibitor Reducing ties 
Fertility – 
Canadian VC 
Investor Adam at 
UniNet 
(-)   VC did not invest and firm was 
totally dependent on investment 
 
Did not sign inward 
agreement 
2 years Extra-region 
(Canada) 
6 months of due 
diligence delayed 
commercialisation 
Inhibitor Dependency 
bonding 
HeartBeat – US 
VC 
Investor US 
cardiologist 
(Dr Arthur) 
(-)   Lack of investor commitment. 
VC did not invest 
Did not sign inward 
agreement 
6 years Extra-region 
(USA) 
Entrepreneur retired 
relation early to 
prevent additional 
costs 
Neutral Eliminating ties 
SafeMed –  
NC 
manufacturer 
Supplier FDA 
consultant 
(+)  Manufacturer encourages 
negotiations with NC distributor 
Did not sign outward 
production agreement 
10 years Extra-region 
(USA) 
Manufacturer’s 
decision to cancel 
delayed 
commercialisation 
Inhibitor Impassive 
bonding 
SafeMed – 
NC distributor 
Buyer FDA 
consultant 
(+)  Distributor begins clinical trials 
in US hospitals 
Did not sign outward sales 
& marketing agreement 
10 years Extra-region 
(USA) 
Distributor agreement 
was contingent on 
production agreement 
Inhibitor Dependency 
bonding 
SafeMed –  
NY 
manufacturer 
Supplier FDA 
consultant 
(+)  Signs heads of agreement 
 
(-)   Imbalanced partnership 
agreement as firm must purchase 
specialist equipment 
Outward production –  
Signed contract out 
manufacturing “heads of 
agreement” 
10 years Extra-region 
(USA) 
Manufacturer 
terminates agreement 
as firm were unable to 
purchase specialised 
equipment 
Inhibitor Impassive 
bonding 
  
 372 
 
Appendix 7C: Local search bridging 
 Tie formation Initial influence on NVI Subsequent influence on NVI Further  
networking 
activities 
 Tie Type Source of network 
search 
Initial benefits or problems 
with networking activity 
Inward / outward 
cross-border 
activity 
Speed Scope 
FemMed –  
BAS 
Investor Scottish Enterprise (+)  Provided seed capital 
and access to experiential 
knowledge 
None None None BAS helped firm 
establish US sales 
subsidiary 
Enabler Affinity 
bonding 
 
Reconfiguring 
ties 
FemMed – Scottish 
manufacturer 
Supplier US trade fair 
network 
(+)  Has FDA regulatory 
approval but are locally 
based which allowed 
regular site visits 
Signed domestic 
agreement 
None None Scottish manufacturer 
supported the delivery 
of the best quality 
product within the US 
market 
Enabler Affinity 
bonding 
HeartBeat – 
Local manufacturer 
Supplier Entrepreneurial 
network 
(+)  Close proximity to 
R&D lab and supported the 
launch of product range 
None None None Local manufacturer 
was unable to produce 
for the product 
demand 
Neutral Prioritising ties  
SafeMed – 
Corporate law firm 
Mentor CEO’s 
professional 
network 
(+)  Helped raise AU$3.4 
million start-up capital 
through IPO 
Inward finance 
agreement –  
IPO brought in 
foreign capital 
investment 
5 years Global Law firm had no 
further influence 
Neutral None 
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Appendix 7D: Global search bridging 
 Tie formation Initial influence on NVI Subsequent influence on NVI  Further  
networking 
activities 
 Tie Type Source of 
referral 
Initial benefits or problems with 
networking activity 
Inward / outward cross-
border activity 
Speed Scope 
FemMed – 
Strategic buyer 
(1) 
Buyer US trade fair (-)  Firm did not have sufficient 
experience to engage in due diligence 
process 
Did not sign outward 
acquisition agreement 
2 years Extra-region 
(USA) 
Unsuccessful trade-sale 
delayed the firm’s NPD 
due to extensive due 
diligence 
Inhibitor None 
FemMed – 
French 
manufacturer 
Supplier US trade fair (+) Had specialist production 
capabilities and US regulatory 
approval 
 
(-)  French location made collaboration 
difficult 
Outward production –  
Signed contract out 
manufacture agreement 
2 years Intra-region 
(France) 
Terminated sub-
contractor due to poor 
product quality and cost 
Inhibitor Eliminating ties 
FemMed –  
US distributor 
Buyer US trade fair (+)  Provided access to US and 
European sales channels along with 
reputational benefits 
Outward sales & marketing –  
Signed direct exporting 
agreement with US 
distributor 
 
2 years Extra-region 
(USA) 
US distributor did not 
sell the firm’s products 
which resulted in a loss 
of international sales 
Inhibitor Impassive 
bonding 
 
Eliminating ties 
FemMed – M&A 
specialist 
Mentor US industrial 
network 
(+)  Helped identify potential buyers 
and provided legal guidance 
Outward legal –  
Contract out acquisition 
process to overseas firm  
 
7 years Extra-region 
(USA) 
Firm was acquired by 
medical technology 
MNE 
Neutral None 
SafeMed – 
Shareholders 
Investor ASX exchange (+)  IPO raised AUS$3.4 million Inward finance –  
IPO brought in foreign 
capital investment 
5 years Global Shareholders refused to 
increase their investment 
which stopped 
commercialisation 
Inhibitor Impassive 
bonding 
SafeMed – R&D 
consultants 
Supplier MEDICA trade 
fair 
(-)  Initial prototype delays, quality 
problems and were charging high fees 
Outward R&D –  
Contract out R&D to 
overseas firms 
6 years Extra-region  
(China/USA) 
R&D consultants did not 
deliver what they were 
contracted to do 
Inhibitor Impassive 
bonding 
SafeMed –  
US licensor 
Buyer MEDICA trade 
fair 
(-)  Resource intensive process with 
communication problems 
Did not sign outward R&D 
agreement 
8 years Extra-region 
(USA) 
US licensor refused to 
invest in firms 
technology  
Inhibitor Impassive 
bonding 
SafeMed –  
FDA consultant 
Mentor US trade show (+)  Helped with FDA application and 
provided access to local US networks 
Outward R&D –  
Contract out part of the 
regulatory process to US 
consultancy 
10 years Extra-region 
(USA) 
FDA consultant 
introduced firm to 
impassive partners 
Inhibitor Dependency 
bonding 
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Appendix 7E – Global acceptance bridging 
 Tie formation Initial influence on NVI Subsequent influence on NVI  Further  
networking 
activities 
 Tie Type Reason for 
approach 
Initial benefits or problems with 
networking activity 
Inward / outward cross-
border activity 
Speed Scope 
Fertility – 
Canadian 
distributor 
Buyer Unique 
technology 
(+) Provided North American 
distribution channel 
Outward sales & marketing 
–  
Signed distribution 
agreement 
3 years Extra-region 
(Canada) 
Generation of 
international sales 
revenues 
Enabler Dependency 
bonding 
 
Reconfiguring 
ties 
HeartBeat – US 
cardiologist 
Mentor Similar 
research 
interests 
(+)  Instant friendship brought 
future benefits surrounding R&D, 
sales and marketing 
Outward R&D – 
Introduced entrepreneur to 
US hospital led research 
consortium 
<1 year Extra region 
(USA) 
Cardiologist became 
key opinion leader and 
helped the firm sign 
distribution agreement 
with HK manufacturer 
Enabler Affinity 
bonding 
HeartBeat – 
Universities 
Mentor Unique 
technology 
 
 
(+)  Universities helped support 
R&D due to similar research 
interests 
Outward R&D –  
Signed co-R&D 
agreements with Finish and 
USA universities  
3 years Extra region 
(Finland/ 
USA) 
Universities  also 
became the firm’s core 
customer base 
Enabler  Affinity 
bonding 
HeartBeat – 
Indian VC 
Investor Unique 
technology 
(-)  Initial due diligence delayed 
expansion by 6 months 
Did not sign inward 
finance agreement 
5 years Extra-region 
(India) 
Due diligence delayed 
the firm’s 
commercialisation 
Inhibitor Dependency 
bonding 
 
FemMed – 
Californian 
surgeon 
Mentor Medical 
interest in 
product 
(+)  Surgeon encouraged the 
entrepreneur to implement a US 
direct sales strategy 
Outward sales & marketing 
–  
Encouraged firm to 
maintain presence in US 
market 
3 years Extra region 
(USA) 
Surgeon became key 
opinion leader for firm 
and encouraged them 
to establish US sales 
subsidiary 
Enabler Affinity 
bonding 
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Appendix 8 Bonding activities that influence new venture internationalisation 
Appendix 8A: Dependency Bonding 
 Tie Investment Initial influence on NVI Subsequent influence on NVI  Further  
networking 
activities 
 Tie Type Reason for 
investment 
Initial benefits or problems with 
networking activity 
Inward / outward cross-
border activity 
Speed Scope 
Dependency bonding – Evidence of stronger practises 
Fertility – 
Chinese 
distributor 
Buyer To build 
initial trust 
with 
distributor 
(+)  Frequent interaction led to the 
signing of “significant” distribution 
agreement 
 
(-)   Chinese regulatory process 
took longer than expected 
Does not sign official 
agreement but enters “trust 
building” phase 
<1 year Extra-region 
(China) 
Three years later, firm 
signs Chinese 
distribution agreement 
with an estimated 
international sales 
value of £60 million 
Enabler Global referral 
bridging 
FemMed – 
Strategic buyer 
(2) 
Buyer Dependent on 
actor 
acquiring the 
firm 
(+)  Successful acquisition with an 
agreed continued expansion of 
product 
Firm enters a 6 month 
cross-border due diligence 
process 
 
7 years Intra-region 
(Europe) 
Strategic buyer 
acquires FemMed 
 
Enabler Global referral 
bridging 
Dependency bonding – Evidence of weaker practices 
Fertility – 
Canadian VC 
Investor Dependent on 
actors 
investment 
(-)  VC did not invest and firm was 
totally dependent on investment 
Did not sign inward 
finance agreement 
2 years Extra-region 
(Canada) 
VC does not invest 
and delays 
commercialisation 
Inhibitor Global referral 
bridging 
Fertility – 
Adam at 
UniNet 
Mentor Dependent on 
actors 
referrals 
(+)  Mentor introduced the 
entrepreneur to an EU licensor and 
Canadian VC 
Outward R&D –  
License out technology to 
European MNE 
1 year Intra-region 
(Europe) 
EU licensor terminates 
agreement and 
introduces him to 
Canadian VC 
Inhibitor Local referral 
bridging 
 
Prioritising ties 
HeartBeat – 
Indian VC 
Investor Dependent on 
actors 
investment 
(-)   VC did not invest and firm was 
totally dependent on investment 
Did not sign inward 
finance agreement 
5 years Extra-region 
(India) 
Due diligence delayed 
the firm’s 
commercialisation 
Inhibitor Global 
acceptance 
bridging  
SafeMed –  
FDA consultant 
Mentor Trust in 
actors 
competence 
(+)  FDA consultant provided 
access to US commercial networks 
Outward R&D –  
Contract out part of the 
regulatory process to US 
consultancy 
10 years Extra-region 
(USA) 
FDA consultant 
introduced firm to 
impassive partners 
Inhibitor Global search 
bridging 
SafeMed – 
NC distributor 
Buyer Dependent on 
actor 
acquiring the 
firm 
(+)  News of US distribution 
agreement leads to 8% increase in 
share price 
 
(-)  Agreement is contingent on firm 
purchasing manufacturing 
equipment 
Did not sign outward sales 
& marketing agreement 
10 years Extra-region 
(USA) 
Distributor agreement 
was contingent on 
production agreement 
Inhibitor Global referral 
bridging 
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Appendix 8B: Impassive bonding 
 Tie Investment Initial influence on NVI Subsequent influence on NVI  Further  
networking 
activities 
 Tie Type Reason for 
investment 
Initial benefits or problems with 
networking activity 
Inward / outward cross-
border activity 
Speed Scope 
Fertility –  
Co-founder (Dr 
Shi) 
Investor Trust in 
actors 
competence 
(+) Co-founder discovers unique 
technology 
(-) Co-founder begins to lose 
interest in the business 
 
Outward sales & marketing 
–  
Co-founder introduces 
entrepreneur to Chinese 
distributor 
1 year Extra-region 
(China) 
Co-founder exits the 
company, which has a 
negative impact on 
Chinese distributor 
relations 
Inhibitor Local referral 
bridging 
 
Eliminating ties 
Fertility – 
BAS 
Investor Trust in 
actors 
likelihood to 
invest 
(-) Unable to secure long-term 
government SMART award due to 
financial crisis 
None None None Firm secures 
emergency capital and 
survives funding 
crisis. Emergency 
funding supports 
product launch 
Enabler Local referral 
bridging 
FemMed –  
US distributor 
Buyer Trust in 
actors 
reliability 
(-)  Lack of commitment to sell 
products 
Outward sales & marketing 
–  
Firm signs US distribution 
agreement 
2 years Extra-region 
(USA) 
Distribution agreement 
did not generate 
international sales 
Inhibitor Global search 
bridging  
 
Eliminating ties 
SafeMed – 
R&D 
consultants 
Supplier Trust in 
actors 
competence 
(-)  Initial prototype delays, quality 
problems and were charging high 
fees 
Outward R&D –  
Contract out R&D to 
overseas firms 
6 years Extra-region  
(China/USA) 
R&D consultants did 
not deliver what they 
were contracted to do 
Inhibitor Global search 
bridging 
SafeMed – 
US licensor 
Buyer Dependent on 
actor’s 
partnership 
(-)  Resource intensive process with 
communication problems 
Did not sign outward R&D 
agreement 
8 years Extra-region 
(USA) 
US licensor refused to 
invest in firms 
technology  
Inhibitor Global search 
bridging 
SafeMed – 
Shareholders 
Investor Trust in 
actors 
reliability 
(+)  IPO raised AUS$3.4 million Inward finance –  
IPO brought in foreign 
capital investment 
5 years Global Shareholders refused 
to increase their 
investment which 
stopped 
commercialisation 
Inhibitor Global search 
bridging 
SafeMed –  
NC 
manufacturer 
Supplier Dependent on 
actors 
partnership 
(+)  Manufacturer encourages 
negotiations with NC distributor 
Did not sign outward 
production agreement 
10 years Extra-region 
(USA) 
Manufacturer’s 
decision to cancel 
delayed 
commercialisation 
Inhibitor Global referral 
bridging 
SafeMed –  
NY 
manufacturer 
Supplier Dependent on 
actors 
partnership 
(+)  Signs heads of agreement 
 
(-)   Imbalanced partnership 
agreement as firm must purchase 
specialist equipment 
Outward production –  
Signed contract out 
manufacturing “heads of 
agreement” 
10 years Extra-region 
(USA) 
Manufacturer 
terminates agreement 
as firm were unable to 
purchase specialised 
equipment 
Inhibitor Global referral 
bridging 
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Appendix 8C: Affinity Bonding 
 Tie Investment Initial influence on NVI Subsequent influence on NVI  Further  
networking 
activities 
 Tie Type Reason for 
extended 
investment 
Initial benefits or problems with 
networking activity 
Inward / outward 
cross-border 
activity 
Speed Scope 
Affinity bonding – Stronger practices 
Fertility – Harry Mentor Had trust in 
showing 
vulnerabilities 
(+)   Harry introduced 
entrepreneur to his “global start-
up” network 
None None None Introduced entrepreneur to Angus 
the VP of a EU distributor, who 
subsequently signed a distribution 
agreement 
Enabler Local referral 
bridging 
Fertility – 
Angus 
Mentor Had trust in 
showing 
vulnerabilities 
(+)   Angus introduced 
entrepreneur to TMT of large EU 
medical technology MNE 
None None None Angus introduced entrepreneur to 
TMT of EU distributor, who 
subsequently signed a distribution 
agreement 
Enabler Local referral 
bridging 
HeartBeat – 
Debbie 
Mentor Had trust in 
showing 
vulnerabilities 
(+)   Helped secure additional 
SMART award while providing 
business and emotional support 
 
 
 
Outward R&D –  
Filed for PCT 
patent & USA 
FDA approval 
 
<1 year Extra-region 
(USA) 
Debbie continued to support the 
new venture’s internationalisation 
Enabler Local referral 
bridging 
HeartBeat – US 
cardiologist 
Mentor Had trust in 
showing 
vulnerabilities 
(+)   Helped the entrepreneur 
determine new strategic direction 
Outward R&D – 
Introduced 
entrepreneur to 
US hospital led 
research 
consortium 
<1 year Extra region 
(USA) 
Cardiologist became key opinion 
leader and helped the firm sign 
distribution agreement with HK 
manufacturer 
Enabler Global 
acceptance 
bridging 
 
Reconfiguring 
ties 
HeartBeat – 
Universities 
Mentor Had trust in 
showing 
vulnerabilities 
(+)   Reputation is increased from 
academic research conducted on 
its products 
Outward R&D –  
Signed co-R&D 
agreements with 
Finish and USA 
universities  
3 years Extra region 
(Finland/ 
USA) 
Universities  also became the firm’s 
core customer base 
Enabler  Global 
acceptance 
bridging 
 
Reconfiguring 
ties 
HeartBeat – US 
corporate 
lawyer 
Mentor Trust in actors 
competence 
(+)   Corporate lawyer took 
SWEAT equity opposed to fees 
Inward legal –  
US corporate 
lawyer took equity 
share in return for 
his expertise 
6 years Intra-region 
(Hong Kong) 
Helped negotiate HK manufacturer 
production and distribution 
agreement 
Enabler Global referral 
bridging 
HeartBeat – Lee 
VP of EliteTech 
Mentor Trust in actors 
competence 
(+)   Lee introduced the 
entrepreneur to TMT of HK 
manufacturer 
Outward 
production –  
Signed 
manufacturing 
agreement with 
7 years Intra-region 
(Hong Kong) 
HK manufacturer agreed to 
distribute firms products within 
Asia 
Enabler None 
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Hong Kong 
manufacturer 
FemMed –  
BAS 
Investor Had trust in 
showing 
vulnerabilities 
(+)   BAS provided finance along 
with emotional and business 
support 
None None None BAS helped firm establish US sales 
subsidiary 
Enabler Local search 
bridging 
 
Reconfiguring 
ties 
FemMed – 
Californian 
surgeon 
Mentor Had trust in 
showing 
vulnerabilities 
(+)   Provided access to local U.S 
medical network along with 
continued emotional and business 
support 
Outward sales & 
marketing –  
Encouraged firm 
to maintain 
presence in US 
market 
3 years Extra region 
(USA) 
Surgeon became key opinion leader 
for firm and encouraged them to 
establish US sales subsidiary 
Enabler Global 
acceptance 
bridging 
 
Reconfiguring 
ties 
FemMed – 
Scottish 
manufacturer 
Supplier Trust in actors 
competence 
(+)  Delivery of cost efficient and 
quality products 
Outward sales & 
marketing –  
Encouraged firm 
to maintain 
presence in US 
market 
3 years Extra region 
(USA) 
Surgeon became key opinion leader 
for firm and encouraged them to 
establish US sales subsidiary 
Enabler Local search 
bridging* 
 
 
*Local search took place in US through sales subsidiary 
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[The End] 
